Students’ attitudes and intentions towards studying science: the effects of under-confidence and over-confidence by Sheldrake, R
Page 1 of 361 
Students’ attitudes and intentions towards studying science: 









Page 2 of 361 
Declaration 
 
I, Richard Sheldrake, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my 
own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that 









Word count (excluding front matter, references, and appendices): 81,844 
 
  
Page 3 of 361 
Abstract 
 
Understanding students’ intentions to study science at upper-secondary 
school continues to be a central concern for science education. Prior 
research has associated students’ confidence with their intentions to study 
science, although under-confidence and over-confidence (lower or higher 
confidence than expected given someone’s attainment) has not been 
considered in detail. Under-confident students may not select subjects that 
they might otherwise succeed in and enjoy, which may be a fundamental 
barrier. Accordingly, this study explored whether under-confident, 
accurately-evaluating, and over-confident students expressed different 
attitudes towards their science education, and explored how under-
confidence and over-confidence might influence students’ science 
intentions. Existing nationally-representative data and newly-collected data 
from secondary school students in England were considered in order to 
provide complementary insights and to enhance the plausibility of the 
findings. Multiple analytical approaches were applied to consider under-
confidence and over-confidence, including calculating various indicators of 
accuracy/bias and applying various approaches to grouping students. The 
results highlighted that under-confidence and over-confidence may be 
problematic, not simply through associating with lower or higher attitudes, 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Understanding students’ intentions to study science at upper-secondary 
school continues to be a central concern for science educators in England 
(Royal Society, 2014). The numbers of students studying science, and 
related subjects, at upper-secondary school and at university in England 
have historically varied, and have often been lower than other subjects and 
imbalanced across boys, girls, and students with different backgrounds 
(Royal Society, 2006, 2008a; Smith, 2011). More students studying science 
have been desired as a means to foster greater quantitative skills (British 
Academy, 2015; Leitch, 2006; OECD, 2015b), to meet an expected demand 
for increased numbers of scientists and science-related professionals 
(Bosworth, Lyonette, Wilson, Bayliss, & Fathers, 2013; Roberts, 2002; 
Wilson, Beaven, May-Gillings, Hay, & Stevens, 2014), and to address 
under-representation and promote equity (CASE, 2014; Institute of Physics, 
2014; WISE, 2014). 
Secondary school students in England have generally considered 
science to be fairly interesting and relevant for careers, although relatively 
few students have liked science better than other subjects or explicitly 
aspired to be scientists (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Jenkins & 
Nelson, 2005). Concurrently, girls, those from families with low incomes, 
and those from Black, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani backgrounds have been 
less likely to study upper-secondary science subjects, while boys, those 
from families with high incomes, and those from Chinese and Indian 
backgrounds have been more likely, although it remains difficult to isolate 
particular causes (Department for Education, 2011; Institute of Physics, 
2014; Royal Society, 2008b). 
Across many research studies in England and other countries, 
students’ attitudes towards science, such as their interest in science and 
perceived utility of science, and their motivational beliefs such as their 
confidence in their own abilities, together with their own attainment, have 
closely associated with their intentions and choices (Bøe & Henriksen, 
2015; Regan & DeWitt, 2015). Indeed, students’ intentions to study science 
have been predicted more by their own attitudes and beliefs than by their 
background and characteristics such as their gender (DeWitt, Archer, & 
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Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Essentially, and as proposed by 
motivational theories (Eccles, 2009), various aspects of students’ 
background and context, such as their parents’ beliefs (DeWitt, et al., 2011) 
and classroom experiences (Wang, 2012), may influence their attitudes 
about science, which may then primarily influence their intentions. 
Differences in students’ attitudes and beliefs may then help explain 
both progression and under-representation in science. For example, 
attainment in itself does not appear to be relevant to the low representation 
of girls, but girls often report lower science attitudes and confidence in their 
abilities (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2013; OECD, 2015a; Wang & Degol, 2013). 
Intuitively, and as shown by some interventions, promoting positive 
attitudes towards science, such as higher perceptions of the utility of 
science, may then help increase the number of students studying science 
(Harackiewicz, Rozek, Hulleman, & Hyde, 2012; Rozek, Hyde, Svoboda, 
Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2015). 
Students’ confidence, however, appears to require closer 
consideration. Students’ confidence does not necessarily correspond to their 
actual attainment: reviews have found only modest associations between 
various indicators of each (Freund & Kasten, 2012; Hansford & Hattie, 
1982; Ma & Kishor, 1997; Mabe & West, 1982; Zell & Krizan, 2014). 
Further studies have highlighted that students can be under-confident, with 
lower confidence than would be expected given their attainment, while 
others can be over-confident, with higher confidence than would be 
expected given their attainment (Bouffard & Narciss, 2011). While higher 
confidence may be motivationally beneficial (Bandura, 1997), aiming to 
increase the number of students studying science through universally 
increasing confidence may reduce under-confidence for some but further 
increase over-confidence for others, and it is unclear whether this would be 
helpful. 
Students’ confidence, expressed in various ways, has nevertheless 
closely associated with their studying intentions (Bong, 2001b; Mujtaba & 
Reiss, 2014). Promoting equity entails understanding potential barriers 
before they can be addressed; students can then, ideally, make informed and 
unconstrained choices about whether to study science or not. Under-
confidence may potentially limit students’ progression or identification with 
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science, but this may be an avoidable barrier; conversely, over-confidence 
may entail subsequent problems if students lack sufficient attainment for 
their future plans. 
Under-confidence and over-confidence have not been extensively 
explored within science education, however. For example, studies have 
found that higher confidence has associated with higher science intentions 
when controlling for attainment (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). While this may 
lead to the inference that higher confidence is beneficial, even if someone is 
over-confident, such results do not isolate under-confidence or over-
confidence from low or high confidence in itself. For some students, 
confidence and attainment may be sufficiently similar to entail accuracy; for 
other students, differences may be large enough to entail under-confidence 
or over-confidence. Similarly, prior research has not considered whether any 
revealed patterns of predictive associations with intentions occur regardless 
of whether someone is under-confident, accurate, or over-confident in their 
beliefs. Instead, other methods are required to first identify students with 
different confidence biases and then to explore their expressed beliefs and 
their patterns of associations within predictive models. 
Accordingly, this thesis identifies under-confident, accurately-
evaluating, and over-confident students, via various approaches, in order to 
explore how these cases might be detrimental or beneficial within science 
education. For example, under-confident students might report lower 
attitudes towards science, including for factors that predict intentions to 
study science further. Additionally, the thesis considers whether students’ 
science intentions are predicted in different ways, depending on whether 
students are under-confident, accurately-evaluating, or over-confident. Any 
differences would provide greater understanding into how students’ choices 




Section 1.1: About this thesis 
 
This thesis developed from, and extends, earlier research associated with 
mathematics progression in England (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014, 
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2015) undertaken to complement a wider national research project covering 
science and mathematics (Reiss, et al., 2011; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). 
Specifically, this earlier research revealed that, for Year 8 students, under-
confident students reported lower mathematics attitudes than accurate and 
over-confident students, including for their mathematics interest and 
perceived utility of mathematics; at Year 10, fewer differences were 
observed, but over-confident students reported the lowest intentions to study 
mathematics further (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014). Indicators of 
confidence accuracy/bias were also directly predictive of students’ 
mathematics intentions, and there were some indications that intentions 
could be predicted differently for various groups of students although this 
was not statistically confirmed (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2015). 
The situation remained unclear for science, however. The majority 
of research into students’ confidence accuracy/bias has covered various 
academic subjects with less focus on science, has been undertaken outside 
of England, and students’ studying intentions have seldom been 
concurrently considered (Cheema & Skultety, 2016; Chen, 2003; Chen & 
Zimmerman, 2007; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). 
Additionally, emerging methods to consider confidence accuracy/bias 
through clustering students appeared not to have been undertaken in 
England (Bouffard, Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Rytkönen, Aunola, & 
Nurmi, 2007; Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016; Seidel, 2006). 
The research underlying this thesis accordingly aimed to apply 
multiple complementary approaches in order to explore the impact of 
confidence accuracy/bias on students’ intentions, attitudes, and beliefs, 
specifically considering science, students in England, and including 
approaches such as clustering students. Science was considered holistically 
as in the National Curriculum for England, encompassing the natural 
sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics (Department for Education, 
2013, 2014). For contextualisation, wider literature was also considered 
across STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) 
subjects, and other areas, when this potentially added insight and/or when 
little research had directly considered science or confidence accuracy/biases. 
Existing data from the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) 2006 was analysed, which surveyed a nationally-
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representative sample of Year 11 students in England and which considered 
a broad array of students’ attitudes and beliefs in science, including their 
studying intentions (OECD, 2009a). However, the PISA design ensured that 
the students’ confidence accuracy/bias could only be broadly approximated. 
Accordingly, new data were collected (2014/2015) and analysed in order to 
consider students’ confidence accuracy/bias in more detail for students in 
Years 9, 10, and 11, using similar methods to prior research undertaken 
outside of England (Chen, 2003; Chen & Zimmerman, 2007). The new 
survey considered an array of attitudes and motivational beliefs, but could 
only reach a relatively small number of students given limited resources. 
Similarities and differences across the two sets of results were then 
considered; specifically, any similarities in results across the different 
samples and different analytical approaches could then enhance the overall 
plausibility of any emerging findings. 
Initial analysis, not presented within this thesis for brevity, provided 
wider contextualisation and explored potential antecedents of confidence 
biases, which had surprisingly received little explicit attention within earlier 
research. Findings included that, for example, lower subject-comparisons 
(science thought to be harder than any other subject) predicted lower self-
concept beliefs (confidence conceptualised as subjective subject-level 
beliefs of personal ability) when students were under-confident but not 
when they were over-confident, for the Year 9, 10, and 11 students surveyed 
in 2014/2015 (Sheldrake, 2016a) and for Year 9 students in the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2011 (Sheldrake, 
2016b). Analysis then focused on the main area of students’ science 
intentions. Initial findings highlighted that, for the surveyed Year 9, 10, and 
11 students, science intentions were predicted by different factors in 
different ways, confirmed with statistical significance, depending on 
whether they tended to under-confidence, accuracy, or over-confidence 
(Sheldrake, 2016c). 
This thesis provides further insight, and reports on multiple 
analytical approaches and both the PISA 2006 survey and the 2014/2015 
survey, including considering confidence accuracy/bias by clustering 
students. Similarities and differences across the approaches and surveys 
were considered in order to enhance the plausibility of any findings, to help 
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address methodological limitations in one set of data with strengths in the 
other, and to ultimately provide new insights. 
Throughout the thesis, the various terms aimed to be intuitive and 
inclusive, where possible. For example, ‘attainment’ has generally been 
used to refer to students’ performance, achievement, and/or similar terms. 
Similarly, ‘confidence’ has been used to broadly encompass terms such as 
students’ self-concept (subjective beliefs of past/current ability) and self-
efficacy (evaluative beliefs of future capacity/capability), although the 
particular terms have also been used when relevant. 
 
 
Section 1.2: Contents and structure 
 
Prior research into students’ intentions and choices is briefly reviewed in 
Section 2, together with the theoretical expectancy-value model of students’ 
motivated behavioural choices. This broadly highlighted the influence of 
students’ confidence on their intentions and choices, although the impact of 
under-confidence or over-confidence remained unclear. Students’ 
confidence is then considered in more detail in Section 3, including 
different conceptualisations and supporting theory; specific studies into 
under-confidence and over-confidence are also detailed. 
The research aims and the overall design of the research are then 
described in Section 4, including the three underlying research questions. 
The research considered nationally-representative data from PISA 2006, and 
new data collected in 2014/2015, and the particular methods are described 
in Section 5 for both surveys. Analytical approaches are then elaborated in 
Section 6, such as how missing responses were handled and how analytical 
modelling was undertaken. 
The results for the three research questions are respectively 
described and discussed in Section 7, Section 8, and Section 9. For each 
research question, the section covers the results from both surveys, 
discusses similarities and differences, and contextualises the findings 
against prior research. Section 10 then provides a general discussion, 
focusing on providing an overall summary of new insights, and also 
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considering limitations and implications to future research. References and 
appendices then follow.  
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Section 2: Students’ intentions and choices 
 
The following sections briefly review influences on students’ intentions and 
choices in Section 2.1, and further aspects related to students’ attitudes and 
beliefs in Section 2.2. Specifically, low science intentions have been 
considered to follow from low attitudes towards science, generally declining 
as students grow older (Section 2.2.1); differences in intentions may follow 
from different students holding different attitudes or beliefs (Section 2.2.2); 
and differences in intentions may follow from different students considering 
their intentions in different ways (Section 2.2.3). A plausible theoretical 
framework for students’ intentions, the expectancy-value model of 
motivated behavioural choices, which highlights the importance of students’ 
confidence, is then considered in Section 2.3. 
 
 
Section 2.1: Influences on students’ intentions and choices 
 
In England, science and mathematics are not compulsory subjects in upper-
secondary education (EACEA, 2011; Eurydice, 2016). Studying science 
subjects at upper-secondary school is generally necessary to study science 
courses at university, however, and studying science at university is 
generally necessary for a science career (Royal Society, 2006). In England, 
relatively early experiences or choices at secondary school may then 
become even more important in facilitating or precluding future careers in 
science. Intuitively, it then remains important to gain a wider understanding 
of secondary school students’ intentions and choices to study science 
further. 
Students’ aspirations and intentions to continue with science, 
reported during secondary school, have been shown to be important 
indicators of their future educational progression. For example, large-scale 
nationally-representative longitudinal studies in the United States of 
America, such as the National Educational Longitudinal Study starting in 
1988 and the Education Longitudinal Study starting in 2002, have revealed 
that students’ views and intentions to study science reported during 
secondary school indeed predicted whether they subsequently gained 
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science degrees (Maltese & Tai, 2011; Morgan, Gelbgiser, & Weeden, 
2013; Tai, Qi Liu, Maltese, & Fan, 2006; Wang, 2013). Similarly, in 
England, national longitudinal studies have highlighted that science 
aspirations reported during secondary school have associated with 
subsequent employment in science (Schoon, 2001). 
Various factors have been found to associate with students’ 
intentions or choices, although it remains difficult to determine their relative 
magnitudes or effects. For example, various studies have highlighted 
associations between intentions/choices and students’ background or 
characteristics such as gender or ethnicity, or students’ educational context 
such as characteristics of their school, although often without considering 
students’ own views (Bennett, Lubben, & Hampden-Thompson, 2013; 
Crawford, 2014; Gill & Bell, 2013; Homer, Ryder, & Banner, 2014). 
However, differences in the number of students studying Advanced Level 
General Certificate of Education (A-Level) science subjects across students’ 
backgrounds and types of schools have been shown to the small, after 
controlling for the students’ prior attainment and gender (Gill & Bell, 2013; 
Homer, Ryder, & Banner, 2014). Further research has revealed that 
students’ intentions to study science have been predicted more by their own 
attitudes and beliefs than by their background, gender, or attainment, 
although the various effects have slightly varied across studies and sets of 
considered predictors (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 
2014). 
The influence of factors may still be complex and difficult to 
disentangle. For example, students’ attainment in secondary school, such as 
in General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent 
examinations, has often been highlighted to be relevant to selecting A-Level 
subjects and attaining high grades in them (Department for Education, 2011, 
2012; Homer, Ryder, & Banner, 2014). However, schools may require 
particular levels of attainment in order to permit students to study upper-
secondary sciences (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009). 
It can be difficult to determine whether some students are unable to continue 
to study particular subjects at A-Level at their particular school, or whether 
they explicitly decide not to study them. Additionally, students’ intentions 
have associated with their predicted or expected grades, which may differ 
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from their current or subsequent attainment (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 
2008). 
Prior research has frequently highlighted that intentions and/or 
choices have associated with students’ attainment and also their beliefs in 
their own abilities (their confidence), together with their intrinsic interest in 
a subject and their extrinsic career concerns such as gaining a specific job or 
gaining a well-paid job (Bates, Pollard, Usher, & Oakley, 2009; Blenkinsop, 
McCrone, Wade, & Morris, 2006; Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 2008; Cann, 
2009; Department for Education, 2012; McCrone, Morris, & Walker, 2005; 
Regan & DeWitt, 2015; Tripney, et al., 2010). More specifically, commonly 
reported reasons for studying science and related subjects at upper-
secondary school in England have included the perceived usefulness of the 
subject, perceived ability in the subject, enjoyment, the complementary 
nature of some subjects, and interest (Tripney, et al., 2010). For example, 
and in more detail, students’ science aspirations at the end of primary school 
(Year 6) and in the middle of secondary school (Year 9) were more strongly 
predicted by their relevant attitudes and beliefs (students’ attitudes to 
science, parents’ attitudes to science, and confidence expressed as self-
concept beliefs in science) than by their background characteristics (gender, 
ethnicity, parental education, books at home, and parents working within 
science) (DeWitt & Archer, 2015). Similarly, for Year 10 students in 
England, students’ intentions to continue to study physics were most 
strongly predicted (in descending magnitudes) by their perceived utility of 
physics, interest in physics, home support for achievement in physics, 
emotional responses to physics lessons, perceptions of physics lessons, 
physics confidence expressed as self-concept beliefs, and their perceived 
advice/pressure to study physics (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). For Year 12 and 
13 students, A-Level choices across various subjects were retrospectively 
reported to follow from their interest and enjoyment, perceived utility for 
careers, and their own perceived ability; students cited utility more for 
science and mathematics related subjects and cited interest more for 
humanities subjects (Vidal Rodeiro, 2007). 
Considering subject choices for university in general, interest in a 
subject, then career concerns (gaining a specific job and gaining a well-paid 
job), and then being good at a subject were considered to be most relevant 
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by students at the end of secondary school in England; the opinions of 
family members and the ease of getting onto a course were considered to be 
far less important (Bates, Pollard, Usher, & Oakley, 2009). University 
students studying science and related subjects in England have similarly 
expressed that they originally selected a science subject because of interest, 
enjoyment, or ability, rather than primarily for career-related reasons; those 
who cited career-related reasons highlighted that science would also keep 
their options open (Mellors-Bourne, Connor, & Jackson, 2011). Science 
graduates in the United States mostly reported that their own interest was 
the strongest influence that maintained their persistence in science and 
related subjects during middle school, high school, and college (Maltese, 
Melki, & Wiebke, 2014). 
Similarly, university students studying science and related subjects 
across England, Denmark, and Norway most frequently mentioned that they 
selected their courses due to interest and enjoyment (mentioned in 68% of 
their written responses), then utility (17%), expectancies of success (16%), 
and then the personal value of the course area to their own identities (9%) 
(Jensen & Henriksen, 2015). Other influences, such as school experiences 
including teachers, family, popular science and leisure activities, and 
outreach activities, most frequently linked with students’ expressed interest 
and enjoyment (Jensen & Henriksen, 2015). When considering only the 
potential influences of other people, university students of science in 
Norway most frequently reported that their parents were influential on their 
choices to study science, then friends, other acquaintances, teachers, 
siblings, and (to a far less frequent extent) public figures in the media 
(Sjaastad, 2012). Fathers were mentioned more than mothers or both parents 
together (Sjaastad, 2012). 
Students’ narratives about their university choices in Denmark 
similarly highlighted that their choices were broadly based on their interests, 
but balanced by other factors including the implications of being a student 
on a particular course and the likely future employment situation 
(Holmegaard, Ulriksen, & Madsen, 2014). Aspects of studying subjects or 
perceptions of wider fields had different implications for different students. 
For example, some who decided to study science were attracted to the 
rigorous methods and clarity in science, while others who did not study 
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science were disenchanted by perceiving science as rigid and superficial 
(Holmegaard, Madsen, & Ulriksen, 2014). 
Considered in general terms, students’ conceptions of themselves or 
their identities, and students’ conceptions of science and/or scientists, have 
appeared to be relevant to students’ intentions and choices (Andersen, 
Krogh, & Lykkegaard, 2014; Archer, et al., 2010; Bøe & Henriksen, 2015; 
Taconis & Kessels, 2009). For example, for secondary school students in 
England, differences between perceptions of science and students’ 
perceptions of their own identities may entail that science is not considered 
as a feasible option for further study or careers, perhaps especially for girls 
(Archer, et al., 2013) and for those from particular backgrounds and 
ethnicities (Archer, DeWitt, & Osborne, 2015). Students have often 
associated scientists with generally being male and white, although often 
‘scientists’ have only been interpreted to mean those working in the natural 
or physical sciences (Archer, DeWitt, & Osborne, 2015; Wong, 2015). 
Students have nevertheless recognised people with various 
backgrounds/ethnicities working in other science fields, such as medicine, 
which may ensure that aspiring to those fields can be more relatable (Wong, 
2015). For secondary school students in the United States, the relations 
between aspects of students’ identities and science, including similarities 
and differences, could associate with increasing or decreasing engagement, 
in various ways (Calabrese Barton, et al., 2013; Carlone, Johnson, & Scott, 
2015; Tan, Calabrese Barton, Kang, & O’Neill, 2013). While elements of 
identity and their implications can be clearly highlighted through these case 
studies, it remains harder to determine their impact in comparison to other 
factors. 
The influence of students’ confidence on their intentions and choices 
has also been highlighted in various ways. In England, for example, 
secondary school students’ confidence in science, measured as self-concept 
beliefs, has predicted their intentions to study science further, together with 
other factors (DeWitt & Archer, 2015; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Students’ 
self-concept beliefs have also associated with selecting science and 
mathematics courses at university in Germany (Parker, et al., 2012) and in 
Australia (Parker, Marsh, Ciarrochi, Marshall, & Abduljabbar, 2014). In 
various countries, students’ confidence, measured as self-efficacy beliefs 
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during secondary schooling, has also been found to influence their ideas of 
potential careers (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001), and 
to directly predict their intentions to study courses (Bong, 2001b) and to 
enter university (Parker, Marsh, Ciarrochi, Marshall, & Abduljabbar, 2014). 
Similarly, during university studies, self-efficacy has also predicted 
students’ intentions to complete their courses in science and related subjects 
(Byars-Winston, Estrada, Howard, Davis, & Zalapa, 2010). Women in 
mathematical, scientific, and technological careers in the United States have 
also highlighted that their strong self-efficacy enabled resiliency to 
overcome potential obstacles and gave a desire to succeed (Zeldin & 
Pajares, 2000). An increased understanding of students’ confidence, and 
potential biases towards under-confidence or over-confidence, may then 
help provide wider insights into students’ science intentions. 
In summary, students’ perceived utility, interest and enjoyment, and 
their perceived ability in science (their confidence) have closely associated 
with their science intentions and choices (Jensen & Henriksen, 2015; 
Mellors-Bourne, Connor, & Jackson, 2011; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Vidal 
Rodeiro, 2007). It remains unclear whether any one factor is the most 
influential, however. Studies highlighting that students cited interest as the 
primary reason for their choices (Bates, Pollard, Usher, & Oakley, 2009; 
Mellors-Bourne, Connor, & Jackson, 2011) may contrast with studies that 
highlighted the importance of the perceived utility of science (Mujtaba & 
Reiss, 2014; Vidal Rodeiro, 2007). It remains possible that methodological 
aspects may be relevant, such as potential differences arising from students 
rating their attitudes compared to researchers categorising students’ 
expressions, or whether prospective or retrospective attitudes are 
considered; it also remains possible that different attitudes are more or less 
relevant at different times. Predictive models aim to isolate the independent 
contribution and relative magnitude of different factors, but any effects may 
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Section 2.2: Students’ attitudes towards science 
 
Given the importance of students’ attitudes such as their interest, various 
studies have explored how they have developed or changed throughout their 
education (Section 2.2.1), and/or whether different students hold different 
beliefs (Section 2.2.2). It is also possible that different students consider 
different attitudes as being more or less relevant to their decisions of what to 
study (Section 2.2.3). Any or all of these areas may help explain why 
different students decide to study science or not. 
 
 
Section 2.2.1: Differences in attitudes across secondary school 
 
Students in primary school in England have generally enjoyed science but 
have not necessarily seen themselves as becoming scientists (Archer, et al., 
2010; Silver & Rushton, 2008; Turner & Ireson, 2010). For such students, 
possessing a natural interest in science has been considered important in 
order to be good at science, and the students could perceive their peers as 
being ‘science people’ or not (Archer, et al., 2010). Primary school students 
also have perceived ‘science in school’ as less exciting and different to their 
ideas of ‘real science’ (Archer, et al., 2010; Zhai, Jocz, & Tan, 2014). While 
relatively few secondary school students in England have aspired to be 
scientists or liked science better than other subjects, science has been 
generally considered to be interesting, relevant for careers and gaining wider 
knowledge, and important for school and wider life (DeWitt, Archer, & 
Osborne, 2014; Jenkins & Nelson, 2005). However, science at school was 
considered to be hard and difficult, while being talented, invested, and 
interested in science and science careers were considered to be closely 
linked (Archer, DeWitt, & Osborne, 2015). 
Declining attitudes towards science as students grow older have 
often been considered a fundamental cause of the low numbers of students 
studying science (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 2003; Royal Society, 2008b). 
However, secondary school students have not necessarily held negative 
attitudes towards science (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Jenkins & 
Nelson, 2005). Additionally, for a large survey of science graduates in the 
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United States, while over half reported that their interest in science 
developed before or during primary/elementary school, around a third 
nevertheless reported that their interest developed during secondary school 
(Maltese, Melki, & Wiebke, 2014). Interviews with graduate students and 
scientists in the United States revealed similar results (Maltese & Tai, 
2010). Interest in science developing during secondary school does not 
easily fit with assumptions of declining interest over the duration of 
secondary school, which also highlights the problem of attempting to 
generalise across all students. Conversely, the problem of generalisation 
may be again highlighted since positive attitudes may not necessarily entail 
aspirations towards science for all students (Archer, et al., 2010). 
Various aspects may be relevant to changing attitudes. Studies have 
considered whether changes in attitudes have followed from specific 
changes in context and environment, such as from primary school to 
secondary school. For example, small decreases in competence beliefs and 
attitudes have been observed following this transition in Germany (Arens, 
Seeshing Yeung, Craven, & Watermann, 2013), while different students 
reported increases, decreases, or their beliefs remained stable across this 
transition in the United States (Harter, Rumbaugh Whitesell, & Kowalski, 
1992). The nature of teaching or the objects of inquiry within science 
education, potentially more ‘everyday’ at primary school and more 
abstracted at secondary school, may also be relevant to differences in 
expressed interest (Anderhag, et al., 2016; Tröbst, Kleickmann, Lange-
Schubert, Rothkopf, & Möller, 2016). Students at different ages may even 
consider or form their attitudes in different ways. For example, a small 
study with primary school and secondary school students in Germany 
highlighted that younger students associated interest more with emotional 
experiences, while older students found discovering new knowledge and 
autonomy to be more important to their interest (Frenzel, Pekrun, Dicke, & 
Goetz, 2012). 
Further studies have considered students for longer periods of time, 
and have highlighted that students’ attitudes in many academic subjects 
have often declined after primary school and across secondary school, 
although the changes have often involved largely-positive views declining 
to slightly-positive or neutral views (Archambault, Eccles, & Vida, 2010; 
Page 26 of 361 
Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, & Wigfield, 2002; Nagy, et al., 2010). For 
example, in the United States, secondary school students’ attitudes towards 
science declined from Grades 6 to 10, becoming relatively neutral at Grade 
10 (Simpson & Oliver, 1990). Again in the United States, students’ 
mathematics interest was seen to decline from primary/elementary school 
and across secondary school and upper-secondary school (Grades 1 to 12) to 
become relatively neutral, while the perceived importance of mathematics 
declined from Grades 1 to 9 but then increased from Grades 10 to 12 
(Fredricks & Eccles, 2002). 
Similarly, and more specifically, in Canada from Grades 5 to 11, 
students’ interest in science and technology declined over time but remained 
overall positive; similar declines were observed for French (as a first 
language), mathematics, and physical education (Potvin & Hasni, 2014). On 
average, students’ views increased over time for their perceived importance 
of outside-school science and technology, utility of outside-school science 
and technology for society, perceived difficulty of science and technology, 
and their attraction to science and technology studies and careers (Potvin & 
Hasni, 2014). Nevertheless, their confidence expressed as self-concept 
beliefs and their interest for in-school science and technology decreased 
(Potvin & Hasni, 2014). Compared to other subjects, science and technology 
increased the most in perceived importance and also in perceived difficulty, 
with the exception of being similar in perceived difficulty to mathematics 
(Potvin & Hasni, 2014). 
Specifically in England, the number of students reporting that 
science was one of their favourite lessons decreased from Year 7 to Year 9 
(Bennett & Hogarth, 2009). Students’ interest and attitudes towards science 
subjects generally declined from Year 7 to Year 9 but then had less change, 
or even increased, to Year 11 (Bennett & Hogarth, 2009). Again in England, 
science aspirations and perceived parental attitudes to science increased 
from Year 6 (the end of primary school) to Year 8 (after the start of 
secondary school), while perceived peer attitudes to science and 
participation in science activities outside school decreased, and the students’ 
self-concept beliefs in science and attitudes towards science remained 
similar (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014). It was nevertheless highlighted 
that the increase in aspirations followed from the increase in students 
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intending to study more science in the future and to have a job that used 
science, rather than intending to specifically become a scientist (DeWitt, 
Archer, & Osborne, 2014). 
Any changes may vary across students, however. For example, in 
Germany, students’ interest in mathematics decreased over their secondary 
school education, although varied by course: those on advanced 
mathematics courses reported high and stable interest, while those on basic 
courses reported lower and declining interest over time (Köller, Baumert, & 
Schnabel, 2001). In the United States, from Grades 1 to 12, distinct clusters 
of students with different trajectories of reading self-concept and utility 
beliefs could be identified, some declining slowly but remaining high or 
moderate, some declining to low magnitudes, and some declining then 
increasing again (Archambault, Eccles, & Vida, 2010). Again in the United 
States, for students followed from Grade 4 to university/college, clusters of 
students’ trajectories of change in their mathematics self-concept, interest, 
and perceived utility (considered as importance and usefulness) could be 
identified, and those with generally high beliefs (which slowly decreased 
over time) were most likely to select a mathematically-intensive course at 
university (Musu-Gillette, Wigfield, Harring, & Eccles, 2015). Other 
clusters showed beliefs that decreased faster over time, were moderate and 
remained stable, or were moderate and slowly decreased (Musu-Gillette, 
Wigfield, Harring, & Eccles, 2015). 
In summary, ‘declining attitudes’ across secondary education may 
not necessarily entail negative attitudes, and students’ attitudes to science 
and attitudes to other subjects may similarly change over time (Potvin & 
Hasni, 2014). However, distinct clusters of students with different 
magnitudes or trajectories of attitudes may be observed (Musu-Gillette, 
Wigfield, Harring, & Eccles, 2015), although it remains unclear why or 
what wider factors might predict membership of such clusters. Even so, 
considering various clusters of students appears to be a promising method, 
which could potentially be as informative as attempting to disentangle 
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Section 2.2.2: Differences in attitudes across students 
 
Various studies have explored whether different students hold different 
attitudes towards science and other subjects, although often focusing on 
explicit groups of students such as boys and girls. For example, the low 
number of girls studying subjects related to mathematics and the physical 
sciences, and their associated low attitudes, has frequently been highlighted 
(Blickenstaff, 2005; Institute of Physics, 2013; Murphy & Whitelegg, 2006; 
Royal Society, 2014), although ability in itself does not appear to be 
relevant to the low representation of girls (Wang & Degol, 2013). 
Across students’ various expressions of confidence and beliefs about 
their personal abilities, boys have generally reported higher beliefs than girls 
even though girls often attain equally or even higher than boys (Fredricks & 
Eccles, 2002; Marsh & Yeung, 1998; Marsh, 1989; Rhodes, Roffman, 
Reddy, & Fredriksen, 2004; Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2004; Watt, 2006; 
Wigfield, Eccles, Mac Iver, Reuman, & Midgley, 1991; Young & Mroczek, 
2003). Research reviews have nevertheless found that gender differences in 
attitudes to mathematics, on average, had small magnitudes and were 
similar to differences in mathematics performance; when differences 
occurred, girls held less positive attitudes than boys (Hyde, Fennema, Ryan, 
Frost, & Hopp, 1990). Similarly, reviews of early international PISA and 
TIMSS studies have highlighted that boys generally reported higher self-
concept beliefs than girls, but with a small magnitude of difference (Else-
Quest, Hyde, & Linn, 2010). It is possible that boys and girls form their 
confidence in different ways. For example, for samples of secondary school 
students in the United States, current grades had stronger associations with 
students’ science confidence expressed as self-efficacy beliefs for girls 
compared to boys (Britner, 2008; Britner & Pajares, 2006). Similarly, for a 
nationally-representative sample of secondary school students in the United 
States, mathematics grades had a larger positive influence on perceived 
mathematics ability for girls compared to boys; boys assessed their 
mathematical competence to be higher than girls for the same mathematics 
grades (Correll, 2001). 
While many academic subjects have been considered in prior 
studies, gender differences in attitudes have indeed been observed for 
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science in various countries (Nagy, Trautwein, Baumert, Köller, & Garrett, 
2006; Simpkins, Davis-Kean, & Eccles, 2006; Taskinen, Schütte, & Prenzel, 
2013). For example, for secondary school students in England, compared to 
girls, boys have expressed that science was easier, more interesting, more 
preferable than other subjects, and more relevant for careers, and boys also 
expressed higher aspirations to become a scientist or work in technology 
(Jenkins & Nelson, 2005). Differences have also been observed across 
specific science subjects. For example, for secondary school students in 
Germany, boys have reported higher self-concept beliefs in physics and 
chemistry while differences have been minimal for biology, regardless of 
whether students’ attainment was controlled for or not (Jansen, Schroeders, 
& Lüdtke, 2014). Similarly, in England, secondary school boys have 
generally reported more-positive science self-concept beliefs than girls, and 
especially so for physics, but not for biology where no difference was 
observed (Hardy, 2014). 
Essentially, various differences in attitudes across boys and girls, for 
example, may help explain why they report different intentions towards 
studying science. Differences in intentions across other observable groups 
of students may similarly follow from differences in attitudes. For example, 
families from particular backgrounds/ethnicities, such as Chinese or Indian, 
have often valued education and promoted professional or vocational 
careers for their children (Archer & Francis, 2006; Connor, Tyers, Modood, 
& Hillage, 2004; Strand, 2007; Torgerson, et al., 2008). Students from such 
backgrounds/ethnicities have accordingly often considered science and 
mathematics favourably, for example as indicators of success and as pre-
requisites for following particular careers (Hernandez-Martinez, et al., 2008; 
Wong, 2012). 
Differences in attitudes may follow from various influences. For 
example, students’ perceptions of their classroom experiences can vary, 
including the support given or their teachers’ expectations of them, which 
can in turn influence students’ interest and confidence (Lazarides & Watt, 
2015; Murphy & Whitelegg, 2006; Wang, 2012). Problematically, some 
teachers may also have lower expectations or perceive lower abilities in 
students with different backgrounds, regardless of their attainment 
(Campbell, 2015; Strand, 2007). For secondary school students, aspects of 
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gendered stereotypes for academic subjects have also been observed, such 
as students believing that mathematics was a male domain and that boys 
were more likely to need mathematics skills for employment, to varying 
extents, in Canada (Plante, de la Sablonnière, Aronson, & Théorêt, 2013), 
France (Chatard, Guimond, & Selimbegovic, 2007), and Sweden (Brandell 
& Staberg, 2008). Students’ conceptions of scientists have also often been 
highlighted to involve assumptions or stereotypes regarding gender and/or 
ethnicity/background (Archer, DeWitt, & Osborne, 2015; Carlone & 
Johnson, 2007; Carlone, Johnson, & Scott, 2015; Wong, 2015). As a 
specific example, for science students at university in the United States, 
stronger gender-science stereotypes associated with lower science 
identification and lower intentions to persist in science for women, but 
higher identification and intentions for men, although the difference was 
small (Cundiff, Vescio, Loken, & Lo, 2013). 
Further research has also considered whether naturally-occurring 
clusters of students might hold similar or different beliefs, which may help 
characterise those students who may or may not intend to study science 
further, perhaps more so than considering students grouped by 
characteristics such as gender or background. Various studies of secondary 
school students in the United States have considered various attitudes and 
beliefs (such as interest, perceived utility, and self-concept beliefs), and 
have identified distinct clusters of students, each with broadly proportionate 
attitudes and beliefs such as these being generally high, moderate, or low in 
magnitude, although with various exceptions (Andersen & Chen, 2016; 
Andersen & Cross, 2014; Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 2012; Conley, 
2012; Simpkins & Davis-Kean, 2005). When further characteristics of 
students have been considered, boys have been more likely to be classified 
into clusters with generally high beliefs, while girls have been more likely to 
be classified into clusters with generally low beliefs (Chow, Eccles, & 
Salmela-Aro, 2012; Simpkins & Davis-Kean, 2005). When students’ 
intentions or choices were also considered, students in clusters with 
consistently high beliefs were associated with studying more science and 
mathematics courses (Simpkins & Davis-Kean, 2005) and associated with 
higher aspirations to science careers (Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 2012). 
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Any inferences and direct comparisons remain difficult, however, 
due to the differing factors considered and methods applied by the various 
studies. For example, considering Grade 9 secondary school students in the 
United States revealed clusters of students with broadly proportionate 
science self-efficacy beliefs (expressions of their confidence in their future 
abilities/attainment), personal value, utility value, and interest/enjoyment 
value, such as all factors being generally below-average (40% of the 
students), average (43%), or above-average (9%), but with one exception 
(Andersen & Chen, 2016). Specifically, one cluster (8% of students) 
exhibited above-average science self-efficacy and personal value, but 
average utility and moderately above-average interest (Andersen & Chen, 
2016). Broadly similar profiles were also observed for mathematics 
(Andersen & Cross, 2014). Considering science self-concept (confidence in 
their current abilities/attainment), expectancy (expected future attainment 
and potential to become a good scientist), and value (interest and utility 
beliefs), for Grade 8 and 9 secondary school students in the United States 
highlighted that the majority of students (57%) formed a cluster with 
generally low responses to all the items, while a smaller proportion (12%) 
formed a cluster with generally high responses; another cluster (9%) 
reported generally high self-concept beliefs but low expectations, interest, 
and utility, while another cluster (21%) reported moderate self-concept, low 
expectations, high interest, and moderate utility (Aschbacher, Ing, & Tsai, 
2014). Essentially, it remains difficult to infer whether distinct clusters with 
notably varying patterns of beliefs (such as holding high attitudes in one 
area but moderate or low attitudes in another) are exceptional, perhaps 
relating more to particular samples, or generalizable tendencies. 
Concurrently, while revealing distinct clusters of students is informative, for 
example in highlighting proportions of students who might plausibly 
continue to study science or not, it remains unclear what might cause 
students to hold particular patterns of beliefs (i.e. and be assigned to one 
cluster rather than another). 
Few comparable studies appear to have been undertaken in England, 
although broad clusters of secondary school students (across ages 11-19) 
have been identified in relation to science (Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, 2014). One cluster (29% of the sample) was found to be 
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relatively focused on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM), generally from affluent backgrounds and also with links to STEM, 
with slightly more boys than girls (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
2014). Another cluster (26%) was relatively focused on humanities, with 
less interest in STEM but not necessarily with lower confidence in their 
abilities, and who were engaged with their education, but generally from 
backgrounds without links to STEM (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
2014). Another (17%) was relatively focused on vocational areas such as 
law, psychology, and business, but with less confidence and interest in 
STEM, and with more students from ethnic minority backgrounds 
(Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2014). Another cluster (10%) covered 
those with interest in STEM but also interest in various other areas, but with 
low confidence and higher beliefs that STEM was difficult and only for the 
cleverest students, and with lower STEM aspirations (STEM was seen as 
not for ‘people like them’), with more from ethnic minority backgrounds 
(Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2014). The final cluster (18%) 
covered those who were less engaged in education in general, with lower 
confidence and fewer wider support networks, and with the lowest STEM 
aspirations, and who were generally from backgrounds without links to 
STEM (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
particular methodological details were not described in detail, and it perhaps 
remains unclear whether students would form similar or different clusters 
when considered at specific ages or over time. 
In more general terms, recent research has proposed that groups of 
students in England, in Years 7 to 10, can be identified with varying 
magnitudes of ‘science capital’, considered as mainly the aggregate of 
someone’s perceived utility of science, encouragement to continue studying 
science, access to science outside of school, and their perceptions of their 
parents’ attitudes to science (Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 
2015). A minority of students (5%) were identified with high science 
capital, and such students were more likely to be male, South-Asian, with 
access to many cultural resources, and who were interested in studying 
science further, were confident in their abilities, and who were secure in 
their science identity (Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015). 
The majority of students (68%) were identified with medium science capital 
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while others were identified with low science capital (27%) (Archer, 
Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015). Such groups rely on conceptual 
or theoretical distinctions and group boundaries, however, in contrast to 
clustering approaches where any cluster boundaries are empirically 
determined in order to maximise the fit to the data. 
In even more general terms, various qualitative studies in the United 
States have highlighted that different students may hold different 
orientations towards science as a fundamental aspect of their personal 
identity, and/or embody or express a science identity in different ways 
(Carlone & Johnson, 2007; Carlone, Johnson, & Scott, 2015; Carlone, 
Webb, Archer, & Taylor, 2015; Tan, Calabrese Barton, Kang, & O’Neill, 
2013). Similarly, qualitative studies in England have highlighted how 
different students may hold different profiles of beliefs, considered as 
varying combinations of science aspirations, attainment, interest, and other 
factors (Wong, 2016). Generally, such qualitative studies have often been 
relatively small in scale, however, and while these can highlight the 
plausibility of particular patterns and/or processes, they cannot necessarily 
highlight how prevalent they may be in wider samples. 
In summary, different students may hold different attitudes, and 
patterns of various attitudes considered together. It remains unclear whether 
students’ science attitudes broadly cohere in magnitude or whether other 
patterns may be observed (Andersen & Chen, 2016; Aschbacher, Ing, & 
Tsai, 2014). It also remains relatively unclear what might explain or cause 
students to hold particular patterns of attitudes and beliefs. Nevertheless, as 




Section 2.2.3: Differences in decision-making processes 
 
Less research has considered whether different students have different 
approaches to considering their choices. Attitudes appear to be central to 
students’ science choices, but different students might consider their choices 
in different ways, for example through considering different attitudes or 
wider factors to be more or less important or relevant to their decisions. 
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 Some studies have extended considering gender differences in 
attitudes to consider gender differences in decision-making processes. For 
example, for students starting secondary school in Canada, girls reported 
higher intentions to continue with non-compulsory mathematics than boys, 
and these intentions were positively predicted by the students’ utility value 
associated with mathematics for both girls and boys (Crombie, et al., 2005). 
For girls, mathematics intentions were also predicted by their mathematics 
self-concept beliefs, while for boys, intentions were also predicted by their 
mathematics attainment (Crombie, et al., 2005). Conversely, in the 
Netherlands, for students in early secondary school, the effect of 
mathematics attainment on mathematics choices was stronger for girls 
compared to boys, although at all levels of attainment boys were generally 
more inclined to study mathematics (Bosker & Dekkers, 1994). For 
secondary school students in Switzerland, the effect of science attainment 
on science choices was stronger for boys compared to girls, while the effect 
of interest was stronger for girls than boys (Aeschlimann, Herzog, & 
Makarova, 2016). Given the differences in considered factors across such 
studies, and their potentially contrasting results, it remains difficult to 
generalise any particular tendencies, other than that different students such 
as girls and boys may broadly consider their choices differently. This also 
relies on an assumption that predictive models indeed reflect processes of 
decision-making. 
Further studies have considered more extensive arrays of attitudes 
and considered science directly. For example, for upper-secondary students 
in Norway, compared to boys, girls retrospectively reported that interest and 
enjoyment, fit to personal beliefs, and expectations of success were more 
important for selecting their subject area, while there were no gender 
differences for self-realisation (developing skills and being challenged), 
utility for university admission, and relative costs (Bøe, 2012). 
Concurrently, a subject’s utility for university admission was considered 
more important, and interest and absence of costs were considered less 
important, for those studying science than for those studying humanities 
(Bøe, 2012). In the context of retrospectively describing important reasons 
for their A-Level subject choices, upper-secondary students in England have 
similarly cited utility (for studying the subject further at university, for 
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being useful to future careers, and as being a ‘good subject’ to have studied) 
more for science and mathematics subjects, and cited interest and enjoyment 
more for humanities subjects (Vidal Rodeiro, 2007). In England, interviews 
with secondary school students have also suggested that girls and boys may 
hold different reasons for studying upper-secondary science: boys often 
reported ‘intrinsic’ reasons (e.g. because they enjoyed science, or wanted to 
understand the world) while girls often reported ‘extrinsic’ reasons (e.g. 
aiming towards careers or to help others), using such terms relatively 
broadly (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009). Particular 
sets of results may then appear similar or to contrast in some areas, but it 
remains unclear how this may reflect differences in samples or methods. 
Other studies have highlighted differences in students’ approaches to 
choices, considered more broadly or indirectly. Interviews with secondary 
school students in England (followed from Years 9 to 11) have suggested 
that some students had already resolved on specific careers (whether in 
science or in other fields), some were partially resolved towards a specific 
career, some narrowed and refined their ideas over time, and some had 
changing, broad, or uncommitted career ideas (Cleaves, 2005). Those who 
did select non-compulsory science subjects reflected these broad 
trajectories: some students who chose science had already resolved or 
partially-resolved on a career in science (Cleaves, 2005). For those with 
broad or uncommitted ideas, science was sometimes studied as one subject 
within a broad mix, but the students were aware of the value of science for 
their subsequent options or careers; however, many who refined their ideas 
over time eliminated science as an option through actively selecting or 
focusing on other areas (Cleaves, 2005). This indirectly highlights that not 
studying science may follow from favouring other areas, rather than 
necessarily following from disfavouring science. 
Students’ attainment may also indirectly influence their processes of 
considering their choices. For example, it is possible that some students may 
consider that they do not necessarily have a choice if they have lower 
attainment (i.e. contextual constraints of pre-requisite grades may eliminate 
choice for them), while students with higher attainment may need to 
consider further factors to actively make a choice between studying 
different subjects. For example, for secondary school students in England 
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studying for GCSEs, expected attainment in mathematics appeared closely 
linked to intentions: most students predicted to attain grades of A* or A 
were considering or actually intending to continue with mathematics while 
those predicted to attain B or C reported much lower inclinations (Brown, 
Brown, & Bibby, 2008). The students’ expressed reasons for not intending 
to continue with mathematics also appeared to differ depending on their 
expected attainment: for all predicted grades except for A*, students 
reported that they considered A-Level mathematics to be too difficult, and 
(to a lesser degree) that they did not enjoy or like mathematics; for those 
predicted to attain A* grades, however, the most frequently reported reason 
for not continuing mathematics was that mathematics was not necessary for 
their intended future degree or career (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 2008). It 
remains unclear whether students’ confidence in their abilities would 
similarly entail differences in decision-making processes, but it is plausible 
to assume that this may be the case. Students’ expectations of their future 
capabilities, such as their expected attainment, have indeed been considered 
to be expressions of confidence, specifically self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 
1997; Bong, 2001b). 
Considered in general terms for students in England, students’ 
backgrounds have also been proposed to influence their attitudes, 
specifically where various cultural aspects, family practices, and wider 
assumptions about science and scientists may help facilitate or limit 
students’ potential identification with science (Archer, et al., 2012, 2013; 
Archer, DeWitt, & Wong, 2014). Such students would essentially be 
undertaking different processes of decision-making through implicitly 
considering various factors as being relevant or irrelevant to them, and/or 
considering what choices may be feasible or unfeasible. However, this does 
not appear to have been considered quantitatively. 
In summary, few studies appear to have explicitly considered 
differences in students’ decision-making. Studies have also applied 
quantitative approaches, such as comparing the predictive magnitudes of 
factors across girls and boys (Crombie, et al., 2005) or comparing self-
reported reasons for choices (Bøe, 2012), and qualitative approaches such as 
broadly exploring the area through self-reported reasons via interviews 
(Cleaves, 2005). The fundamental points of note were that students’ 
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attitudes may have varying importance for different students (Bøe, 2012), 
and that attainment may entail differences in how choices are made (Brown, 
Brown, & Bibby, 2008). It appears plausible to hypothesise that students’ 
confidence may similarly entail differences in how choices are made. 
 
 
Section 2.3: An expectancy-value model of intentions and choices 
 
The importance of students’ attitudes and beliefs has been reflected through 
research in science education progressing from considering attitudes in 
generalised and aggregated forms (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 2003) to 
conceptualising and considering specific attitudes and motivational beliefs 
(Regan & DeWitt, 2015) and by increasingly applying motivational theories 
as interpretative and explanatory perspectives (Bøe & Henriksen, 2015). For 
example, recent research has often applied the expectancy-value model of 
motivated behavioural choices (Eccles, 2009; Eccles, et al., 1983; Wigfield 
& Eccles, 2000) to gain wider insight into students’ intentions and choices 
(Bøe, 2012; Bøe & Henriksen, 2013, 2015; Bøe, Henriksen, Lyons, & 
Schreiner, 2011; Wang & Degol, 2013). 
The expectancy-value model aims to provide a relatively 
comprehensive theoretical framework for studying the psychological and 
contextual factors underlying motivation, attainment, and choices within 
education (Eccles, 2009; Eccles, et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
Educational and career choices are assumed to closely relate to someone’s 
expectations for success and the value attached to the various options 
considered as available; these various beliefs are assumed to be influenced 
by cultural factors, someone’s family and background, someone’s context 
and environment, and their affective and other reactions from earlier 
experiences (Eccles, 2009). The model emphasises subjectively-perceived 
values and interpretations, recognising that students may have limited 
information, understand information differently, and may not necessarily 
follow a ‘rational’ decision-making process (Bøe, Henriksen, Lyons, & 
Schreiner, 2011; Eccles, 2009). 
Within the model, specific attitudes and beliefs associated with 
activities and wider areas have been considered, and formally termed 
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‘subjective task values’ (Eccles, 2009). These have been conceptualised as 
interest value (intrinsic interest and enjoyment in doing something), utility 
value (extrinsic usefulness as doing something as a means to gain wider 
benefits or outcomes), attainment value (the importance or value an activity 
has through affirming a personal or collective identity), and cost value (such 
as financial and emotional costs as well as time and other aspects) (Eccles, 
2009). (This thesis uses ‘personal value’ to refer to ‘attainment value’ for 
intuitive clarity, for example to avoid confusion with higher attainment 
(performance or achievement) being valued.) Additionally, the model has 
separated someone’s confidence in their personal abilities (akin to self-
concept beliefs) from their expectations for success (akin to self-efficacy 
beliefs), although the two aspects have been proposed to influence each 
other and have sometimes been measured as if they were the same (Eccles, 
2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
These various elements have been assumed to closely, and 
reciprocally, associate (Eccles, 2009). In accordance with these 
assumptions, students’ attitudes, attainment, and beliefs of their own 
abilities have associated in various ways. For example, across 
primary/elementary school and secondary school in the United States, 
students’ interest and self-concept beliefs closely linked, and to a greater 
extent than the link between attainment and self-concept and the link 
between attainment and interest (Denissen, Zarrett, & Eccles, 2007). 
Similarly, again in the United States, students’ self-concept beliefs and 
interest have both reciprocally associated with attainment at upper-
secondary school when measured from Grade 10 to five years after 
secondary school graduation (Guo, Marsh, Morin, Parker, & Kaur, 2015). 
Other close associations have been observed in various other studies. For 
example, for Grade 9 students in Germany for science, interest and 
attainment (Jansen, Lüdtke, & Ulrich, 2016), and interest and perceived 
utility (Taskinen, Schütte, & Prenzel, 2013), have closely associated. 
Similarly, for Grade 9/10 students in Norway for mathematics, interest and 
perceived utility, and interest and effort, have associated (Federici & 
Skaalvik, 2014). 
The expectancy-value model broadly assumes that students’ context 
and background influences their subjective values and beliefs, which then 
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influence their intentions and choices (Eccles, 2009). These assumptions 
have been supported by various research studies. For example, parents’ and 
teachers’ expectations and attributions may influence students’ beliefs, such 
as through parents and teachers attributing success due to ability in boys but 
due to effort in girls (Espinoza, Arêas da Luz Fontes, & Arms-Chavez, 
2014; Gunderson, Ramirez, Levine, & Beilock, 2012). For secondary school 
students in Australia, boys and girls differentially perceived the beliefs of 
their mathematics teachers: compared to boys, girls believed that their 
teachers expected them to do less well, but believed that their teacher 
thought that mathematics had higher status compared to other subjects 
(Lazarides & Watt, 2015). For secondary school students in the United 
States, students’ classroom experiences, including their beliefs about their 
teachers’ expectations of the student doing well, the level of social support, 
and the extent of promoting understanding and discussing the meaning of 
problems and issues, predicted the students’ aggregated perceived 
importance, utility, and interest (Wang, 2012). The students’ course 
enrolment and career aspirations in mathematics were then positively 
predicted by their expectancies (mixing self-concept and self-efficacy items) 
and their values (aggregated importance, utility, and interest), but were not 
directly predicted by their classroom experiences (Wang, 2012). 
Theoretical models may ideally help ensure that any inherent 
elements are similarly conceptualised across different studies, although 
different results may still follow from different interpretations or 
implementations of these elements (Bong, 1996). For example, the 
expectancy-value model separated someone’s confidence in their personal 
abilities from their expectations for success, although it was subsequently 
recognised that various research studies had used the terms and/or different 
measurement items interchangeably (Eccles, 2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 
2000). Similarly, various studies have considered students’ values 
aggregated together (Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 2012; Wang, 2012) or 
as discrete factors (Musu-Gillette, Wigfield, Harring, & Eccles, 2015). Even 
when studies have considered students’ values as an aggregate, each of the 
four theorised elements has not always been covered; for example, 
sometimes only interest and utility have been considered (Wang, 2012). 
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On a wider level, the expectancy-value model has also been 
contextualised with reference to personal identity (Eccles, 2009). 
Someone’s perceptions of various cultural and social aspects may influence 
how they orient their personal identity against various roles, relationships, 
and expectations; various actions may be valued or promoted through 
helping to enact a particular role or identity (Eccles, 2009). Essentially, the 
expectancy-value model has been interpreted to inherently link students’ 
aspirations for the future with who they want to become in the future 
(Eccles, 2009). Students’ identities have been increasingly considered 
within various research fields, and have been defined and explored in 
various ways (Côté, 2006; Gee, 2000; Sfard & Prusak, 2005). Within 
science education, considering students’ identities has encompassed 
numerous aspects such as: students’ current beliefs of themselves and their 
abilities; students’ beliefs of how other people view them and wider social 
and cultural expectations and influences; and students’ beliefs of what they 
want to do and become in the future (Archer, et al., 2010; Aschbacher, Li, & 
Roth, 2010). A complementary perspective has considered that enacting or 
embodying a particular identity may require specific knowledge and skills 
(or ‘competences’) in undertaking relevant social practices (or 
‘performances’), which are recognised and observed by others and also by 
the person themselves (Carlone & Johnson, 2007). These elements highlight 
the importance of personal skills and confidence, including self-reflection 
and recognising such skills. 
In summary, the expectancy-value model proposes a plausible 
framework for students’ intentions and choices, highlights the importance of 
students’ confidence (which may be conceptualised and expressed as akin to 
self-concept and self-efficacy beliefs), and has been supported through 
various research studies (Bøe & Henriksen, 2015; Wang & Degol, 2013). 
Practically, the model provides a basic list of factors to consider, which can 
then be extended as necessary. While the various factors within the 
expectancy-value model have been historically measured slightly differently 
or included or omitted (Eccles, 2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), specific 
models of educational choices may help ensure that the considered factors 
broadly reflect historically-accepted and/or contemporary theory and 
conceptualisations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007; Messick, 1995).  
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Section 3: Students’ confidence 
 
Students’ confidence, which is used here as an intuitive term for brevity and 
inclusivity, has been conceptualised in various ways within educational and 
motivational research, most commonly as ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-efficacy’ 
beliefs (Bandura, 1977; Bong & Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). 
Someone’s current confidence (‘self-concept’) broadly considers their 
interpretations of their historic and current attainment experiences, such as 
gaining particular grades or accomplishing difficult work, often through 
evaluations of whether they think that they are ‘doing well’ or are ‘good’ at 
a subject (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). 
Alternately, someone’s confidence in their future capacities or capabilities 
(‘self-efficacy’) considers their evaluative beliefs about specific events or 
contexts, such as their confidence in being able to gain a particular 
examination grade or in being able to successfully undertake a particular 
type of task (Bandura, 1977; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). 
Section 3.1 briefly considers these common conceptualisations of 
students’ confidence, self-efficacy and self-concept, and how they may be 
influenced; various factors, other than attainment, have been theoretically 
proposed and empirically found to influence students’ confidence, which 
may potentially introduce under-confidence or over-confidence biases. 
Section 3.2 then covers prior research that has directly considered 
confidence accuracy/biases. A plausible conceptual and theoretical rationale 
for the importance of accurate confidence is then considered in Section 3.3, 
specifically through the idea of self-regulation. Additionally, given the focus 
on confidence accuracy/bias throughout this thesis, and given that it needed 
to be calculated within the analysis, Section 3.4 discusses some of the 
inherent uncertainty involved in attempting to measure confidence 
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Section 3.1: Confidence as self-efficacy and self-concept beliefs 
 
Confidence conceptualised as self-efficacy forms an integral aspect of 
social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997). Social-cognitive theory essentially 
proposes that individual behaviour is not necessarily entirely autonomous, 
nor necessarily entirely deterministic; instead, behaviour, motivations and 
beliefs (including confidence), and wider contextual influences are assumed 
to each reciprocally influence one another (Bandura, 1989). 
Self-efficacy represents someone’s beliefs in their capabilities to 
successfully undertake an action (Bandura, 1977). Self-efficacy was 
considered to be distinct from outcome expectations (estimates that a 
particular action would then lead to a particular outcome) and was theorised 
to be specific to tasks and domains (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1997). 
Subsequent studies have accordingly confirmed that students’ self-efficacy 
beliefs have been specific to various areas, but have nevertheless often 
associated to some degree across academic subjects and across more-
specific to more-generalised measures (Bong, 1997, 2001a, 2002, 2004). 
High self-efficacy beliefs may be motivational and facilitate people 
to surpass their normal performance, while low self-efficacy beliefs may be 
limiting and ensure that some actions are not even attempted (Bandura, 
1997). In accordance with these theoretical assumptions, higher self-
efficacy has indeed been associated with various motivational approaches, 
such as aiming to learn and master academic work (Jiang, Song, Lee, & 
Bong, 2014; Phillips & Gully, 1997), with persistence (Multon, Brown, & 
Lent, 1991; Skaalvik, Federici, & Klassen, 2015), and with students’ self-
regulation for their learning (Usher & Pajares, 2008a; Zimmerman & 
Schunk, 2011). Self-efficacy has also strongly predicted students’ 
attainment (Britner, 2008; Britner & Pajares, 2006; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 
1991) and has associated with their studying intentions (Bong, 2001b; 
Pajares & Miller, 1995; Stevens, Wang, Olivárez, & Hamman, 2007). 
Self-efficacy beliefs were theorised to follow from particular sources 
or antecedents (Bandura, 1977, 1997): ‘enactive mastery experiences’ (i.e. 
prior experiences, whether successes or failures); ‘vicarious experiences’ 
(i.e. seeing others successfully perform, which was assumed to be more 
influential when there were no absolute measures of adequacy and when 
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there was a perceived similarity with the person performing); ‘verbal 
persuasions’ (i.e. persuasive and evaluative feedback from significant 
others, which was assumed to be more influential when the person was 
considered knowledgeable and credible, and the information was considered 
realistic, but which was assumed to be easily outweighed by disconfirming 
mastery experiences); and ‘physiological reactions’ (i.e. physical and 
emotional responses such as anxiety). 
Mastery experiences have generally been found to be the most 
influential from these four sources of self-efficacy beliefs, while the 
influences of the others have varied across studies (Britner, 2008; Britner & 
Pajares, 2006; Lopez, Lent, Brown, & Gore, 1997; Usher & Pajares, 2008b, 
2009). Correlations between the sources of self-efficacy have been typically 
found, since those gaining successful experiences likely receive praise for 
them and experience positive feelings (Usher & Pajares, 2008b). Relatively 
similar findings have also been observed through qualitative explorations of 
influences on self-efficacy (Butz & Usher, 2015; Zeldin & Pajares, 2000; 
Zeldin, Britner, & Pajares, 2008) and through interventions that have 
targeted self-efficacy (van Dinther, Dochy, & Segers, 2011). 
Further studies have highlighted that different students may be 
influenced in different ways. For example, the four theorised sources have 
differentially predicted self-efficacy for boys and girls (Britner, 2008; 
Britner & Pajares, 2006; Lent, Lopez, & Bieschke, 1991). Additionally, 
distinct clusters of students have been identified who reported varying 
magnitudes of the four theorised sources (Chen & Usher, 2013). Such 
differences may then help explain differences in students’ confidence, 
and/or confidence biases towards under-confidence or over-confidence 
(although such studies have not explicitly made the connection to 
confidence biases). However, prior studies have often focused on 
determining the relative magnitudes of the four theorised sources (whether 
via reported expressions or via coefficients in predictive models), with less 
focus on considering any other potential antecedents/influences or wider 
implications. 
Confidence conceptualised as self-concept evolved from general 
psychological measures (such as self-esteem) rather than within a 
motivational theory (Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Self-concept 
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was originally conceptualised as someone’s perceptions of their self, formed 
through experiences and interactions with and within their environment 
(Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Concurrently, self-concept was 
ascribed various characteristics, such as being structured, hierarchical, and 
being both descriptive and evaluative, where evaluations could be made 
against absolute standards or relative standards such as peers (Shavelson, 
Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). However, someone’s perceptions of their self are 
many and varied, and it perhaps remained unclear regarding what, exactly, 
should be measured. Initially, self-concept encompassed confidence 
together with interest and enjoyment (Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). 
Subsequently, self-concept became increasingly focused on someone’s 
beliefs of their academic ability (i.e. evaluations of ‘being good’ or ‘doing 
well’), and students’ affective responses were then considered separately 
(Arens, Seeshing Yeung, Craven, & Hasselhorn, 2011; Marsh, Craven, & 
Debus, 1999). Contemporary conceptions of self-concept beliefs do not, 
therefore, consider someone’s overall sense or idea of their ‘self’ as it would 
be considered through ‘science identity’ (Archer, et al., 2010; Aschbacher, 
Li, & Roth, 2010; Carlone & Johnson, 2007) or through wider ideas of 
identity (Côté, 2006; Gee, 2000; Sfard & Prusak, 2005). 
Early research helped establish academic subject-specific self-
concept beliefs that also generalised into wider factors such as 
verbal/language self-concept beliefs and mathematical/quantitative self-
concept beliefs (Marsh, 1990; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Marsh, Byrne, & 
Shavelson, 1988). Early studies also found that students’ mathematics and 
languages attainment generally positively associated, while mathematics 
and languages self-concept beliefs generally had very low or no 
associations, when the four factors were modelled together (Marsh, 1986b; 
Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1988). Additionally, someone’s self-concept 
beliefs were positively predicted by their own academic attainment but 
negatively predicted by group-average attainment when these three factors 
were modelled together (Marsh, 1987; Marsh & Parker, 1984). 
Results from these early studies were interpreted to mean that 
students formed their self-concept beliefs, to some extent, in reference to or 
in contrast with their peers (Marsh, 1987; Marsh & Parker, 1984). The 
results were subsequently replicated across England (Nagengast & Marsh, 
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2011) and various other countries via data from international studies (Marsh 
& Hau, 2003; Marsh, Abduljabbar, et al., 2015; Seaton, et al., 2008; Seaton, 
Marsh, & Craven, 2009). Students were concurrently assumed to form their 
self-concept beliefs in reference to or through contrasting their attainment in 
different subjects (Marsh, 1986b; Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1988). 
Similarly, these results were subsequently replicated using data from 
various international studies (Chiu, 2008, 2012; Marsh, et al., 2014; Marsh, 
Lüdtke, et al., 2015; Möller & Köller, 2001; Möller & Marsh, 2013; Möller, 
Pohlmann, Köller, & Marsh, 2009). Such results, however, have generally 
not been observed for self-efficacy (Bong, 1998; Möller, Pohlmann, Köller, 
& Marsh, 2009; Skaalvik & Rankin, 1990, 1995). 
Outside of replication studies, self-concept studies have produced 
more variable results. Longitudinal studies have variously found some 
evidence (Marsh & Köller, 2004; Niepel, Brunner, & Preckel, 2014b) or no 
evidence (Chen, Yeh, Hwang, & Lin, 2013; Möller, Retelsdorf, Köller, & 
Marsh, 2011; Parker, Marsh, Morin, Seaton, & Van Zanden, 2015) for self-
concept beliefs being influenced by contrasting attainment across different 
subjects. Students’ self-concept beliefs have also positively associated 
within similar academic areas (such as across quantitative subjects including 
mathematics and science) (Jansen, Schroeders, Lüdtke, & Marsh, 2015; 
Marsh, et al., 2014; Marsh, Lüdtke, et al., 2015), and when students had 
similar attainment across different subjects (Rost, Sparfeldt, Dickhauser, & 
Schilling, 2005). Self-concept research has also often focused on replication 
of specific models, but without exploring how and why any assumed effects 
such as peer-comparisons occur. Numerous factors may be relevant, such as 
who students compare themselves against and the specific practices of 
grouping students within schools (Chiu, et al., 2008; Collins, 1996; Huguet, 
Dumas, Monteil, & Genestoux, 2001; Ireson & Hallam, 2009; Lubbers, 
Kuyper, & van der Werf, 2009; Wehrens, Kuyper, Dijkstra, Buunk, & van 
der Werf, 2010). Wider psychological research has also suggested that peer-
comparisons may be inherently problematic to explore: in some situations, 
students may base their peer-comparisons mainly on assessments of 
themselves rather than on assessments of others, so that a comparison may 
not necessarily take place (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & 
Vredenburg, 1995; Klar & Giladi, 1999; Kruger, 1999). Broadly, some 
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uncertainty remains into what might influence self-concept beliefs: self-
concept research has almost exclusively been quantitative, and has not 
included interviews or free-responses to allow students to report what 
influences their confidence beliefs, in contrast to various studies into self-
efficacy (Butz & Usher, 2015; Zeldin & Pajares, 2000; Zeldin, Britner, & 
Pajares, 2008). 
The motivational implications of self-concept beliefs have been 
explored for various areas. For example, across various samples and 
countries, prior attainment has predicted subsequent self-concept beliefs, 
controlling for prior self-concept beliefs, and concurrently prior self-concept 
has predicted subsequent attainment, controlling for prior attainment 
(Huang, 2011b; Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, & Baumert, 2005; 
Möller, Retelsdorf, Köller, & Marsh, 2011; Niepel, Brunner, & Preckel, 
2014a; Preckel, Niepel, Schneider, & Brunner, 2013; Seaton, Parker, Marsh, 
Craven, & Yeung, 2014; Skaalvik & Hagtvet, 1990). Self-concept may then 
have a motivational role, similar to self-efficacy, although it perhaps 
remains unclear why. Various studies have revealed close associations 
between self-concept beliefs and interest over time (Denissen, Zarrett, & 
Eccles, 2007; Guay, Ratelle, Roy, & Litalien, 2010; Guo, Marsh, Morin, 
Parker, & Kaur, 2015; Marsh, Trautwein, Lüdtke, Köller, & Baumert, 2005; 
Viljaranta, Tolvanen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2014). It is perhaps then plausible 
to infer that, similarly to self-efficacy, higher self-concept may appear 
motivational through perhaps entailing higher interest and engagement. 
In summary, self-efficacy beliefs, and perhaps also self-concept 
beliefs, may be motivational, and associate with beneficial outcomes within 
education. Self-efficacy and self-concept beliefs may be influenced by 
broadly similar areas within education; for example, peers may provide 
evidence that students can similarly accomplish tasks and so influence self-
efficacy beliefs, and/or peers may partially provide evaluative standards for 
what ‘being good at science’ means and so influence self-concept beliefs. 
These various influences on students’ confidence, other than their 
attainment, may potentially introduce biases towards under-confidence or 
over-confidence. Additionally, similarities in self-efficacy and self-concept 
beliefs from more-specific to more-generalised beliefs, and across areas or 
subjects, may suggest that any biases towards under-confidence and over-
Page 47 of 361 
confidence may be similarly reflected across degrees of generalisation 
and/or across academic subjects. 
 
 
Section 3.2: Confidence accuracy and biases 
 
The motivational implications of higher self-efficacy and/or self-concept 
beliefs suggest that higher confidence may be beneficial in itself (Bandura, 
1997). It is possible that benefits then occur even if someone is over-
confident, although the area remains relatively unclear. 
On a wider level, views have also differed as to whether over-
confidence, self-enhancement, self-serving biases, positivity biases, positive 
illusions, and similar concepts are essentially universal and potentially 
‘beneficial’ to everyone (Cai, et al., 2011; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 
2008; Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; Hepper, Sedikides, & Cai, 
2013; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), or whether the potential 
benefits of any biases may be relative to particular countries (Heine, 2005; 
Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; 
Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). The issue may be 
complicated through differences in some biases across countries being 
dependent, to some extent, on the methods used to reveal and measure them 
(Church, et al., 2014; Krueger & Wright, 2010; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, 
& Hankin, 2004). Regardless, for students within England (or any country 
considered alone), it is perhaps more relevant to explore whether they are 
under-confident or over-confident compared to other students in England, or 
when compared against absolute standards. Accordingly, international 
differences (in the sense of universal/relative biases) are not focused on 
when considering prior literature, and within the overall research design for 
the thesis. 
The following sections review various studies into students’ 
accuracy/bias, in order to consider the different ways in which under-
confidence, accuracy, or over-confidence might be considered beneficial or 
detrimental, such as associating with higher or lower attainment (Section 
3.2.1) and/or higher or lower attitudes and other aspects relevant to 
education (Section 3.2.2). Less research has explored how prevalent 
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different degrees of accuracy/bias may be across samples of students 
(Section 3.2.3); however, such studies have potentially highlighted the 
benefit of exploring confidence accuracy/bias via cluster analysis. 
 
 
Section 3.2.1: Accuracy/bias and attainment 
 
Many studies have explored how students’ accuracy/bias associates with 
their attainment, which is often considered to be fundamentally beneficial 
within educational systems, although results have varied. For example, 
studies of secondary school students have, via different approaches, 
samples, and measured factors, variously associated under-confidence with 
higher attainment (Chiu & Klassen, 2010), accurately-evaluated beliefs with 
higher attainment (Chen, 2003), and also over-confidence with higher 
attainment (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & Régner, 2011). Perhaps unhelpfully, 
each case could then be considered to be ‘beneficial’, from a particular 
perspective and given a particular context and methodology. 
Further studies can nevertheless provide insights into the area. For 
example, a study of students at the end of primary school in the Netherlands 
(Grade 5, age 10-11) showed that boys performed higher than girls on 
arithmetic mathematics tasks, and were more confident in their ability to 
find an adequate solution; while boys tended to over-estimate their 
performance (showing over-confidence) compared to girls, the girls were 
not necessarily under-confident (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010). The 
students generally over-estimated their performance when measured after 
the tasks than before the tasks, although this varied by the type of 
mathematics task: accuracy was higher after completing arithmetic tasks, 
suggesting that the students were able to evaluate their problem-solving 
process and make an enhanced assessment of their performance, although 
the opposite occurred for applied tasks that required interpretation of the 
problem (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010). For secondary school students in 
the United States (age 15), students’ retrospective estimates of their 
performance were more accurate (although still slightly over-confident) 
compared to their predictions made in advance, although these did vary 
across academic subjects (Erickson & Heit, 2015). 
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For students in early secondary school in the United States (Grade 7, 
age 12-13), accuracy in confidence associated with higher attainment, both 
directly and indirectly via self-efficacy beliefs (Chen, 2003). For similar 
students, accuracy decreased and over-confidence increased with the 
difficulty of the tasks (Chen & Zimmerman, 2007). Similarly, again for 
secondary school students in the United States considered over time (Grades 
5-8, age 10-14), accuracy was higher for easier rather than harder questions, 
for boys, and for those with higher performance (Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). 
Additionally, higher accuracy predicted higher subsequent gains in 
mathematics performance, controlling for the students’ concurrent 
performance (Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). For all secondary school students 
(age 15) surveyed by PISA 2000, which measured students’ self-concept 
beliefs in reading (Chiu & Klassen, 2009) and in mathematics (Chiu & 
Klassen, 2010), those who were over-confident in their self-concept beliefs 
were more likely to have scores below their country mean, while under-
confident students were more likely to score above their country mean (Chiu 
& Klassen, 2009, 2010). 
Studies with undergraduate students, most undertaken in the United 
States with psychology students, have usually highlighted higher accuracy 
but slight under-confidence in higher-performing students and lower 
accuracy and over-confidence in lower-performing students (Ackerman & 
Wolman, 2007; Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, 
& Rakow, 2000; Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005). Similarly, 
undergraduate students in England generally over-estimated their mental 
arithmetic test scores, although higher-performing students had smaller 
biases (Chevalier, Gibbons, Thorpe, Snelle, & Hoskins, 2009). Such results 
have been observed since some of the earliest studies into accuracy/bias: 
historically, university students with lower performance were seen to be 
over-confident while students with higher performance were seen to be 
slightly under-confident (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Students were 
generally over-confident, but showed under-confidence on easier test items 
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Similarly, and more recently, 
undergraduate students in the United States also over-estimated their scores 
when a test was difficult but not when it was easy (Krueger & Mueller, 
2002). 
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In general terms, psychological studies with undergraduate students 
have applied various methods. Similar results have broadly been seen when 
undergraduate students have made relative estimates of their performance, 
such as estimating their percentile ranking against the study sample or 
against their peers in general (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), and also when 
students made absolute estimates, such as estimating the numbers of test 
items forecasted or retrospectively considered to be correct (Ehrlinger, 
Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008). However, higher-performing 
students could be variously under-confident or accurate when absolute 
estimates were used (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 
2008). Nevertheless, others have suggested that various effects, including 
statistical or methodological aspects, may have contributed to the varying 
results (Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002; Krajc & Ortmann, 2008; 
Krueger & Mueller, 2002). 
Specific studies of undergraduate students in the United States have 
shown that over-evaluating their academic abilities was associated with 
lower subsequent course grades (Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 
2003; Robins & Beer, 2001). Further studies highlighted that similar 
students generally over-reported their current attainment (their Grade Point 
Average, GPA) and their prior attainment (their Scholastic Aptitude Test, 
SAT, scores) (Gramzow & Willard, 2006). Over-reporting their GPA was 
positively predicted by believing themselves to be better than other students 
on a range of personality measures (which may or may not have been 
accurate and could not be determined), while over-reporting their SAT 
scores was positively predicted by being an older student (Gramzow & 
Willard, 2006). The pattern was interpreted as highlighting that self-
enhancement contributed to motivational biases in reporting current 
performance (which reflected current aims and goals) but was less relevant 
to biases in reporting prior performance (which reflected prior aims) 
(Gramzow & Willard, 2006). Reconstructive memory processes were 
suggested to contribute to the increased bias in reporting prior performance 
in older students, as older information may become less accessible over time 
and may increasingly be influenced by tendencies to bias reports (Gramzow 
& Willard, 2006; Willard & Gramzow, 2008). Further work has highlighted 
that any costs and benefits of over-confidence may depend on any 
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underlying motivation: exaggeration of students’ GPA associated with their 
reported need for achievement (e.g. enjoying challenging tasks and not 
necessarily working only because they were required to) and improvement 
in their subsequent academic attainment (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). In 
that situation, exaggeration may have reflected the projection of positive 
goals onto someone’s responses (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). 
Further studies with undergraduate students, again mostly occurring 
in the United States, have explored memory and accuracy/biases 
(considering meta-cognition or ‘meta-memory’ via ‘judgements of 
learning’). Generally, specific methods have been applied, where students 
memorise pairs of words and report their confidence in subsequently 
recalling the second word when given the first word (i.e. providing their 
‘judgment of learning’), which is then compared against their subsequent 
test performance (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat, 1997). Such studies have 
broadly highlighted that students were often over-confident prior to 
undertaking a test, but were under-confident on subsequent testing 
occasions (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 2008; Koriat, 1997; Koriat, Sheffer, & 
Ma’ayan, 2002). Such studies have also been undertaken with younger 
students, but highlighting slightly different results. For example, for primary 
school students in the United States (Grade 3 and 5, age 8 and 10), students 
remained over-confident in their predictive judgements of being able to 
remember definitions, across three occasions of studying, predicting, and 
testing (Finn & Metcalfe, 2014). The students were also very accurate for 
items that were correct but less accurate for items that were incorrect, 
essentially reflecting a higher ‘false positive’ reporting rate (Finn & 
Metcalfe, 2014). For primary school students in Switzerland (age 6), under-
estimating students performed higher than over-estimating students and 
showed higher discrimination in their confidence judgments when they were 
incorrect (i.e. accurately reporting low confidence when they were 
incorrect) compared to other patterns (Destan & Roebers, 2015). The 
students showed similar discrimination when they were correct (i.e. 
reporting high confidence when they were correct) regardless of whether 
they were under-confident, accurate, or over-confident (Destan & Roebers, 
2015). Such studies begin to suggest that under-confidence and over-
confidence may follow from different processes, such as over-confidence 
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perhaps following from students not recognising when answers might be 
wrong. 
In summary, higher attainment is intuitively beneficial within 
education. While results have varied, it seems plausible to infer that accurate 
beliefs broadly associate with higher attainment (Chen, 2003). However, the 
area is potentially complicated since accuracy may be higher for easier tasks 
(Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014) and over-confidence may increase with the 
difficulty of the task (Chen & Zimmerman, 2007). It also remains unclear 
whether higher accuracy simply reflects higher attainment in some way or 




Section 3.2.2: Accuracy/bias and attitudes and beliefs 
 
Various studies have explored the associations between accuracy/bias and 
students’ wider attitudes and motivational beliefs, some of which may be 
(indirectly) considered beneficial within education, and/or relevant to 
students’ studying choices. 
For example, a study of Canadian primary school students (Grade 3 
and 5, age 9 and 11) showed that under-confident students (via self-beliefs 
of general ability compared to a general mental ability test) reported lower 
intrinsic motivation for mathematics, pride in their results, and attitude to 
effort (i.e. being less likely to apply effort as a means to succeed), and 
gained lower attainment in mathematics, compared to accurate and over-
confident students (Bouffard, Boisvert, & Vezeau, 2003). For primary 
school students in the United States (Grade 3, age 8-9), confidence biases 
were considered through comparing students’ general academic self-concept 
beliefs against teachers’ judgments of their academic attainment; those with 
accurately-high self-concept beliefs had higher reading and mathematics 
attainment, and higher social skills, than those with over-confident or 
accurately-low beliefs (Gresham, Lane, MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000). 
Those with accurately-high and over-confident beliefs similarly reported 
high perceived importance for their academic work (Gresham, Lane, 
MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000). Curiously, insufficient numbers of 
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students could be classified into an under-confident group for that to be 
considered (Gresham, Lane, MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000). 
For secondary school students in Greece (Grade 9 and 10, age 15-
16), over-confident students (via their self-efficacy compared with their 
attainment) reported higher interest in the subject than under-confident 
students for both mathematics and languages; accurately-evaluating students 
reported more interest in mathematics compared to over-confident students, 
and reported the same interest as over-confident students for languages 
(Gonida & Leondari, 2011). No group differences were found for 
persistence, mastery goals (focusing on learning/mastering studying), and 
performance-approach goals (focusing on out-performing peers), for both 
mathematics and languages considered separately (Gonida & Leondari, 
2011). However, when considering students who were over-confident, 
accurate, or under-confident in both mathematics and languages, over-
confident students reported higher performance-approach goals (focusing on 
out-performing peers) and higher performance-avoidance goals (focusing on 
avoiding looking worse than peers) compared to the other groups; over-
confident students and accurate students reported similar mastery goals, 
higher than under-confident students (Gonida & Leondari, 2011). For 
secondary school students in France (Grade 8 and 9, age 13-16), considering 
their perceived relative ability to other students compared against their 
relative attainment, over-evaluating students in mathematics reported higher 
performance-approach goals and made more progress during the year than 
under-evaluating students, while the over-evaluating and accurately-
evaluating groups did not significantly differ (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & 
Régner, 2011). Alternately, for secondary school students in Austria (Grade 
7, age 14), neither mastery goal orientations nor performance-avoidance 
goal orientations for school studying were predicted by an accuracy/bias 
indicator (self-estimated attainment compared against actual attainment) for 
German language and for mathematics (Schwab & Hessels, 2015). 
For undergraduate students in the United States, exaggerating their 
attainment (GPA) positively associated with a performance-approach 
orientation but had no association with a performance-avoidance orientation 
or with a mastery orientation (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). For similar 
university students in Germany and the Netherlands, those with high 
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performance-approach goals over-estimated their intelligence test scores and 
those with high performance-avoidance under-estimated, while mastery 
goals did not associate with over-estimating or under-estimating (Bipp, 
Steinmayr, & Spinath, 2012). University students in the United States who 
expressed a fixed/entity view of intelligence/ability tended towards over-
confidence in estimating their test-scores compared to those who expressed 
an incremental/changeable view, who were more accurate (Ehrlinger, 
Mitchum, & Dweck, 2016). 
Few studies have considered students’ intentions or choices and 
confidence accuracy/bias. As one example, for secondary school students in 
Australia (Year 9 and 11, age 14-16), over-evaluation of their mathematics 
self-concept beliefs (compared to their teachers’ perceptions) was associated 
with higher examination performance and greater intentions to engage with 
mathematics in the future (Martin & Debus, 1998). More recently in 
England, research has started to explore the implications of confidence 
accuracy/bias on students’ intentions, considering accuracy/bias using 
paired tasks and confidence-ratings (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014). 
For Year 8 students, under-confident students reported lower mathematics 
attitudes than accurate and over-confident students, including for their 
interest and perceived utility; at Year 10, however, over-confident students 
reported the lowest intentions to study mathematics further (Sheldrake, 
Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014). 
In summary, it is possible to infer that over-confidence may 
associate with higher interest and performance orientations (i.e. 
motivational tendencies to try to perform higher than peers), although 
results have varied across studies. It remains unclear whether perceptions of 




Section 3.2.3: Accuracy/bias across clusters of students 
 
Research has started to consider how prevalent different degrees of 
accuracy/bias may be, through defining and considering clusters of students 
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with similar biases, although results have varied. Few studies have 
considered similar samples and/or applied similar approaches. 
For example, one study of Canadian students from Grade 3/4 (age 
9/10) to Grade 7/8 (aged 13/14) highlighted that most students had a stable 
degree of accuracy/bias over time (when comparing their general 
perceptions of ability against intelligence test scores): the majority (75% of 
the sample) showed a stable but moderate over-estimating bias, while a 
smaller cluster (15%) showed a stable but highly over-estimating bias; a 
minority (6%) showed an under-estimating bias that became even more 
under-estimating over time, while another minority (4%) showed a highly 
under-estimating bias that changed to a moderately under-estimating bias 
over time (Bouffard, Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011). In comparison, 
clusters of students in primary school in Finland (Grade 1-2, age 7-8) were 
identified using their mathematics self-concept beliefs and their attainment: 
half of the students (49%) were over-confident with high self-concept but 
low attainment, a third (33%) were accurate with high self-concept and high 
attainment, and the remainder (18%) were accurate with low self-concept 
and low attainment (Rytkönen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007). Cluster 
membership was relatively stable over time, although the proportion of 
students in the over-confident group slightly decreased over two years while 
the proportion of students in the accurate clusters slightly increased 
(Rytkönen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007). Differences in results might simply 
reflect different studies measuring different students and areas, although it is 
possible that tendencies towards accuracy/bias may be relatively stable over 
time (although difficult to determine given limited research). Psychological 
studies with university students have also suggested stable bias over time 
(Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000). 
Clusters of secondary school students in Spain (Grade 10-11, age 15-
16) were identified when considering their mathematics self-concept and 
attainment (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). Clusters formed for those with 
accurately-high self-concept beliefs (36% of the students), accurately-low 
beliefs (22%), over-confident beliefs (20%), and under-confident beliefs 
(21%) (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). The students’ cluster membership 
remained relatively constant between Grade 10 and Grade 11, although the 
proportion of students in the accurately-high cluster slightly decreased at 
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Grade 11, and the proportions of students in the other clusters increased 
accordingly (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). Boys were more likely than girls to 
be assigned to the accurately-high (at Grade 10) or over-confident clusters 
(at Grade 10 and Grade 11) than the under-confident cluster (Sáinz & 
Upadyaya, 2016). Students with higher fathers’ education were more likely 
to be assigned to the under-confident cluster than the accurately-high cluster 
at Grade 10 (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). Students with higher mothers’ or 
fathers’ education were more likely to be assigned to the accurately-low 
cluster at Grade 10 than the accurately-high cluster (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 
2016). 
For secondary school students in Switzerland and Germany (Grade 
9, age 15), students were clustered using latent-class analysis on their scores 
on general cognitive tests and physics content tests, their reported interest in 
physics, and their self-concept beliefs in physics (Seidel, 2006). Five 
clusters were found to be optimal to fit the data: one with generally high 
scores and beliefs (24% of the students); one with high cognitive scores, 
varying physics scores, low interest in physics, and moderate self-concept 
(12%); one with high cognitive scores and physics scores, moderate interest, 
and low self-concept (29%, potentially ‘under-estimating’); one with low 
cognitive scores, moderate/varying physics scores, high interest, and high 
self-concept (16%, potentially ‘over-estimating’); and one with generally 
low/moderate scores and responses (19%) (Seidel, 2006). The same students 
were considered further, highlighting that more girls were classified as 
under-estimating and more boys were classified as over-estimating (Jurik, 
Gröschner, & Seidel, 2013). The cluster with generally high scores and 
beliefs were observed to have higher frequency and duration of engagement 
and giving answers in lessons; membership of the under-estimating cluster 
only associated with lower frequency of engagement (and not duration of 
engagement or frequency of giving answers), while membership of the over-
estimating cluster did not associate with students’ engagement (Jurik, 
Gröschner, & Seidel, 2013). Additionally, the cluster with generally high 
scores and beliefs reported higher use of particular learning strategies (such 
as rephrasing content into the students’ own words) and intrinsic motivation 
for learning, while the over-estimating students reported moderately, and 
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while the under-estimating students reported lower (Jurik, Gröschner, & 
Seidel, 2014). 
In summary, it remains relatively unclear, given the varying ages 
and samples of students considered, whether biases towards under-
confidence and over-confidence occur in equal proportions of students, or 
only in minorities of students. The fundamental points of note were that 
considering clusters of students appeared to offer the potential for new 
insights, but appeared not to have been undertaken for students in England. 
 
 
Section 3.3: Self-regulation 
 
Motivational theories, such as social-cognitive theory applied through the 
expectancy-value model, can help provide interpretative and explanatory 
perspectives onto students’ intentions and choices (Bøe & Henriksen, 2015; 
Eccles, 2009). Similarly, the wider perspective of self-regulation can 
potentially help contextualise, interpret, and/or explain the relevance of 
accuracy/bias in students’ confidence. Indeed, the expectancy-value model, 
which encompasses students’ confidence beliefs, itself operates within 
social-cognitive theory, which has been described as inherently involving 
self-regulation (Bandura, 1989, 2001).  
For example, someone’s self-efficacy and expectations have been 
theorised to determine, together with various other influences, what goals 
are chosen and what actions are taken to realise them; various beliefs, ideas, 
and conceptions may influence goals, actions, and the standards against 
which actions and results are evaluated (Bandura, 2001). Someone then 
monitors and evaluates their progress against their goals, which helps 
determine any changes in actions, motivation, and other aspects, in order to 
help meet the goals or even to change the goals themselves (Bandura, 2001). 
These various processes may occur on different levels of detail and over 
time, broadly within iterative cycles of ‘self-regulation’ (broadly covering 
planning, acting, monitoring, and evaluating), and may be influenced in 
various ways by beliefs, feelings, and affective reactions (Bandura, 1989, 
2001; Butler & Winne, 1995; Zimmerman, 2000; Zimmerman & Moylan, 
2009). Self-regulation, considered as a cyclical process in this way, appears 
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conceptually similar to (biological) feedback processes (Cannon, 1929; 
Carver & Scheier, 1982) and general ideas of experiential learning (Kolb, 
1984). 
Ultimately, someone would need to accurately determine their 
current situation in order to monitor their progress against their goals. For 
example, someone would need to consider their confidence in their expected 
attainment, including their understanding of various topics and similar 
aspects, in order to determine whether further revision would be necessary 
in order to gain their desired examination grade. Accurate self-evaluation 
may then have important implications to students’ studying approaches and 
motivation: students may study less if they believe that they already master 
an area, for example, which becomes problematic if this belief is inaccurate 
(Winne, 1995). Generally, effective self-regulation has been assumed to 
result in improved learning and performance, and also in accurate beliefs of 
ability, efficacy, or performance (Boekaerts, 1999; Pintrich, 1999). 
‘Self-regulated learning’, considered as a specific concept in itself, 
has been defined as someone using deliberate cycles of planning, acting, and 
monitoring, specifically applied to learning activities (Butler & Winne, 
1995). Essentially, the idea of self-regulation (which could potentially be 
implicit or explicit within various areas of life) has been formalised into an 
explicit strategy that students may or may not apply (or may apply to 
varying degrees). In accordance with theoretical assumptions, studies have 
highlighted the apparent benefits of self-regulated studying. Reviewed 
across various studies, students’ self-reported self-regulated studying has 
associated with attainment, and at a greater average magnitude than specific 
studying approaches such as memorisation/rehearsal, elaboration, and 
organisation (Credé & Phillips, 2011). More specifically, for secondary 
school students in the United States, those with higher attainment reported 
higher adaptive self-regulation skills and interest in mathematics than those 
with lower attainment (Cleary & Chen, 2009). For similar students, science 
grades also correlated with their self-reported regulation and knowledge of 
their studying (Sperling, Richmond, Ramsay, & Klapp, 2012). For 
secondary school students in Germany, self-regulated learning has also 
associated with enjoyment of learning (Goetz, Hall, Frenzel, & Pekrun, 
2006). For secondary school students in Korea, self-regulation, together 
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with self-efficacy (contextualised as confidence in gaining grades) and 
grade goals (what grade is aimed at, what is the lowest grade that they 
would be satisfied in getting), directly predicted attainment across various 
academic subjects; students’ subject interest did not directly predict 
attainment but instead predicted self-regulation (Lee, Lee, & Bong, 2014). 
The one exception was science, where the same general pattern occurred, 
but self-regulation did not directly predict attainment in science (Lee, Lee, 
& Bong, 2014). 
It remains relatively unclear whether self-regulated learning, as a 
specific strategy, leads to accurate beliefs, whether self-regulated learning 
requires accurate beliefs, and/or whether other relations occur (such as 
elements of both cases). Given that studies have often associated higher 
attainment with higher accuracy in beliefs and lower biases (degrees of 
under-confidence/over-confidence) for secondary school students (Chen, 
2003; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014) and university students (Ackerman & 
Wolman, 2007; Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005), it is perhaps plausible 
to infer that higher accuracy may similarly associate with higher self-
regulation of studying. Nevertheless, any causality would remain unclear. 
For example, higher attainment might facilitate higher accuracy rather than 
higher accuracy entailing higher attainment. Equally, ‘self-regulatory’ 
studying strategies may entail higher attainment in themselves, perhaps 
regardless of whether they actually reflect or require accurate beliefs (and/or 
a cycle of activities/processes). Additionally, the ‘self-regulation’ 
underlying the accuracy/bias of someone’s beliefs, including their 
confidence, may differ from the (perhaps more explicit or conscious) ‘self-
regulation’ measured in terms of study strategies. 
Any association between indicators of the accuracy/bias of beliefs 
and potential indicators of self-regulation remains somewhat unclear (Stone, 
2000). For example, it remains unclear whether students with high self-
regulation of their studying strategies also have high accuracy in their 
beliefs, as few studies have explicitly explored the area. As one example, for 
undergraduate students in the United States, students’ confidence accuracy 
(confidence compared to their task performance) did not associate with their 
reported knowledge of their own studying strategies and how they planned 
and monitored their learning (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). For similar 
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students, performance/confidence accuracy positively correlated with self-
reported knowledge of their own strengths and weaknesses, learning 
strategies, and when and why to apply those strategies, but only for one out 
of two tests (Sperling, Howard, Staley, & DuBoi, 2004). For a relatively 
small sample of primary school students in the Netherlands, students’ 
expressions of self-regulation when undertaking tasks (e.g. coded to reflect 
planning, monitoring, reflecting on the answer, and other theoretical 
aspects) and their performance/confidence accuracy both positively 
correlated with performance but only modestly correlated with each other, 
and neither measure correlated with self-reported self-regulated studying 
(Jacobse & Harskamp, 2012). 
In summary, the idea of self-regulation assumes that accurate beliefs 
are integral to personal well-being and functioning (Butler & Winne, 1995), 
hence under-confidence and over-confidence may equally be problematic. 
Alternately, the theorised motivational benefits of confidence (Bandura, 
1997) may suggest that higher confidence, and perhaps even some degree of 
over-confidence, may be beneficial. Research within the area then has the 
potential to inform wider theoretical assumptions. The idea of self-
regulation may suggest why accurate beliefs are beneficial, for example 
through potentially facilitating cyclical processes of learning and in working 
towards various goals (Bandura, 1989, 2001; Butler & Winne, 1995; 
Zimmerman, 2000; Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009). Specifically, without 
accurate beliefs it may be difficult to determine progress and to refine any 
studying approaches. Nevertheless, the ideas of accurate beliefs and self-
regulation are distinct from the idea of an explicit and formalised process of 
self-regulated learning; while self-regulated learning strategies conceptually 
rely on accurate beliefs, any empirical association remains unclear. Self-
regulated learning strategies have nevertheless broadly associated with 
students’ attainment (Credé & Phillips, 2011). Indicators of learning or 
studying strategies may perhaps provide further means to help determine 
whether under-confident or over-confident beliefs are beneficial or 
detrimental.  
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Section 3.4: Issues inherent to considering confidence accuracy/bias 
 
The accuracy/bias of judgments was historically considered within the 
specific context of probability assessment (Brier, 1950; Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). In order to consider its accuracy, a ‘subjective 
probability’ was compared against an external or ‘objective probability’, 
where both referred to the same event or situation; for example, the 
subjective probability associated with a particular weather forecast was 
compared to the weather on the relevant day (Brier, 1950). 
Subsequent studies have explored accuracy/bias in various contexts, 
generally comparing someone’s predictions or retrospective evaluations of 
their performance (their ‘subjective’ judgments) against their actual 
performance (an ideally ‘objective’ situation). Various research traditions 
have developed, and have applied a large array of different approaches to 
measure performance, including non-curricular tasks, general knowledge 
questions, and memorisation tests of pairs of words (Hansson, Rönnlund, 
Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008; Koriat, 1997; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Similarly, 
students’ judgments have been measured in various ways, including directly 
in relation to their performance or as relative comparisons or rankings 
against the perceived performance of others, which has sometimes entailed 
variable results (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; 
Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). Various studies have also faithfully followed the tradition of directly 
considering ‘probabilities’, although subsequently found that asking 
students to directly express or interpret probabilities can introduce 
ambiguity and entail variable results (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 
1991; Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008; Soll & Klayman, 2004; 
Stankov, Lee, & Paek, 2009). 
Within educational and motivational research, considering 
accuracy/bias has broadly developed into considering the degree of 
correspondence between someone’s confidence, or other beliefs about their 
abilities, and their attainment, or other evidence of their abilities (Pieschl, 
2009; Stone, 2000). While attention has been given to applying 
contextually-relevant measures of each, some general methodological issues 
or potential limitations may be unavoidable. 
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Considering the degree of correspondence between someone’s 
beliefs and their attainment assumes that a belief is inaccurate when it does 
not correspond to the selected indicator. This may follow from, and impose, 
ontological realism (where external things are as they are, independently of 
how they are perceived by people) and a correspondence theory of truth 
(where true beliefs correspond to reality) (Audi, 1998). When considering 
the accuracy of students’ beliefs compared to their attainment, a student’s 
justification for holding a belief (in an epistemological sense) is not 
necessarily explored. Justifications for holding beliefs may include 
correspondences with reality, inferences from other beliefs, and/or the 
general coherence between beliefs (Audi, 1998). Someone may feel justified 
in their confidence due to it cohering with their other beliefs, which may 
involve notions of someone’s wider identity, for example; under-confidence 
or over-confidence may perhaps partially follow from aspiring towards or 
avoiding a particular identity. Alternately, confidence biases may perhaps 
follow from particular motivations, such as to self-enhance through 
maximising positive beliefs or to self-protect through minimising negative 
beliefs (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). Someone 
may also simply have low self-reflection, without any specific motivation to 
self-enhance or self-protect. Essentially, indicators of accuracy/bias involve 
specific assumptions, and do not necessarily explain why biases occur. 
The correspondence between someone’s confidence and their 
attainment may be interpreted as conceptually or theoretically representing 
self-reflection, self-awareness, and/or self-regulation of some kind (Pieschl, 
2009; Stone, 2000). However, indicators of accuracy/bias cannot determine 
whether and how processes such as self-evaluation occur, and may only 
indirectly reflect or represent them. For example, students might form their 
self-concept beliefs through reflecting on their classwork or homework 
experiences and results rather than the specific attainment grades considered 
within a research study. Operationally, the accuracy/bias of someone’s 
confidence compared to their attainment is an artificially created indicator, 
given particular data; different data, such as different attainment measures, 
may provide different results. Essentially, an indicator may not necessarily 
reflect any aspect of someone’s thinking (Cronbach & Furby, 1970). 
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Conceptually and methodologically, comparing an expression of 
confidence and a measure of attainment requires that they both reflect the 
same underlying aspect (e.g. knowledge and skills in science), so that the 
comparison is valid. Intuitively, validity appears clear when considering 
confidence inherently matched to specific circumstances (e.g. test items 
paired with confidence-ratings such as ‘How confident are you that your 
answer is correct?’). Similarly, expressions of self-concept beliefs are 
theorised to develop from, and often empirically measured in relation to, 
attainment experiences (e.g. agreement with ‘I get good grades in science’) 
(Bong & Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). Intuitively, it appears valid 
to compare self-concept beliefs against attainment grades in science. 
Nevertheless, validity is reduced when the two measures do not exactly 
overlap and/or are variously influenced by other factors, such as varying 
interpretations of what ‘good grades’ entail. 
On a general level, anything that reduces the correspondence 
between someone’s confidence and attainment may potentially give the 
appearance of under-confidence or over-confidence (Erev, Wallsten, & 
Budescu, 1994). For example, someone may have performed higher or 
lower than usual by chance or due to some features of the test items, which 
may give the appearance of biased confidence at the time of testing while it 
might appear accurate on other occasions. When averaged across numerous 
students, random chance alone might not necessarily invalidate the 
consideration of accuracy/bias, but instead might reduce reliability (i.e. it 
would be harder to distinguish consistent results from random variation). 
However, any form of systematic variation could complicate the 
measurement of accuracy/bias. Inherent aspects of measurement may 
influence someone’s responses and hence perhaps give the appearance of 
confidence biases (or influence their magnitude). For example, general 
tendencies of people to agree to items regardless of their content and/or to 
respond differently to positively-phrased or negatively-phrased items may 
be relevant, as these may influence expressions of confidence (Cronbach, 
1950; Paulhus, 1991; Weems, Onwuegbuzie, & Collins, 2006; Weems, 
Onwuegbuzie, Schreiber, & Eggers, 2003). Such issues, however, introduce 
uncertainty into measurement in general, not simply measurement of 
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accuracy/bias, and it remains somewhat unclear how prevalent particular 
response styles or tendencies may be. 
In summary, considering confidence accuracy/bias involves 
comparing indicators of confidence and attainment. Validity may depend on 
the indicators conceptually reflecting the same area, and would be enhanced 
by the indicators being directly comparable or explicitly matched (e.g. 
comparing someone’s confidence rating for a particular task against their 
performance for that particular task). Even when a comparison is 
conceptually valid, it cannot necessarily confirm that students self-evaluate 
in the same way, unless the expression of confidence is explicitly formed in 
reference to a specific indicator of attainment. 
 
 
Section 3.4.1: Creating indicators of accuracy/bias 
 
Various indicators can be calculated to quantify overall accuracy and/or bias 
in confidence, and/or other related aspects such as accurately determining 
when answers are either correct or incorrect (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & 
Phillips, 1982; Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991; Yates, 1990). Many indicators 
have been found to be complementary, each providing specific but 
informative results (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010). 
Practically, many studies have applied multiple tasks each paired 
with confidence-ratings (i.e. ‘How confident are you that your answer is 
correct?’), where the two measures can then be intuitively and directly 
compared through calculating a simple ‘difference-score’ after equalising 
the measures onto equivalent scales (Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 1999). 
A difference-score broadly assumes that the equalised scales have 
equivalent ranges (i.e. the lowest confidence value equates to the lowest 
attainment value, and similarly for the highest values) and intervals (i.e. 
confidence increases in the same increments to attainment). This allows a 
symmetrical relation where over-evaluating confidence given a level of 
attainment is equivalent to under-attainment given a level of confidence, 
both in principle and in magnitude. 
Calculating the simple difference between two indicators has often 
been assumed to reduce reliability (Cronbach & Furby, 1970). For example, 
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the reliability of a difference-score is a function of the reliabilities of both of 
the two components and the correlation between them, and any correlation 
is likely to be imperfect (Cohen & Cohen, 1984; Willett, 1988). However, 
lower reliability in that situation may not necessarily reflect reduced 
precision or increased statistical error (Rogosa & Willett, 1983; Rogosa, 
Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982). 
When confidence and task-scores have been both operationalised as, 
or can be converted into, binary measures (i.e. confident/not-confident and 
correct/incorrect), then numerous indicators of accuracy can be calculated 
from cross-tabulating the measures and considering the various cell 
frequencies and row/column totals: for example, ‘sensitivity’ provides a 
measure of when someone accurately believes themselves to be correct and 
‘specificity’ provides a measure of when someone accurately believes that 
they are incorrect (Yule, 1912). Linking with statistical and research 
approaches, ‘specificity’ subtracted from one represents a Type I (false 
positive) error rate, and ‘sensitivity’ subtracted from one represents a Type 
II (false negative) error rate (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Such 
distinctions also link with theoretical assumptions that different types of 
confidence evaluations may be formed through different cognitive processes 
(Koriat, 2012). Explorations using simulated data (Schraw, Kuch, & 
Gutierrez, 2013) and responses from university students (Schraw, Kuch, 
Gutierrez, & Richmond, 2014) have highlighted that measures of sensitivity 
and specificity accounted for most of the variance across various other 
calculated binary indicators, and hence may be useful to apply. 
When paired tasks and confidence-ratings have not been available, 
studies have compared students’ broader expressions of confidence and 
indicators of attainment in various ways. For example, students’ confidence 
has been predicted using their attainment (via linear regression), and the 
regression-residual has been used as an indicator of confidence 
accuracy/bias (Bouffard, Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Gonida & 
Leondari, 2011; Narciss, Koerndle, & Dresel, 2011). This approach is 
especially useful for considering expressions of confidence (e.g. self-
concept beliefs) that are not inherently contextualised against measures of 
attainment. 
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A regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias can be interpreted as 
the difference between someone’s expressed confidence and the predicted 
confidence that would be expected, given their attainment and given the 
association between confidence and attainment across a wider sample. 
Essentially, the indicator highlights ‘relative’ under-confidence or over-
confidence, compared to others within a sample. Given the underlying 
algebraic calculations (i.e. regression equates someone’s predicted z-score 
confidence with the z-score of their attainment multiplied by the correlation 
between the two factors seen across the sample), a regression-residual 
indicator of accuracy/bias can essentially become a difference-score 
indicator through various simplifications (Cohen & Cohen, 1984; Kolen & 
Brennan, 2004). However, linear (ordinary-least-squares) regression does 
not involve symmetrical relations (Cohen & Cohen, 1984): over-confidence 
given a level of attainment may not necessarily be equivalent to under-
attainment given a level of confidence. Alternate regression approaches are 
possible to give symmetrical relations (Samuelson, 1942; Woolley, 1941), 
but these would make the interpretation of the regression-residuals less clear 
(i.e. they would involve some degree of residual confidence and residual 
attainment). 
In summary, it remains important to consider how confidence 
accuracy/bias can be measured. Depending on the research design, different 
indicators can be calculated, which may involve different conceptual ideas 
of under-confidence and over-confidence that may be against specific task 
performance or relative to samples. 
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Section 4: Research aims and questions 
 
The following sections describe the overall aims of the research, in terms of 
applying confidence accuracy/bias as a perspective to potentially provide 
new insight and value (Section 4.1), and the specific research questions for 
the study (Section 4.2). 
 
 
Section 4.1: Research aims 
 
An increased understanding of what influences students’ intentions to study 
science at upper-secondary school may help wider consideration of varying 
or imbalanced progression (Section 1). 
The literature review broadly highlighted that science intentions may 
be influenced by various factors (Section 2), primarily students’ attitudes 
and beliefs towards science, including their confidence (Section 2.1). 
Recent studies in England have considered various arrays of attitudes; while 
students’ interest in science and perceived utility of science appear to be 
strongly predictive of their intentions, results have nevertheless varied and it 
perhaps remains unclear as to which factors are the most relevant (Bates, 
Pollard, Usher, & Oakley, 2009; Mellors-Bourne, Connor, & Jackson, 2011; 
Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Vidal Rodeiro, 2007). Recent studies in England 
have also considered students’ confidence expressed through their self-
concept beliefs but not their self-efficacy beliefs, so it remains unclear how 
different expressions or conceptualisations of confidence may associate with 
students’ intentions (DeWitt & Archer, 2015; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). 
Further insight may also be gained from considering clusters or groups of 
students, each with different profiles of attitudes and beliefs, and/or from 
considering how students’ intentions may be influenced in different ways 
for different groups or clusters of students (Section 2.2). These approaches 
appear to offer potential value (perhaps in highlighting clusters of students 
who are likely or not likely to progress further within science), but have 
only been applied outside of England (Andersen & Chen, 2016; Chow, 
Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 2012; Simpkins & Davis-Kean, 2005). 
Page 68 of 361 
Given the importance of students’ attitudes and motivational beliefs, 
including their confidence, on their intentions to study subjects (Section 2 
and Section 3), new insights may be gained through exploring whether, and 
how, under-confidence and over-confidence associate with students’ science 
intentions. Accuracy/bias may be a potential barrier or facilitator, since 
students’ confidence accuracy/bias may associate with their attitudes and 
beliefs (Section 3.2), although any particular associations and patterns of 
difference remain unclear. In general, the accuracy/bias of students’ 
confidence remains under-explored in England: the majority of studies 
explicitly exploring confidence accuracy/bias have been undertaken in the 
United States (Cheema & Skultety, 2016; Chen, 2003; Chen & Zimmerman, 
2007; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014) and various countries in Europe (Dupeyrat, 
Escribe, Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; Rytkönen, 
Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007; Schwab & Hessels, 2015). Psychologically-
orientated studies with undergraduate students have, again, mostly been 
undertaken in the United States (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Bol, Hacker, 
O’Shea, & Allen, 2005; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Maki, 
Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005). Additionally, most studies have 
focused on academic subjects other than science, although with some 
exceptions (Cheema & Skultety, 2016; Seidel, 2006). Again, insight may 
also be gained through considering confidence accuracy/bias via empirically 
clustering students in addition to defining ‘conceptual’ groups of under-
confident, accurate, and over-confident students (Rytkönen, Aunola, & 
Nurmi, 2007; Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). 
Prior studies considering confidence accuracy/bias in England have 
been limited. For example, an early study in England considered small 
numbers of secondary school students in London, and compared the 
students’ perceptions of their relative abilities compared to their peers 
against their relative test performance; the students were mostly accurate in 
their beliefs of mathematics and reading abilities, although few statistical 
tests were applied (Blatchford, 1997). Another study explored the accuracy 
of secondary school students’ predicted attainment (made in Year 7/8) 
compared to their subsequent GCSE attainment; the students appeared 
mainly accurate in their expectations, although no statistical tests were 
applied (Attwood, Croll, Fuller, & Last, 2013). Both studies interpreted 
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relative proportions of under-confident, accurate, and over-confident 
students and inferred gender differences, specifically that girls could be 
more under-confident (Blatchford, 1997) and that boys could be more over-
confident (Attwood, Croll, Fuller, & Last, 2013). In the absence of 
statistical tests and given the small numbers of students considered, 
however, the situation remained unclear. 
Other studies have considered the alignment of various beliefs 
reported by secondary school students in England, such as low or high 
aspirations (considered as intentions to continue into upper-secondary 
school), expectations (considered as a students’ reported likelihood of 
successfully applying to university), and attainment (Khattab, 2015). 
Specifically, alignment between high aspirations, expectations, and 
attainment associated with the highest predicted probability of applying to 
university (Khattab, 2015). Similarly, differences between secondary school 
students’ highest level of expected education and their career aspirations 
(given the researchers’ assumptions about the minimum level of education 
required for different careers) highlighted that those with high and aligned 
educational and career aspirations subsequently earned higher wages 
(Sabate, Harris, & Staff, 2011). Such studies, however, have not explicitly 
considered accuracy/bias for students’ confidence, and relied on researchers 
determining what comparisons were meaningful. 
Fundamentally, the research presented in this thesis broadly aimed to 
provide value through offering an extended perspective on students’ 
choices, where the implications of under-confidence and over-confidence 
have seldom been considered, especially for science education in England. 
Students’ confidence was essentially considered as an ‘analytical 
perspective’, similarly to how other studies have applied students’ 
characteristics such as gender or ethnicity/background (Archer, Halsall, & 
Hollingworth, 2007) and/or conceptual ideas such as identity (Archer, et al., 
2010) to gain insight. However, the research broadly focused on an 
empirical exploration, rather than applying, integrating, or developing 
theory. 
An illustrative conceptual model of potential influences on students’ 
intentions, contextualised to this thesis, is provided in Figure 1. The model 
broadly links factors associated with observed differences in science 
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intentions, specifically students’ background characteristics, attainment, 
confidence, and attitudes such as interest and perceived utility of science 
(Section 2.1 and Section 2.2). Following social-cognitive theory 
implemented through the expectancy-value model, the various factors are 
assumed to associate reciprocally, for example where higher attainment may 
lead to higher confidence beliefs, and concurrently, where higher confidence 
may be motivational and facilitate higher subsequent attainment (Section 
2.3 and Section 3.1). The model contains multiple reciprocal associations, 
such as between attainment and confidence, and then between attainment, 
confidence, and attitudes, together with any background influences. 
Accordingly, any initially-observed associations with intentions (such as 
between students’ background and intentions) may reflect underlying 
differences in other factors (e.g. attainment, confidence, and/or attitudes) 
(DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). 
In addition (not illustrated for simplicity in Figure 1), science 
intentions conceptually lead to choices (which are also potentially facilitated 
or constrained by other factors), leading to changes in someone’s 
environment and context, leading to changes in someone’s experiences, 
attitudes, and beliefs, within wider cycles. Various other factors and their 
associations may also be relevant; for example, further factors (such as 
students’ perceptions of their lessons) may associate directly with 
intentions, and/or these factors may also associate with students’ confidence 
and/or other factors, which then associate with intentions (Hampden-
Thompson & Bennett, 2013; Wang, 2012). The modelled placement of the 
factors is only illustrative, especially given that confirming or developing 
structural models was not a focus of the thesis (otherwise, such models 
might attempt to determine, for example, whether interest primarily leads to 
confidence, whether confidence primarily leads to interest, and/or whether 
elements of both situations occur, together with exploring various other 
potential combinations of associations including classroom and other 
experiences). 
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Section 4.2: Research questions 
 
Given this background and overall aims, the research was focused into three 
areas of enquiry. 
First, it remained somewhat unclear as to which attitudes and 
motivational beliefs were the most relevant influences on students’ 
intentions and choices, including different conceptualisations of confidence 
and indicators of confidence accuracy/bias. 
Various studies have associated students’ interest, perceived utility, 
attainment, and expressions of confidence with their intentions and choices 
(Section 2.1). Research has broadly established the motivational role of 
self-efficacy beliefs, in relation to numerous aspects of studying (Jiang, 
Song, Lee, & Bong, 2014; Skaalvik, Federici, & Klassen, 2015; 
Zimmerman & Schunk, 2011), although the motivational role of self-
concept beliefs is plausible but perhaps less clearly evidenced (Section 3.1). 
Indicators of confidence accuracy/bias might also plausibly predict students’ 
science intentions, inferring from research into mathematics (Sheldrake, 
Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2015), but it remained unclear whether this depended on 
the particular indicator of accuracy/bias that was calculated. Overall, 
students’ perceived utility, interest, and self-efficacy beliefs were then 
hypothesised to be key influences on their science intentions. 
Second, the research aimed to explore whether students with 
different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias exhibited different attitudes 
and beliefs, including whether they reported different science intentions. 
Inferring from motivational theory, under-confidence could be 
hypothesised to be potentially limiting while over-confidence might be 
motivationally beneficial (Bandura, 1997); conversely, under-confidence 
and over-confidence may be equally problematic, and accurate beliefs might 
associate with higher attainment and/or effective studying (Butler & Winne, 
1995). Prior studies have provided varying results (Section 3.2), but have 
generally associated over-confidence with higher interest and/or 
motivational tendencies to perform higher than peers (Dupeyrat, Escribe, 
Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; Gresham, Lane, 
MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000). Similarly inferring from prior research, 
confidence accuracy/bias may indeed associate with students’ studying 
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intentions (Martin & Debus, 1998; Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014). 
Inferring across these various areas, under-confidence was hypothesised to 
associate with lower intentions, interest, and motivational tendencies to 
perform higher than peers, while over-confidence and/or accuracy were 
hypothesised to associate with higher attitudes/beliefs. 
Third, the research aimed to explore whether students with different 
degrees of confidence accuracy/bias considered their choices in different 
ways. 
It was plausible to hypothesise that different students would consider 
their choices in different ways (Section 2.2.3); attainment may entail 
differences in how choices are made (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 2008), 
hence students’ confidence and accuracy/bias may similarly entail 
differences in how choices are made. Additionally, inferring from research 
into mathematics progression, interest might be more predictive of 
intentions for over-confident students, although patterns generally appeared 
unclear (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2015). 
In summary, the research questions were as follows. 
(1) Which attitudes and motivational beliefs (including expressions of 
confidence) were the most relevant influences on students’ science 
intentions? 
(2) Did students with different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias 
exhibit different science intentions, attitudes, and beliefs? 
(3) Did students with different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias 
consider their science intentions in different ways? 
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Section 5: Research design and methods 
 
The overall research design is described in Section 5.1. Essentially, the 
research considered two surveys, PISA 2006 and a new survey undertaken 
in 2014/2015. Either survey considered alone may not necessarily be ideal: 
PISA 2006 offered a nationally-representative sample, but could only 
provide an indirect indication of students’ confidence accuracy/bias; the 
new survey provided explicit measures of students’ confidence 
accuracy/bias, as applied in prior studies outside of England, but might have 
lower generalisation to other students due to limited resources when 
sampling and collecting data. The overall plausibility of the results would be 
supported if the results from the indirect measure of students’ confidence 
accuracy/bias (in PISA 2006) cohered with the results from the direct 
measure of students’ confidence accuracy/bias (in the new survey). With 
limited prior research covering confidence accuracy/bias in England, it was 
beneficial to generate the opportunity for contextualisation (and potential 
disconfirmation) within the research design itself. 
The following sections then describe methodological details for 
PISA 2006 (Section 5.2) and for the 2014/2015 survey (Section 5.3), 
focusing on the samples of students and the measurement of their various 
attitudes and beliefs that were considered in the subsequent analysis, 
including how confidence accuracy/bias was measured for each survey. 
As these sections highlight, many measured factors within the two 
surveys were conceptually comparable (aiming to measure the same 
underlying ideas), particularly for theorised factors such as self-concept 
beliefs. Nevertheless, the factors were operationalised with varying degrees 
of item-level comparability, given that the 2014/2015 survey aimed to be 
contextualised against (and to include items/dimensions from) various 
surveys, mainly PISA but also TIMSS: some factors (such as cost value, 
anxiety, and studying strategies) were not measured within PISA 2006, 
while other factors (such as self-efficacy beliefs) were intentionally 
operationalised differently in the 2014/2015 survey in order to maximise 
their contextual relevance to science education and progression (Section 
5.3). In addition to the following sections that describe the measured factors 
for both surveys, Appendix 1 provides a detailed reference and illustrates 
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the item-level comparability when measuring self-concept beliefs, interest 
value, utility value, and personal value (potentially-relevant areas identified 




Section 5.1: Research design 
 
In England, the compulsory stage of secondary school currently covers 
Years 7 to 11 (ages 11/12 to 15/16). During Year 9, students select various 
subjects to study during Years 10 and 11 at General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent level, where science is 
compulsory (Department for Education, 2014). Students can then undertake 
upper-secondary education in Years 12 and 13 (ages 16/17 to 17/18) at 
Advanced Level General Certificate of Education (A-Level) or equivalent 
level, where science subjects are optional. 
Considering the prospective intentions and aspirations of students 
from Years 9 to 11 may increase understanding, potentially sufficient to 
inform practical guidance or the promotion of science. These students were 
also targeted to increase contextualisation against existing research that has 
considered students in Year 9 (DeWitt & Archer, 2015) and Year 10 
(Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Similarly, TIMSS has focused on Year 9 (Martin 
& Mullis, 2013) and PISA has focused on Year 10/11 (Bradshaw, Sturman, 
Vappula, Ager, & Wheater, 2007; OECD, 2009a). Some uncertainty was 
still expected to be unavoidable: students’ prospective intentions may not 
necessarily reflect their subsequent choices, while students’ retrospective 
accounts may sometimes involve reinterpretations or rationalisations; 
neither approach may comprehensively reflect complex and continuous 
processes of decision-making (Holmegaard, Ulriksen, & Madsen, 2014). 
However, it was less clear how any influences of confidence accuracy/bias 
could have been considered in retrospect for older students already studying 
A-Level subjects in Year 12 and Year 13. 
Students’ science intentions and attitudes can be efficiently 
measured across large numbers of students via surveys (DeWitt, Archer, & 
Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Surveys can also easily include 
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attainment tasks, paired with confidence-ratings, from which specific 
indicators of accuracy/bias can be calculated (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 
2010; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 
1991; Yates, 1990). While interviews can provide extensive detail on 
students’ prospective intentions or retrospective choices (Holmegaard, 
Ulriksen, & Madsen, 2015) and what might influence their confidence 
(Zeldin & Pajares, 2000; Zeldin, Britner, & Pajares, 2008), they are resource 
intensive, which would limit the numbers of students that could be 
interviewed (who may not necessarily be generalizable to other students). It 
would also be harder to reliably associate confidence accuracy/bias with 
students’ other attitudes and undertake predictive modelling given fewer 
students. 
Considering existing survey data may allow responses from large 
numbers of students to be considered, but the data may be less suited to 
address particular research questions. Collecting new data is resource 
intensive, which may reduce the number of participating students and limit 
generalisation from the results, but allows the methods to be adapted to any 
overall aims and research questions. As a compromise, the overall research 
design considered two sets of student data. Fundamentally, the design aimed 
to address methodological limitations in one set of data with strengths in the 
other. The results could then be compared, and any similarities would 
enhance their plausibility. 
First, existing data from PISA 2006 were considered, which 
surveyed a nationally-representative sample of students in England and 
considered a broad array of students’ attitudes and beliefs in science, 
including their studying intentions (OECD, 2009a). Compared to other 
existing data (e.g. the Next Steps / Longitudinal Study of Young People in 
England, the various national life-long cohort studies), PISA studies covered 
wider arrays of attitudes and beliefs, were more recent, and measured 
students’ confidence and attainment at the same time so that indicators of 
accuracy/bias could plausibly be calculated. Otherwise (e.g. in Next Steps), 
comparing indicators of confidence and attainment measured at different 
times could mix confidence accuracy/bias with changes over time; for 
example, someone might be accurate even if they reported higher 
confidence than might be expected, given their lower earlier attainment, if 
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their attainment had subsequently increased. While the PISA 2006 data were 
older than other PISA surveys, data from PISA 2015, which also focused on 
science, were not available during the study, while PISA 2012 focused on 
mathematics and PISA 2009 focused on reading. 
Second, new survey data were collected in order to measure 
students’ self-reflective confidence accuracy/bias through paired tasks and 
confidence-ratings, similarly to prior research undertaken outside of 
England (Chen, 2003; Chen & Zimmerman, 2007). If similar patterns of 
results emerged across both surveys, it would support their plausibility. 
Essentially, with less research into confidence accuracy/bias having been 
undertaken in England, PISA 2006 provided a plausible baseline; however, 
it would be unclear whether PISA 2006 was actually measuring self-
reflective accuracy/bias as considered in most prior research without 
comparison against other data using different methods. Conversely, the 
generalisation of any small new survey undertaken alone could be unclear, 
which could be problematic when exploring relatively new areas (e.g. 
whether students’ intentions might be influenced in different ways 
depending on the confidence accuracy/bias). Additionally, given the 
opportunity for new data collection, the survey was designed in order to 
facilitate ancillary research that could provide wider contextualisation, such 
as what theorised influences or antecedents might associate with students’ 
expressions of confidence and/or accuracy/bias (which is reported 
elsewhere, given the focus on students’ science intentions within this 
thesis). 
Little research has considered confidence accuracy/bias and 
students’ intentions, so it was difficult to determine any necessary sample 
sizes. To potentially reproduce the differences in (mathematics) intentions 
observed in Year 10 students across under-confident, accurate, and over-
confident groups (Sheldrake, Mujtaba, & Reiss, 2014), at the standard 
significance level of .05 (α, determining the risk of Type I errors) and with a 
power of .80 (power = 1 – β, where β is the standard Type II error 
probability of .20), a sample size of 1152 (384 per group) was expected to 
be needed, given power/sample size calculations (Cohen, 1992; StataCorp, 
2013b). Type I errors reflect ‘false positives’, essentially rejecting a null 
hypothesis when it is actually true, while Type II errors reflect ‘false 
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negatives’, essentially accepting a null hypothesis when it is actually false 
(Cohen, 1988, 1992). PISA 2006 surveyed 4935 students in England, while 
1523 students in England (across Years 9, 10, and 11) participated in the 
new survey, which were then likely to be sufficient to reveal potential 
differences in students’ science intentions across accuracy/bias groups 
(assuming that there were differences to be found). These numbers were 
also sufficient for reliable predictive modelling (Cohen & Cohen, 1984; 
Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Ethical approval for the analysis of existing data and the collection 
and analysis of new data was given from the (UCL) Institute of Education. 
 
 
Section 5.2: Methods: PISA 2006 survey 
 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) consists of 
various surveys undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The following sections describe the sample of 
students within PISA 2006 for England (Section 5.2.1), their various 
attitudes and beliefs that were measured by the OECD and which were 
considered in the subsequent analysis (Section 5.2.2), and how an indicator 
of confidence accuracy/bias was calculated (Section 5.2.3). 
 
 
Section 5.2.1: Sampling 
 
PISA 2006 targeted students aged 15, at the time of testing, within full-time 
education (OECD, 2007, 2009a). Schools were systematically sampled 
(with probabilities proportional to their size) within strata (with separate 
sampling of schools per regions and other strata), and around 35 students 
were then randomly-sampled within each school (OECD, 2009a). 
Sample-weighting was calculated by the OECD to allow the 
complex sample to still reflect the wider population of students (OECD, 
2009a, 2009b). Following analytical guidance from the OECD, the sample-
weighting was re-scaled so that the sum of the sampling-weights was then 
equal to the number of considered students for England, and applied in the 
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subsequent analysis (OECD, 2009b). The various results include sample-
weighting, excepting that numbers of students are reported as un-weighted 
numbers for intuitive clarity. 
Across England, 4935 students were surveyed (2532 girls and 2403 
boys); the majority were in Year 11 (Bradshaw, Sturman, Vappula, Ager, & 
Wheater, 2007; OECD, 2007). As a brief contextualisation, students in 
England scored higher than the OECD-average in science and equal to the 
OECD-average in mathematics and in reading; boys in England scored 
higher than girls in science and mathematics, but lower than girls in reading 
(Bradshaw, Sturman, Vappula, Ager, & Wheater, 2007). 
 
 
Section 5.2.2: Measuring students’ attitudes and beliefs 
 
Students’ attitudes and beliefs cannot be directly observed, and are instead 
measured through various expressions or reports. Psychologically, attitudes 
are generally considered to be unobserved personal tendencies that are 
assumed to entail that someone acts in a particular way, in particular 
circumstances, meaning in practice that someone gives particular responses 
to questionnaire items (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Someone’s questionnaire 
responses can be considered to reflect or to be caused by these various 
unobserved tendencies, which have various terms within statistical and 
quantitative modelling such as ‘constructs’ or ‘factors’. 
A realist perspective would assume that unobserved factors have an 
existence independent of measurement; existence would be necessary for 
factors to cause anything such as responses to questionnaire items (Bollen, 
2002; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Edwards & Bagozzi, 
2000). A utilitarian or pragmatic perspective would alternately consider 
factors to be dependent on measurement, as artificial ways to simplify and 
explain data or situations; unobserved factors would be pragmatically 
considered as empirical operationalisations of particular statistical models 
(Bollen, 2002; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Edwards & 
Bagozzi, 2000). Both perspectives may be informative. For example, 
students’ interest in science, operationalised as a factor (i.e. aggregated 
responses across a set of items), embodies the idea that responses to 
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particular items reflect wider personal tendencies; however, someone’s 
responses may still somewhat depend on the particular items used. 
Analytical approaches such as confirmatory factor analysis test 
whether a set of items can be considered to all contribute, in a statistical 
sense, to a theorised factor, and hence whether numerous items can indeed 
be validly simplified into one factor (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, & 
Galbraith, 2008). The internal consistency or statistical reliability of a factor 
can be considered through indicators such as Cronbach’s α (alpha) 
coefficient, which has various interpretations including the expected 
correlation between two random samples of items from the set of items 
being considered (Cronbach, 1951). Results from factor analysis and 
indicators of reliability nevertheless remain relative to the sample 
considered (e.g. results may vary across ages of students). 
Within educational research, it remains difficult to logically progress 
from a conceptual definition of an attitude to necessary and/or sufficient 
aspects of measurement, practically considered as particular measurement 
items or questions to ask students. Various reviews of motivational attitudes 
and beliefs, as applied within research, have highlighted that theoretical 
definitions and operational measurement have sometimes varied (Eccles & 
Wigfield, 2002; Murphy & Alexander, 2000; Wigfield & Cambria, 2010). 
Different conceptual labels have been sometimes applied to the same 
measurement items, and/or the same conceptual label has sometimes been 
measured in various ways (Murphy & Alexander, 2000; Wigfield & 
Cambria, 2010). 
Comprehensive processes of item and questionnaire development 
have been applied by the OECD (OECD, 2009a), and the various items 
within PISA 2006 broadly represent established attitudes and motivational 
beliefs within educational research (Wigfield & Cambria, 2010). 
Nevertheless, factors may be operationalised in slightly (or greatly) varying 
ways, and still be given the same descriptive label (Murphy & Alexander, 
2000). For example, in PISA 2006, students’ personal value of science was 
measured through agreement with items such as ‘Science is very relevant to 
me’, ‘Some concepts in science help me see how I relate to other people’, 
and ‘I will use science in many ways when I am an adult’ (OECD, 2009a). 
These may reflect a broader notion of personal value, compared to 
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agreement with items such as ‘Science is important to me personally’, 
‘Thinking scientifically is an important part of who I am’, or ‘Being able to 
do science helps me show other people who I am’ (Conley, 2012; 
Trautwein, et al., 2012; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Different 
operationalisations can be considered as providing different perspectives 
onto an underlying idea, ideally through some commonality of measurement 
items, and where results will ideally converge towards common findings 
(Messick, 1995). 
Preliminary analysis was undertaken and the intended/theorised 
factors were indeed supported through confirmatory and exploratory factor 
analysis and indicators of reliability; essentially, the various items could 
validly be aggregated into the intended/theorised factors. Table 1 provides a 
simple summary. (See Appendix 1 for detailed item/factor lists.) 
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Table 1: PISA (England) 2006: items/factors, reliability 
 
Factor/scale Example item / description Items Reliability 
Intentions ‘I would like to work in a career involving science’ 4 .922 
Self-concept ‘Science topics are easy for me’ 6 .911 
Self-efficacy (various areas) ‘Recognise the science question that underlies a newspaper report on a health issue’ 8 .854 
Interest (various areas) Interest in learning about topics in physics, chemistry, biology of plants, geology, etc. 8 .847 
Interest value ‘I am interested in learning about science’ 5 .913 
Utility value ‘What I learn in my science subjects is important for me because I need this for what I want to study later on’ 5 .916 
Personal value ‘Science is very relevant to me’ 5 .830 
General value ‘Science is valuable to society’ 5 .775 
Science activities Frequency of watching programmes on science, reading science magazines, attending a science club, etc. 6 .777 
School career preparation ‘The subjects I study provide me with the basic skills and knowledge for a science-related career’ 4 .834 
School career information Available information regarding e.g. ‘science-related careers that are available in the job market’ 4 .848 
Teaching: interaction ‘Students are given opportunities to explain their ideas’ 4 .772 
Teaching: activities ‘Students spend time in the laboratory doing practical experiments’ 4 .691 
Teaching: investigations ‘Students are allowed to design their own experiments’ 3 .753 
Teaching: applications ‘The teacher clearly explains the relevance of science concepts to our lives’ 4 .770 
Notes: Reliability was measured through Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients. 
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Attitudes and beliefs 
 
Students in PISA 2006 completed questionnaires that measured their 
attitudes and motivations towards science, and collected some information 
about their backgrounds (OECD, 2006a). Areas of the expectancy-value 
model of motivated behavioural choices were broadly covered by PISA 
2006, including expressions of confidence and the subjective task values of 
interest, utility, and personal value (Eccles, 2009). However, measures of 
anxiety or other costs were not covered. 
The OECD’s theorised assignment of items to factors (OECD, 
2009a) was verified through confirmatory factor analysis (via maximum-
likelihood estimation, i.e. factor by factor) and through exploratory factor 
analysis (via principal-components analysis, i.e. considering emergent 
factors from all available items). 
The OECD provided factor-scores calculated through item-response 
models, which essentially allowed response-categories per items to have 
varying ‘difficulty’, considered as the magnitude of the underlying factor 
required to endorse the particular agreement-scale category (de Ayala, 2009; 
OECD, 2009a). As a sensitivity check, preliminary analysis also calculated 
factor-scores as simple-averages of the relevant items (reversing the 
agreement-scale category scoring when necessary for consistency), which 
closely correlated with the OECD’s factor-scores (e.g. R = .996, p < .001, 
for science intentions). Regardless of how the factor-scores were calculated, 
the various parameters in predictive modelling were sufficiently similar so 
that the same inferences would be made. In the final analytical models, the 
factor-scores provided by the OECD were used in order to increase 
contextualisation with prior research and/or published reports. 
Students’ intentions/aspirations towards science were measured (e.g. 
‘I would like to work in a career involving science’, ‘I would like to study 
science after secondary school’). This was considered as the main outcome 
of relevance for the predictive modelling. 
Students’ confidence in science was measured through subject-level 
expressions of self-concept (e.g. ‘Science topics are easy for me’, ‘I learn 
science topics quickly’). Additionally, self-efficacy was measured, 
operationalised as someone’s capacity to undertake various 
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applied/everyday science tasks (‘How easy do you think it would be for you 
to perform the following tasks on your own?’, e.g. ‘Recognise the science 
question that underlies a newspaper report on a health issue’, ‘Explain why 
earthquakes occur more frequently in some areas than in others’). 
Students’ interest value (interest and enjoyment) in science was 
measured (e.g. ‘I generally have fun when I am learning science topics’, ‘I 
am interested in learning about science’), together with area/topic-specific 
interest (‘How much interest do you have in learning about the following 
science topics?’, e.g. ‘Topics in physics’, ‘Topics in chemistry’). 
Confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis highlighted that these 
measures of subject-level and area/topic-level interest indeed formed two 
separate factors. Utility value (e.g. ‘Making an effort in my science subjects 
is worth it because this will help me in the work I want to do later on’, 
‘What I learn in my science subjects is important for me because I need this 
for what I want to study later on’) and personal value of science (e.g. ‘I will 
use science in many ways when I am an adult’, ‘Science is very relevant to 
me’) were also measured. Anxiety or other measures of cost were not 
measured, however, in PISA 2006. 
Students’ general value of science (e.g. ‘Advances in science and 
technology usually improve people’s living conditions’, ‘Science is valuable 
to society’) and engagement in science-related activities were also measured 
(e.g. the frequency of watching programmes on science, reading science 
magazines, attending a science club). 
Further aspects related to science careers were also measured, 
specifically students’ perceptions of the school preparation for science 
careers (e.g. ‘The subjects available at my school provide students with the 
basic skills and knowledge for a science-related career’, ‘The subjects I 
study provide me with the basic skills and knowledge for a science-related 
career’) and information on science careers (students’ reported degree of 
being informed about e.g. ‘Science-related careers that are available in the 
job market’, ‘The steps a student needs to take if they want a science-related 
career’). 
The students’ science learning context was also considered through 
the reported frequencies of various aspects of science teaching being 
applied. This specifically covered interaction (e.g. ‘Students are given 
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opportunities to explain their ideas’, ‘There is a class debate or discussion’), 
practical/hands-on activities (e.g. ‘Students spend time in the laboratory 
doing practical experiments’, ‘Students are asked to draw conclusions from 
an experiment they have conducted’), student-led investigations (e.g. 
‘Students are allowed to design their own experiments’, ‘Students are asked 
to do an investigation to test out their own ideas’), and teaching that focused 
on models or applications of science (e.g. ‘The teacher uses science to help 
students understand the world outside school’, ‘The teacher clearly explains 
the relevance of science concepts to our lives’). 
Further items/factors considering the students’ awareness of 
environment issues were not included within the final models, however. 
Preliminary analysis highlighted that they had minimal to no association 
with students’ science intentions, so these were omitted in help reduce the 
number of considered factors. 
PISA 2006 also measured the students’ own expected occupation at 
age 30. An indicator of whether the student expected a science-related 
career at age 30 (a binary indicator coded by the OECD from the students’ 
free-text expected occupation) and the science intentions scale (e.g. 
agreement with ‘I would like to work in a career involving science’) 
moderately associated (R = .415, p < .001). Confirmatory factor analysis 
highlighted that the binary indicator had a low factor loading (.453) when 
modelled with the items for the intentions scale (which otherwise had a 
lowest factor loading of .826). Reliability also decreased (α = .922 to α = 
.797) when including this additional binary indicator. Preliminary analysis 
nevertheless highlighted (perhaps unsurprisingly) that the binary indicator 
strongly predicted the students’ agreement-scale science intentions, even 
when modelling the various other attitudes and beliefs. Conceptually, both 
the agreement-scale and binary indicators measured the same area, although 
the intentions scale additionally reflected further aspects related to 
educational progression in science (e.g. ‘I would like to study science after 
secondary school’). Practically, this potentially offered two different 
outcome measures. 
The OECD’s binary indicator was coded to consider various 
occupations such as aviation specialists (including pilots), architects, social 
workers, sociologists, and psychologists as science-related occupations, 
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together with computing science, engineering, health, and natural/physical 
science occupations (OECD, 2009a). While explorations of supply and 
demand for occupations have sometimes considered wider areas such as 
agricultural sciences and architecture as science-related fields (Bosworth, 
Lyonette, Wilson, Bayliss, & Fathers, 2013), most educational research and 
commentary has not done so, and has generally focused on students 
interpreting ‘science’ themselves or has focused on the natural/physical 
sciences (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Royal 
Society, 2014). The moderate correlation between the binary indicator and 
the agreement-scale science intentions might similarly follow from students 
interpreting the agreement-scale items such as ‘I would like to work in a 
career involving science’ to perhaps only mean careers within the 
natural/physical sciences. 
Ultimately, considering science intentions as an agreement-scale that 
reflected multiple aspects of educational progression (i.e. studying science 
at the next educational stage(s) and also aiming for a science career) was 
most comparable to other research in England (DeWitt, Archer, & Osborne, 
2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Accordingly, the agreement-scale measure 
of science intentions was used as the outcome for the predictive models. 
Additionally, analytical constraints were such that sample-weighting and 
multi-level modelling features were supported in linear predictive modelling 






Various aspects of students’ background and context were also measured in 
PISA 2006. These included home possessions, including indicators of 
wealth, cultural possessions, home educational resources, and the number of 
books at home (OECD, 2009a). Preliminary analysis highlighted that the 
scale of home possessions produced broadly similar parameters to the item 
measuring the number of books at home considered alone. In order to 
increase general comparability with the new data collection, where it was 
not feasible to ask students an extensive array of questions regarding their 
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possessions, the indicator of the number of books at home was used in the 
final models. 
PISA 2006 also measured the students’ parents’ highest occupational 
level (coded by the OECD from the students’ open-ended responses) and 
highest educational level (OECD, 2009a). The occupational level was 
considered by the OECD through the international socio-economic index of 
occupational status (ISEI), a continuous scale that reflected income and 
educational differences across occupations (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & 
Treiman, 1992). Preliminary analysis highlighted that the parents’ highest 
educational levels and occupational levels had no predictive association 
with students’ science intentions when controlling for the students’ attitudes 
and beliefs, except for the fathers’ (or male guardians’) highest educational 
level within some models. In order to simplify modelling, the parents’ 
highest educational levels (and not the parents’ occupational levels) were 
retained in the final models. This also increased model comparability with 
the new data collection, where it was not feasible to ask students about their 
parental occupations and classify the results (and this also enhanced 
potential comparability with other studies such as TIMSS that have only 
considered parental education and not occupation). 
An indicator of whether the students’ mother or father worked in a 
science-related career (yes or no/undetermined, as coded by the OECD) 
(OECD, 2009a) was also included in the final models. Parents working 
within science might reflect implicit dispositions or attitudes to science that 
may be promoted within families, which may then influence students’ own 






Students in PISA 2006 completed test booklets containing various sets of 
applied tasks (not necessarily curricula-based), covering science, 
mathematics, and reading items. Not every questionnaire booklet included 
every task item. Students could receive one of thirteen possible task 
booklets, each containing different sets of items; some science items were 
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included in every booklet, but no mathematics items were present in three 
booklets and no reading items were present in six booklets (OECD, 2009a). 
For science, the average number of items per booklet was 32 (standard 
deviation of 13, minimum of 15, maximum of 60, all rounded to the nearer 
integer; the average reliability across all booklets was α = .872). 
Students’ task-scores were treated by the OECD as ‘missing 
responses’ to be analytically inferred from the tasks that were assigned, 
given that ideally all students would have completed every possible task. 
Operationally, the OECD calculated students’ task-scores through item-
response models (i.e. estimating scores given the particular responses to the 
test items), while using the students’ other responses (i.e. their reported 
background characteristics and attitudes) as additional information to help 
infer ‘missing responses’ across all students through multiple-imputation 
(OECD, 2009a). Estimates of task-scores were then provided as ‘plausible-
values’, five random-selections from each student’s estimated distribution of 
scores (OECD, 2009a). 
The plausible-values were broadly designed to optimise performance 
estimates for wider populations of students, rather than individual students 
(OECD, 2009b). Analysis would ideally be repeated and results would be 
combined across all five plausible-values (OECD, 2009b; Rubin, 1987). 
Using one single plausible-value alone would nevertheless give statistically-
unbiased estimates, and remains an acceptable approach, but would include 
some unknown degree of additional (theoretically-random) imputation 
variance (OECD, 2009b). Accordingly, studies of PISA have variously used 
one single plausible-value (Cheema & Skultety, 2016) or combined all 
plausible-values through multiple-imputation (Nagengast & Marsh, 2011). 
On average for students in England, the OECD plausible-values 
closely but imperfectly associated, with a mean of R = .928, p < .001, across 
the possible correlations between the five different plausible-values, which 
highlighted the imputation variance. This could potentially complicate 
considering accuracy/bias when comparing students’ confidence against 
different plausible-values and when defining groups: someone might be 
differently classified as under-confident, accurate, and/or over-confident 
when using different plausible-values. However, approaches to combine 
estimates across multiple plausible-values assume that group sizes and 
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compositions are constant across the various plausible-values (Rubin, 1987). 
Preliminary analysis therefore explored the implications of using one 
plausible-value and using all plausible-values (analytically aggregated 
through multiple-imputation). The parameters in predictive modelling were 
similar, such that conclusions and inferences would remain unchanged 
either way. Given that latent-profile analysis did not support multiple-
imputation across multiple plausible-values, only the first plausible-value 
was used for consistency in the final analytical models. 
As a further sensitivity check, preliminary analysis also considered 
single estimates of task-scores that were calculated as averages of the 
administered items (i.e. the mean proportion correct) and calculated through 
simple (single-parameter logistic) item-response models without attempting 
to infer/impute across the rotated design (i.e. calculating models for each of 
the thirteen booklets) (de Ayala, 2009; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 
2004; Zheng & Rabe-Hesketh, 2007). These calculated item-response and 
simple-average task-scores closely correlated (R = .987, p < .001), and also 
correlated with the plausible-values (respectively R = .920, p < .001, and R 
= .918, p < .001, calculated through multiple-imputation across the 
plausible-values). Regardless of the different methods used to calculate the 
task-scores, the parameters in predictive modelling were broadly similar so 
that fundamental conclusions or inferences would not change. However, any 
calculated task-score could not match the complexity of the item-response 
models applied by the OECD (i.e. modelling both binary and partial-credit 
tasks) (OECD, 2009a). As above, the first plausible-value from the OECD 
was therefore used in the final analysis. 
 
 
Section 5.2.3: Measuring students’ confidence biases 
 
The design of PISA 2006 provided measures of confidence (i.e. self-concept 
and self-efficacy) and one measure of attainment (i.e. task-score). 
Preliminary analysis highlighted that the students’ science self-concept 
beliefs had a higher predictive association with their science intentions than 
their self-efficacy beliefs for the students in England, which cohered with 
prior research considering students in Germany (Jansen, Scherer, & 
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Schroeders, 2015). Accordingly, the accuracy/bias of the students’ self-
concept beliefs formed the focus of the subsequent analysis (i.e. given that 
self-concept beliefs appeared to have greater contextual relevance). While 
the task-scores covered applied areas and may not perfectly reflect the 
students’ classroom (curricular-based) attainment, alternate attainment 
measures were not available; nevertheless, when PISA cohorts have been 
considered longitudinally in various countries, PISA task-scores have 
positively associated with students’ subsequent examination attainment with 
small to moderate magnitudes (Fischbach, Keller, Preckel, & Brunner, 
2013; Parker, Marsh, Ciarrochi, Marshall, & Abduljabbar, 2014). 
In PISA 2006 for England, students’ self-concept beliefs correlated 
to some extent with their task-scores (R = .331, p < .001, for the first 
plausible-value alone, or R = .330, p < .001, across all plausible-values via 
multiple-imputation). This relatively modest association could reflect 
various situations. First, students may form their self-concept beliefs in 
reference to diverse measures of attainment that are only approximated by 
the (applied and non-curricular) OECD tasks; essentially, the OECD tasks 
may not be ideal for determining self-concept accuracy/bias. Second, 
students’ beliefs may be influenced by factors other than attainment 
(Section 3.1), and imperfect associations are then perhaps unavoidable. 
Third, some students may be variously under-confident or over-confident in 
their self-concept beliefs, when compared to their task-scores (Section 3.2; 
although it remains unclear whether the same accuracy/bias would be 
apparent when compared to other indicators of attainment). All three 
situations may occur to some extent (plus other potential 
conceptual/theoretical issues may be relevant, as discussed in Section 3.4). 
Accordingly, and unavoidably, there is some uncertainty and/or imprecision 
in any exploration of confidence accuracy/bias, although this does not 
necessarily make the process invalid or without potential benefit. 
Considering the accuracy/bias of students’ self-concept beliefs 
against their task-scores required a method to associate the two measures 
(Section 3.4): for example, task-scores could simply be subtracted from 
confidence in a simple difference-score, assuming that the two indicators 
were measured on equivalent scales. However, students’ expressions of self-
concept beliefs (e.g. agreement with ‘Science topics are easy for me’) were 
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not inherently contextualised or referenced against task-scores. For 
example, science being ‘easy’ does not necessarily entail attaining at a 
particular task-score; different students may also have different 
interpretations of what ‘ease’ entails. 
In order to directly compare self-concept/self-efficacy and task-
scores, prior research has sometimes standardised these indicators (i.e. 
through z-score transformations); standardised indicators then intuitively 
appear to be on the same scale (i.e. standard deviations above or below the 
mean) and directly comparable. For example, one prior study of PISA 
calculated an accuracy/bias index as the students’ expressed self-concept 
beliefs minus the students’ task-score, minus the country-mean task-score 
(multiple countries were considered); the components were standardised via 
z-score transformations across all countries (Chiu & Klassen, 2010). 
Similarly, another study calculated an accuracy/bias index as the students’ 
expressed self-efficacy minus the students’ task-score, where both 
components were standardised via z-score transformations across the 
country being considered (Cheema & Skultety, 2016). These indicators can 
be broadly interpreted to reflect relative accuracy/bias, given the sample. 
For example, accuracy would entail confidence beliefs and attainment both 
being similarly above or below the sample mean, in standard deviation 
units. 
However, ‘relative accuracy’ may not necessarily entail confidence 
increasing by one standard deviation when attainment increases by one 
standard deviation. Across a sample, the particular association between 
confidence and attainment can be revealed through, for example, linear 
regression (i.e. which also accounts for the correlation between confidence 
and attainment). ‘Relative accuracy’ would then entail someone’s expressed 
confidence corresponding to the prediction from the regression equation, 
and under-confidence or over-confidence would be revealed by the 
regression-residual. For example, under-confidence would be revealed 
through lower reported confidence than predicted confidence and a negative 
regression-residual. Prior research has considered accuracy/bias through 
regression-residual indicators in this way, although not using PISA samples 
(Bouffard, Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; 
Narciss, Koerndle, & Dresel, 2011). 
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Accordingly, a regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias was 
used to compare the students’ self-concept beliefs and task-scores (for 
consistency across all the final analysis, this only considered the first 
plausible-value). This can be interpreted as the difference between 
someone’s expressed self-concept and the predicted self-concept that would 
be expected, given their task-scores and given the association between self-
concept and task-scores across the sample. A regression-residual indicator is 
essentially equivalent to a difference between z-scores, but also accounts for 
the correlation between the two factors (Section 3.4). 
 
 
Section 5.3: Methods: 2014/2015 survey 
 
In order to comprehensively address the research aims (Section 4) a new 
survey was developed and applied in 2014/2015. In PISA 2006, confidence 
accuracy/bias could only be considered relatively imprecisely through 
comparing non-matching indicators of confidence and attainment. The new 
survey was applied in order to determine whether similar results would be 
observed when considering explicit indicators of students’ self-reflective 
confidence accuracy/bias, measured via matched tasks and confidence-
ratings as applied in various prior studies (Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 
1999). 
The following sections cover the sampling in Section 5.3.1 and 
development of the questionnaire in Section 5.3.2. The various science 
attitudes and beliefs that were measured and used within the analysis are 
detailed in Section 5.3.3, and the measures of confidence accuracy/bias are 
similarly detailed in Section 5.3.4. 
 
 
Section 5.3.1: Sampling 
 
Surveying students usually requires schools to be sampled and approached, 
since students cannot easily be directly invited to participate in research. 
Schools may be classified into various types, depending on observable 
features such as their admissions policies; schools may also have varying 
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contextual features, such as their teaching approaches, which may not easily 
be observable or described within national records. 
Stratified sampling can help ensure that sufficient numbers of 
participants are gathered from specific types of schools; however, this 
requires determining what strata are relevant to consider and then requires 
larger samples to adequately cover all strata (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 
2007). The overall research design focused on students’ attitudes and 
beliefs, rather than the influence of types of school or other aspects that 
could easily form strata. Additionally, schools needed to be sampled and 
invited in stages (e.g. for piloting and then at subsequent stages), with 
limited resources and with no way to guarantee participation within strata or 
otherwise. Accordingly, it was operationally more feasible to randomly-
sample schools, although this potentially limited generalisation, depending 
on participation. 
National attainment records for Key Stage 4 (GCSE and equivalent 
qualifications) for secondary schools in England as of 2012/2013 (the latest 
available during 2014) formed the sampling frame, and data collection 
occurred during the 2014/2015 academic year. Subsequent national 
attainment records from 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 were considered for 
further contextualisation when they became available (Department of 
Education, 2016). 
The sampling frame excluded schools exclusively for those with 
special educational needs, who might find a questionnaire inaccessible 
and/or might have limited generalisation to other students. The sampling 
frame therefore considered 4125 schools out of 5238 secondary schools 
across England as of 2012/2013. Schools were then randomly selected and 
invited to participate, regardless of school type, admissions policies, and 
other school features. Given limited resources, invitations were sent 
electronically (and not via post); if there was no feasible means to contact a 
school, another was randomly selected instead. Schools were invited in 
stages (i.e. inviting 10-20 schools and allowing a few weeks for responses 
before inviting more) until resources were exhausted, for example on 
questionnaire printing and courier costs. This process was necessary to 
avoid potentially over-committing resources (e.g. if 100 schools were 
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invited at once, and all chose to participate, then there would have been 
insufficient resources to provide printed questionnaires for them all). 
In total, 314 schools were invited and 12 schools participated for 
science. Schools participated at their convenience (but were reminded and 
prompted to facilitate a decision either way). The invitation explained the 
research and potential benefits of gaining more knowledge (e.g. highlighting 
that understanding students’ confidence may have implications on guidance 
for subject choices or careers). Schools were also offered anonymous 
summaries of their students’ responses (e.g. school-level averages per 
questionnaire item), which were subsequently provided. 
From the twelve participating schools, seven were mixed-admissions 
comprehensive schools (admitting boys and girls, and not selecting students 
based on their attainment). Mixed-admissions comprehensive schools 
formed the majority of all secondary schools within England: 67% as of 
2012/2013 and 68% as of 2014/2015 (Department of Education, 2016). 
Selective schools (only admitting students based on their attainment) and 
boys-only and girls-only schools were also represented in the sample, but 
with minimal numbers. Further details of the sampled schools are covered in 
Appendix 2. 
The twelve schools covered a range of examination attainment 
evidenced by prior cohorts, although on average, as of 2012/2013, 65% of 
their students were reported to have achieved five or more A*-C grades 
(including in both English and mathematics) at GCSE level compared to 
averages of 64% across the invited schools, 61% across the sampling frame, 
and 51% across all schools in England (i.e. including schools for special 
educational needs). The equivalent averages, as of 2014/2015, were 62% for 
the sample, 59% across the invited schools, 54% across the sampling frame, 
and 47% across all national schools. Due to continual changes of school 
status (e.g. schools closing, opening, and/or changing status and hence 
identification codes), not all schools on the original 2012/2013 sampling 
frame could be matched against subsequent records. The contextualisation 
unavoidably involved slightly different numbers of schools for each year, 
and also involved changes in attainment due to different cohorts sitting the 
examinations. 
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Any sampling approach may potentially encounter different schools 
being more or less likely to participate (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). 
Considering the 2012/2013 data, there appeared to be no clear participation 
bias in terms of attainment, although with only twelve schools participating 
any inferences cannot be conclusive. However, the invitation process 
appeared to (inadvertently) select slightly higher attaining schools, perhaps 
following from re-sampling inaccessible schools. In practice, ‘random’ 
selection may not be completely possible with limited resources. 
Teachers were given freedom to disseminate the questionnaires to 
their students to suit their context (e.g. during free periods or during lesson 
time). Teachers were not supervised during the process. The introduction to 
the questionnaire explained the purpose of the study to the students, that 
participation was voluntary and that any particular items could be left blank, 
that the data would be kept confidential and individuals would not be 
identified, and that further information about the research or data could be 
requested. 
All students within Years 9, 10, and 11 were invited to be surveyed, 
in order to explore confidence accuracy/bias while science was still a 
compulsory subject. Considering multiple ages of students was intended to 
allow the results to be contextualised against a wide range of existing 
national and international research (Section 5.1). Some schools also offered 
for some younger students to participate (i.e. in Years 7 and 8); some data 
were then collected, although the numbers were relatively low and were not 
considered in the final analysis. Potential student-level participation biases 
could not be considered, given no wider information (e.g. on all students per 
schools) and potentially different practices being applied within schools 
depending on the teachers (e.g. where the questionnaires may have been 
administered for some classes/forms, in some science lessons, or via other 
arrangements). 
In total, 685 students in Year 9, 489 in Year 10, and 349 in Year 11 
were surveyed (1523 total). Given limited resources and participation, fewer 
than expected students were surveyed, especially in Year 11 (where 
teachers/schools may have wanted to focus on examination preparation 
rather than on completing surveys). This introduced methodological 
complications, such as whether to analyse separately by academic year or 
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across all the surveyed students, as described later within the analytical 
approaches (Section 6.4). 
 
 
Section 5.3.2: Questionnaire development 
 
The questionnaire for the 2014/2015 survey aimed to reveal whether 
students were under-confident, accurate, or over-confident in their 
confidence on various science tasks, and to measure students’ attitudes and 
motivational beliefs that might associate with their confidence accuracy/bias 
and/or with their science intentions. (A questionnaire is reproduced in 
Appendix 3.) The questionnaire was conceived within social-cognitive 
theory, applied through the expectancy-value model of motivated 
behavioural choices (Bandura, 1997; Eccles, 2009), and also aimed to 
measure additional attitudes and/or motivational beliefs of potential 
relevance (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Wigfield & Cambria, 2010). 
The questionnaire considered ‘science’ holistically, in accordance 
with the National Curriculum, for comparability with prior national and 
international studies, and for brevity and practicality (Department for 
Education, 2013, 2014; DeWitt & Archer, 2015; Martin & Mullis, 2013; 
OECD, 2009a). Repeating items/factors for biology, chemistry, physics, and 
any other subjects, would either entail an unfeasibly long questionnaire, or 
limit the overall amount of covered content. Nevertheless, students may 
have varying attitudes and beliefs across biology, chemistry, and physics 
(Jansen, Schroeders, & Lüdtke, 2014), and across other areas such as the 
nature of science and practical skills (Hardy, 2014). Fundamentally, the 
contextual relevance was therefore unavoidably reduced through 
considering ‘science’ rather than separate subjects. 
The measurement items were developed to be broadly comparable 
with a range of existing research (Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 2009a, 
2014). Ensuring comparability by drawing on existing items and 
conceptualisations enhanced factor/construct validity (i.e. the various 
items/factors were more likely to reflect prior theoretical and operational 
understandings), and (theoretically) content validity (i.e. the items were 
more likely to represent what they intended to measure) (Messick, 1995). 
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Nevertheless, prior items and/or conceptualisations were still closely 
considered. 
The initial pilot questionnaires were provided as electronic and paper 
formats. The majority of the subsequent questionnaires were completed by 
students on paper within school, as teachers highlighted that this was easier 
for them to administer. All paper responses were then manually recorded as 
electronic data. The pilot questionnaires included rating-scales and free-text 
prompts so that students could provide feedback. Anecdotally, the feedback 
could vary from students enjoying the questionnaire and recognising the 
potential benefit of research to education, to students highlighting that the 
questionnaire was uninteresting and too long. Perhaps surprisingly, the tasks 
were relatively well-received. 
Questionnaire piloting involved 165 students across Years 9, 10, and 
11, which clarified operational matters such as using paper questionnaires 
rather than an online format for the subsequent work, and helped to suggest 
initial refinements in scope and items, although with some uncertainty due 
to the limited numbers of students. Offering incentives to students was also 
explored initially in piloting (i.e. students could optionally enter their name 
to be randomly-selected to receive a gift voucher), but appeared to produce 
no substantial increase in returns; vouchers were then subsequently 
disseminated to the relevant students via their teachers, and all data were 
made anonymous if names had been entered. Incentives were not offered 
subsequently. 
Various new items were explored through questionnaire piloting, 
and particular items and areas of exploration were accordingly refined 
and/or eliminated. For example, students may potentially respond 
differently to positively-phrased and negatively-phrased items, such as 
being more likely to agree with positively-phrased items than to disagree 
with negatively-phrased items (Benson & Hocevar, 1985; Lindwall, et al., 
2012; Weems, Onwuegbuzie, & Collins, 2006; Weems, Onwuegbuzie, 
Schreiber, & Eggers, 2003). Any methodological effects (or other response 
tendencies) might influence students’ expressions of confidence, and hence 
the apparent accuracy/bias of their confidence. Accordingly, the pilot 
questionnaire included items such as agreement or disagreement with ‘I 
usually do well in science’ and ‘I am bad at science’, ‘Science is harder for 
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me than for many of my classmates’ and ‘Science is easier for me than for 
other students’, and various other items. However, students’ free-text 
feedback highlighted that they easily noticed the repetition (and thought that 
it was tiresome, redundant, and unnecessary), and students’ responses were 
essentially replicated but mirrored across the equivalent positively-phrased 
and negatively-phrased items (i.e. there appeared to be little to no 
difference/bias). 
Essentially, it was unfeasible to continue to apply additional 
negatively-phrased items in this way, and eliminating these items helped 
reduce the questionnaire length. Historically, applying a balance between 
positively-phrased and negatively-phrased items was suggested in order to 
reduce potential response tendencies such as acquiescence (Likert, 1932). 
Subsequently, however, recommendations have been to simply phrase items 
in order to reduce any potential ambiguity (Cronbach, 1950; Haladyna & 
Rodriguez, 2013). Focusing on positively-phrased items may also ensure 
that items are generally easier to understand and increase factor reliability 
(Barnette, 2000; Marsh, 1986a; Sliter & Zickar, 2014). Some particular 
negatively-phrased items were still retained for direct comparability with 
prior studies, however (Section 5.3.3). 
After the initial pilot questionnaires, some teachers still highlighted 
that the questionnaire was relatively long, and changes were sometimes 
requested (such as measuring grades through free-text boxes rather than 
tick-boxes to encompass National Curriculum levels, as described in 
Section 5.3.3). Accordingly, the length of the questionnaire was 
successively reduced where possible through further iterations, while core 
items were retained, in order to make the questionnaire more accessible and 
feasible for teachers to administer within shorter lessons. This involved 
attempting to refine the questionnaire using limited data (e.g. the paper 
questionnaires took time to be entered as electronic data). Most notably, the 
last version of the questionnaire (only used by 18% of the students) 
involved the removal of two entire tasks, and two factors (cost value and 
personal value) were reduced from three to two items, in order to 
substantially reduce the length (items/factors are detailed in Section 5.3.3). 
Initial analysis applied a cautious approach, and formed factors only 
from the common/core items, retained across all questionnaire versions 
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including the pilot versions. For the majority of students, more information 
was available in addition to the core items. For example, across Years 9-11, 
1016 students responded to ‘Science is important to me personally’, 1298 to 
‘Thinking scientifically is an important part of who I am’, and 1296 to 
‘Being able to do science helps me show other people who I am’. While one 
item was removed in the last questionnaire version (‘Science is important to 
me personally’), the students’ personal value of science could still be 
calculated across three items for most students (but across only two items 
for some). Factors and task-scores were accordingly calculated given the 
questionnaire version to maximise the information considered; for example, 
average task-scores (i.e. the proportion correct) were calculated out of eight 
or ten items, depending on the questionnaire version (Section 5.3.3). 
Preliminary analysis gave similar results either way (e.g. with personal 
value calculated with two or three items), so the factors were created as 
above to maximise the available data. 
Considering the final data from the 1523 surveyed students (685 
students in Year 9, 489 in Year 10, and 349 in Year 11, across all 
questionnaire versions), the assignment of items to wider factors was 
confirmed and/or refined through confirmatory factor analysis (via 
maximum-likelihood estimation, i.e. factor by factor) and through 
exploratory factor analysis (via principal-components analysis, i.e. 
considering emergent factors from all the available items). The process 
balanced maximising the number of items per factor with ensuring that the 
items were conceptually coherent/valid and empirically associated with the 
underlying theorised factor or idea. For example, the factor measuring 
students’ perceptions of their teacher and learning context potentially 
included the item ‘I think of things not related to the science lesson’, as 
applied in prior research (Martin & Mullis, 2013). For students across Years 
9-11, this item had a low association with the theorised underlying factor (a 
factor loading of -.010, while the other items had loadings between .672 and 
.817) and entailed that two factors were identified rather than the single 
theorised factor. Removing the item ensured that the remaining items 
formed only one factor, and improved the overall reliability (α = .864 to α = 
.904). Essentially, the item ‘I think of things not related to the science 
lesson’ may measure some form of distraction or disengagement, which 
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conceptually differs from the other items (e.g. ‘My Science teacher is easy 
to understand’, ‘My science teacher gives me interesting things to do’, ‘My 
Science teacher tells me what I need to do to become better in science’). 
However, in order to maintain broad comparability with the factor as 
applied in prior studies, further potential division of the items was not 




Section 5.3.3: Measuring students’ attitudes and beliefs 
 
Factors are often developed through conceptualising or defining an area to 
be explored, undertaking a review of the existing literature and 
measurement items, selecting specific items aided by statistical analysis, and 
considering how the resulting factor associates with existing measures or 
outcomes (Clark & Watson, 1995; Simms, 2008). Ideally, the various items 
will be comprehensively representative of the factor (Messick, 1995). 
Within educational and motivational research, however, it remains difficult 
to conclusively determine how factors should be defined; even given a 
particular definition, it remains difficult to then (logically) derive necessary 
and/or sufficient measurement items. Instead, the development of 
measurement items and factors has generally balanced theoretical and 
empirical considerations (Messick, 1995). 
Some of these issues were reduced by considering existing ideas, 
concepts, or factors, such as ‘self-concept’ and ‘utility value’ rather than 
defining and developing measurement items for entirely new concepts. The 
questionnaire development then involved reviewing and aggregating 
questionnaire items from various sources (e.g. prior instruments, studies, 
etc.) for specific areas/factors (e.g. self-concept, interest, utility, etc.), 
identifying similar items and removing duplicates, and considering and/or 
adjusting the phrasing of items to ensure their contextual relevance and ease 
of comprehension. New items were developed where the underlying idea 
unavoidably required more contextualisation (e.g. science intentions via ‘I 
intend to study science at A-Level’ or self-efficacy via ‘What grade do you 
think you will be able to get at GCSE (or equivalent) science’). Once data 
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were collected, various statistical analyses then considered and helped refine 
the links between items and factors (e.g. correlations between items, 
exploratory factor analysis across all potential items, confirmatory factor 
analysis across theorised items). Ultimately, single-factor structures (via 
confirmatory factor analysis) and acceptable indicators of reliability 
(Cronbach’s α coefficients) were confirmed, for students considered per 
academic year and across multiple years. 
The questionnaire items used agreement scales with categories of (1) 
‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’, (3) ‘slightly disagree’, (4) ‘slightly 
agree’, (5) ‘agree’, and (6) ‘strongly agree’. Depending on the item 
phrasing, categories were reverse-scored when necessary so that high values 
(e.g. 6) consistently indicated a positive experience or belief (e.g. doing 
well, being interested, the absence of anxiety, etc.). Preliminary analysis 
explored calculating factor-scores as averages of the relevant items (i.e. 
‘observed’ scores) and as predictions (i.e. estimated ‘unobserved’ or ‘latent’ 
scores) from confirmatory factor analysis (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, 
& Galbraith, 2008) and one-parameter-logistic item-response models (Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004; Zheng & Rabe-Hesketh, 2007). These 
various factor-scores appeared to closely associate. For example, across 
Years 9-11, and without inferring any missing responses, a simple-average 
factor-score for students’ self-concept beliefs highly correlated with 
predicted factor-scores from confirmatory factor analysis (R = .999, p < 
.001) and from one-parameter-logistic item-response models (R = .986, p < 
.001). Additionally, preliminary analysis highlighted that similar 
conclusions could be inferred, such as when predicting science intentions, 
regardless of how the factor-scores were calculated. 
Estimating factor-scores through predictive models entailed that the 
various model parameters (and hence the resulting factor-scores) were 
dependent on the particular sample of students, which introduced further 
potential decisions (e.g. whether to estimate factor-scores per year or across 
multiple years). Parameters might vary across academic years (or other 
groups) due to differences in how items were interpreted or contributed to 
factors, or due to variability from low sample sizes. While item-response 
models have been successfully applied by the OECD in PISA studies, for 
example, the relevant sample sizes have been large and the processes have 
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only needed to consider one age group (OECD, 2009a). Additionally, 
various forms of item-response or other models can be applied (de Ayala, 
2009), requiring further layers of assumptions or justifications into applying 
one particular model over another. 
The final analysis used factor-scores calculated as averages of the 
relevant items, in order to avoid such issues. Essentially, each item was then 
implicitly assumed to have equal relevance or contribution to the wider 
factor; confirmatory factor analysis indeed highlighted that the various items 
within the various factors had acceptable and relatively similar factor 
loadings (e.g. items with low loadings were removed during the 
development/refinement process). This also insured that all the various 
item/factor-scores, including those only covered by single-items, remained 
on the same metric: all were observed scores, rather than some being 
observed scores (such as the single-items) and others being predicted scores 
from confirmatory factor analysis or item-response models. Fundamentally, 
this helped reduce the layers of methodological complexity and 
assumptions, especially given that research in science education has 
similarly focused on students’ observed responses/scores (DeWitt & Archer, 
2015; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). 
The various factors are summarised in Table 2 and further 
elaborated in the following sections, together with the relevant single-item 
indicators. Table 3 provides an example of item-level comparability across 
surveys for self-concept beliefs. (See Appendix 1 for further details of item-
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Table 2: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): items/factors, reliability 
 
   Reliability 
Factor/scale Example item Items Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 
Years 
9-11 
Intentions ‘I intend to study science at A-Level’ 3 .882 .878 .880 .882 
Self-concept ‘I usually do well in science’ 5 .894 .898 .895 .896 
Self-efficacy ‘What grade do you think you will be able to get at GCSE (or equivalent) science’ 2 .850 .841 .804 .835 
Interest value ‘I am interested in the things I learn in science’ 7 .942 .923 .937 .936 
Utility value ‘Science is an important subject for me because I need it for what I want to study later on’ 11 .948 .941 .949 .948 
Personal value ‘Thinking scientifically is an important part of who I am’ 3 .904 .876 .883 .892 
Cost value ‘I have to invest a lot of time to get good grades in science’ 4 .873 .861 .853 .867 
Perceived control ‘If I put in enough effort I can succeed in science’ 5 .817 .885 .867 .856 
Perceived control (exams) ‘I do badly in science whether or not I study for my exams’ 4 .863 .876 .842 .863 
Study strategy: self-regulation ‘When I study for my science class, I set goals for myself in order to direct my activities in 
each study period’ 
12 .833 .810 .840 .829 
Study strategy: control ‘When I study science, I start by working out exactly what I need to learn’ 4 .864 .805 .860 .848 
Study strategy: memorisation ‘In order to remember the method for solving a science problem, I go through examples 
again and again’ 
4 .784 .663 .781 .759 
Study strategy: elaboration ‘When I study science, I try to relate the work to things I have learnt in other subjects’ 4 .837 .813 .833 .831 
Anxiety ‘Science makes me confused and nervous’ 5 .905 .906 .902 .905 
Social persuasions (praise) ‘My science teacher tells me I am good at science’ 3 .808 .771 .811 .797 
Subjective norms (friends) ‘Most of my friends do well in science’ 3 .625 .658 .656 .645 
Subjective norms (parents) ‘My parents believe it’s important for me to study science’ 3 .828 .814 .779 .820 
Teacher perceptions ‘My science teacher gives me interesting things to do’ 8 .908 .897 .905 .904 
Careers/events ‘My science teacher tells me about careers and jobs in science’ 3 .710 .674 .764 .707 
Notes: Reliability was measured through Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients. Items/factors were consistently score/coded so that higher values reflected positive attitudes/beliefs (e.g. 
higher interest, the absence of anxiety, disagreement with ‘I do badly in science whether or not I study for my exams’, etc.). For some students, personal value and cost were only 
measured through two items. 
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Table 3: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): item/factor development and survey comparability example (measuring self-concept beliefs) 
 
  Example source/reference items 
Dimension/theme 2014/2015 survey items PISA 2006 TIMSS 2011 PISA 2012 
Self-evaluation (doing well, 
being good, ease) 
‘I usually do well in science’ 
‘I have always been good at 
science’ 
‘Science topics are easy for me’ 
‘I can easily understand new ideas 
in science’ 
‘When I am being taught science, 
I can understand the concepts very 
well’ 
‘I usually do well in science’ 
‘Science is not one of my 
strengths’ 
‘I am just not good at science’ 
Mastery experiences (and their 
interpretation/evaluation) 
‘I get good grades in science’ ‘I can usually give good answers 
to test questions on science topics’ 
(No included items) ‘I get good grades in science’ 
Mastery experiences of 
difficult work 
‘I understand even the most 
difficult science work’ 
‘Learning advanced science topics 
would be easy for me’ 
‘I am good at working out difficult 
science problems’ 
‘In my science class, I understand 
even the most difficult work’ 
Learning quickly ‘I learn things quickly in science’ ‘I learn science topics quickly’ ‘I learn things quickly in science’ ‘I learn science quickly’ 
Notes: PISA 2012 measured students’ attitudes and beliefs related to mathematics; the listed items have been re-phrased to science for illustration. The distinction between the 
dimensions of ‘self-evaluation’ and ‘mastery experiences’ remains flexible (i.e. even items plausibly measuring mastery experiences involve some degree of evaluation, such as what 
‘good grades’ would entail). 
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Science intentions 
 
Students’ intentions towards science were measured across upper-secondary 
study (A-Level or equivalent), university study, and a career involving 
science (i.e. ‘I intend to study science at A-Level’, ‘I intend to study science 
at university’, ‘I am planning on pursuing a career that involves a lot of 
science’). The average across these items then reflected the students’ 
aspirations to persist within science across all these stages. As with PISA 
2006, considering science intentions across these multiple aspects of 
educational and career progression was most comparable to 
intentions/aspirations as considered in prior research in England (DeWitt, 
Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). This also approximated 
a continuous scale to a greater degree than any individual item considered 
alone, which helped meet the assumptions of (linear) predictive modelling 
(e.g. the outcome has a normal distribution, given the various predictors) 
(Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, & Galbraith, 2008; Cohen & Cohen, 
1984). 
While any individual item could form an outcome in itself in order 
to provide greater insight, and particular groups could be considered (e.g. 
those who responded with any degree of agreement, those who responded 
with strong agreement, etc.), these areas were outside the scope of the 
current research (and would entail an extensive amount of replication, 





Historical research into self-concept beliefs initially focused on structural 
features (Marsh, 1990; Marsh, Byrne, & Shavelson, 1988), given a 
relatively broad initial conceptualisation (Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 
1976), and it perhaps remained unclear and/or unquestioned why self-
concept was measured in particular ways or what aspects were necessarily 
integral. For example, initially, self-concept beliefs and interest/enjoyment 
were combined (Arens, Seeshing Yeung, Craven, & Hasselhorn, 2011; 
Marsh, Craven, & Debus, 1999). Contemporary research still potentially 
Page 106 of 361 
involves disconnections between theory, conceptualisations, and operational 
measurement. For example, research has proposed that peer-comparisons 
are influences on self-concept beliefs, but has sometimes included implicit 
expressions of peer-comparisons (e.g. ‘Math is harder for me than for many 
of my classmates’) as inherent aspects of a measure of self-concept (Marsh, 
Abduljabbar, et al., 2015). Essentially, in some cases, there may be less 
distinction between potential antecedents and potential expressions of self-
concept beliefs. 
Prior instruments and measures of self-concept were then reviewed 
(e.g. Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 2009a, 2013). The various items were 
categorised and commonalities were identified (but potential antecedents 
were identified and considered separately): prior items broadly covered self-
evaluation, general mastery experiences, mastery experiences of difficult 
work, and learning quickly (Table 3). These commonalities reflected 
aspects of existing theory (Bong & Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003); 
higher abilities entailing less learning time have also been proposed by 
theories of learning (Carroll, 1989). 
Accordingly, providing broad comparability with prior research, 
students’ subject-level self-concept beliefs were measured through five 
items: ‘I usually do well in science’; ‘I have always been good at science’; 
‘I get good grades in science’; ‘I understand even the most difficult science 





Someone’s self-efficacy or confidence in their future capacities inherently 
requires contextually-dependent expressions (Bandura, 1997). For example, 
self-efficacy could be expressed as confidence to correctly answer particular 
tasks, confidence in gaining particular examination grades, or confidence in 
passing a particular course; self-efficacy as measured in PISA 2006 
considered students’ confidence in being able to undertake various non-
curricular or everyday science-related tasks/activities (OECD, 2009a). 
General advice has been to measure self-efficacy on the same level as the 
outcome or area being investigated (Bandura, 1997; Bong, 1997; Pajares & 
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Miller, 1995). In the context of considering influences onto students’ 
subject-level studying intentions, this entailed a subject-level expression of 
self-efficacy. 
Accordingly, subject-level self-efficacy was measured through 
students’ confidence expressed as their expected future attainment (i.e. 
‘What grade do you think you will be able to get at GCSE (or equivalent) 
science’ and ‘What grade do you think you would be able to get if you 
studied your best science subject at A-Level’). These indicators were also 
contextually-relevant as students likely require particular grades in order to 
enrol on A-Level or university courses. Prior research has similarly 
measured self-efficacy as expressions of future capabilities to gain course-
specific attainment (Bong, 2001b; Lee, Lee, & Bong, 2014), although it 





Students also recorded their current science grade and related information 
such as their science grade in the previous year and their average grade 
across all subjects. From these items, preliminary analysis highlighted that 
the students’ current grade had the strongest association with science 
intentions (and with self-concept beliefs), and so was subsequently used 
within the final analysis. Students’ previous grades (and other such 
information) were then used as background information during preliminary 
analysis, for example to predict the students’ current grade in order to 
provide wider insight. 
Two of the twelve participating schools requested that the grade 
information was measured through National Curriculum levels: the 
questionnaires were amended so that grades/levels were reported as free-
text, which was then coded and categorised to be equivalent with the other 
reported grade data (detailed in Appendix 4). From the 685 students 
surveyed at Year 9, 186 students reported National Curriculum levels rather 
than alphabetical grades. Preliminary analysis suggested that the grades and 
levels associated with other reports but with some variability. For example, 
for Year 9 students (without inferring any missing values), the students’ 
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self-concept beliefs correlated slightly more strongly with reported grades 
(R = .445, p < .001) compared to National Curriculum levels (R = .372, p < 
.001). Conversely, self-efficacy beliefs (inherently expressed as expected 
alphabetical grades) correlated slightly more strongly with expressed current 
levels (R = .689, p < .001) compared to expressed current grades (R = .563, 
p < .001). However, any differences may have followed from the varying 
numbers of students involved and/or from the different students having 
different characteristics (and/or being at different schools). 
Fundamentally, preliminary analysis produced similar predictive 
coefficients and significance values when considering only those students 
who reported alphabetical grades and when considering all students through 
the aggregated grade/level indicator, suggesting that the inclusion of those 
who reported National Curriculum levels was not notably influencing the 
various associations when considered within a wider context. 
Regardless of these particular operational aspects, alphabetical 
grades may be inherently variable in implementation or interpretation across 
schools (outside of national examinations such as GCSE and A-Level 
grades), which unavoidably introduces variability or uncertainty. 
Additionally, self-reported grades can be under-reported, accurate, or over-
reported (Robins & Beer, 2001; Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 
2003), but have generally been observed to have high correlations with 
actual grades (Kuncel, Credé, & Thomas, 2005). 
During data collection, it was operationally unfeasible to collect 
information other than self-reports. For example, asking schools to provide 
‘objective’ attainment records for their students would have been intrusive, 
eliminate anonymity (i.e. the questionnaires would have needed to ask for 
students’ names so that attainment records could be matched to their 
responses), and generally require further time and effort from teachers. In 
any event, for those students in Years 9, 10, and 11, any national attainment 
results would either be historical (e.g. Key Stage 2 tests taken in Year 6) or 
may not have been undertaken (e.g. GCSE or equivalent examinations), and 
so would not necessarily help to consider whether the students were tending 
towards under-confidence or over-confidence. Appearances of biases could 
follow from any unobserved changes in attainment over time; for example, 
someone might be generally accurate when reporting high self-concept 
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beliefs but with low prior attainment (e.g. at Key Stage 2) if their attainment 
had subsequently increased in the meantime. 
Preliminary analysis considered the accuracy/bias of students’ self-
concept beliefs compared to their current grades, but ultimately focused on 
the accuracy/bias of their task-level confidence and scores, given that these 




Theorised influences on confidence 
 
Various influences on, antecedents of, and/or sources of self-efficacy and 
self-concept beliefs have been identified or theorised (Bandura, 1997; Bong 
& Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). Measurement items were again 
informed by commonalities across various prior studies or instruments (e.g. 
Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 2013; Usher & Pajares, 2009). 
Accordingly, various potential influences on students’ self-
efficacy/self-concept beliefs were measured: mastery experiences (students’ 
current science grade, as above); vicarious experiences (‘When I see how 
another student solves a science problem, I can see myself solving the 
problem in the same way’); social persuasions or praise (e.g. ‘My science 
teacher tells me I am good at science’); (the absence of) anxiety (e.g. 
‘Science makes me confused and nervous’, reverse-scored); subject-
comparisons (‘Science is harder for me than any other subject’, reverse-
scored); and peer-comparisons (‘Science is harder for me than for many of 
my classmates’, reverse-scored). 
Some items were unavoidably measured through single-items given 
the constraints of the questionnaire length and given few items or precedents 
being used in prior research. For example, for brevity and comparability 
with prior research, single-item indicators representing subject-comparisons 
and peer-comparisons were applied and negatively-phrased (Martin & 
Mullis, 2013). As before, all items were then coded so that higher scores 
reflected positive aspects/beliefs (e.g. science being easier than other 
subjects). Reassuringly, single-items have indeed been established as 
acceptable indicators when compared to multiple-item factors (Gogol, et al., 
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2014). Applying single-items increases the reliance on the particular 
phrasing, however; for example, the indicator of subject-comparisons and 
peer-comparisons considered relative difficulty rather than relative 
attainment comparisons. An extensive amount of research has focused on 
inferring the (implicit) influence of peer-comparisons through modelling 
students’ own attainment and group-average levels of attainment (Marsh, 
Abduljabbar, et al., 2015; Nagengast & Marsh, 2011). Other research has, 
however, highlighted the benefit of considering (explicit) indicators of 
students’ peer-comparisons through questionnaire items (Huguet, et al., 
2009; Thijs, Verkuyten, & Helmond, 2010). 
Anxiety and praise were measured with more extensive sets of items, 
given their prevalence in prior research (Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 
2013). However, conceptually, ‘anxiety’ may form one aspect of the ‘costs’ 
associated with studying a subject (Flake, Barron, Hulleman, McCoach, & 
Welsh, 2015). For the considered students, factor analysis confirmed that 
the anxiety and cost items indeed formed two factors, although acceptable 
reliability could still be observed across the aggregated anxiety and cost 
items (e.g. α = .826 across Years 9-11). Nevertheless, anxiety and costs 
were kept separate for direct comparability with prior research. 
 
 
Theorised influences on intentions 
 
The theorised influences on students’ intentions and choices from the 
expectancy-value model have been frequently explored across various prior 
studies (Bøe & Henriksen, 2015). As before, measurement items were 
informed by commonalities across various prior studies or instruments (e.g. 
Conley, 2012; Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 2013; Trautwein, et al., 2012; 
Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
Students’ science interest value reflected their inherent or intrinsic 
interest (e.g. ‘I am interested in the things I learn in science’) and enjoyment 
(e.g. ‘I enjoy learning science’) in studying science, and in science 
considered in general (i.e. ‘I like science’, interpretable as science at school, 
science as a wider field, etc.). 
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Utility value aimed to reflect the indirect or extrinsic benefits, 
importance, or value associated with science or studying science. This 
included the potential benefits of science for other areas of study (e.g. ‘I 
need science to learn other school subjects’, ‘Science is an important subject 
for me because I need it for what I want to study later on’) and for future 
employment (e.g. ‘I will learn many things in science that will help me get a 
job’, ‘Learning science is worthwhile for me because it will improve my 
career prospects’). Exploratory factor analysis (across all items) highlighted 
potential associations between some utility value items (e.g. ‘I need to do 
well in science to get the job I want’) and items intending to directly 
measure science intentions. Nevertheless, further exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis highlighted that the intentions and utility items 
(when considered together) indeed formed two factors. 
Students’ personal value of science reflected the importance of 
science to their own identity. Personal value was considered as personal 
importance, as an inherent aspect of personal identity, and as a means to 
convey personal identity to other people (i.e. ‘Science is important to me 
personally’, ‘Thinking scientifically is an important part of who I am’, 
‘Being able to do science helps me show other people who I am’), and 
accordingly directly linked with theoretical conceptualisations of ‘identity’ 
within science (Carlone & Johnson, 2007). Potentially-similar items for 
measuring utility value (e.g. ‘It is important to do well in science’) (Martin 
& Mullis, 2013) did indeed load onto the utility value factor and not the 
personal value factor. 
The cost value associated with science covered time (e.g. ‘I have to 
invest a lot of time to get good grades in science’), lost opportunities (e.g. 
‘Success in science means that I need to give up other activities I enjoy’), 
and in general terms (e.g. ‘I have to give up a lot to do well in science’). 
Conceptually, costs can broadly encompass effort and time, demands and 
restrictions from other areas of life, sacrifice and the loss of other 
alternatives, and negative emotions such as anxiety and stress (Flake, 
Barron, Hulleman, McCoach, & Welsh, 2015; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
The items measuring anxiety and cost nevertheless formed separate factors 
for the considered students. 
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Some students completed a questionnaire with only two items for 
each of the personal value and cost value factors, however, since the last 
iteration of the questionnaire was (perhaps overly) reduced in length to help 
teachers administer it. In retrospect, other factors could have been more-
easily reduced and the importance of the personal value factor was less 
immediately clear, given prior research focusing on utility value and interest 
value. Nevertheless, the full items were available for the majority of 
students, and prior studies have indeed measured factors such as cost with 
only two items (Conley, 2012; Trautwein, et al., 2012). 
 
 
Other potential influences on intentions 
 
While the expectancy-value model recognises that someone’s context and 
other people may be influential on intentions/choices, further factors have 
not been consistently modelled, given that wider influences are theorised to 
be mainly mediated by someone’s confidence and their various (‘subjective 
task value’) attitudes (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Prior research has 
nevertheless highlighted the direct influence of other people onto students’ 
choices (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Sjaastad, 2012). Accordingly, further 
potential influences on students’ intentions were measured, including the 
students’ perceptions of their teacher and/or learning context (Martin & 
Mullis, 2013), any potential influences of friends and parents (OECD, 
2013), and students’ notions of perceived control or effort (OECD, 2013). 
Items were broadly phrased as per earlier research for comparability. 
Students’ perceptions of their teacher and/or learning context 
covered their affective perceptions (e.g. ‘My Science teacher is easy to 
understand’, ‘My science teacher gives me interesting things to do’) 
together with any experiences of formative feedback/guidance (e.g. ‘My 
Science teacher gives me feedback on my strengths and weaknesses in 
science’, ‘My Science teacher tells me what I need to do to become better in 
science’) (Martin & Mullis, 2013). Factor analysis confirmed that these 
various items formed only one factor. 
Page 113 of 361 
A further factor was formed to cover the provision of science careers 
advice, events, and guidance from teachers or otherwise provided by the 
school (e.g. ‘My science teacher tells me about careers and jobs in science’). 
Implicit influences or ‘subjective-norms’ were considered in relation 
to the students’ friends (i.e. ‘Most of my friends do well in science’, ‘Most 
of my friends work hard at science’, ‘My friends enjoy taking science tests’) 
and parents (‘My parents believe it’s important for me to study science’, 
‘My parents believe that science is important for my career’, ‘My parents 
like science’). Factor analysis confirmed separate factors for friends and 
parents although acceptable reliability was also observed across the 
combined items. 
Someone’s ‘perceived control’ was originally (historically) 
conceived as theoretically akin to self-efficacy but also considering the 
perceived ease or difficulty of the area (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). Perceived 
control was intended to be distinct from someone’s beliefs of their ‘locus of 
control’, considered as whether outcomes followed from someone’s own 
efforts/characteristics (internal causes) or wider (external) causes (Rotter, 
1966). Similarly, perceived control did not necessarily consider whether 
someone believed that their abilities or other personal characteristics were 
fixed or changeable, and so were broadly under their own control or not in 
terms of potential development (Dweck, 2000; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Contemporary measurement, however, has broadly considered someone’s 
perceived control as whether their personal efforts can lead to success, 
which perhaps implicitly considers an internal locus of control (OECD, 
2013; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & Mckeachie, 1993; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, 
& Wilbert, 1991). 
Perceived control was nevertheless considered as a potential 
motivational factor, even though the underlying concept appeared less clear. 
For example, it was possible to hypothesise that believing that science 
abilities cannot be changed, outcomes are outside of personal control, and/or 
effort is futile, might entail lower intentions to study science further, and/or 
somehow link with under-confidence. Reviewed across various studies, 
believing that personal abilities could be changed has associated with higher 
attainment (to a small extent) and with various other beneficial motivational 
beliefs, such as motivations to learn and master work, and expectations that 
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outcomes could be achieved (Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & 
Finkel, 2013). For students at the start of secondary school in the United 
States, for example, believing that personal science abilities could be 
changed associated with higher science self-efficacy, and boys reported 
stronger beliefs compared to girls (Chen & Pajares, 2010). Perceived control 
for learning, considered akin to an internal locus of control, has also 
associated with high attainment and self-efficacy for university students 
(Credé & Phillips, 2011). 
Factor analysis highlighted that items measuring the notion of ability 
being changeable (e.g. ‘I can improve my ability in science’) (Dweck, 2000) 
formed one factor together with those items measuring perceived control in 
general terms, covering whether personal effort could lead to success (e.g. 
‘If I put in enough effort I can succeed in science’) and whether success 
would follow from individual efforts (e.g. ‘Whether or not I do well in 
science is completely up to me’) (OECD, 2013). However, new (negatively-
phrased) items considering perceived control for attainment (e.g. ‘I do badly 
in science whether or not I study for my exams’) formed a separate factor. 
Indicators of reliability were also higher for these two separate factors than 
across the aggregated items. 
As further potential motivational influences, students’ orientations 
towards mastering learning (referred to as a ‘mastery’ orientation) and/or 
performing better than other students (referred to as a ‘performance’ 
orientation) were also measured (Ames, 1992; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Elliot, 1999; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Elliot & Thrash, 2001). Prior 
conceptualisations and measurement of these goal orientations has perhaps 
tended towards re-phrasing the same (singular) underlying idea across 
multiple items (e.g. ‘I am striving to demonstrate my ability relative to 
others in this class’, ‘I am motivated by the thought of outperforming my 
peers, ‘It is important to me to do well compared to others in this class’) 
(Elliot, 1999). Given that the underlying ideas appeared to form relatively 
clear and distinct concepts, and for brevity, new single-items were applied 
in the questionnaire (‘I aim to understand and learn the material in science’ 
and ‘I aim to perform better than other students in science’). 
Fundamentally, the inclusion of these further items/factors could 
potentially extend understanding and highlight their relevance to science 
Page 115 of 361 




Self-regulation and studying strategies 
 
Self-regulation for studying can be measured in various ways. Various 
questionnaire items have been developed, although arising more from prior 
empirical studies than deriving from theoretical cyclical models of self-
regulation (Pintrich, 2004; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & Mckeachie, 1993; 
Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & Wilbert, 1991; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 
1986, 1988). Various items/factors within different instruments have been 
found to be broadly equivalent (Muis, Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2007). 
Other approaches to measure self-regulation have facilitated students to talk 
through their experiences and processes of undertaking tasks (Armstrong, 
Wallace, & Chang, 2008) or have considered recordings or observations 
(coded by researchers) of how students work in practice (Lippmann Kung & 
Linder, 2007). When multiple methodological approaches have been 
considered for the same students, results have variously been similar across 
the approaches (Schellings, 2011; Schellings, van Hout-Wolters, Veenman, 
& Meijer, 2013) or different across the approaches (Hadwin, Nesbit, 
Jamieson-Noel, Code, & Winne, 2007; Jacobse & Harskamp, 2012). Within 
the constraints of the research underlying this thesis, however, it was 
unfeasible to apply multiple approaches in addition to the questionnaire. 
The self-regulation for studying factor (‘meta-cognitive self-
regulation’) from the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire 
(MSLQ) was selected for the questionnaire, given that the overall 
instrument was broadly based on the social-cognitive model, had been 
applied within various prior research to aid contextualisation, and that the 
relevant factor was relatively brief (Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & Mckeachie, 
1993; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & Wilbert, 1991). The factor covered various 
areas including the setting of goals (e.g. ‘When I study for my science class, 
I set goals for myself in order to direct my activities in each study period’), 
adapting and applying different studying approaches (e.g. ‘I try to change 
the way I study in order to fit the science course requirements and the 
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teacher’s teaching style’), and reflection and/or monitoring (e.g. ‘I ask 
myself questions to make sure I understand the material I have been 
studying earlier in science class’). This broadly covered elements within 
theorised cycles of self-regulation (Zimmerman, 2000), although without 
explicitly asking whether a cycle or process occurs. 
The MSLQ items were used directly for the measure of self-
regulated studying, in order to be more comparable with prior studies. 
However, some items may not necessarily have been ideal though using 
conditional phrasing (e.g. ‘If science course materials are difficult to 
understand, I change the way I approach the material’), which may 
introduce uncertainty (e.g. some students may not find science materials 
difficult to understand) and/or entail that agreement or disagreement may 
have different meanings for different students. Students may have attempted 
to interpret what the item was asking, given that the exact phrasing may not 
have completely applied to them. 
Further measures were also included for the study strategies of 
‘controlling’ or organising learning (e.g. ‘When I study science, I start by 
working out exactly what I need to learn’, ‘When I study science, I try to 
figure out which concepts I still have not understood properly’), 
‘memorisation’ or rehearsal (e.g. ‘When I study for a science test, I learn as 
much as I can off by heart’, ‘In order to remember the method for solving a 
science problem, I go through examples again and again’), and ‘elaborating’ 
materials and ideas (e.g. ‘When I study for a science test, I try to understand 
new concepts by relating them to things I already know’, ‘When I study 
science, I try to relate the work to things I have learnt in other subjects’). 
Such factors have been similarly measured in the MSLQ (Pintrich, Smith, 
Garcia, & Wilbert, 1991) and international studies (OECD, 2013), and were 
phrased for comparability with both. 
These studying strategies provided further potential indicators of 
benefits or detriments that might associate with students’ confidence 
accuracy/bias. Across various studies with university students, strategies of 
control, memorisation, and elaboration all associated with higher attainment, 
with elaboration having the highest association (Credé & Phillips, 2011; 
Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 2012). For secondary school students, 
however, memorisation strategies have associated with lower task-scores in 
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mathematics, and control strategies have associated with higher task-scores, 
while elaboration has had no association, in PISA 2000 (Chiu, Chow, & 
Mcbride-Chang, 2007) and in PISA 2012 (Echazarra, Salinas, Méndez, 
Denis, & Rech, 2016). Similarly, for secondary school students in Germany 
(outside of PISA), memorisation associated with lower attainment in 
mathematics, controlling for the students’ interest in mathematics and other 
factors, while elaboration had no association (Köller, 2001). 
Study strategies are nevertheless distinct from the concepts of 
‘surface’ and ‘deep’ learning (Biggs, 1993; Entwistle & McCune, 2004); 
memorisation does not necessarily imply or equate to surface learning (i.e. 
only learning the minimum that is sufficient to pass), nor does elaboration 
equate to deep learning (i.e. maximising learning). The ideas of surface and 
deep learning consider motivations or orientations towards learning rather 
than the particular strategies undertaken when learning (Pintrich, Smith, 
Garcia, & Wilbert, 1991). 
Some of the self-regulated studying items (e.g. ‘I try to think through 
a science topic and decide what I am supposed to learn from it rather than 
just reading it over when studying for science’) might conceptually overlap 
with control strategies (e.g. ‘When I study for a science test, I try to work 
out what the most important parts to learn are’). Exploratory factor analysis 
highlighted that the self-regulated learning strategies and the other learning 
strategies could overlap to varying degrees (i.e. common factors could 
emerge across the various strategy items) but the results varied depending 
on which students were considered (e.g. individual year groups and/or 
across Years 9-11) and whether all questionnaire items were considered or 
whether only the studying strategy items were considered. Given that 
confirmatory factor analysis highlighted single-factors with acceptable 
reliability for each factor considered alone, the theorised items/factors were 





Students’ self-reported background was also recorded. Specifically: their 
gender; their background/ethnicity; the highest level of education completed 
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by the students’ mother and father (or equivalent guardians); the number of 
books at home; and whether either parent/guardian worked in any job or 
area related to science (as interpreted by the student). 
These indicators balanced including those measured within 
comparable prior studies against brevity and areas that students may be able 
to answer (e.g. Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015; OECD, 
2009a). It was less feasible to include complex measures of parental 
occupation and/or to solicit free-text descriptions that would then require 
coding and classification. For example, family background is often 
considered through indicators of ‘socio-economic status’, which is often 
considered through classifying occupations. National surveys often apply 
the ‘National Statistics Socio-economic Classification’ (NS-SEC) scheme, 
which considers someone’s occupation and employment status, managerial 
responsibilities, and workplace size (Rose & O’Reilly, 1998; Rose, Pevalin, 
& O‘Reilly, 2005). However, such questions are unfeasible for students to 
answer. Additionally, the ‘economic’ aspect of this ‘socio-economic 
classification’ appears to remain implicit, so it perhaps remains unclear what 
is or should be measured; students might again be less likely to know the 
precise details of their parents’ income, and/or find the question intrusive. 
The piloting indeed highlighted (anecdotally from free-text responses) that 
some students found questions about their parents intrusive and they were 
not clear why they were asked. 
Preliminary analysis of PISA 2006 highlighted that indicators of 
parents’ occupational levels were not significantly predictive of students’ 
science intentions, when considering parental education, parents working in 
science or not, and the students’ own attitudes and beliefs. Similarly, prior 
research has associated students’ aspirations more with parental education 
rather than parent occupation (Davies, Qiu, & Davies, 2014). To facilitate 
the data collection in the 2014/2015 survey, students were then only asked 
about their parents’ levels of education and whether either parent worked 
within science. Not considering hierarchies of parental occupation may be 
considered problematic for some research fields, but appeared to be less 
contextually relevant here (i.e. parents working within science or not 
appeared to have more potential relevance); nevertheless, it may be 
beneficial to explore all such areas within future studies. 
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Further areas such as students’ science set were recorded by the 
questionnaire (i.e. top, middle, or bottom, if setting was used) but these had 
no predictive association with science intentions once students’ wider 
attitudes and beliefs were also modelled (specifically, setting was 
completely mediated by students’ self-concept and self-efficacy beliefs). For 
brevity, such areas were then not included within the final analysis; since 
the analysis focused on accuracy/bias groups/clusters, further sub-division 




Section 5.3.4: Measuring students’ confidence biases 
 
Evaluating someone’s confidence accuracy/bias essentially requires 
conceptually-equivalent measures of confidence and attainment, so that the 
two can be plausibly compared (Section 3.4). The most explicit 
comparisons have involved attainment tasks paired with expressions of 
confidence, so that self-reflective confidence accuracy/bias can be directly 
considered (Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 1999). In contrast, comparisons 
of attainment and confidence through PISA, for example, can only form 
implicit or potentially artificial indicators of accuracy/bias (Cheema & 
Skultety, 2016; Chiu & Klassen, 2010). 
Potential attainment tasks for the questionnaire were considered 
from a variety of sources, including PISA, TIMSS, discontinued national 
Key Stage 3 (KS3) tests, and previous examination papers for GCSE and A-
Level tests from various providers (e.g. AQA, Edexcel, OCR, etc.). All had 
been nationally or internationally validated as reliable indicators of 
performance through various processes. Tasks from TIMSS were then 
selected due their strong contextual relevance (i.e. being designed to cover 
curricula areas) and their efficiency in measurement (Foy, Arora, & Stanco, 
2013). Additionally, TIMSS tasks have been successfully used in prior 
research to consider confidence accuracy/bias (Chen, 2003; Chen & 
Zimmerman, 2007; Seidel, 2006). Alternately, tasks from PISA were 
relatively lengthy and often involved multi-stage tasks, and were less 
contextually-relevant through considering applied rather than curricular 
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areas (OECD, 2006b). Tasks from past examination papers or legacy KS3 
tests were also relatively lengthy, and although they potentially offered 
strong contextual relevance they were potentially less accessible to different 
ages of students. 
Tasks from TIMSS have been internationally validated through 
extensive processes, and were designed to broadly cover curricula areas 
from the participating countries, including England (Mullis, Martin, 
Ruddock, O’Sullivan, & Preuschoff, 2009). As a precaution, the content of 
the tasks were verified against the (Key Stage 3) National Curriculum 
(Department for Education, 2013, 2014). For example, the ‘what is a 
compound’ task (S042306) operated within the ‘atoms, elements and 
compounds’ National Curriculum area, where students are required to 
understand the differences between atoms, elements, and compounds; the 
‘parachute jumper’ task (S032141) operated within the ‘motion and forces’ 
National Curriculum area, where students need to consider and understand 
balanced and unbalanced forces. 
Reliability (i.e. consistency) and validity (i.e. scope of content 
coverage) were both likely to increase with the number of tasks (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2007; Cronbach, 1951). It was unfeasible to assign 
students a comprehensive examination, however. The overall purpose was 
not to ‘definitively’ measure attainment, but to measure accuracy/bias 
through pairs of tasks and confidence-ratings (although reliability/validity 
would nevertheless be improved through considering more task/confidence 
pairs). Prior research into accuracy/bias has considered variable numbers of 
paired items, for example fifteen (Chen, 2003; Chen & Zimmerman, 2007). 
Including ten tasks was feasible, balanced against the other areas of the 
questionnaire and its overall length. Calculations of accuracy/bias then 
covered similar numbers of items to longer attitudinal scales, and covered 
more items than many factors (such as self-concept beliefs). 
The tasks were selected to cover a range of curricular areas, 
including photosynthesis, atomic structures, changes of state, electricity and 
current, and various other areas; these covered biology, chemistry, and 
physics. The selected tasks mainly used a four-item multiple-choice format 
but also involved students writing free-text responses, which were 
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subsequently coded using the TIMSS schemes (Foy, Arora, & Stanco, 
2013). 
The tasks were selected to be potentially accessible to younger and 
older students. Given published task-level results and analysis of TIMSS 
2011 data, tasks were selected with a range of likely ‘difficulties’ (i.e. 
inferred from the average proportion correct in TIMSS 2011 across students 
in England), but with a balanced overall average (i.e. averaging close to 
50% answered correctly across the selected tasks) (Foy, Arora, & Stanco, 
2013). Essentially, the selected tasks were intended to be (considered 
together) neither too easy nor too difficult, and so to be relatively valid for 
different ages. Subsequently, across the surveyed students in 2014/2015, the 
proportions of correct answers per item appeared broadly similar to those 
observed in TIMSS 2011 (Foy, Arora, & Stanco, 2013). Even for Year 11 
students, on average, there did not appear to be ‘ceiling’ effects with all 
students essentially answering items correctly. These particular item-level 
details are shown in Appendix 5. 
In preliminary analysis, as in PISA and TIMSS, item-response 
models were considered in order to estimate students’ overall task-scores: 
such models estimated the varying ‘difficulty’ of each item while 
concurrently estimating the students’ performance (de Ayala, 2009; Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004; Zheng & Rabe-Hesketh, 2007). 
Preliminary analysis highlighted that, for example, one-parameter-logistic 
item-response model estimates of performance strongly associated with 
average proportion-correct task-scores (e.g. R = .903, p < .001, across Years 
9-11 without inferring any missing values). The various item-response 
model parameters and estimates depended on the considered students, 
however, so that the statistical sophistication of estimating item difficulty 
and performance per academic year was potentially undermined by any 
uncertainty arising from the lower numbers of modelled students for each 
year. Ultimately, sophisticated measures were not required to compare 
someone being correct or not against being confident or not in their answer. 
Therefore, students’ task-scores were measured as the average proportion of 
correct answers. 
Each task was paired with a confidence rating (i.e. ‘How confident 
are you that you solved this correctly?’), providing a retrospective self-
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reflective evaluation of the students’ answer. Various other self-evaluative 
or ‘meta-cognitive’ questions can be asked immediately after a task, for 
example covering the familiarity, interest, perceived difficulty, and applied 
effort and time related to solving the task (Efklides, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & 
Ziliaskopoulou, 2006). Only retrospective task-confidence was considered 
for brevity. 
Measures of confidence given before and after undertaking tasks 
conceptually differ (i.e. respectively reflecting extremely contextualised 
self-efficacy and self-concept beliefs to some extent) and may be formed in 
different ways. For example, someone may consider features of the task in 
order to express their prospective confidence in being able to successfully 
solve it, and/or (perhaps if they were unfamiliar with the task) they may also 
generalise from their wider subject-level confidence beliefs. Alternately, 
confidence retrospectively expressed after undertaking tasks allows 
someone to self-reflect on their problem-solving processes and their 
answers. Accordingly, and as highlighted in prior studies, confidence 
expressed after undertaking tasks may be inherently more accurate than 
expressed before undertaking tasks, although under-confidence and over-
confidence biases have nevertheless still been observed (Ackerman & 
Wolman, 2007; Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010; Erickson & Heit, 2015). 
In the last version of the questionnaire, two tasks were removed in 
order to substantially reduce the length to help teachers administer the 
questionnaire and for students to complete the questionnaire within limited 
time periods. The various task-scores and accuracy/bias indicators were 
accordingly calculated depending on the questionnaire version (i.e. out of 
eight or ten items/pairs). 
 
 
Indicators of task-level confidence biases 
 
Various indicators can be calculated to quantify overall accuracy and/or bias 
in confidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Yaniv, Yates, & 
Smith, 1991; Yates, 1990). 
Following earlier studies (Chen, 2003; Pajares & Graham, 1999), a 
simple difference-score was calculated between the students’ average task-
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confidence and task-score, equalised to the same scales. This measured the 
‘absolute’ degree of accuracy/bias, from under-confidence through accuracy 
through to over-confidence. Preliminary analysis also considered 
regression-residual indicators, calculated separately for each academic year, 
for task-level confidence accuracy/bias (i.e. ‘relative’ under-confidence or 
over-confidence via comparing someone’s reported task-confidence against 
the predicted task-confidence that would be expected given their task-score 
and given the task-score/task-confidence association across the students for 
that academic year) and for subject-level self-concept accuracy/bias (i.e. 
‘relative’ under-confidence or over-confidence in reported science self-
concept, compared to the predicted self-concept given the students’ current 
science grade and given the other students for that academic year). 
The task-level difference-score and regression-residual indicators 
closely associated (e.g. R = .777, p < .001, without accounting for missing 
values, across Years 9-11). However, the regression-residual indicator of 
self-concept accuracy/bias had less association with the task-level 
difference-score (R = .198, p < .001) and the task-level regression-residual 
indicators (R = .358, p < .001, both without accounting for missing values, 
across Years 9-11). The other associations between the task-level and 
subject-level indicators might suggest a higher correspondence between 
accuracy/bias across both levels. Without accounting for missing values and 
considered across Years 9-11, moderate (and relatively similar) associations 
were observed between students’ task-scores and current grades (R = .515, p 
< .001), task-confidence and self-concept beliefs (R = .557, p < .001), task-
scores and task-confidence (R = .521, p < .001), and current grades and self-
concept beliefs (R = .489, p < .001). 
Preliminary analysis highlighted that for the 2014/2015 survey, self-
concept had little predictive association with the students’ science 
intentions, when controlling for the students’ other attitudes and beliefs (in 
contrast to the PISA 2006 preliminary results). Considering self-concept 
accuracy/bias may have then been less meaningful in context, for this new 
sample of students. Alternately, considering self-efficacy accuracy/bias (i.e. 
confidence, expressed as expected grades, compared to actual grades) would 
not have been possible without a longitudinal design. Fundamentally, in 
contrast to comparing self-concept beliefs and current grades, the task-level 
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comparisons considered self-reflective accuracy/bias with potentially higher 
validity (i.e. task-scores and task-confidence clearly considered the same 
area) and reliability (i.e. multiple pairs of task-scores/confidence-ratings 
were considered). On the task-level, it was also less meaningful to consider 
‘relative’ (regression-residual) accuracy/bias when ‘absolute’ (difference-
score) accuracy/bias could be considered. Accordingly, the difference-score 
indicator of task-level accuracy/bias was focused on within the final 
analysis. 
Various other indicators of accuracy can be considered through 
comparing binary measures of confidence against correctness. For these 
approaches, the scalar/categorical confidence-ratings were coded as either 
being confident (i.e. ‘Very confident’ or ‘Confident’) or not confident (i.e. 
‘Not very confident’ or ‘Not at all confident’). Indicators of ‘sensitivity’ and 
‘specificity’ were calculated in order to provide additional insight; 
sensitivity and specificity have a long history of applications within 
statistics and medical/clinical diagnosis, and both provide indicators of 
accuracy (Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2013; Schraw, Kuch, Gutierrez, & 
Richmond, 2014; Yule, 1912). 
Sensitivity provides an indicator of when someone knows that they 
have answered correctly (i.e. being ‘confident’ when they have the right 
answer) while specificity provides an indicator of when someone knows that 
they have the wrong answer (i.e. being ‘not confident’ when they have the 
wrong answer) (Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2013; Yule, 1912). A 
complementary indicator of ‘simple-matching’ was also calculated, 
representing the combined proportions of both knowing when answers are 
right and knowing when answers are wrong (Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 
2013; Yule, 1912). The calculation methods/formulae are reproduced in 
Appendix 6. Given that the sensitivity, specificity, and simple-matching 
indicators provided scales of accuracy (and not biases towards under-
confidence and over-confidence), they were not considered as means for 
grouping students. This remained a potential area for future exploration. 
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Section 6: Analytical approaches 
 
The research presented in this thesis considered three main areas of enquiry 
(Section 4) through two sets of survey data (Section 5). Given the 
quantitative design, the research questions were addressed in the following 
ways. 
The first research question, considering which attitudes and 
motivational beliefs were the most relevant influences on students’ science 
intentions and choices, entailed undertaking predictive modelling of the 
students’ reported science intentions and determining which predictors had 
the highest relative magnitudes. The relevant results and discussion are 
covered in Section 7. 
The second research question, considering whether students with 
different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias exhibited different science 
intentions, attitudes, and beliefs, entailed categorising students according to 
their different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias (via groups and clusters), 
and comparing their expressed beliefs across the various groups and 
clusters, especially considering students’ intentions and any key predictors 
identified from the first research question. The relevant results and 
discussion are covered in Section 8. Differences across groups/clusters were 
determined via analysis of variance tests with Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
(reproduced via sample-weighted general linear models for PISA 2006). 
The third research question, considering whether students with 
different degrees of confidence accuracy/bias considered their science 
intentions in different ways, entailed applying predictive models of 
students’ intentions per group/cluster and considering whether the patterns 
of coefficients differed across different groups/clusters. The relevant results 
and discussion are covered in Section 9. Significant differences in 
coefficient magnitudes across groups (or clusters) were identified through 
interaction models: two groups were modelled together (e.g. under-
confident students and accurate students); the various items/factors were 
included as predictors, together with a group membership indicator (e.g. 
accurate = 0 or 1) and the interactions between the group membership 
indicator and each of the other predictors. The significance associated with 
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the interaction terms then highlighted differences in coefficient magnitude 
across the two groups being considered. 
Within each survey, the three research questions considered common 
sets of items/factors: essentially, there were no items/factors considered in 
the second and third research questions that were not considered in the first 
research question. 
Before the various results are described and discussed, the following 
sections describe the common methodological and analytical approaches 
underlying these three research areas, including highlighting potential 
methodological limitations which also informed the selection of specific 
approaches. 
Students do not necessarily respond to every questionnaire item, and 
expectation-maximisation was applied across both surveys to estimate 
missing values/responses and hence to maximise the number of considered 
students, otherwise undertaking predictive modelling could be unfeasible for 
smaller groups or clusters of students (Section 6.1). 
Predictive models can also be undertaken in various ways, and 
multi-level models were more suited to the structure of students within 
schools than single-level models (Section 6.2). 
Students can also be grouped or clustered in various ways in order to 
consider their confidence accuracy/bias, such as via researchers defining 
specific groups (Gonida & Leondari, 2011), algorithmic hierarchical 
clustering (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016), algorithmic optimisation clustering 
(Rytkönen, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007), and model-based clustering (Seidel, 
2006). The formation of groups, covering the conceptual ideas of under-
confidence, accuracy, and over-confidence, is described in Section 6.3. 
Additionally, the model-based clustering approach of latent-profile analysis 
offered various advantages such as helping to identify optimal numbers of 
clusters while avoiding potential difficulties inherent to algorithmic and 
optimisation clustering, and was used to identify various clusters of students 
(Section 6.3). 
Additionally, given the power/sample size calculations underlying 
the research design (Section 5.1), it was necessary to aggregate the 
2014/2015 survey sample across academic years (i.e. Years 9, 10, and 11). 
Section 6.4 describes how various approaches were applied to still ensure 
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meaningful results, such as controlling for the students’ academic year 
within predictive models. 
As a wider point, across the various analyses, p < .05 was used as the 
criterion to denote statistical significance (Cohen, 1992). Considering larger 
numbers of students, such as in PISA studies, may allow smaller differences 
or coefficients to be revealed with statistical significance; accordingly, 
magnitudes of differences and coefficients were considered in order to help 
determine whether results were meaningful (Cohen, 1988, 1992). 
 
 
Section 6.1: Missing responses 
 
Students may have numerous reasons for not answering particular questions. 
They may not know the answer or may not understand the question, for 
example, or they may not have sufficient time or interest to respond. Within 
educational research, any set of collected data is likely to unavoidably 
contain missing responses for various items. 
Forming factors by aggregating multiple items can help mitigate the 
impact of any missing responses (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, & 
Galbraith, 2008; Bollen, 2002). A factor-score can be calculated as the 
average of five items, for example, even if some of these items may have 
been left blank by some students, ensuring that a factor-score is available for 
most (if not all) students. Missing responses may be more problematic for 
single-item indicators. Educational research often uses single-items as 
indicators of personal characteristics or background, for example of gender 
or of ethnicity. Additionally, single-items may be used as indicators of 
wider conceptual or theoretical factors. For example, parental occupations 
may be considered to reflect some form of status or categorisation (e.g. 
‘social class’ or ‘socio-economic classification’) (Rose & O’Reilly, 1998), 
while parental education may be considered to reflect implicit dispositions 
within families (e.g. ‘habitus’) that may influence students’ educational 
choices (Bourdieu, 1984). Similarly, indicators of the number of books at 
home, and/or other material assets, may also be considered to reflect family 
income or wealth (OECD, 2009a) and/or some form of cultural engagement 
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or knowledge (‘cultural capital’) (Bourdieu, 1984). Problematically, 
students may not always answer such items. 
For PISA 2006, relatively few missing values were present for the 
students’ attitudes and motivational beliefs measured through the OECD 
factor-scores (e.g. a maximum of 4.1% missing for students’ self-concept 
beliefs). Across the other considered items/factors, however, the most 
missing responses were observed for the students’ reports of the educational 
level of their mother (9.9%) and father (15.2%). 
For the 2014/2015 survey, numerous missing responses were 
present. Considered across Years 9-11, most missing responses occurred for 
the students’ reports of the educational level of their mother (30.9% 
missing) and father (34.1% missing). Given that these items occurred on the 
first page of the questionnaire, and that the surrounding items had lower 
proportions of missing responses, it is perhaps plausible to assume that 
students simply did not know the particular details of their parents’ 
education (or felt less comfortable in answering the question, or many other 
reasons may have been relevant; it remains unclear whether students could 
or would answer simpler questions such as whether their parents/guardians 
attended university or not). The various missing responses entailed that 
some missing values were present even for factors formed through 
aggregates of multiple items, including self-concept (2.2% missing across 
Years 9-11), self-efficacy (4.4%), interest value (11.2%), utility value 
(12.0%), personal value (14.0%), and cost value (14.2%). Higher 
proportions of missing responses were present for the students’ reported 
studying strategies, which were measured at the end of the questionnaire, 
specifically the students’ self-regulatory studying strategies (20.6% missing 
across Years 9-11) and control (21.9%), memorisation (21.3%), and 
elaboration (22.5%) strategies. 
Predictive modelling often only considers students with 
responses/values for every modelled item/factor (‘listwise deletion’, the 
default within most statistical software). Only considering students with 
responses for every modelled item/factor (detailed in Section 5) would 
notably reduce the numbers of considered students within PISA 2006 (i.e. 
only considering 3860 of 4935 students when predicting science intentions) 
and the 2014/2015 survey (i.e. only considering 571 of 1523 students when 
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predicting science intentions across Years 9, 10, and 11); these modelled 
students may then not necessarily reflect the wider sample and/or 
population. Additionally, lower numbers of students may reduce the 
statistical power of any tests (e.g. whether coefficients can be determined to 
be statistically-significantly different to zero or not). For the 2014/2015 
survey, given the power/sample size calculations underlying the research 
design (Section 5.1), it was necessary to aggregate across academic years 
(i.e. Years 9, 10, and 11) and to maximise the number of students (i.e. not to 
only consider those with responses for every considered item/factor). For 
both surveys, maximising the number of students would help ensure the 
feasibility of modelling smaller groups or clusters, for example when 
undertaking predictive modelling for under-confident, accurate, and over-
confident groups separately. 
Additionally, only considering students with responses for every 
item/factor assumes that missing responses are ‘missing completely at 
random’ (Rubin, 1976). Missing responses across the various items/factors 
considered together did not appear to follow this assumption within PISA 
2006 (Little’s test: χ2 (1677) = 2717.750, p < .001) and within the 2014/2015 
survey (Little’s test: χ2 (4800) = 5792.674, p < .001) (IBM, 2014; Little, 
1988). The missing responses could therefore either be ‘missing at random’ 
or ‘missing but not at random’ using formal terminology; it was impossible 
to determine either way without knowing the actual magnitudes of the 
missing values themselves (Rubin, 1976). Fundamentally, only considering 
the students who responded for every item/factor appeared not to be ideal. 
Alternately, missing responses can be replaced with estimated values 
in order to allow most if not all students to be analysed. Applying full-
information maximum-likelihood via expectation-maximisation or applying 
multiple-imputation to estimate missing responses are considered to be the 
best contemporary approaches to handling missing responses (Peugh & 
Enders, 2004; Rubin, 1996). Both approaches assume joint normality of all 
the modelled items/factors and that any missing responses are ‘missing at 
random’ (i.e. missing responses can be predicted by other observed 
items/factors, rather than assuming/requiring that missing responses are 
‘missing completely at random’) (IBM, 2014; Peugh & Enders, 2004; 
StataCorp, 2013a). Specifically, full-information maximum-likelihood via 
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expectation-maximisation estimates population parameters (i.e. means, 
covariance, correlations) that are likely to have produced the considered 
data; given these parameters, conditional expectations of any missing 
responses are then calculated, which are then used to further refine the 
parameters and re-estimate the missing responses in an iterative process 
(Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977; IBM, 2014). 
Regardless of the technical sophistication applied, someone’s 
missing responses are unlikely to be perfectly estimated given the other 
available items/factors. Estimates of missing responses may also have less 
variability than might be present in ‘real’ data; standard errors in analysis 
may be slightly lower, and hence significance (low p-values) may be 
slightly more likely (Peugh & Enders, 2004). Multiple-imputation attempts 
to address this through applying expectation-maximisation but then saving 
multiple estimates (‘plausible-values’) of any missing responses, each with 
some randomly-added variation; analytical processes then combine results 
from across the multiple data sets to separate the sources of variation 
(Rubin, 1976, 1987). However, different plausible-values may be produced 
on different occasions, given the inherent randomness. Multiple-imputation 
also focuses on entire-sample models and assumes a consistent number of 
students across any analysis (Rubin, 1976, 1987); attempting to group 
students on plausible-values becomes complicated since the numbers of 
students per group could then vary across the various sets of data. Applying 
multiple-imputation then appeared to be less feasible, given that students 
needed to be grouped and clustered within the research design. Additionally, 
the available statistical software to undertake latent-profile analysis (Latent 
Gold) did not support multiple-imputation, although it allowed full-
information maximum-likelihood estimation via expectation-maximisation 
(Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). 
Within educational and motivational research, various studies have 
applied expectation-maximisation to directly estimate missing responses 
(Lee, Bong, & Kim, 2014) or applied expectation-maximisation through 
full-information maximum-likelihood via structural equation modelling 
(Trautwein, et al., 2012). Multiple-imputation appears to have been less 
frequently applied, although it remains an inherent aspect of PISA and 
TIMSS task-scores, which are estimates via multiple-imputation to infer 
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across missing-by-design blocks of tasks (Foy, Arora, & Stanco, 2013; 
OECD, 2009a). 
Fundamentally, applying expectation-maximisation appeared to be a 
feasible approach to handle missing responses, given that the analysis 
needed to form and analyse groups or clusters of students within wider 
samples while maximising the number of considered students. Potential 
influences on p-values were then considered/addressed through preliminary 
modelling with and without accounting for missing responses, and through 
considering magnitudes of ‘effect’ rather than significance alone. The 
preliminary analysis highlighted that models appeared sufficiently similar 
with and without estimating missing responses, when broadly similar 
numbers of students could be considered, suggesting that estimating missing 
responses did not appear to introduce issues. 
Accordingly, for the final analysis, estimates of missing responses 
were produced through expectation-maximisation (IBM, 2014) using all 
available items/factors in each survey, plus additional items/factors that 
were available but were not included within the final analytical models (e.g. 
task-scores for mathematics and reading in PISA 2006). Essentially, models 
to estimate missing responses have been advised to be comprehensive, and 
to include available items/factors as additional input even if they are not 
included in the subsequent analytical models (Peugh & Enders, 2004). 
Estimates of missing responses could only be made for the continuous 
items/factors and not for binary/categorical items such as gender and 
whether either parent worked within science, although these items/factors 
were still included as input for the expectation-maximisation process (IBM, 
2014). Missing factor-scores (plus the various single-item indicators when 
necessary) were estimated rather than the underlying items, which would 
have otherwise entailed unfeasibly extensive models. 
As a precaution, only students’ expressed beliefs (not including any 
estimates of missing responses) were used when considering confidence 
accuracy/bias (which unavoidably reduced the number of considered 
students to a small extent). If missing responses were estimated for self-
concept beliefs or task-confidence using only task-scores, for example, then 
these estimated responses may be more likely to appear to be ‘accurate’ 
through regression-residual approaches. Nevertheless, preliminary analysis 
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produced similar results when considering both situations, for example 
where latent-profile analysis resulted in similar accuracy/bias cluster 
profiles and proportions regardless of whether missing responses were 
estimated or not. 
For consistency, the various final results (e.g. averages per 
cluster/group, correlations, predictive coefficients) include estimates of 
missing responses (unless highlighted otherwise), given that these were 
included within the data considered by the final predictive models. 
 
 
Section 6.2: Predictive modelling 
 
Predictive modelling can reveal the independent association between each 
predicting item/factor (e.g. interest, utility, etc.) and an outcome (e.g. 
students’ science intentions). The various predictive associations (i.e. the 
estimated ‘effect’ of each item/factor on the students’ science intentions, 
controlling for all the other predicting items/factors) can then be directly 
compared. 
Predictive models via linear regression using ordinary-least-squares 
estimation involves numerous assumptions, specifically: independent 
observations (controlling for the predictors, the values of the outcome are 
independent across observations); linearity (the expected mean outcome is a 
linear function of the predictors); constant variance (the variance of the 
outcome, given the predictors, is constant, i.e. the variance of the outcome 
does not depend on the magnitude of the predictors); and normality (the 
outcome has a normal distribution, given the predictors) (Bartholomew, 
Steele, Moustaki, & Galbraith, 2008; Cohen & Cohen, 1984). Accordingly, 
the residual error (the differences between the observed outcome and the 
predicted outcome, given the model) is assumed to be normally-distributed, 
with a mean of zero (and a variance that can be estimated from the 
observations), and to be independent across observations and independent 
across values of the predictors (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki, & 
Galbraith, 2008). 
Educational systems may unavoidably entail some similarities 
occurring between groups of students (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). For 
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example, students within a school share the same environment, teachers, and 
geographical location. Accordingly, in ordinary-least-squares regression 
models, after controlling for the predictors, the values of the outcome may 
still be slightly dependent on the school (i.e. students within schools may 
have similar outcomes when compared across schools), hence residual 
errors may not be completely independent within schools (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). Generally, such similarities between students can entail 
lower standard errors associated with regression coefficients (the 
calculations of which involve residuals), which can entail increased chances 
for significance to be observed (i.e. lower p-values) (Bartholomew, Steele, 
Moustaki, & Galbraith, 2008; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Alternately, multi-level predictive modelling (also called 
hierarchical modelling or mixed modelling) can allow for similarities 
between students within groups such as schools (Hox, 2002; Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). Essentially, residual errors are considered for schools and 
students per school: both are assumed to be normally-distributed and to have 
means of zero (and variances that can be estimated from the observations); 
however, these residuals can depend on the school (i.e. have separate 
distributions per school) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Residuals essentially 
represent unexplained variance, so a multi-level model can separate 
unexplained variance at the student-level from the school-level. 
Concurrently, multi-level models can account for further similarities or 
differences across schools. Specifically, schools can be modelled with 
varying regression constants (intercepts) and/or coefficients (slopes); 
practically, each varying term would be estimated as a ‘random’ variable 
with a specific distribution (rather than a ‘fixed’ parameter), from which 
schools may take different values (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Multi-level modelling was then selected for the final analysis to help 
account for residual similarities between students within schools. Given the 
focus on students’ beliefs rather than school-level factors (such as resources 
available, entry requirements, etc.), the simplest multi-level models were 
applied (i.e. ‘random-intercept’ models, rather than ‘random-slope’ models, 
or models with ‘random-intercepts and random-slopes’). The potential 
influence of school-level factors can be explored in various ways, such as 
through using aggregates of student-level factors or using discrete school-
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level indicators (Hox, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). However, 
considering school-level predictors would generally require large numbers 
of schools, which was not feasible for the new survey. Research in England 
has also suggested that schools’ influences on choices may be more indirect 
than direct, and so can broadly be considered through students’ views about 
potential areas, such as the provision of careers support (Bennett, Lubben, & 
Hampden-Thompson, 2013; Crawford, 2014; Gill & Bell, 2013). 
Fundamentally, and for consistency, the analysis focused on students’ 
reported attitudes and beliefs (i.e. all the items/factors were consistently on 
the ‘student’ level), so that school-level factors were not considered. 
Various other issues may still be relevant for predictive modelling, 
even within multi-level models. Simulations have highlighted that multi-
level regression coefficients and their standard errors have been estimated 
without systemic bias, regardless of the number of groups (e.g. schools) 
considered, even for 5-10 groups; however, smaller numbers of groups (less 
than 50) can entail low standard errors associated with group-level variance 
components (Maas & Hox, 2005). Correlation between the various 
predictors is likely to be unavoidable in educational research, and extreme 
correlation between predictors has been referred to as ‘multicollinearity’; 
while this does not violate any of the underlying assumptions, it can 
increase the standard errors of the regression coefficients (i.e. entailing 
higher p-values, and less likelihood of significant results) (Cohen & Cohen, 
1984). Simulations have highlighted that multicollinearity has not appeared 
to bias parameter estimation within multi-level modelling (Yu, Jiang, & 
Land, 2015). 
As a precaution, preliminary analysis considered predictive models 
through both single-level (via linear regression using ordinary-least-squares) 
and multi-level models; the parameters appeared broadly similar (e.g. 
excepting differences such as potentially more precise p-values in multi-
level models), so that fundamental methodological issues did not appear to 
have been introduced. Residual plots were acceptable, and high 
multicollinearity was not present; ‘tolerance’ indicators, representing the 
proportion of variance for each predictor that was unexplained by the other 
predictors, were all above .1 (Cohen & Cohen, 1984). 
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Operationally, single-level regression involves an algebraic 
estimation process (i.e. ordinary-least-squares, where parameters can be 
calculated through formulae using observed features of the data) while 
multi-level regression involves iterative maximum-likelihood estimation in 
order to estimate the parameters that best fit the observed data (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). Various model indicators cannot be directly calculated via 
maximum-likelihood (e.g. adjusted R
2
, which represents the proportion of 
variance in the outcome explained by the model). Accordingly, indicators of 
explained variance for the multi-level models were calculated as 
proportional reductions in residual variance (i.e. variance of the student-
level and school-level residuals) when compared to a model without any 
predictors (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
The predictive ‘effect sizes’ were calculated to reflect standardised 
coefficients (directly comparable across predictors): how many standard 
deviations of increase/decrease would occur in the outcome, given one 
standard deviation increase in the predictor (e.g. the estimated coefficient 
was multiplied by the standard deviation of the predictor, then divided by 
the standard deviation of the outcome) (Hox, 2002). Some studies have then 
multiplied the result by two (i.e. considering how many standard deviations 
of increase/decrease would occur in the outcome, given two standard 
deviation increases in the predictor), highlighting that it remains important 
to clarify or determine how effect sizes are defined (Tymms, 2004). 
Standardised coefficients are not effect sizes in the sense of the unique 
contributions/amounts of explained variance, although they may be broadly 
analogous to the correlation between two factors while controlling for one 
or more other factors. Accordingly, indicators of effect sizes for correlations 
were considered, specifically: above .1 as a ‘small effect’, above .3 as a 
‘medium effect’, and above .5 as a ‘large effect’ (Cohen, 1988). 
Standardised coefficients of .1 and above were then considered to be 
meaningful. 
In summary, multi-level modelling was selected for the final 
predictive models to help account for any residual similarities between 
students within schools. Preliminary analysis nevertheless applied 
(ordinary-least-squares) linear regression (confirming the inherent 
assumptions through various residual graphs) as a general sensitivity check, 
Page 136 of 361 
and the various parameters were sufficiently similar to suggest that no 
notable methodological issues were being introduced. 
 
 
Section 6.3: Groups and clusters of students 
 
Students can be categorised in various ways. Prior research has considered 
groups of under-confident, accurately-evaluating, and over-confident 
students, depending on group boundaries or criteria as defined by 
researchers (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 
2011). Alternately, cluster analysis allows students to be categorised 
according to their accuracy/bias without researchers needing to determine 
the specific cluster boundaries (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). The proportions 
of students per cluster may vary, which may help determine how prevalent 
under-confidence or over-confidence may be. 
For the PISA 2006 survey and for the 2014/2015 survey, students 
were accordingly categorised as conceptual ‘groups’ representing the 
conceptual/theoretical ideas of under-confidence, accuracy, and over-
confidence (Section 6.3.1), and also as emergent ‘clusters’ of students from 
latent-profile analysis (Section 6.3.2). 
 
 
Section 6.3.1: Conceptual groups 
 
In the PISA 2006 survey, accuracy/bias was considered through a 
regression-residual indicator of self-concept accuracy/bias, as the 
questionnaire was not explicitly designed to measure accuracy/bias (Section 
5.2). In the 2014/2015 survey, multiple indicators were available given the 
questionnaire design, and a difference-score indicator of task-confidence 
accuracy/bias was more contextually meaningful than a regression-residual 
indicator, and so was focused on for the final analysis (Section 5.3). 
Conceptual groups were formed by directly categorising the 
accuracy/bias indicators, an approach that has been applied in various prior 
studies (Bouffard, Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 
2011; Narciss, Koerndle, & Dresel, 2011). The indicators were standardised 
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as z-scores (per academic year, in the 2014/2015 survey) and ±.5 standard 
deviations were used as the group boundaries: below -.5 was classified as 
under-confident, between -.5 and +.5 was classified as accurate (one 
standard deviation range), and above +.5 was classified as over-confident. 
For greater insight, the accurately-evaluating students were divided into 
those with above-average task-scores and those with below-average task-
scores (relative to the students’ academic year in the 2014/2015 survey). 
In PISA 2006, to provide a simple baseline for comparison (which 
also broadly reflected the profiles of the difference-score groups in the 
2014/2015 survey), conceptual groups were also formed from cross-
tabulating the students’ self-concept and task-scores, when each was 
classified as either being above-average or below-average. Under-
confidence was then defined as ‘below-average self-concept with above-
average task-scores’, for example, while over-confidence was defined as 
‘above-average self-concept with below-average task-scores’. Accurately-
low beliefs were considered as ‘below-average self-concept with below-
average task-scores’, and accurately-high beliefs were considered as ‘above-
average self-concept with above-average task-scores’. This approach was 
broadly inspired by prior research that considered differences in above-
average and below-average confidence and attainment via z-scores (Cheema 
& Skultety, 2016; Chiu & Klassen, 2010). 
Additionally, preliminary analysis considered the implications of 
various different approaches to grouping, such as considering different 
group boundaries (i.e. ±1.0 standard deviations) and through grouping the 
various different indicators of accuracy/bias in the 2014/2015 survey in 
various ways. In the PISA 2006 survey, for example, the regression-residual 
group boundaries (±.5 standard deviations) produced relatively similar 
numbers of students per group which facilitated predictive modelling. 
Different boundaries (e.g. ±1.0 standard deviations) entailed broader 
definitions of ‘accuracy’ and hence classified far fewer students with 
extreme under-confidence or extreme over-confidence. Preliminary analysis 
highlighted that the patterns of predictive coefficients across the groups 
remained broadly similar regardless of different group boundaries (i.e. ±.5 
or ±1.0). 
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In the 2014/2015 survey, cross-tabulations of the various conceptual 
accuracy/bias groups showed that the majority of students were similarly 
classified across approaches (grouping by difference-score or regression-
residual) and when considering the task level (task-confidence and task-
scores) or the subject level (self-concept beliefs and current grades), 
although there was still a notable amount of variation. Considering ±.5 
standard deviations as the group boundaries highlighted that the majority of 
the accuracy/bias groups corresponded on the task and subject levels. The 
exception was that more ‘over-confident’ students from the subject-level 
self-concept/grade regression-residual groups were classified as ‘accurate’ 
students on the task-level difference-score groups. Considering ±1.0 
standard deviations as the group boundaries highlighted that the majority of 
any task-level accuracy/bias group was classified as ‘accurate’ on the 
subject-level self-concept/grade regression-residual groups. Perhaps un-
intuitively, these wider group boundaries may have entailed that accuracy 
was considered too broadly, rather than helping to reveal any common 
extremes of confidence biases. Preliminary analysis again highlighted that 
the patterns of predictive coefficients across the groups remained somewhat 
similar regardless of different group boundaries (i.e. ±.5 or ±1.0), although 
the results were likely less reliable due to the smaller numbers of extremely 
under-confident and extremely over-confident students when considering 
±1.0 standard deviations as the group boundaries. 
In summary, the final analysis of PISA 2006 focused on conceptual 
groups formed through the intersection of above-average/below-average 
self-concept and task-scores, and through the categorisation of the 
regression-residual indicator of self-concept accuracy/bias. The analysis of 
the 2014/2015 survey focused on the conceptual groups formed through the 
categorisation of the difference-score indicator of task-confidence 
accuracy/bias, which directly measured students’ self-reflective 
accuracy/bias. The profile of above-average/below-average intersection 
groups in the PISA 2006 survey broadly reflected the profile of the 
difference-score groups in the 2014/2015 survey, which furthered 
comparability. These various groups provided exemplars of approaches 
from prior research that were most contextually relevant and meaningful 
given the two questionnaires designs. Preliminary analysis also explored 
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various alternatives to grouping, but rather than undertake an extensive 
comparison of various (researcher-dependent) approaches to forming 




Section 6.3.2: Emergent clusters 
 
Cluster analysis allows students to be categorised according to their 
accuracy/bias through directly considering the underlying indicators of 
confidence and attainment, and avoiding the need to calculate and classify 
an indicator of accuracy/bias and the need for researchers to determine any 
specific group boundaries (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). 
Considered broadly, cluster analysis aims to identify naturally-
occurring homogenous groups within data; for the specified criteria, clusters 
are found so that (essentially) those within clusters are similar to one 
another while any differences across clusters are maximised (Everitt, 
Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). Cluster analysis can be accomplished by 
many different approaches, including algorithmic and model-based 
methods. 
Algorithmic approaches include hierarchical clustering (e.g. via 
(agglomerative or divisive approaches) and optimisation clustering (e.g. 
using the k-means algorithm) (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). 
Problematically, both hierarchical and optimisation clustering methods can 
be influenced by the order in which their algorithms encounter and then 
parse through the data (i.e. the cluster solution may slightly depend on the 
order of cases, which may be sorted by students/schools, by any item or 
factor, by random identifiers, etc.) (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). 
Hierarchical cluster structures may be more appropriate for some contexts 
than others (e.g. biological classification, where species of animals can be 
hierarchically aggregated into clusters of genera, then families, orders, 
classes, phyla, etc.). Optimisation clustering involves specifying a number 
of clusters to be identified, and may be unhelpful without knowing plausible 
numbers of clusters to consider. 
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Model-based approaches to cluster analysis avoid these problems, 
and also provide indicators that can help determine the number of clusters 
that best fit the data (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Model-based cluster analysis 
has been called latent-class analysis when binary variables have been 
considered and latent-profile analysis when continuous or varying types of 
variables have been considered (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Masyn, 2013). 
Conceptually, model-based cluster analysis identifies clusters of students 
who have similar profiles of responses for the considered items/factors; 
ideally, homogenous clusters will be formed (i.e. within each cluster, the 
students have similar patterns of responses and hence there is little to no 
association between items/factors within the cluster) that are clearly separate 
to one another (i.e. different patterns or magnitudes of responses are 
characteristic of different clusters) (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Cluster 
membership then ‘explains’ the overall associations between factors seen in 
the entire sample: given the students’ (conditional) cluster membership, the 
considered factors then have no association (are locally-independent) within 
the clusters themselves (i.e. there is an underlying assumption of 
‘conditional local independence’) (Collins & Lanza, 2010). When 
considering multiple factors, those within a particular cluster may not 
necessarily have the same magnitude of responses for every factor; but they 
would have a particular profile of responses (e.g. which may involve high 
responses for some factors but low responses for others, or which may 
involve high response for all factors, or any particular profile given the data) 
that distinguishes them from the profiles of responses seen in other clusters. 
Methodologically, cluster membership is modelled as a categorical 
latent-variable; iterative maximum-likelihood algorithms are used for model 
estimation; and classification of students to clusters is based on probabilities 
(i.e. each student has a varying probability, anywhere between 0 and 1, of 
belonging to each cluster) (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Model-based 
information criteria are usually used to compare models with different 
numbers of clusters, in order to consider which particular number of clusters 
may be best to explain the data (Collins & Lanza, 2010). Essentially, 
information criteria promote simplicity or parsimony (considered as 
‘estimating fewer parameters’) when comparing different models. The 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) balances the fit of the 
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model to the data and the complexity of the model (i.e. models with many 
parameters are ‘penalised’); the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
(Schwarz, 1978) is similar, but penalises more parameters even more than 
the AIC. Simulation studies have resulted in recommendations to consider 
the BIC (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007) or the sample-size adjusted 
BIC (Henson, Reise, & Kim, 2007). Nevertheless, and pragmatically, 
information criteria may be more useful in identifying plausible models 
rather than being able to definitively prove that any one single model is 
ideal (Collins & Lanza, 2010). 
Various studies in educational and motivational research have 
applied hierarchical clustering (using Ward’s method to help identify the 
optimal number of clusters to consider) (Ferguson & Bråten, 2013) and 
optimisation clustering (using the k-means algorithm) (Bøe & Henriksen, 
2013). Other studies have applied model-based clustering such as latent-
profile analysis (Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 2012). Nevertheless, results 
from optimisation clustering (k-means) and model-based clustering (latent-
class analysis) have been found to be broadly similar (DiStefano & 
Kamphaus, 2006). 
For the analysis presented in this thesis, model-based clustering (i.e. 
latent-profile analysis) was selected in order to help identify optimal 
numbers of clusters via information criteria, and to avoid potential 
difficulties of algorithmic and optimisation clustering (e.g. results 
potentially varying depending on the order of cases in a data set). Latent-
profile analysis had various other benefits, such as being able to potentially 
reveal a hierarchical structure or no specific structure of clusters, while 
algorithmic hierarchical clustering could only model/impose a hierarchical 
structure. 
Latent-profile analysis was undertaken via Latent Gold software 
(Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). Sample-weighting was supported and 
applied when relevant (i.e. when analysing PISA 2006), but multiple-
imputation was not supported (Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). However, even 
if multiple-imputation was supported to combine estimates of model 
parameters across the different plausible-values, selecting one particular 
plausible-value would still be necessary in order to export the classification 
of students to clusters, which appears to be the situation when using 
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alternate software such as MPlus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Preliminary 
modelling of PISA 2006 therefore considered each plausible-value in turn 
(and together); given the similarity of the various results, the final analysis 
used the first plausible-value only. 
Latent-profile analysis considered the students’ self-concept beliefs 
and task-scores (first plausible-value) in the PISA 2006 survey, and 
considered their task-confidence and task-scores in the 2014/2015 survey 
(i.e. considering the same indicators of confidence and attainment used 
within the indicators of accuracy/bias). Operationally, the latent-profile 
analysis estimated various parameters: the mean per item/factor per cluster, 
and the error variance per item/factor per cluster, all while the covariance(s) 
between items/factors per cluster was set to zero (Vermunt & Magidson, 
2013). This implemented the ‘conditional local independence’ assumption 
inherent to latent-profile analysis, although there still could be varying 
degrees of residual covariance between the considered items/factors. 
Various other models could be formed, but there appeared to be no prior 
precedent or theoretical reason to assume that they would be preferable (and 
the research did not attempt to undertake a technical exploration of different 
types of modelling). For example, ‘conditional local independence’ can be 
relaxed so that the covariance(s) between items/factors per cluster can be 
directly estimated rather than set to zero; this would technically be 
‘multivariate mixture’ modelling rather than latent-profile analysis (Collins 
& Lanza, 2010; Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). 
Since latent-profile analysis used maximum-likelihood estimation, it 
was possible that parameters could converge to different solutions 
depending on the starting values (i.e. potentially finding various ‘locally-
optimal’ solutions rather than one single ‘globally-optimal’ solution) 
(Collins & Lanza, 2010). An extensive number of starting values (i.e. 1000) 
were therefore applied during estimation for each model; each set of models 
(i.e. with 1-10 clusters) was itself re-estimated 10 times to consider the 
consistency of the results. Consistency across these replications would not 
necessarily entail that a ‘globally-optimal’ solution was found (i.e. requiring 
an infinite number of replications), but could provide reassurance that 
solutions were sufficiently stable to be feasible and informative in practice. 
Only consistent models were considered within the final analysis; in 
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practice, consistency appeared to only be an issue when modelling relatively 
high numbers of clusters. 
In summary, cluster analysis was undertaken through latent-profile 
analysis in order to help identify optimal numbers of clusters to describe the 
data (via information criteria), and to avoid potential difficulties of 
algorithmic and optimisation clustering, such as results potentially varying 
depending on the order of cases in a data set, or needing to know the 
number of clusters to consider in advance (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Everitt, 
Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). 
 
 
Section 6.4: Aggregating academic years (2014/2015 survey) 
 
The 2014/2015 survey was able to cover 1523 students (685 students in 
Year 9, 489 in Year 10, and 349 in Year 11). The power/sample size 
calculations underlying the research design (Section 5.1) indicated that 
considering more than 1152 students would be preferable for analysis, 
however. It was also less feasible to directly compare Year 11 students from 
PISA with the 349 Year 11 students from the 2014/2015 survey: dividing 
349 students into groups would likely limit or prevent predictive modelling 
per group, given the low numbers involved. 
Considered through analysis of variance, with Bonferroni post-hoc 
tests, the students in Years 10 and 11 in the 2014/2015 survey generally 
reported lower science attitudes, and science intentions, than students in 
Year 9. However, various patterns of differences were observed across the 
items/factors (tabulated in Appendix 7 for reference). On average, students 
in Year 9 gained lower task-scores than students in Years 10 and 11, while 
students in Year 10 reported higher task-confidence than students in Years 9 
and 11. On average, students in Years 10 and 11 exhibited small under-
confidence biases while students in Year 9 were broadly accurate. Students 
in Year 10 had higher task sensitivity (accurately knowing when they had 
answered correctly) than students in Years 9 and 11. Students had similar 
task specificity (accurately knowing when they had answered incorrectly) 
across the different academic years. Students in Year 10 had higher task 
simple-matching (accurately knowing when they had answered correctly 
Page 144 of 361 
and incorrectly) than students in Year 9. Given the relatively small numbers 
of students involved (with different numbers per academic year), and since 
the data were not collected from the same students over time, conclusions 
could not easily be drawn regarding differences due to age. 
Preliminary analysis highlighted that the various correlations 
between item/factors, and the patterns of coefficients when predicting 
science intentions, were similar when considered for each academic year 
separately. It was plausible to infer that students’ intentions were relatively 
similarly influenced for each academic year. In order to maximise the 
number of considered students, the final analysis then considered students 
across Years 9, 10, and 11; the various accuracy/bias groups and clusters 
were formed relative to each academic year, but then considered together for 
all years. Essentially, the analysis explored differences in accuracy/bias via 
groups, but assumed that students’ intentions were similarly predicted 
across any other potential groups (e.g. students’ ages). Considering various 
other groups or moderation effects could form entire areas of analysis, such 
as considering whether science intentions were differently predicted across 
boys and girls, and could not be considered for reasons of brevity and since 
considering accuracy/bias groups by gender or other categories would entail 
insufficient group sizes for predictive modelling. 
Within predictive models, the students’ academic year was included 
in order to account for any varying magnitudes per item/factor per year. 
Essentially, the models then assumed that students’ intentions would be 
similarly predicted by items/factors such as their interest across the different 
academic years, but accounted for the magnitudes of intentions, interest, and 
other items/factors potentially varying per academic year. Preliminary 
analysis confirmed that using per-year standardised predictors (i.e. the 
item/factors were converted to z-scores formed relative to each academic 
year) entailed the same conclusions as using the un-standardised predictors 
while also modelling the students’ year as a predictor. Modelling the 
students’ year (rather than standardising every item/factor per academic 
year) could also reveal any remaining influence due to students’ ages. 
The various accuracy/bias groups were formed through considering 
relative groups per year. For example, ‘under-confidence’ was defined 
relative to Year 9, 10, or 11, depending on the student, and then all the 
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under-confident students in Years 9, 10, and 11 were considered together. 
This also helped account/control for any potential accuracy/bias differences 
linking with task ease/difficulty across the different years (Section 3.2.1). 
When considering differences in students’ expressed attitudes and beliefs 
across the groups via analysis of variance tests, the indicators were 
standardised to reflect within-year differences (i.e. as z-scores formed per 
academic year). This could then consider whether the groups of students 
(across Years 9, 10, and 11) varied in their attitudes, as being above-average 
or below-average (in standard deviations) relative to the students’ respective 
academic years, while accounting for the various means and standard 
deviations potentially varying per academic year. 
Preliminary latent-profile analysis confirmed that the same clusters 
emerged per year regardless of whether indicators were standardised or not. 
Preliminary latent-profile analysis then considered standardised indicators 
(i.e. z-scores formed per academic year) across the separate academic years, 
and across multiple years considered together; broadly similar cluster 
profiles and proportions emerged. In order to maximise the number of 
considered students, the final latent-profile analysis then considered 
standardised indicators (i.e. z-scores formed per academic year) and students 
across multiple academic years (i.e. Years 9, 10, and 11). 
In summary, for the analysis of the 2014/2015 survey, students were 
considered across Years 9, 10, and 11, in order to ensure that sufficient 
numbers of students were considered to reveal potential effects. The groups 
and clusters were formed to represent within-year differences, and then 
considered together across these three academic years, which 
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Section 7: Research question one 
 
The first research question considered which attitudes and motivational 
beliefs, including different conceptualisations of confidence and indicators 
of confidence accuracy/bias, were the most relevant influences on students’ 
intentions and choices. The results from the PISA 2006 survey (Section 7.1) 
and the 2014/2015 survey (Section 7.2) are described in turn, and then 
discussed and contextualised in Section 7.3. 
When applied to predictive modelling, the earlier conceptual model 
(Figure 1) broadly supported a series of models, starting with modelling the 
predictive associations between students’ background characteristics and 
their science intentions, and then sequentially including various further 
factors as additional predictors (specifically, confidence and attainment, 
theorised influences (‘subjective task values’) including interest and utility 
value, and then further potential influences). Any reductions in the 
predictive coefficients from one step to the next would suggest that the 
original associations were ‘mediated’ (or explained) by differences in the 
new factors (Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Kisbu-Sakarya, & 
Gottschall, 2013). However, given the overall analytical approach to 
addressing the first research question (i.e. ultimately determining which 
factors had the highest predictive associations with science intentions; 
Section 6), the predictive models did not attempt to consider every potential 
association within the conceptual model (Figure 1); any mediation 
associations would be implicit, observed through any varying coefficients at 
different stages, rather than explicitly considered through also modelling 
predictors of students’ confidence, attainment, and attitudes. 
Sequential modelling nevertheless aimed to provide insight at each 
step. Specifically, initial modelling determined the predictive associations 
between students’ background characteristics and intentions (determining 
which factors were most predictive and to what extent, while accounting for 
the others); this also facilitated contextualisation of the modelled students 
against any other research that may have only considered particular aspects 
of students’ background (such as gender). Subsequently, also including 
students’ confidence and attainment within the model then considered their 
potential motivational implications, with and without accounting for the 
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other (which explored whether confidence appeared motivational when 
considered alone through partially reflecting attainment, and/or vice versa). 
Subsequently, also including further predictors (such as interest in science 
and perceived utility of science) then considered whether the apparent 
motivational effect of confidence was reduced (where the previous effect of 
confidence may have partially encompassed or reflected another factor such 
as interest value or utility value, given potentially-close associations 
between students’ attitudes and beliefs), while also determining the 
independent predictive associations of the further factors (especially interest 
value, utility value, and other potentially-relevant predictors from prior 
research; Section 2). Subsequently, any further factors were then also 
included in order to provide a comprehensive model to determine which 




Section 7.1: Results: PISA 2006 
 
The (linear) associations between students’ science intentions and attitudes 
can be described through (Pearson) correlation coefficients. The highest 
correlations with students’ science intentions occurred with science utility 
value (R = .684, p < .001), science interest/enjoyment value (R = .610, p < 
.001), personal value of science (R = .607, p < .001), science self-concept 
beliefs (R = .537, p < .001), and interest across the various science 
areas/topics (R = .516, p < .001). Students’ self-concept beliefs also most 
strongly correlated with their interest/enjoyment value (R = .620, p < .001), 
personal value (R = .555, p < .001), self-efficacy for various types of science 
tasks/activities (R = .534, p < .001), and utility value (R = .531, p < .001). 
Table 4 summarises the various correlations for the main measures of 
attitudes and beliefs (limited for brevity). 
Students’ attitudes and beliefs may closely associate in complex 
ways, so that predictive modelling was necessary in order to isolate the 
independent associations of the various factors. For example, students’ 
interest directly correlated with their intentions, but higher interest may also 
foster higher self-concept beliefs (or vice versa) and so also indirectly 
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associate with intentions, given that interest correlated with self-concept 
beliefs and that self-concept beliefs correlated with intentions. 
For greater insight and contextualisation, a series of predictive 
models were then considered (Table 5). Within these models, the students’ 
reported science intentions, represented as a continuous/scalar factor-score 
(Section 5.2), were predicted using multi-level linear (predictive) modelling 
(Section 6.2). Through the use of expectation-maximisation to estimate 
missing responses (Section 6.1), the models were able to consistently 
consider 4645 of the 4935 students surveyed in England in PISA 2006, 
regardless of the inclusion of different predictors at different steps within 
the process; unavoidably, missing binary indicators such as gender could not 
be estimated, and so the number of considered students was still slightly 
reduced. However, without estimating missing responses, only 3860 
students would have been considered in the final model, and different 
numbers of students could have been considered at different steps 
depending on which predictors were included. 
When predicting science intentions for all students, background 
characteristics such as their gender, whether their parents worked within 
science or not, and the number of books at home only explained a small 
amount of variance (Table 5, step 1). Including the students’ (plausible-
value) task-score (but not the students’ self-concept beliefs) only provided a 
modest improvement in explained variance (Table 5, step 2a). However, the 
students’ attainment appeared to ‘mediate’ the influences of the number of 
books at home and parents working within science (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
MacKinnon, Kisbu-Sakarya, & Gottschall, 2013); essentially, these factors 
could be interpreted to associate with attainment (task-scores), which then 
associated with intentions (although any causal relations cannot be 
confirmed since the factors were all measured at the same time). 
Alternately, including the students’ self-concept beliefs (but not the 
students’ task-score) explained more variance (Table 5, step 2b), but only 
mediated the association between intentions and gender; essentially, the 
association between gender and intentions (i.e. boys were predictively 
associated with higher intentions at step 1) appeared to follow from the 
underlying association between intentions and self-concept beliefs (i.e. 
where boys reported higher self-concept beliefs). 
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Including the students’ task-score and self-concept beliefs (Table 5, 
step 3) highlighted that self-concept beliefs had a relatively higher 
predictive association with intentions than task-scores, and highlighted little 
difference in the proportion of explained variance compared to modelling 
self-concept beliefs without task-scores (i.e. step 3 compared to step 2b). 
This potentially highlighted the motivational nature of self-concept beliefs, 
and hence the potential importance of considering the impact of under-
confidence or over-confidence. 
Including the available factors from the expectancy-value model 
allowed over half of the variance in the students’ intentions to be explained 
(Table 5, step 4). These factors also appeared to mediate the association 
between students’ intentions and self-concept beliefs (i.e. the predictive 
coefficient for self-concept was lower in step 4 compared to step 3, but still 
significant); essentially, higher self-concept beliefs may partially reflect 
higher interest, utility, and/or personal value. Additional models (not 
tabulated for brevity) highlighted that interest, utility, and personal value 
each mediated the predictive association between self-concept beliefs (and 
for some other factors) and intentions, and utility value appeared to entail 
the largest change (i.e. the reduction of the predictive coefficient between 
self-concept beliefs and intentions). Including further potential influences 
such as the frequency of various teaching approaches produced little change 
in the proportion of explained variance (Table 5, step 5). 
Further analysis would be necessarily to isolate and determine 
mediation relations in more detail, but such areas were outside the scope of 
the immediate research questions. Essentially, the sequential models 
provided context through helping to plausibly explain why aspects of 
students’ background (e.g. their gender and whether their parents worked 
within science) were not directly predictive of intentions in the final model. 
The models also highlighted that self-concept beliefs may reflect interest, 
utility, and other factors that have not been considered as theoretical 
antecedents to expressions of confidence, as considered in more detail 
elsewhere (Sheldrake, 2016a, 2016b). On a wider level, the results did not 
appear to be sensitive to the analytical approaches and methodology; 
preliminary analysis considered various alternate approaches, for example 
using multiple-imputation across all task-score plausible-values and 
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modelling without estimating missing responses, which still produced the 
same results as reported here. 
Fundamentally, the first research question was addressed by the final 
predictive model (Table 5, step 5), where students’ science intentions were 
most strongly predicted by their perceived utility of science, 
interest/enjoyment of science, personal value of science, and their science 
self-concept beliefs. Various other items/factors were predictive, but at 
lower relative magnitudes (a standardised predictive coefficient of .1 was 
considered the threshold for a meaningful magnitude; Section 6.2). 
Ultimately, students’ background and gender were not predictive of their 
science intentions when accounting for their attitudes and motivational 
beliefs, which cohered with findings from prior studies (DeWitt, Archer, & 
Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014). Similarly, the pattern of predictors, 
broadly highlighting the importance of students’ perceived utility, interest, 
and (self-concept) confidence, cohered with prior findings (Mujtaba & 
Reiss, 2014; Wang & Degol, 2013). The low predictive association between 
the students’ task-scores and science intentions may potentially highlight 
that the non-curricular nature of the OECD tasks limits their contextual 
relevance. Students’ examination grades, for example, might show higher 
associations with their intentions, given that current or expected grades may 
directly facilitate or preclude students’ options (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 
2008; Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009). While such 
results suggested that any subsequent analytical models could be greatly 
simplified to only consider the strongest identified predictors, it was 
possible that other factors were more relevant to specific groups of students 
when considered alone. 
The regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias could not be 
modelled as a predictor of science intentions together with the students’ 
self-concept beliefs and task-scores. Any one of the indicators of 
accuracy/bias, self-concept, and task-score could be perfectly predicted 
given the other two indicators, which entailed the highest possible 
‘multicollinearity’ within a predictive model (Cohen & Cohen, 1984). This 
situation would be identified automatically, and one of the three indicators 
would be removed by statistical software if all three were included as 
predictors. 
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It was still possible to model the various combinations of self-
concept, task-scores, and the accuracy/bias indicator, considering any two of 
the three factors (Table 6). Specifically, the various models highlighted that, 
controlling for the various other predictors: task-scores and self-concept 
beliefs both positively predicted science intentions (Table 6, model A); 
task-scores and the self-concept accuracy/bias indicator both positively 
predicted science intentions (i.e. higher over-confidence, controlling for 
task-scores, predicted higher science intentions; Table 6, model B); self-
concept positively predicted and the accuracy/bias indicator negatively 
predicted science intentions (i.e. higher over-confidence, controlling for 
self-concept beliefs, predicted lower science intentions; Table 6, model C). 
These patterns were not necessarily easy to interpret, however, hence the 
impact of under-confidence and over-confidence on students’ intentions 
needed to be considered through the other research questions via 
considering groups and clusters of students. 
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Table 4: PISA (England) 2006: items/factors, selected correlations 
 
Factor/scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Gender (1=boy) 1.000          
2. Intentions .092 1.000         
3. Task-score (PV1) .051 .260 1.000        
4. Self-concept .203 .537 .331 1.000       
5. Self-concept accuracy/bias .197 .473 (<.001) .943 1.000      
6. Self-efficacy (areas) .132 .345 .528 .534 .375 1.000     
7. Interest (areas) .071 .516 .242 .484 .424 .413 1.000    
8. Interest value .126 .610 .366 .620 .525 .462 .650 1.000   
9. Utility value .067 .684 .227 .531 .477 .333 .515 .571 1.000  
10. Personal value .091 .607 .300 .555 .477 .467 .546 .630 .645 1.000 
11. General value .129 .358 .362 .417 .310 .465 .397 .476 .406 .655 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. All coefficients were significant (p < .001) except when 
highlighted in brackets (i.e. for task-score and the self-concept accuracy/bias indicator: R < .001, p = 1.000). 
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Table 5: PISA (England) 2006: predicting science intentions 
 
 Step 1 Step 2a Step 2b Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Item/factor 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept/constant NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 
Gender (1=boy) .100 <.001 .084 <.001 -.016 .220 -.016 .222 -.002 .843 .006 .543 
Books at home .089 <.001 -.010 .536 .031 .024 -.002 .904 -.010 .387 -.016 .155 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .042 .005 .017 .258 .026 .043 .018 .157 .006 .590 .006 .550 
Mothers’ education -.033 .058 -.030 .069 -.030 .039 -.030 .038 -.004 .734 .001 .958 
Fathers’ education .109 <.001 .097 <.001 .061 <.001 .059 <.001 .014 .239 .008 .494 
Task-score (PV1)   .280 <.001   .095 <.001 .018 .129 .061 <.001 
Self-concept     .533 <.001 .506 <.001 .101 <.001 .111 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas)           -.050 <.001 
Interest (various areas)           .055 <.001 
Interest value         .220 <.001 .189 <.001 
Utility value         .405 <.001 .393 <.001 
Personal value         .147 <.001 .182 <.001 
General value           -.087 <.001 
Science activities           .069 <.001 
School career preparation           -.030 .014 
School career information           .085 <.001 
Teaching: interaction           -.037 .004 
Teaching: activities           -.042 .001 
Teaching: investigations           .022 .067 
Teaching: applications           -.044 .001 
Explained variance 3.1%  8.2%  29.9%  30.5%  56.2%  58.4%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 94.0%  88.0%  68.9%  68.2%  43.6%  41.4%  
Unexplained variance (school) 2.8%  3.8%  1.2%  1.4%  .2%  .2%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold.  
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Table 6: PISA (England) 2006: predicting science intentions, including the accuracy/bias indicator 
 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept/constant NA <.001 NA <.001 NA .001 
Gender (1=boy) .006 .543 .005 .597 .005 .597 
Books at home -.016 .155 -.015 .180 -.015 .180 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .006 .550 .003 .751 .003 .751 
Mothers’ education .001 .958 .005 .691 .005 .691 
Fathers’ education .008 .494 .006 .597 .006 .597 
Task-score (PV1) .061 <.001 .101 <.001   
Self-concept .111 <.001   .294 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias   .104 <.001 -.177 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.050 <.001 -.053 <.001 -.053 <.001 
Interest (various areas) .055 <.001 .059 <.001 .059 <.001 
Interest value .189 <.001 .185 <.001 .185 <.001 
Utility value .393 <.001 .390 <.001 .390 <.001 
Personal value .182 <.001 .188 <.001 .188 <.001 
General value -.087 <.001 -.088 <.001 -.088 <.001 
Science activities .069 <.001 .069 <.001 .069 <.001 
School career preparation -.030 .014 -.027 .027 -.027 .027 
School career information .085 <.001 .083 <.001 .083 <.001 
Teaching: interaction -.037 .004 -.037 .005 -.037 .005 
Teaching: activities -.042 .001 -.042 .001 -.042 .001 
Teaching: investigations .022 .067 .024 .055 .024 .055 
Teaching: applications -.044 .001 -.044 .002 -.044 .002 
Explained variance 58.4%  58.3%  58.3%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 41.4%  41.5%  41.5%  
Unexplained variance (school) .2%  .2%  .2%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
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Section 7.2: Results: 2014/2015 survey 
 
The 2014/2015 survey was analysed similarly to the PISA 2006 survey, 
through first considering correlations and then predictive modelling. 
Considered across Years 9-11, the strongest correlations with 
students’ science intentions were observed for the students’ perceived utility 
of science (R = .732, p < .001), personal value of science (R = .684, p < 
.001), interest value of science (R = .622, p < .001), and the subjective-
norm/influence of parents (R = .554, p < .001). Moderate correlations were 
also observed between intentions and students’ self-concept (R = .475, p < 
.001) and self-efficacy beliefs (R = .444, p < .001), and also between 
intentions and self-regulated studying (R = .492, p < .001), and the strategies 
of elaboration (R = .448, p < .001), control (R = .444, p < .001), and 
memorisation (R = .435, p < .001). A slightly lower association was 
observed between intentions and students’ current science grade (R = .351, p 
< .001). Intentions also had a higher association with task-confidence (R = 
.403, p < .001) than task-score (R = .256, p < .001). 
The higher associations between science intentions and different 
indicators of ‘confidence’ (i.e. self-concept, self-efficacy, and task-
confidence) compared to ‘attainment’ (i.e. current grades and task-scores) 
perhaps highlighted the potential relevance of confidence accuracy/bias. The 
difference-score indicator of task accuracy/bias (i.e. under-confidence 
through accuracy through to over-confidence) nevertheless had a minimal 
association with science intentions (R = .080, p = .002). However, task 
sensitivity (R = .259, p < .001), specificity (R = -.317, p < .001), and simple-
matching (R = .115, p < .001) showed relatively higher associations with 
intentions. Comprehensive correlation tables are summarised in Appendix 
8. 
As with PISA 2006, predictive models were applied in order to 
isolate the independent associations between intentions and students’ 
various attitudes and beliefs. Initial comparison of equivalent models (Table 
7) highlighted that the samples of students differed across the two surveys: 
specifically, self-concept beliefs and interest value appeared to be relatively 
less predictive of science intentions in the 2014/2015 survey than in the 
PISA 2006 survey, while personal value appeared to be relatively more 
Page 156 of 361 
predictive. Accordingly, some differences in results were expected across 
the two surveys. Limiting the analysis to only consider equivalent factors 
across the two surveys would have undermined the purpose of directly 
measuring self-reflective accuracy/bias through task-confidence and task-
scores, and further potential influences on intentions, via the 2014/2015 
survey. 
A series of linear multi-level predictive models were again applied 
for the 2014/2015 survey, to increase insight and provide wider 
contextualisation (Table 8). As with the PISA 2006 survey, expectation-
maximisation was applied to estimate missing responses, which allowed 
1423 (rather than only 571) of the 1523 students to be considered, regardless 
of which predictors were included. 
 When predicting science intentions, students’ background 
characteristics only explained a small amount of variance (Table 8, step 1). 
Extending from this step (not tabulated for brevity), students’ expressions of 
confidence (task-confidence, self-concept beliefs, self-efficacy beliefs) and 
indicators of attainment (task-scores, current science grades) were each 
positively predictive of intentions, accounting for the students’ background 
characteristics, when considered in turn. As with PISA 2006, the indicators 
of attainment each appeared to mediate the influence of the number of 
books at home, while the indicators of confidence each appeared to mediate 
the influence of gender. The students’ current grade was positively 
predictive when modelled with the students’ background and their self-
concept beliefs or with the students’ background and their self-efficacy 
beliefs. However, current grades lost significance when modelled with the 
students’ background, self-concept beliefs, and self-efficacy beliefs. 
Modelling the various indicators of students’ background, 
confidence, and attainment (Table 8, step 2) highlighted that self-concept 
and self-efficacy had the highest predictive associations with intentions. 
Adding the theorised influences from the expectancy-value model (Table 8, 
step 3), specifically interest value, utility value, personal value, and (the 
absence of) costs, mediated the influences of parents working in science, 
self-concept beliefs, and (to some extent) self-efficacy beliefs. As with 
PISA 2006, expressions of confidence may partially reflect interest and 
other factors, which may help explain why they appear motivational. 
Page 157 of 361 
Adding the theorised influences in turn instead of together (not tabulated for 
brevity) highlighted that: utility value appeared to be the main mediator of 
parents working in science; additionally, interest, utility, and personal value 
each mediated the predictive association between self-concept beliefs and 
intentions, with interest and then utility entailing the largest changes. 
The various factors from the expectancy-value model (Table 8, step 
3) explained more variance than other potential predictors (Table 8, step 4), 
such as focusing on mastering science work, believing that effort can 
achieve success in science (perceived control), and the various studying 
strategies. Nevertheless, some of these predictors were still significant when 
considered together with the expectancy-value factors (Table 8, step 5), 
although with relatively low predictive magnitudes. 
Finally, when considering the comprehensive set of items/factors 
(Table 8, step 6), students’ science intentions were most strongly predicted 
by the students’ perceived utility of science, personal value of science, self-
efficacy, subjective-norms/influences from parents, and the students’ 
interest value (which was only just below the .1 coefficient magnitude 
threshold). Various other items/factors were predictive, but at lower relative 
magnitudes. Despite the various study strategies having moderate 
correlations with science intentions, only the memorisation studying 
strategy had a minimal predictive association within the final model. In 
contrast to self-efficacy, neither the students’ self-concept beliefs nor their 
current science grades were predictive of their science intentions when 
accounting for the various other factors. An alternate model highlighted that 
self-concept beliefs (but not the students’ current grade) was predictive if 
self-efficacy was removed (standardised coefficient for self-concept = .058, 
p = .032, at the equivalent of step 6, but without self-efficacy; the other 
predictors were essentially unchanged). Given that self-concept beliefs have 
been predictive of science intentions in prior research in England (DeWitt, 
Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014), and in the PISA 2006 
data, the different implication of self-concept, self-efficacy, and students’ 
grades likely need to be explored in more detail with further students. 
As before with PISA 2006, the task-confidence (difference-score) 
accuracy/bias indicator could not be modelled together with the task-score 
and task-confidence indicators. When considering the comprehensive set of 
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predictors (i.e. step 6), but including various combinations of task-score, 
task-confidence, and (difference-score) accuracy/bias (not tabulated for 
brevity): task-score was positively predictive of intentions while task-
confidence was not significantly predictive; replacing task-score and task-
confidence with the task accuracy/bias indicator highlighted that it was not 
significantly predictive; when included together, task-score was positively 
predictive of intentions but task accuracy/bias was not significantly 
predictive; finally, when included together, task-confidence was positively 
predictive while task accuracy/bias was negatively predictive. The various 
coefficient magnitudes were very small, however. The same pattern was 
seen when using the task-confidence regression-residual accuracy/bias 
indicator. However, no elements of the equivalent combinations of self-
concept, current grades, and self-concept (regression-residual) accuracy/bias 
were significant. 
For contextualisation (Table 9), when modelled alone with the 
students’ background characteristics, the various patterns of coefficients for 
the task-level indicators were more clearly revealed. In addition to the 
students’ background characteristics, task-score and task-confidence both 
positively predicted science intentions (Table 9, model A); task-scores and 
the (difference-score) accuracy/bias indicator both positively predicted 
science intentions (i.e. higher over-confidence, controlling for task-scores, 
predicted higher science intentions; Table 9, model B); task-confidence 
positively predicted science intentions and the accuracy/bias indicator 
negatively predicted science intentions (i.e. higher over-confidence, 
controlling for task-confidence, predicted lower science intentions; Table 9, 
model C). This also mirrored the equivalent patterns in PISA 2006 (Table 
6). Similarly, when modelled with students’ background characteristics, the 
indicators of task sensitivity, task specificity, and task simple-matching, and 
also the regression-residual accuracy/bias indicators, were predictive of 
science intentions (Table 10). However, they were not significantly 
predictive when the students’ other attitudes and beliefs were also included 
as predictors (not tabulated for brevity). 
Predictive models and results cannot be selected simply to provide 
significant results, however, and it was possible to infer that indicators of 
self-reflective accuracy/bias on the task-level did not necessarily have a 
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large direct influence on students’ subject-level science studying intentions. 
The analysis continued, nevertheless, to consider whether task-level self-
reflective confidence accuracy/bias had an indirect or other influence on 
students’ intentions: groups or clusters of students with different degrees of 
self-reflective accuracy/bias might be more suited to explore the area 
(covered by research question two, Section 8), and tendencies towards 
under-confidence or over-confidence might entail that students’ intentions 
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Table 7: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): predicting science intentions (contextualisation with PISA 2006) 
 
 PISA 2006 survey 2014/2015 survey 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept NA <.001 NA .404 
Year NA NA -.007 .715 
Gender (1=boy) -.002 .846 .022 .248 
Books at home -.004 .726 -.020 .294 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .007 .497 .027 .127 
Mothers’ education -.004 .751 -.006 .797 
Fathers’ education .014 .225 .012 .614 
Self-concept .104 <.001 .059 .010 
Interest value .224 <.001 .072 .016 
Utility value .404 <.001 .467 <.001 
Personal value .148 <.001 .221 <.001 
Explained variance 56.2%  58.9%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 43.6%  40.5%  
Unexplained variance (school) .2%  .6%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
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Table 8: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): predicting science intentions 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Item/factor 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept NA <.001 NA .013 NA .007 NA .487 NA .150 NA .110 
Year -.088 .001 -.045 .076 .011 .571 -.074 .001 .003 .887 .009 .637 
Gender (1=boy) .091 .001 -.002 .920 .011 .543 .039 .102 .010 .605 .002 .915 
Ethnicity (Black) .026 .336 .023 .326 .026 .142 .013 .561 .020 .239 .019 .253 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .025 .336 .012 .601 .001 .959 .008 .715 -.004 .797 -.008 .636 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .197 <.001 .132 <.001 .075 .001 .120 <.001 .057 .004 .049 .013 
Ethnicity (mixed) .038 .141 .024 .283 .030 .085 .032 .140 .024 .166 .021 .218 
Ethnicity (other) .064 .011 .048 .030 .040 .016 .053 .013 .032 .053 .029 .069 
Books at home .074 .009 -.035 .180 -.037 .058 .005 .823 -.044 .024 -.042 .028 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .065 .013 .057 .013 .026 .139 .051 .022 .026 .128 .014 .409 
Mothers’ education -.030 .390 -.069 .027 -.016 .492 -.039 .188 -.018 .452 -.017 .452 
Fathers’ education .095 .010 .020 .541 -.003 .908 .023 .458 .001 .980 -.013 .580 
Task-score   .056 .055 .047 .034 .049 .070 .065 .003 .058 .007 
Task-confidence   .119 <.001 .013 .596 .112 <.001 .024 .324 .022 .361 
Current grade   -.020 .569 -.029 .282   -.036 .162 -.037 .159 
Self-concept   .280 <.001 .012 .639   .033 .202 .037 .173 
Self-efficacy   .203 <.001 .110 <.001   .135 <.001 .118 <.001 
Interest value     .049 .102   .087 .006 .097 .003 
Utility value     .463 <.001   .508 <.001 .451 <.001 
Personal value     .231 <.001   .211 <.001 .215 <.001 
Cost value (absence of)     .038 .041   .059 .002 .052 .007 
Orientation: mastery       .083 .002 -.053 .015 -.040 .068 
Orientation: performance       .049 .057 -.054 .008 -.053 .010 
Perceived control       .077 .004 -.073 .001 -.050 .029 
Perceived control (exams)       .023 .339 -.056 .006 -.059 .005 
Study strategy: self-regulation       .147 <.001 -.013 .672 -.005 .875 
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 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Item/factor 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Std. 
Effect Sig. (p) 
Study strategy: control       .040 .272 .006 .821 .036 .205 
Study strategy: memorisation       .066 .056 .078 .004 .073 .007 
Study strategy: elaboration       .117 <.001 -.012 .634 -.018 .483 
Anxiety (absence of)           .038 .164 
Mastery norms (good grade)           .005 .766 
Subject-comparisons           .045 .060 
Peer-comparisons           -.012 .617 
Social persuasions (praise)           -.052 .033 
Vicarious experiences           -.063 .002 
Norms/influence (friends)           -.049 .009 
Norms/influence (parents)           .109 <.001 
Teacher perceptions           -.046 .088 
Teacher/school careers/events           .046 .039 
Explained variance 10.9%  31.4%  60.6%  36.3%  61.8%  63.2%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 86.2%  68.4%  39.3%  63.7%  38.2%  36.8%  
Unexplained variance (school) 2.9%  .3%  .0%  .0%  .0%  .0%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
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Table 9: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): predicting science intentions, considering students’ background and task accuracy/bias 
 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 
Year -.128 <.001 -.128 <.001 -.128 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) .015 .574 .015 .574 .015 .574 
Ethnicity (Black) .024 .340 .024 .340 .024 .340 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .001 .958 .001 .958 .001 .958 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .163 <.001 .163 <.001 .163 <.001 
Ethnicity (mixed) .039 .111 .039 .111 .039 .111 
Ethnicity (other) .057 .016 .057 .016 .057 .016 
Books at home .004 .892 .004 .892 .004 .892 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .056 .024 .056 .024 .056 .024 
Mothers’ education -.052 .112 -.052 .112 -.052 .112 
Fathers’ education .054 .119 .054 .119 .054 .119 
Task-score .104 .001 .495 <.001   
Task-confidence .319 <.001   .403 <.001 
Task-confidence accuracy/bias (difference-score)   .354 <.001 -.094 .001 
Explained variance 22.2%  22.2%  22.2%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 77.1%  77.1%  77.1%  
Unexplained variance (school) .7%  .7%  .7%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
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Table 10: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): predicting science intentions, considering students’ background and further accuracy/bias indicators 
 






























Intercept NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 NA <.001 
Year -.128 <.001 -.083 .002 -.106 <.001 -.088 <.001 -.096 <.001 -.100 <.001 -.097 .001 
Gender (1=boy) .015 .574 .082 .004 .048 .068 .040 .130 .085 .002 .039 .149 .051 .093 
Ethnicity (Black) .024 .340 .026 .335 .025 .318 .024 .334 .026 .334 .024 .359 .015 .621 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .001 .958 .025 .345 .018 .482 .015 .536 .025 .341 .017 .511 .051 .070 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .163 <.001 .196 <.001 .192 <.001 .179 <.001 .198 <.001 .188 <.001 .164 <.001 
Ethnicity (mixed) .039 .111 .037 .147 .039 .118 .033 .175 .039 .134 .036 .153 .027 .309 
Ethnicity (other) .057 .016 .064 .011 .059 .015 .064 .007 .064 .010 .061 .011 .058 .034 
Books at home .004 .892 .079 .006 .055 .046 .072 .008 .072 .010 .075 .006 .048 .111 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .056 .024 .064 .014 .059 .022 .064 .011 .063 .016 .062 .016 .098 <.001 
Mothers’ education -.052 .112 -.029 .400 -.045 .192 -.025 .449 -.033 .344 -.031 .372 -.064 .078 
Fathers’ education .054 .119 .089 .015 .088 .014 .077 .029 .091 .013 .063 .078 .057 .134 
Task-score .104 .001             
Task-confidence .319 <.001             
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score)   .054 .038           
Task sensitivity     .189 <.001         
Task specificity       -.255 <.001       
Task simple-matching         .067 .013     
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (reg.-res.)           .229 <.001   
Self-concept accuracy/bias (reg.-res.)             .344 <.001 
Explained variance 22.2%  10.9%  15.7%  18.6%  12.0%  16.8%  18.4%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 77.1%  86.0%  84.3%  81.3%  86.0%  82.9%  78.5%  
Unexplained variance (school) .7%  3.2%  .0%  .2%  2.0%  .2%  3.1%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
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Section 7.3: Discussion 
 
Students’ science intentions were predicted by their confidence, attitudes, 
and other beliefs, in both surveys. Students’ confidence expressed as self-
concept beliefs was a strong predictor of their science intentions in the PISA 
2006 survey, while confidence expressed as self-efficacy beliefs was a 
strong predictor in the 2014/2015 survey. The following sections discuss 
and contextualise these results, focusing on the students’ various attitudes 
and wider factors (Section 7.3.1) and on their expressions of confidence and 
confidence accuracy/bias (Section 7.3.2), and highlight initial conclusions 
for the first research question (Section 7.3.3). 
 
 
Section 7.3.1: Students’ attitudes and further factors 
 
In PISA 2006 for England, Year 11 students’ science intentions were most 
strongly predicted (with standardised coefficients over .1) by the students’ 
perceived utility of science, interest/enjoyment of science, personal value of 
science, and their science self-concept beliefs. In data collected in 
2014/2015 in England, considered across students in Years 9, 10, and 11 
while accounting for their varying ages, students’ science intentions were 
most strongly predicted by the students’ perceived utility of science, 
personal value of science, self-efficacy (confidence in their expected grades 
at GCSE/A-Level), subjective-norms/influences from parents, and the 
students’ interest/enjoyment of science (although interest was just below the 
.1 magnitude threshold). 
These results broadly confirmed the earlier hypotheses (Section 4.2) 
and accordingly confirmed findings seen within earlier studies, including 
the relevance of perceived utility of science, interest in science, and the 
influence of parents (DeWitt & Archer, 2015; Kjærnsli & Lie, 2011; 
Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Sjaastad, 2012; Wang & Degol, 2013). 
Concurrently, the results extended earlier studies through highlighting the 
strong predictive association between students’ personal value of science to 
their identities and their science intentions. Students’ science identities have 
generally been explored through qualitative perspectives, so that any 
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relative impact compared to other factors could not easily be determined 
(Archer, et al., 2010; Aschbacher, Li, & Roth, 2010; Carlone & Johnson, 
2007). Simple scales of agreement within questionnaires may not 
necessarily reflect the complex idea of identity, however, and the area can 
be considered in many ways. The students’ personal value of science in 
PISA 2006 covered the personal relevance of science in understanding 
wider areas, relating to other people, and in being applied in various ways in 
the future (OECD, 2009a). The 2014/2015 survey directly covered theorised 
aspects of identity such as self-recognition (‘Thinking scientifically is an 
important part of who I am’) and conveying this to other people (‘Being 
able to do science helps me show other people who I am’) (Carlone & 
Johnson, 2007; Trautwein, et al., 2012; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Further 
research may need to explore how additional aspects of science identities 
could be measured or explored. Similarly, considering potential links 
between identity, interest, perceived difficulty or ability, and other areas of 
relevance to science education may be informative (Archer, et al., 2010; 
Archer, DeWitt, & Osborne, 2015); identity may also perhaps entail patterns 
of beliefs and associations between them, together with self-recognition and 
movements towards or away from particular ideals or roles. 
The PISA 2006 survey and the 2014/2015 survey covered 
overlapping arrays of factors, but sometimes considered the same idea or 
factor in slightly different ways, as with the students’ personal value of 
science. Similarities were nevertheless observed across the two sets of data, 
such as the importance of students’ perceived utility of science and personal 
value of science. The slightly different measurement items plausibly 
reflected different perspectives onto similar underlying ideas, supported by 
the convergence of the results (Messick, 1995). However, the results notably 
differed across the two surveys regarding the relevance of students’ interest, 
despite the similarities in measurement (which covered interest and 
enjoyment, such as via agreement or disagreement with ‘I enjoy acquiring 
new knowledge in science’ and ‘I am interested in learning about science’ in 
the PISA 2006 survey, and ‘I enjoy learning science’ and ‘I am interested in 
the things I learn in science’ in the 2014/2015 survey). Given that prior 
research has highlighted the strong relevance of students’ interest to their 
choices (Holmegaard, Ulriksen, & Madsen, 2014; Jensen & Henriksen, 
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2015; Maltese, Melki, & Wiebke, 2014), some results may reflect the 
samples and may not necessarily generalise to wider students (and would 
need to be explored further); educational and social contexts also change 
over time, so some variability is also unavoidable. 
The students’ perceived utility value of science was the strongest 
predictor of science intentions for students in England in PISA 2006 and in 
the 2014/2015 survey, as also seen in earlier research studies (Mujtaba & 
Reiss, 2014). Within the expectancy-value model, utility value aims to 
consider the idea of science being valued due to indirect benefits (Eccles, 
2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000); the similar idea of extrinsic (instrumental) 
motivation considers activities being undertaken to gain a separate or wider 
outcome (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In the two surveys, 
utility value was measured with items such as ‘Making an effort in science 
is worth it because it will help me in the work that I want to do later on’ 
(OECD, 2009a). The 2014/2015 survey was supplemented by further items 
such as ‘I need to do well in science to get the job I want’ to be similarly 
comparable with further studies (Martin & Mullis, 2013). 
For some students, studying science may be indirectly valued 
through helping them to widen their educational or career prospects: 
someone may aspire to a job that uses scientific but transferable skills in 
some way, rather than a job clearly within science itself. For other students 
who aspire towards a science career, it perhaps becomes difficult to 
distinguish utility as indirect value from utility reflecting some form of 
direct value; practically, it may be harder to disagree with items such as ‘I 
need to do well in science to get the job I want’ if the job that someone 
wants is within science. Future research may need to consider and separate 
students’ perceptions of the indirect utility value of studying science (e.g. in 
providing transferable skills) from the direct utility value of studying 
science (e.g. in providing the skills and qualifications that are necessary to 
become a scientist). For example, considered from another perspective, it is 
even possible that someone may resolve to study science (perhaps due to 
interest or other factors), which then entails that they recognise and agree 
with the direct utility value of studying science (i.e. that they then need 
strong science qualifications to progress further); science intentions and 
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direct utility value may be clearly associated, but causality may be reversed 
so that results might have less meaning. 
Further benefit may also be gained from exploring why science 
qualifications and skills may be indirectly valued (or not valued). For 
example, science is often perceived as a relatively difficult subject (Archer, 
et al., 2010; Aschbacher, Li, & Roth, 2010; Bates, Pollard, Usher, & 
Oakley, 2009), and has indeed been found to require more generalised 
ability than other subjects to gain particular grades (Coe, 2008; He & 
Stockford, 2015). Prestige may then be gained from success in difficult 
examinations, for example, reflecting the idea that qualifications may 
embody various forms of indirect or exchange value (Archer, Dawson, 
DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015; Claussen & Osborne, 2013; Williams & 
Choudry, 2016). Additionally, it is possible that science and related skills 
are indirectly valued through facilitating higher potential income. Those 
with science-related degrees who work within science-related fields earn 
some of the highest salaries compared to other fields (Engineering UK, 
2015; Royal Society, 2006; Walker & Zhu, 2013). Similarly, higher skills in 
science and mathematics have associated with increases in national 
productivity and economic returns across different countries (Hanushek & 
Kimko, 2000; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2012; OECD, 2015b), although 
students may not necessarily be aware of such wider contexts. Further 
research may then also need to explore why the indirect (or perhaps the 
direct) goal of studying science is valued or not and in what way (i.e. what, 
exactly, about a career in science or being a scientist is valued or attractive 
to students). 
Considering wider factors, in both surveys, the students’ gender 
(being a boy), the number of books at home, the level of fathers’ education, 
and whether either parent worked within science were predictively 
associated with higher science intentions but only when the students’ task-
scores, confidence, and attitudes were not considered. While PISA 2006 did 
not measure students’ ethnicity, reporting a South-Asian/Indian background 
(rather than a White background) predictively associated with higher 
intentions in the 2014/2015 data, even when modelling the students’ various 
attitudes and other beliefs. These results matched earlier studies that have 
highlighted lower science intentions and/or choices for girls (Blickenstaff, 
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2005; Murphy & Whitelegg, 2006) and higher intentions/choices for 
students from ethnicities/backgrounds such as Indian (Archer & Francis, 
2006; Connor, Tyers, Modood, & Hillage, 2004; Strand, 2007; Torgerson, et 
al., 2008). Nevertheless, considering further factors appears to be necessary 
in order to help explain such differences. 
In general terms, these results supported the assumptions of the 
expectancy-value model of social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 
1997; Eccles, 2009; Eccles, et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
Essentially, any influences due to students’ background and context have 
been theorised to be mainly mediated through students’ attitudes and 
confidence expressed as self-concept or self-efficacy beliefs (Eccles, 2009). 
Further research may then need to consider, in more detail, how students’ 
attitudes are formed or influenced. For example, parental education and 
fields of work may foster implicit (or perhaps explicit) dispositions within 
families that may influence students’ interpretative frameworks and/or their 
attitudes and beliefs (Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015; 
Bourdieu, 1984; Edgerton & Roberts, 2014). Families from various 
ethnicities/backgrounds, such as East-Asian/Chinese and Indian, have also 
often valued education and promoted particular careers for their children 
(Archer & Francis, 2006; Connor, Tyers, Modood, & Hillage, 2004; Strand, 
2007; Torgerson, et al., 2008). University students’ reported initial interest 
in science has also associated with parental encouragement and parents 
working within science (Dabney, Chakraverty, & Robert, 2013). 
Quantitative research may then need to encompass wider indicators, such as 
views from parents (and/or students’ beliefs about their parents’ 
preferences), in order to consider such areas. 
The results from both surveys also highlighted that further factors 
could be directly predictive of students’ intentions, but generally with lower 
magnitudes that perhaps entailed less practical relevance. For example, 
psychological studies have often considered factors such as motivational 
orientations to master learning, which have generally associated with higher 
interest and attainment (Elliot, 1999; Huang, 2011a; Jiang, Song, Lee, & 
Bong, 2014; Paulick, Watermann, & Nückles, 2013). The 2014/2015 survey 
highlighted that mastery orientations associated with higher science 
intentions, but only when the expectancy-value factors (i.e. including 
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interest and attainment) were not modelled; when the expectancy-value 
factors were modelled, mastering learning became negatively predictive of 
science intentions, but was ultimately not predictive when the full array of 
factors was considered. The coefficient and significance changes suggested 
that complex patterns of mediation may occur (i.e. mastery orientations may 
reflect higher interest, attainment, or other factors, and/or may better predict 
these factors rather than science intentions); further research may then need 
to consider structural models of association in addition to predictive 
modelling of one outcome. Orientations to out-perform other students, 
however, remained negatively predictive of science intentions in the final 
predictive models, but with a minimal magnitude. 
The predictive models covering PISA 2006 highlighted that different 
teaching approaches (i.e. interaction/discussion/debate, practical 
experiments, student-led investigations, and explaining/focusing on applied 
areas) had minimal (and sometimes negative) predictive associations with 
the students’ science intentions, when also considering the students’ various 
attitudes and beliefs. Teaching approaches have often been considered in the 
context of attainment, essentially in order to determine optimal or efficient 
practices (Cavagnetto, 2010; Schroeder, Scott, Tolson, Huang, & Lee, 
2007). Teaching approaches and classroom experiences may influence 
students’ interest and other attitudes to some extent, although it perhaps 
remains unclear how these would compare against other potential influences 
(Abrahams, 2009; Hampden-Thompson & Bennett, 2013; Wang, 2012). In 
general terms, practical work remains valued and recommended within 
science education, for example due to practical work being assumed to 
reflect the empirical nature of science itself (Royal Society, 2014). 
However, applying practical work in science education can be rationalised 
in various ways, and scientists, policy makers, teachers, and students may 
all have different interpretations of what practical work aims to achieve 
(Abrahams & Reiss, 2012; Abrahams, Reiss, & Sharpe, 2014; Hodson, 
1993; Millar, 1998). Science education as being balanced between training 
future scientists (e.g. perhaps via practical laboratory work) while enhancing 
science literacy for everyone, and considering how to best undertake science 
teaching and learning, has been discussed for an extensive amount of time, 
but with no apparent resolution (Claussen & Osborne, 2013; Kimball, 1913; 
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Osborne & Dillon, 2008). In general, research and commentary on teaching 
and learning approaches can potentially lead to relatively clear practical 
impact (e.g. whether to apply a specific and tangible teaching approach or 
not), although may constrain enquiry and limit consideration of what 
students might prefer (e.g. teaching practices may be instead recommended 
following from contextualising learning theories, from assumptions about 
what scientists do or need to know, etc.). Further research may need to 
continue to consider how teaching associates with students’ attitudes, and 
consider which areas of science and/or teaching/learning students favour; 
for example, some students might prefer learning about ‘big ideas’ or 
theories and/or applied areas of science and disfavour practical work or 
debate. 
Students’ studying strategies have also been variously considered in 
prior research studies, although to a lesser degree with secondary school 
students. For university students, the studying strategies of organisation, 
memorisation, and elaboration have generally been associated with higher 
attainment, with elaboration having the highest relative association (Credé 
& Phillips, 2011; Richardson, Abraham, & Bond, 2012). For secondary 
school students, however, memorisation strategies have been associated 
with lower attainment in mathematics (Chiu, Chow, & Mcbride-Chang, 
2007; Echazarra, Salinas, Méndez, Denis, & Rech, 2016; Köller, 2001). The 
2014/2015 survey highlighted that, in simple predictive models, self-
regulated and elaboration studying strategies had the highest predictive 
associations with science intentions, higher than memorisation and control 
strategies. However, when the expectancy-value factors were also modelled 
(i.e. including students’ attainment), only memorisation strategies remained 
predictive of higher science intentions, but with a very small magnitude. It 
perhaps remains unclear whether any particular studying strategies should 
be promoted, and if so, for what reasons. Researchers may also need to 
remain mindful of contextualisation; for example, memorisation may be 
perhaps unavoidable at secondary school and/or a pre-requisite to other 
learning strategies. 
Many of the other areas considered in the 2014/2015 survey also 
appeared to be less relevant to students’ science intentions. For example, the 
students’ perceived control predictively associated with their science 
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intentions, but at a minimal magnitude. Higher beliefs of perceived control 
(e.g. effort can lead to success in science, success depends on the individual, 
etc.) predicted slightly higher intentions when the expectancy-value factors 
were not modelled, but predicted slightly lower intentions when considering 
the comprehensive array of factors. It is possible that perceived control may 
influence students’ attitudes more than intentions. Nevertheless, it perhaps 
remains important to continue to explore further potential predictors of 
students’ science intentions, otherwise theoretical or analytical perspectives 
may become more prescriptive than informative. Analysis of Next Steps 
(formerly the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England), for 
example, has indeed highlighted that students’ perceived control (believing 
in lack of success being due to the student i.e. an internal locus of control) 
has associated with studying science at A-Level, together with prior 
attainment and liking science (Department for Education, 2011). Given that 
some results from the 2014/2015 appear particular to the sample and may or 
may not generalise to other students, further research may be needed to help 
clarify the area. 
 
 
Section 7.3.2: Students’ confidence and confidence accuracy/bias 
 
Focusing on the various expressions of confidence, students’ self-concept 
beliefs, and to a lesser extent their self-efficacy beliefs, were predictive of 
their science intentions in the PISA 2006 survey. For the 2014/2015 survey, 
however, students’ self-efficacy beliefs were predictive, while their self-
concept beliefs were not. While both studies highlighted the relevance of 
self-efficacy and/or self-concept, the students’ perceived utility of science 
and personal value of science ultimately had higher predictive associations 
with students’ intentions. 
These results broadly cohered with earlier studies. For example, 
students’ self-concept beliefs have associated with science intentions in 
prior studies in England, which have also highlighted the importance of 
students’ perceived utility of science (DeWitt & Archer, 2015; Mujtaba & 
Reiss, 2014). Other studies have also variously highlighted the associations 
between science intentions and self-concept or self-efficacy beliefs in 
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various other countries (Bong, 2001b; Byars-Winston, Estrada, Howard, 
Davis, & Zalapa, 2010; Parker, et al., 2012; Parker, Marsh, Ciarrochi, 
Marshall, & Abduljabbar, 2014). 
The contrasting results from the two surveys may reflect and 
highlight the importance of contextual measurement. In the PISA 2006 
survey, self-efficacy was measured as someone’s expected capacity to 
undertake various applied science tasks that might be encountered in 
everyday life (e.g. ‘Recognise the science question that underlies a 
newspaper report on a health issue’, ‘Interpret the scientific information 
provided on the labelling of food items’) (OECD, 2009a). In the 2014/2015 
survey, self-efficacy was measured as expected capacity to gain particular 
grades at GCSE and A-Level, and this had a relatively high predictive 
association with science intentions. In general terms, students’ GCSE 
attainment has often been associated with selecting A-Level subjects 
(Department for Education, 2011, 2012; Homer, Ryder, & Banner, 2014); 
schools may require particular levels of GCSE attainment in order to study 
A-Level subjects (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009); 
and, additionally, for mathematics, students’ intentions have associated with 
their predicted grades (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 2008). The importance of 
self-efficacy, expressed as expected grades, plausibly cohered with and 
reflected such areas. Additionally, the higher association seen in the 
2014/2015 survey may reflect that the measures of self-efficacy and 
intentions were both contextualised and measured at the subject level 
(Bandura, 1997; Bong, 1997; Pajares & Miller, 1995). Self-efficacy 
measured at the task level may be more relevant for task level outcomes 
(Bong, 1997; Jansen, Scherer, & Schroeders, 2015). 
Alternately or additionally, the contrasting results may also follow 
from the different samples: the 2014/2015 sample was comparatively small 
and not necessarily nationally-representative; PISA 2006 covered a 
nationally-representative sample, although considered the situation as of that 
particular year. Regardless, given the partially unexpected results from the 
2014/2015 survey (e.g. where self-concept and interest appeared less 
relevant), further research would realistically be necessary in order to help 
consider the relative influences of students’ self-concept, self-efficacy, and 
any other expressions of confidence. 
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For both the surveys, indicators of accuracy/bias, formed via self-
concept/task-score regression-residuals in the PISA 2006 survey and via 
task-level task-confidence/task-score difference-scores in the 2014/2015 
survey, were predictive of students’ science intentions; however, 
significance was lost in the 2014/2015 survey once students’ wider attitudes 
and beliefs were also modelled as predictors. In PISA 2006, the 
accuracy/bias indicator remained predictive when it replaced the self-
concept indicator, regardless of which other predictors were considered, 
which likely reflected the greater relative importance of self-concept beliefs 
in the PISA data. Additional models for PISA 2006 highlighted that, 
controlling for the various other predictors: task-scores and self-concept 
beliefs both positively predicted science intentions; task-scores and the 
accuracy/bias indicator both positively predicted science intentions (i.e. 
higher over-confidence, controlling for task-scores, predicted higher science 
intentions); self-concept positively predicted and the accuracy/bias indicator 
negatively predicted science intentions (i.e. higher over-confidence, 
controlling for self-concept beliefs, predicted lower science intentions). The 
same pattern was also seen in the 2014/2015 survey, but only when the task-
level indicators were modelled alone with the students’ background 
characteristics (otherwise significance was lost). 
Accordingly, the two surveys provide reassurance that similar 
predictive patterns emerged, regardless of the methods of considering 
accuracy/bias, whether via differences in self-concept beliefs relative to 
task-scores across a sample, or via differences in self-reflective task-
confidence explicitly linked to task-scores. However, the 2014/2015 survey 
ultimately highlighted that task-level self-reflective accuracy/bias was less 
directly relevant to subject-level studying intentions. This may unavoidably 
follow from task level measures being less generalizable or relevant to the 
subject level. 
The additional indicators of students’ task-level accuracy in the 
2014/2015 survey were broadly similar to the task-level accuracy/bias 
indicator in that they were only predictive of science intentions when 
considered with the students’ background characteristics, and were not 
predictive once the students’ various other attitudes and beliefs were 
modelled. When considered with the students’ background characteristics, 
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higher sensitivity (being accurately confident when they had the right 
answer) predicted higher intentions, higher specificity (being accurately not 
confident when they had the wrong answer) predicted lower intentions, and 
higher simple-matching (both accurately knowing when answers were right 
and wrong) predicted slightly higher intentions. Despite earlier studies 
highlighting the importance of sensitivity and specificity (Schraw, Kuch, & 
Gutierrez, 2013; Schraw, Kuch, Gutierrez, & Richmond, 2014), it perhaps 
remains unclear how to best apply these ideas within science education. 
Considering task-level confidence accuracy may be directly meaningful for 
examinations and other assessment, and may require further exploration; for 
example, being able to accurately determine whether a task has been 
answered correctly or not may help students in deciding whether to consider 
the task again, which may help determine their allocation of effort and time. 
 
 
Section 7.3.3: Conclusions 
 
Research question one: which attitudes and motivational beliefs (including 
expressions of confidence) were the most relevant influences on students’ 
science intentions? 
 
Fundamentally, students’ perceived utility of science and personal value of 
science were most strongly predictive of science intention across both PISA 
2006 and the 2014/2015 survey. Students’ confidence expressed as self-
concept beliefs was a strong predictor of their science intentions in the PISA 
2006 survey, while confidence expressed as self-efficacy beliefs 
(contextualised as confidence in their expected grades at GCSE/A-Level) 
was a strong predictor in the 2014/2015 survey. Indicators of accuracy/bias 
appeared to be directly predictive of science intentions if the underlying 
expression of confidence was also predictive. 
However, indicators of confidence, attainment, and accuracy/bias 
could not be modelled together hence any wider implications were 
unavoidably less clear. The impact of accuracy/bias was then considered via 
grouping or clustering students, and whether students might consider their 
choices in different ways.  
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Section 8: Research question two 
 
The second research question considered whether students with different 
degrees of confidence accuracy/bias exhibited different science intentions, 
attitudes, and beliefs. The results from the PISA 2006 survey (Section 8.1) 
and the 2014/2015 survey (Section 8.2) are described in turn, and then 
discussed and contextualised in Section 8.3. 
 
 
Section 8.1: Results: PISA 2006 
 
Predictive modelling could not easily reveal the impact of accuracy/bias on 
students’ intentions (Section 7), so students were categorised according to 
their confidence accuracy/bias so that their expressed intentions, attitudes, 
and other beliefs could be considered and compared across the groups. 
Students were classified through different approaches in order to consider 
any similarities or differences: via conceptual accuracy/bias groups (Section 
8.1.1) and via accuracy/bias clusters from latent-profile analysis (Section 
8.1.2). Additionally, latent-profile analysis was used to form clusters based 
on students’ intentions and key predictors (identified in Section 7), and 
differences in the cluster profiles were considered, including their degrees of 
accuracy/bias (Section 8.1.3). 
 
 
Section 8.1.1: Accuracy/bias groups 
 
Conceptual groups (above-average/below-average intersections) 
 
Four conceptual accuracy/bias groups were formed to consider the 
intersection of below-average and above-average confidence and attainment 
(Section 6.3). These grouped (Table 11): those with above-average self-
concept beliefs and above-average task-scores (33.2% of the considered 
students, i.e. broadly accurate with high confidence); those with above-
average self-concept but below-average task-scores (18.2%, i.e. broadly 
over-confident); those with below-average self-concept but above-average 
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task-scores (20.1%, i.e. broadly under-confident); and those with below-
average self-concept and below-average task-scores (28.5%, i.e. broadly 
accurate with low confidence). 
While such groups considered accuracy/bias broadly, they 
represented the conceptual ideas of under-confidence and over-confidence. 
The degree of exhibited (regression-residual) accuracy/bias also reflected 
the conceptual formation of the groups (means per group are shown in 
Table 11), although on average, students with accurately-high beliefs 
exhibited some degree of relative over-confidence (via the regression-
residual indicator), while students with accurately-low beliefs exhibited 
some degree of relative under-confidence. 
The students’ science intentions differed when comparing all 
possible pairs of groups (means per group are shown in Table 11 and 
differences are shown in Table 12). Since the analysis used the OECD 
factor-scores, which have no inherent meaning assigned to their values, 
standardised z-scores are reported (i.e. negative z-scores reflect below-
average values while positive z-scores reflect above-average values, where 
values are given in standard deviations). Those with accurately-high beliefs 
reported the highest (above-average) science intentions, then over-confident 
students, then under-confident students, and then those with accurately-low 
beliefs. The magnitude of the overall difference in intentions across the 
groups was moderate: 19.8% of the variance in intentions could be 
attributed to the differences across the groups (η2 (eta-squared) represents R2 
in this situation as a measure of effect size) (Cohen, 1988). 
Group differences for the students’ other attitudes and beliefs 
broadly followed the same pattern as seen in their intentions, including for 
the key predictors of students’ intentions (the students’ perceived utility of 
science, interest/enjoyment of science, personal value of science, and their 
science self-concept beliefs, as revealed in Section 7). The students’ 
background factors showed different patterns across the groups, however. 
For example, there was no gender difference across the accurately-high and 
over-confident groups (both with above-average proportions of boys) or 
across the under-confident and accurately-low groups (both with below-
average proportions of boys). For the other background indicators (number 
of books at home, either parent working in science, and parental educational 
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level), fewer or no differences occurred between accurately-high and under-
confident students and between over-confident and accurately-low students. 
The students’ self-concept beliefs and task-scores differed across the 
groups (by design given the method of forming the groups), but also 
empirically differed across all possible pairs of groups. For example, while 
the accurately-high and under-confident groups were both formed from 
students with ‘above-average task-scores’, the students in the accurately-
high group nevertheless exhibited a higher magnitude of task-scores. 
Considering the patterns of magnitudes and differences across the groups, 
the pattern of science intentions and attitudes appeared to broadly reflect the 
students’ self-concept beliefs (e.g. attitudes broadly descended across the 
accurately-high, then over-confident, then under-confident, then accurately-
low groups), while the pattern of background indicators appeared to reflect 
the students’ task-scores (e.g. accurately-high and under-confident students 
exhibited above-average and similar numbers of books at home). 
On a wider level, it would be easy to then infer that holding 
accurately-high beliefs was the most beneficial case, in terms of the 
students’ expressed attitudes and beliefs (which perhaps risks stating an 
intuitively obvious situation). The results nevertheless highlighted that over-
confident students generally reported lower attitudes than accurately-high 
students, despite over-confident students holding potentially motivational 
above-average self-concept beliefs. Nevertheless, the artificial nature of 
these conceptual (above-average/below-average) accuracy/bias groups 
ensures that any findings cannot be definitive. 
Perhaps problematically for science education, the above-average 
intentions held by the students with accurately-high beliefs (Table 11) may 
not necessarily entail strong aspirations towards science. As noted in the 
methods (Section 5.2), the OECD factor-scores were used for increased 
comparability against prior studies and national/international reports. While 
statistically sophisticated (OECD, 2009a), the factor-scores unavoidably 
draw attention away from the students’ actual agreement or disagreement to 
the various underlying items. Calculated only for illustration (without 
estimating any missing responses), students across England in PISA 2006 
on average ‘disagreed’ across the various items within the science intentions 
scale (mean (M) = 1.98; standard deviation (SD) = .80), each measured on a 
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four-category scale with (1) ‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’, (3) ‘agree’, 
and (4) ‘strongly agree’. The group of accurately-high students responded, 
on average, close to the mid-point of the agreement scale (M = 2.42; SD = 
.82), while the other groups responded lower within the range of 
disagreement and strong disagreement (over-confident M = 2.10, SD = .73; 
under-confident M = 1.69, SD = .65; accurately-low M = 1.60, SD = .60). 
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Table 11: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (above-average/below-average self-concept/task-score intersections) 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias -.92 .61 -.59 .74 .55 .70 .92 .67 
Intentions -.37 .86 -.49 .81 .55 .99 .17 .92 
Gender (1=boy) -.21 .97 -.19 .98 .19 .98 .13 .99 
Books at home .32 .88 -.37 .98 .39 .88 -.38 .97 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .09 1.07 -.17 .84 .18 1.12 -.17 .84 
Mothers’ education .11 .95 -.19 1.04 .19 .95 -.13 1.04 
Fathers’ education .07 .97 -.23 1.00 .24 .98 -.12 1.00 
Task-score (PV1) .61 .46 -.84 .61 .90 .59 -.77 .59 
Self-concept -.68 .59 -.86 .69 .82 .70 .60 .59 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.06 .75 -.68 .86 .70 .89 -.07 .84 
Interest (various areas) -.22 .84 -.48 1.07 .43 .76 .22 1.04 
Interest value -.32 .82 -.63 .86 .65 .87 .18 .88 
Utility value -.35 .87 -.47 .91 .49 .95 .22 .93 
Personal value -.30 .83 -.54 .88 .57 .96 .14 .87 
General value -.05 .83 -.51 .90 .50 1.00 -.03 .93 
Science activities -.21 .88 -.44 .91 .44 .94 .15 1.04 
School career preparation -.14 .91 -.45 .92 .46 .99 .07 .93 
School career information -.28 .92 -.26 1.00 .20 .97 .33 1.00 
Teaching: interaction -.23 .99 -.19 .97 .14 1.01 .25 .97 
Teaching: activities -.08 .83 -.27 1.07 .13 .90 .23 1.15 
Teaching: investigations -.34 .87 -.07 .97 -.02 .94 .42 1.13 
Teaching: applications -.21 .92 -.26 .97 .20 .99 .23 1.04 
Group size (N, %) 949 20.1% 1348 28.5% 1573 33.2% 863 18.2% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey.  
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Table 12: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (above-average/below-average self-concept/task-score intersections), group differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) U-L U-H U-O L-H L-O H-O 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .525 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .198 .008 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .034 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .967 
Books at home <.001 .136 <.001 .444 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .026 <.001 .271 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Mothers’ education <.001 .027 <.001 .367 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .036 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .089 <.001 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .665 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .052 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .579 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .291 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .145 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .272 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .171 .010 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .207 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .156 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .130 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .130 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .067 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .008 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .038 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .083 
Teaching: activities <.001 .037 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .113 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .057 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: applications <.001 .050 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Conceptual groups (regression-residual accuracy/bias groups) 
 
Students were also classified into conceptual (regression-residual) groups, 
through classifying the regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias (and 
applying ±.5 standard deviations as group boundaries; Section 6.3); 
specifically, this process formed under-confident (28.9% of the considered 
students), accurately-evaluating (44.3%), and over-confident (26.8%) 
groups. Such groups have been considered in prior studies (Bouffard, 
Vezeau, Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; Narciss, 
Koerndle, & Dresel, 2011), and were directly considered in preliminary 
analysis. For greater insight, and to aid comparability across the various 
other groups and clusters of students, the accurately-evaluating students 
were then divided into those with above-average task-scores (23.6% of the 
overall number of considered students, i.e. those with accurately-high 
confidence) or below-average task-scores (20.6%, i.e. those with accurately-
low confidence). 
Cross-tabulating the regression-residual accuracy/bias groups and 
the previous ‘above-average/below-average intersection’ accuracy/bias 
groups highlighted that: the regression-residual under-confident group was 
mainly formed from those from the ‘under-confident’ (51.8%) and 
‘accurately-low’ (46.5%) above-average/below-average groups; the 
regression-residual accurately-low group was mainly formed from the 
‘accurately-low’ (71.6%) then the ‘over-confident’ (28.4%) groups; the 
regression-residual accurately-high group was mainly formed from the 
‘accurately-high’ (78.5%) then the ‘under-confident’ (21.5%) groups; and 
the regression-residual over-confident group was mainly formed from those 
from the ‘over-confident’ (46.1%) and ‘accurately-high’ (52.8%) groups. 
Different grouping approaches unavoidably entail different classifications 
but there was some general similarity across both approaches, especially for 
the accurately-low and accurately-high groups. 
The means per group and differences across groups are summarised 
in Table 13 and Table 14. Following the nature of regression-residuals 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1984), under-confident, accurately-evaluating, and over-
confident regression-residual groups would exhibit, on average, similar 
task-scores but different magnitudes of self-concept beliefs (i.e. their 
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degrees of bias). Accordingly, the under-confident and over-confident 
groups exhibited similar task-scores. The accurately-low and accurately-
high groups exhibited different task-scores only through being sub-groups 
of the wider ‘accurately-evaluating’ regression-residual group (which would 
otherwise exhibit average task-scores, similar to the under-confident and 
over-confident groups). 
Considering the students’ background, there were only differences 
between the under-confident and over-confident groups for gender (the 
under-confident group had a below-average proportion of boys, while the 
over-confident group had an above-average proportion) and level of fathers’ 
education (under-confident students reported slightly below-average levels, 
while over-confident students reported slightly above-average levels); there 
were no differences for the number of books at home, parents working 
within science, and the level of mothers’ education. There were no 
differences in parental education across the accurately-high and over-
confident groups. 
For the students’ self-concept beliefs, and their other attitudes 
including their science intentions and its key predictors, under-confident 
students generally exhibited moderately below-average magnitudes, 
accurately-low students exhibited slightly below-average magnitudes, 
accurately-high students exhibited slightly above-average magnitudes, and 
over-confident students exhibited moderately above-average magnitudes. 
Fundamentally (Table 13 / Table 14), 19.9% of the variance in science 
intentions followed from differences across the groups, highlighting a 
moderate effect. 
On a wider level, considering these conceptual regression-residual 
accuracy/bias groups (and contrary to the results from the conceptual above-
average/below-average accuracy/bias groups), it would be possible to infer 
that holding over-confident beliefs would be beneficial (rather than holding 
accurate beliefs), given that these students generally expressed the highest 
attitudes towards science (even when sub-dividing the accurately-evaluating 
students into those with accurately-low and those with accurately-high self-
concept beliefs). Once again, however, the artificial nature of these 
regression-residual accuracy/bias groups still ensured that any findings 
cannot be definitive. Additionally, the above-average science intentions held 
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by the over-confident students did not necessarily entail positive aspirations. 
For illustration (without estimating missing responses), for these regression-
residual groups, over-confident students responded close to the mid-point of 
the underlying agreement scale (M = 2.43; SD = .84), while the other groups 
responded within the range of disagreement and strong disagreement 
(accurately-high M = 2.16, SD = .75; accurately-low M = 1.82, SD = .61; 
under-confident M = 1.53, SD = .61). 
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Table 13: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (regression-residual accuracy/bias groups, ±.5 SD boundaries) 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias -1.14 .62 .02 .28 -.01 .28 1.19 .60 
Intentions -.59 .82 -.19 .81 .23 .93 .56 1.02 
Gender (1=boy) -.24 .97 -.08 1.00 .04 1.00 .24 .97 
Books at home .03 .98 -.37 .98 .36 .87 -.02 1.02 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .01 1.01 -.17 .84 .12 1.09 .01 1.00 
Mothers’ education -.01 1.01 -.15 1.02 .14 .94 .03 1.04 
Fathers’ education -.06 1.01 -.19 .98 .18 .95 .08 1.05 
Task-score (PV1) .05 .90 -.78 .57 .77 .55 -.01 1.12 
Self-concept -1.08 .70 -.26 .32 .25 .35 1.12 .70 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.41 .94 -.42 .78 .36 .81 .47 1.04 
Interest (various areas) -.52 1.02 -.13 .97 .24 .71 .44 .97 
Interest value -.65 .89 -.23 .76 .29 .80 .61 .99 
Utility value -.58 .91 -.16 .86 .18 .88 .56 .97 
Personal value -.55 .90 -.25 .81 .21 .87 .58 .99 
General value -.32 .93 -.34 .85 .24 .88 .41 1.08 
Science activities -.43 .87 -.16 .96 .17 .90 .43 1.04 
School career preparation -.38 .98 -.21 .85 .19 .92 .41 1.03 
School career information -.38 1.01 -.03 .92 -.03 .91 .43 .98 
Teaching: interaction -.34 1.02 .00 .87 .02 .94 .32 1.04 
Teaching: activities -.27 1.00 -.08 .97 .04 .84 .28 1.09 
Teaching: investigations -.34 .90 .09 .97 -.14 .90 .35 1.09 
Teaching: applications -.35 .96 -.07 .93 .04 .91 .36 1.07 
Group size (N, %) 1368 28.9% 976 20.6% 1119 23.6% 1270 26.8% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table 14: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (regression-residual accuracy/bias groups, ±.5 SD boundaries), group differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) U-L U-H U-O L-H L-O H-O 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .756 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .199 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .033 .001 <.001 <.001 .026 <.001 <.001 
Books at home <.001 .061 <.001 <.001 .760 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .010 <.001 .029 1.000 <.001 <.001 .025 
Mothers’ education <.001 .009 .004 .002 1.000 <.001 <.001 .079 
Fathers’ education <.001 .018 .010 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 .121 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .275 <.001 <.001 .252 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .686 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .176 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .017 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .146 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .246 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .190 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .198 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .111 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .114 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .103 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .090 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .062 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: activities <.001 .043 <.001 <.001 <.001 .038 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .072 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: applications <.001 .071 <.001 <.001 <.001 .042 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Section 8.1.2: Accuracy/bias clusters 
 
Different methods of grouping students entailed different ideas of ‘under-
confidence’ and ‘over-confidence’. For example, applying the intersection 
between below-average and above-average self-concept and task-scores 
assumed and entailed that under-confident students would exhibit above-
average task-scores and below-average self-concept beliefs; applying 
regression-residuals as an indicator of accuracy/bias assumed and entailed 
that under-confident students would exhibit average task-scores and below-
average self-concept beliefs. Both approaches were valid in covering the 
underlying ideas of under-confidence (lower confidence than attainment) 
and over-confidence (higher confidence than attainment) applied as an 
analytical perspective, but relied on particular conceptual definitions that 
varied per approach. Neither approach could comprehensively consider the 
overall prevalence of under-confidence or over-confidence across England. 
Fundamentally, while various conceptual accuracy/bias groups could be 
formed, it remained unclear whether such groups would be naturally 
observed or would naturally emerge from data. 
For greater insight, latent-profile analysis (Section 6.3) was 
undertaken using the students’ reported self-concept beliefs and task-scores 
(the first plausible-value). This identified clusters of students, each with 
distinct magnitudes of self-concept beliefs and task-scores; implicitly, each 
cluster then had a distinct magnitude of accuracy/bias. The clusters could 
then highlight any particular tendencies of accuracy/bias and their 
prevalence (i.e. the cluster sizes). 
Essentially, the clusters were indirectly formed on the accuracy/bias 
of the students’ self-concept beliefs, but without directly calculating an 
indicator of accuracy/bias and/or forming artificial groups. The latent-
profile analysis therefore applied accuracy/bias as an analytical perspective 
while also testing the analytical perspective itself. One cluster (i.e. the 
whole sample considered together) might fit the data better than numerous 
clusters, which would highlight that considering accuracy/bias would be less 
meaningful. 
Operationally, multiple-imputation was not supported by the latent-
profile analysis software (Vermunt & Magidson, 2013), so only the first 
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plausible-value was considered in the final models. Preliminary analysis 
highlighted that similar cluster profiles and sizes resulted from modelling 
self-concept with each of the five plausible-values (i.e. the different 
plausible-values were essentially interchangeable). Additionally, 
preliminary latent-profile analysis with all five plausible-values (and not 
including self-concept beliefs), and with all five plausible-values and self-
concept beliefs, resulted in similar cluster profiles and proportions. 
Conceptually, modelling all five plausible-values together with students’ 
self-concept beliefs did not form groups based on the accuracy/bias of 
students’ beliefs: the differences between the five plausible-values 
themselves were given equal relevance to the differences between the 
plausible-values and the students’ self-concept beliefs; empirically, there 
were more indicators of task-score than self-concept, and the clusters were 
then essentially formed by considering task-score. As a further 
methodological check, preliminary analysis produced similar results (i.e. 
cluster profiles and proportions) regardless of how the students’ self-concept 
beliefs and task-scores were operationalised (e.g. using the OECD factors, 
using re-calculated simple-average factors, etc.). As before, the final 
analysis used the OECD factors, to enhance contextualisation against any 
existing OECD material and related research studies. 
 
 
Identifying the number of clusters to consider 
 
Modelling one to ten clusters highlighted relatively linear improvements in 
the model information criteria (AIC, BIC, and sample-size adjusted BIC) as 
the number of modelled clusters increased (Table 15); lower information 
criteria represented better fit to the data. There was, therefore, no clearly 
‘ideal’ number of clusters to consider. Nevertheless, the improvements in 
the information criteria highlighted that considering multiple clusters rather 
than one single cluster (i.e. the entire sample) was indeed plausible (and 
empirically validated). 
Different insights may be gained from considering different numbers 
of clusters. However, higher numbers of modelled clusters may entail 
numerous smaller clusters, which may be too small for reliable predictive 
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modelling. Higher numbers of clusters also become increasingly difficult to 
compare and briefly summarise (i.e. the number of comparisons across pairs 
of clusters increases substantially). The various cluster sizes and profiles, 
and changes across the different numbers of clusters being modelled, were 
then considered. 
The automatic labelling of clusters (i.e. A, B, C, etc.) broadly 
followed their descending size order (although with some exceptions for 
some of the smaller clusters). Some clusters of students naturally emerged 
regardless of the numbers of clusters being modelled. For example, cluster 
B from the three-cluster model broadly emerged as a distinct cluster in the 
subsequent models that identified four to ten clusters, for example being 
classified as cluster C in the four-cluster model and cluster B in the five-
cluster model. Accordingly, considering the four-cluster model, cluster C 
then appeared as a distinct cluster in all the subsequent models (i.e. when 
identifying five to ten clusters), such as emerging as cluster B in the five-
cluster model. Considering the five-cluster model, clusters B, C, and E then 
appeared as distinct clusters in all the subsequent models; cluster D from the 
five-cluster model also broadly emerged in models with eight, nine, and ten 
clusters (with the addition of a small number of other students). Considering 
subsequent changes from five clusters to six, from six to seven, and so on, 
generally involved changes to two clusters each time, although the changes 
were not necessarily hierarchical. Clusters could reform and did not always 
involve one cluster simply dividing into two further clusters. For example, 
cluster A from the five-cluster model mainly divided into two clusters (A 
and B) in the six-cluster model, but cluster A in the six-cluster model also 
included students from cluster D from the five-cluster model. 
Accordingly, and considered broadly, four or five clusters appeared 
to be plausible foci for analysis, balancing interpretability, complexity, and 
the number of students per cluster (which facilitated reliable predictive 
modelling per cluster). More clusters would provide greater insight and fit 
to the data, but would be far less practical to interpret. One of the four 
clusters from the four-cluster model, and three of the five clusters from the 
five-cluster model, emerged again when identifying higher numbers of 
clusters, highlighting that these appeared to be key groups to consider. Four 
clusters matched the number of conceptual groups, while five clusters 
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potentially provided greater insight and empirical fit to the data. Ultimately, 
for brevity and consistency across all areas of the analysis, and to facilitate 
predictive modelling via larger cluster sizes (Section 9), four clusters were 
focused on (five clusters were considered in preliminary analysis and 
provided similar insights; see Appendix 9 for illustration). 
 
 
Accuracy/bias clusters from latent-profile analysis (four clusters) 
 
The clusters from the four-cluster model had varying sizes (Table 16), from 
cluster A (55.9% of the considered students), B (17.8%), C (15.9%), to D 
(10.4%). Tabulating the clusters against the conceptual above-
average/below-average accuracy/bias groups in order to help contextualise 
the clusters highlighted that cluster A, the largest cluster, was mainly 
composed of ‘accurately-low’ students (31.1% of the cluster) then ‘under-
confident’ students (30.9%). Cluster B was mainly composed of ‘accurately-
low’ students (62.5%) then ‘over-confident’ students (20.6%). Cluster C 
was mainly composed of ‘accurately-high’ students (65.5%) then ‘over-
confident’ students (34.5%), while cluster D was primarily composed of 
‘accurately-high’ students (95.7%). 
Alternately, tabulating the clusters against the conceptual regression-
residual groups highlighted that cluster A was mainly composed of 
‘accurately-low’ (33.5%), ‘accurately-high’ (30.7%), and ‘under-confident’ 
students (30.6%). Cluster B was mainly composed of ‘under-confident’ 
students (66.3%). Cluster C was mainly composed of ‘over-confident’ 
students (60.9%) then ‘accurately-high’ students (39.1%), while cluster D 
was almost exclusively composed of ‘over-confident’ students (97.8%). 
Means per cluster are summarised in Table 16 and differences 
across the clusters are summarised in Table 17. The students’ self-concept 
beliefs, task-scores, and accuracy/bias differed across all pairs of clusters (as 
expected, given the process). Students in cluster B reported the lowest self-
concept beliefs and task-scores, but exhibited under-confidence via the 
regression-residual indicator (reflecting relative comparisons against other 
students, given the student’s own task-scores). Conversely, students in 
cluster D reported the highest self-concept beliefs and task-scores, but 
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exhibited relative over-confidence. Accordingly, given the constraints of the 
PISA design, it was difficult to definitively characterise each cluster in 
terms of their accuracy/bias: the regression-residual indicator reflected 
relative accuracy/bias, not necessarily absolute or self-reflective 
accuracy/bias. 
The students’ reported attitudes and motivational beliefs (Table 16) 
generally differed across all pairs of clusters (Table 17), with small 
numbers of exceptions. The students’ reported attitudes and beliefs appeared 
broadly proportional to their self-concept beliefs and task-scores when 
compared across the clusters. For example, those in cluster B (with the 
lowest self-concept and task-scores) consistently reported the lowest 
attitudes and those in cluster D (with the highest self-concept and task-
scores) consistently reported the highest, including for their science 
intentions. Essentially, students in cluster B exhibited moderately below-
average attitudes, students in cluster A exhibited slightly below-average 
attitudes, students in cluster C exhibited moderately above-average 
attitudes, and students in cluster D exhibited highly above-average attitudes. 
The students’ background and other reported characteristics also varied 
across the clusters, for example with above-average proportions of boys 
being present in cluster D (with the highest attitudes and beliefs), who also 
reported the highest levels of books at home, parental education, and parents 
working within science. 
Fundamentally, the students’ reported science intentions, and key 
predictors, differed in reported magnitude across all pairs of clusters; 20.1% 
of the variance in intentions could be attributed to the differences across the 
clusters (Table 17). For further illustration (without estimating missing 
responses), considering science intentions contextualised against the 
original agreement-scale with (1) ‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’, (3) 
‘agree’, and (4) ‘strongly agree’, students in cluster B responded the lowest, 
on average between strong disagreement and disagreement (M = 1.56, SD = 
.75), while students in cluster A responded on average with disagreement 
(M = 1.87, SD = .66). Students in cluster C responded slightly below the 
mid-point of the scale (M = 2.31, SD = .73), while students in cluster D held 
positive intentions, closer to agreement (M = 2.82, SD = .84). 
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As a wider point, and somewhat curiously, cluster C was formed 
from students who exhibited essentially the same self-concept beliefs, with 
little to no variance in self-concept within the cluster (Table 16). 
Considering the frequencies of response-categories for the items within the 
self-concept factor, students in cluster C primarily ‘agreed’ with all the 
items (on the four-category scale with ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, 
‘agree’, and ‘strongly agree). It was unclear whether this was a particular 
acquiescence or any other response tendency (e.g. indifference, lower self-
reflection, or rushed answers). The self-concept items were the last 
questions on the PISA 2006 student questionnaire, but the students’ 
responses to the preceding questions showed more variation (i.e. and did not 
necessarily suggest simply ‘agreeing’ due to fatigue or having to respond 
swiftly due to running out of assessment time, unless this only became an 
issue for the final questionnaire page). A pattern of responses may not 
necessarily entail that the students were somehow answering 
‘problematically’ or were somehow at fault; the four-category response 
scale may not have been sufficient to distinguish differences in the students’ 
confidence, for example, compared to six-category or other response scales. 
Nevertheless, the clusters may have reflected tendencies other than 
accuracy/bias. 
As another wider point, the clusters were formed via latent-profile 
analysis, implicitly considering accuracy/bias via forming clusters on the 
students’ self-concept beliefs and task-scores. Further insight could 
potentially be gained through considering what items/factors predicted 
membership of the different clusters, other than self-concept beliefs and 
task-scores. Such predictors may help explain why particular tendencies 
towards accuracy/bias may have arisen, although the predictors would also 
help explain the particular cluster magnitudes of self-concept beliefs and 
task-scores. It may then be harder to practically interpret the results, and 
separate antecedents of accuracy/bias from antecedents of self-concept 
beliefs or task-scores. Fundamentally, given the focus on students’ 
intentions, such areas would only offer further contextualisation and are 
outside the scope of the current research questions; nevertheless, this may 
offer further potential for future research. 
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Table 15: PISA (England) 2006: accuracy/bias clusters, model information criteria  
 
Clusters BIC AIC SA-BIC 
1 69884.03 69858.18 69871.32 
2 69363.75 69305.59 69335.15 
3 67090.22 66999.75 67045.73 
4 66213.12 66090.34 66152.75 
5 64468.65 64313.55 64392.38 
6 63833.33 63645.93 63741.18 
7 61948.03 61728.31 61839.99 
8 58768.84 58516.81 58644.91 
9 57615.08 57330.73 57475.26 
10 55006.01 54689.36 54850.31 
Notes: The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SA-BIC) from the respective 
solutions for the numbers of clusters are reported. Lower information criteria reflected better fit to the data. 
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Table 16: PISA (England) 2006: accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters)  
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias -.24 .49 -.65 1.53 .65 .36 1.45 .59 
Intentions -.13 .86 -.56 .97 .43 .89 1.02 1.00 
Gender (1=boy) -.08 1.00 -.17 .98 .14 .99 .41 .92 
Books at home .01 .98 -.34 1.00 .13 1.00 .44 .90 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.01 .99 -.16 .86 .04 1.03 .26 1.15 
Mothers’ education -.01 .98 -.13 1.07 .04 1.00 .27 .99 
Fathers’ education -.04 .98 -.15 1.06 .10 .98 .35 1.05 
Task-score (PV1) .04 .80 -.88 .89 .30 1.01 1.08 .66 
Self-concept -.23 .40 -.93 1.36 .71 .00 1.75 .53 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.12 .77 -.70 .98 .48 .95 1.17 .92 
Interest (various areas) -.04 .83 -.60 1.28 .34 .87 .76 .82 
Interest value -.11 .79 -.72 1.09 .43 .80 1.20 .88 
Utility value -.12 .86 -.53 1.09 .38 .90 .93 .95 
Personal value -.12 .83 -.59 1.06 .37 .84 1.11 .96 
General value -.09 .87 -.50 1.02 .26 .94 .98 1.02 
Science activities -.10 .91 -.42 1.03 .31 .94 .83 .94 
School career preparation -.08 .88 -.48 1.08 .27 .94 .89 .96 
School career information -.08 .92 -.27 1.14 .26 .94 .52 1.04 
Teaching: interaction -.04 .92 -.23 1.16 .13 .95 .37 1.13 
Teaching: activities -.04 .91 -.21 1.25 .13 .98 .29 1.00 
Teaching: investigations -.11 .94 .02 1.13 .22 1.01 .09 1.01 
Teaching: applications -.07 .91 -.26 1.15 .17 1.00 .48 1.09 
Cluster size (N, %) 2644 55.9% 841 17.8% 754 15.9% 494 10.4% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table 17: PISA (England) 2006: accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters), cluster differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .391 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .201 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .029 .194 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Books at home <.001 .043 <.001 .026 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .012 .002 1.000 <.001 .001 <.001 .002 
Mothers’ education <.001 .011 .017 1.000 <.001 .004 <.001 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .019 .049 .004 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .280 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .563 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .273 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .142 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .275 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .167 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .218 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .158 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .123 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .135 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .055 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .027 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: activities <.001 .020 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .028 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .015 .006 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 .128 
Teaching: applications <.001 .042 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Section 8.1.3: Intention/attitude clusters 
 
For students in England in PISA 2006, science intentions were most 
strongly predicted by their perceived utility of science, interest/enjoyment of 
science, personal value of science, and their science self-concept beliefs 
(Section 7). These findings informed further analysis to provide a 
complementary perspective onto the prevalence of confidence 
accuracy/biases: latent-profile analysis was undertaken using the students’ 
science intentions and these key predictive factors (perceived utility of 
science, interest/enjoyment of science, personal value of science, and 
science self-concept beliefs) to reveal further (intention/attitude) clusters of 
students. The results could then consider whether the students’ task-scores, 
and hence their self-concept accuracy/bias, differed across any emerging 
clusters. Essentially, this explored whether confidence accuracy/bias 
actually differed across clusters of students who might be of particular 
contextual relevance to science education. 
Additionally, the intention/attitude cluster profiles and proportions 
could help quantify the proportions of students likely to aspire towards 
science. Previous research has highlighted that students in England have, on 
average, generally considered science to be fairly interesting and relevant 
for careers, but have not necessarily aspired towards science (DeWitt, 
Archer, & Osborne, 2014; Jenkins & Nelson, 2005). However, the 
appearance of positive (or negative) attitudes may be misleading if the 
sample-average results from a small cluster of students with high attitudes 
while the majority of students hold lower attitudes, or from any other 
combinations of clusters. 
 
 
Identifying the number of clusters to consider 
 
Modelling one to ten clusters revealed improvements in the model 
information criteria as the number of modelled clusters increased, but 
highlighted diminishing improvements after five clusters (Table 18). 
Tabulations of the various clusters highlighted that some consistent clusters 
were increasingly revealed, regardless of the number of clusters modelled. 
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Four clusters were considered for contextualisation and comparability with 
the earlier results from the conceptual accuracy/bias groups and 
accuracy/bias clusters. However, considering five clusters (or more) would 
be beneficial in future research. Preliminary analysis essentially highlighted 
that the four-cluster and five-cluster solutions revealed similar profiles and 
proportions for the clusters exhibiting the lowest and highest attitudes, while 
the five-cluster solution provided greater differentiation of those with 
moderately positive/negative attitudes (Appendix 9 shows the five-cluster 
solution). For the purposes of addressing the research question, 
accuracy/bias differed across both the four-cluster and the five-cluster 
intention/attitude cluster solutions. 
 
 
Intention/attitude clusters from latent-profile analysis (four clusters) 
 
The intention/attitude clusters from the four-cluster model had varying sizes 
(Table 19), from cluster A (41.5% of the considered students), B (24.4%), C 
(22.3%), to D (11.7%). 
Tabulating the clusters against the conceptual above-average/below-
average accuracy/bias groups highlighted that cluster A was broadly 
composed of all groups. Cluster B was mainly composed of ‘accurately-
high’ students (59.9%) then ‘over-confident’ students (24.3%). Cluster C 
was mainly composed of ‘accurately-low’ students (48.8%) then ‘under-
confident’ students (28.5%). Cluster D was mainly composed of 
‘accurately-high’ students (65.0%) and ‘over-confident’ students (20.8%). 
Tabulating the clusters against the conceptual regression-residual 
groups highlighted that cluster A was mainly composed of ‘under-confident’ 
students (34.2%), ‘accurately-low’ (28.6%), and ‘accurately-high’ (23.0%) 
students. Cluster B was mainly composed of ‘over-confident’ (46.9%) and 
‘accurately-high’ students (34.0%). Cluster C was mainly composed of 
‘under-confident’ (55.1%) then ‘accurately-low’ students (21.4%). Cluster 
D was mainly composed of ‘over-confident’ (60.3%) then ‘accurately-high’ 
students (24.4%). 
The intention/attitude clusters did not clearly correspond to the 
earlier accuracy/bias clusters. The majority of the students from the 
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accuracy/bias cluster A (54.0% of the cluster) were assigned to the 
intention/attitude cluster A. The accuracy/bias cluster B was mostly 
assigned across intention/attitude cluster C (48.7%) and cluster A (34.5%). 
The accuracy/bias cluster C was mostly assigned across intention/attitude 
cluster B (47.1%) and cluster A (28.3%). The accuracy/bias cluster D was 
mostly assigned across intention/attitude cluster B (48.0%) and cluster D 
(42.7%). 
Considered broadly, the students’ reported attitudes and motivational 
beliefs significantly differed across all potential pairs of clusters (Table 19 / 
Table 20). This was expected, given that latent-profile analysis would likely 
ensure that factor averages differ across any emerging clusters for the 
modelled factors. Nevertheless, the students’ other beliefs also similarly 
varied across the clusters, while their background characteristics also varied 
to some extent. Notably, the students’ task-scores, and the magnitudes of 
regression-residual indicators of self-concept accuracy/bias, also differed 
across all pairs of groups. 
Essentially, the students’ reported science attitudes and beliefs were 
moderately to highly below-average in cluster C (22.3% of the modelled 
students), slightly below-average in cluster A (41.5%), moderately above-
average in cluster B (24.4%), and highly above-average in cluster D 
(11.7%). Students’ task-scores were observed with a similar pattern, 
increasing across clusters C, A, B, to D. Similarly, the students’ self-concept 
accuracy/bias progressed from relative (regression-residual) under-
confidence to relative over-confidence across clusters C, A, B, to D. 
For further illustration (without estimating missing responses), 
considering science intentions contextualised against the original 
agreement-scale with (1) ‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’, (3) ‘agree’, and 
(4) ‘strongly agree’, students in cluster C responded on average with strong 
(and rather clearly unvarying) disagreement (M = 1.00, SD = .00). Students 
in cluster A responded with disagreement (M = 1.86, SD = .37), while 
students in cluster B responded around the scale mid-point (M = 2.54, SD = 
.56). Students in cluster D responded positively with agreement (M = 3.11, 
SD = .68). However, as above, cluster D was the smallest with only 11.7% 
of the considered students. 
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These intention/attitude clusters (Table 19 / Table 20) and the 
previous accuracy/bias clusters (Table 16 / Table 17) varied in their 
proportions, and cross-tabulating the intention/attitude and the accuracy/bias 
clusters revealed less correspondence. However, a common tendency was 
nevertheless observed across both sets of clusters. A minority of students 
(i.e. 10.4% embodying accuracy/bias cluster D in Table 16, and 11.7% 
embodying intention/attitude cluster D in Table 19) emerged with highly 
above-average self-concept and task-scores (with relative ‘over-confidence’ 
from the regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias), and with highly 
above-average attitudes and beliefs regarding science. Similarly, a greater 
proportion of students were observed with less-extreme but below-average 
self-concept, attitudes, and task-scores, and apparent relative ‘under-
confidence’ (i.e. cluster A in Table 16 and in Table 19). 
Considered briefly for further insight (see Appendix 9 for result 
tables), the five-cluster solution similarly highlighted that students’ task-
scores, and the associated regression-residual indicators of accuracy/bias in 
self-concept beliefs, differed across all pairs of clusters; their magnitudes 
broadly corresponded to their reported attitudes and beliefs, as seen in the 
four-cluster solution. In the five-cluster solution, the students’ reported 
intentions, attitudes, and motivational beliefs were moderately to highly 
below-average in cluster B (22.4% of the modelled students), slightly to 
moderately below-average in cluster D (16.7%), slightly below-average in 
cluster C (21.1%), slightly to moderately above-average in cluster A 
(28.2%), and highly above-average in cluster E (11.5%). For further 
illustration (without estimating missing responses), considering science 
intentions on the original agreement-scale, students in cluster B responded 
with unvarying strong disagreement (M = 1.00, SD = .00). Students in 
cluster D responded with disagreement (M = 1.49, SD = .20), as did students 
in cluster C (M = 2.00, SD = .00). Students in cluster A responded around 
the mid-point (M = 2.57, SD = .50), while students in cluster E responded 
positively with agreement (M = 3.14, SD = .66). Essentially, the same 
inferences could be drawn from the four-cluster and the five-cluster 
solutions. 
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Table 18: PISA (England) 2006: intention/attitude clusters, model information criteria  
 
Clusters BIC AIC SA-BIC 
1 63421.47 63356.97 63389.70 
2 53764.20 53628.74 53697.47 
3 47855.97 47649.56 47754.28 
4 44339.85 44062.48 44203.21 
5 39861.06 39512.74 39689.47 
6 38411.80 37992.52 38205.26 
7 37509.57 37019.34 37268.07 
8 35511.55 34950.37 35235.10 
9 34954.52 34322.38 34643.12 
10 33711.89 33008.80 33365.53 
Notes: The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SA-BIC) from the respective 
solutions for the numbers of clusters are reported. Lower information criteria reflected better fit to the data. 
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Table 19: PISA (England) 2006: intention/attitude clusters (four clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias -.21 .75 .57 .79 -.67 1.02 .84 .94 
Intentions -.10 .48 .73 .65 -1.33 .00 1.36 .78 
Gender (1=boy) -.06 1.00 .19 .98 -.17 .98 .03 1.00 
Books at home -.05 .98 .19 .96 -.16 1.04 .18 .97 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.08 .93 .10 1.07 -.07 .94 .18 1.12 
Mothers’ education -.04 .99 .08 1.01 -.05 1.02 .09 1.04 
Fathers’ education -.06 .98 .18 .98 -.16 1.01 .19 1.06 
Task-score (PV1) -.11 .92 .35 1.00 -.29 .89 .53 .97 
Self-concept -.25 .69 .66 .75 -.75 .99 .97 .94 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.19 .82 .45 .93 -.44 1.01 .70 .96 
Interest (various areas) -.10 .72 .52 .66 -.80 1.17 .83 .84 
Interest value -.25 .69 .71 .69 -.85 .87 1.07 .90 
Utility value -.31 .57 .51 .55 -.91 .84 1.77 .00 
Personal value -.31 .61 .69 .73 -.81 .85 1.23 .87 
General value -.27 .79 .48 .95 -.44 .94 .84 1.02 
Science activities -.21 .87 .56 .87 -.61 .83 .76 .94 
School career preparation -.19 .83 .38 .90 -.49 1.02 .87 1.00 
School career information -.10 .88 .32 .89 -.51 1.07 .63 1.00 
Teaching: interaction -.06 .93 .22 .98 -.31 1.05 .29 1.06 
Teaching: activities -.09 .93 .24 .98 -.25 1.09 .28 .98 
Teaching: investigations -.06 .97 .21 1.04 -.26 .94 .16 1.05 
Teaching: applications -.11 .89 .27 .98 -.35 1.05 .46 1.04 
Cluster size (N, %) 1941 41.5% 1143 24.4% 1044 22.3% 549 11.7% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey; the clusters were formed on these factors. 
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Table 20: PISA (England) 2006: intention/attitude clusters (four clusters), cluster differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .282 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .733 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .017 <.001 .022 .367 <.001 .010 .001 
Books at home <.001 .019 <.001 .028 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .010 <.001 1.000 <.001 .001 .840 <.001 
Mothers’ education .001 .003 .010 1.000 .079 .018 1.000 .082 
Fathers’ education <.001 .019 <.001 .085 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .088 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .358 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .166 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .291 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .435 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .643 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .473 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .210 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .244 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .188 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .131 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .043 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Teaching: activities <.001 .041 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .030 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Teaching: applications <.001 .075 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey; the clusters were formed on these factors. 
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Section 8.2: Results: 2014/2015 survey 
 
The students surveyed in 2014/2015 were classified via conceptual 
accuracy/bias groups (Section 8.2.1) and via accuracy/bias clusters from 
latent-profile analysis (Section 8.2.2). As with PISA 2006, additional latent-
profile analysis was used to form clusters based on students’ intentions and 
key predictors (identified in Section 7), and differences in the cluster 




Section 8.2.1: Accuracy/bias groups 
 
Conceptual groups (difference-score groups with accurately-high and 
accurately-low groups) 
 
Following traditional approaches (Gonida & Leondari, 2011), the 
difference-score indicator of task-level accuracy/bias was used to initially 
classify students as under-confident, accurate, or over-confident, relative to 
their academic year (i.e. the indicator was standardised as a z-score per year, 
and ±.5 standard deviations were used as the group boundaries, as described 
in Section 5.3). Cross-tabulating these difference-score accuracy/bias 
groups (under-confident, accurate, and over-confident, relative to the 
students’ academic year) with indicators of performance (below-average and 
above-average task-scores, again relative to the students’ academic year) 
highlighted that the majority of under-confident students exhibited above-
average task-scores while the majority of over-confident students exhibited 
below-average task-scores. For additional insight, the accurate group was 
then divided into those with above-average or below-average task-scores, 
relative to their year, while the under-confident and over-confident groups 
were unchanged (Table 21). These groups then broadly matched the idea 
underlying the conceptual (above-average/below-average) accuracy/bias 
groups that were considered in PISA 2006, but directly considered self-
reflective accuracy/bias via the difference-score indicator. 
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Various differences in attitudes and beliefs were observed across the 
groups; means for the groups are presented in Table 21 and differences 
across groups are presented in Table 22. For example, under-confident 
students reported similar interest, utility, personal, and cost values and 
norms/influences from their parents, to those with accurately-low beliefs, 
despite reporting higher current science grades. Those with accurately-high 
beliefs reported the highest attitudes and intentions (above-average, relative 
to their academic year), significantly higher than over-confident students. 
The students’ reported background characteristics also varied across the 
groups, for example with above-average proportions of boys being present 
in the accurately-high group, roughly average proportions of boys in the 
over-confident groups, and similar and below-average proportions of boys 
in the under-confident and accurately-low groups. 
Students’ science intentions differed across all potential pairs of 
groups, except for the under-confident and over-confident groups. 
Fundamentally, however, only a small amount of variance in students’ 
science intentions (7.6%) could be attributed to the differences across the 
groups. For illustration, considering the students’ science intentions on the 
original agreement-scales from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (6) ‘strongly 
agree’, accurately-high students essentially ‘slightly agreed’ (M = 4.16, SD 
= 1.32) , under-confident and over-confident students similarly reported 
around the mid-point (under-confident M = 3.33, SD = 1.49, and over-
confident M = 3.50, SD = 1.49, between ‘slightly agree’ and ‘slightly 
disagree’), while accurately-low students essentially ‘slightly disagreed’ (M 
= 3.00, SD = 1.36). 
 
 
Page 205 of 361 
Table 21: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): difference-score accuracy/bias groups with accurately-low/accurately-high groups 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions -.10 1.00 -.34 .91 .47 .91 .02 1.00 
Task-score .67 .69 -.62 .49 .82 .47 -.80 .87 
Task-confidence -.42 .83 -.75 .62 .92 .64 .32 .94 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) -1.12 .52 .01 .27 -.06 .27 1.17 .67 
Task sensitivity -.38 .90 -.62 .95 .77 .44 .30 .97 
Task specificity .52 .83 .52 .69 -.56 .94 -.50 .92 
Task simple-matching -.18 .94 .01 .85 .62 .71 -.26 1.13 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.89 .71 -.50 .48 .58 .51 .86 .80 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.30 .97 -.21 .97 .37 .81 .18 1.04 
Gender (1=boy) -.23 1.01 -.22 1.01 .43 .82 .07 .99 
Ethnicity (White) .01 1.00 .27 .87 -.23 1.02 -.02 1.02 
Ethnicity (Black) .01 1.06 -.04 .88 .07 1.21 -.04 .82 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) -.05 .79 -.05 .79 .17 1.47 -.03 .90 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .01 .99 -.26 .77 .14 1.06 .05 1.05 
Ethnicity (mixed) -.01 .98 -.02 .95 .04 1.09 -.01 .99 
Ethnicity (other) -.05 .71 .02 1.12 .05 1.17 .00 1.05 
Books at home .12 .95 -.27 .98 .38 .89 -.20 1.04 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .02 1.02 -.11 .91 .08 1.06 .00 .99 
Mothers’ education .01 1.00 -.31 .86 .37 1.01 -.04 1.01 
Fathers’ education -.02 1.01 -.34 .86 .37 1.01 .00 .99 
Current grade .08 .96 -.48 .85 .61 .88 -.17 1.00 
Self-concept -.22 .96 -.40 .90 .63 .77 .06 1.03 
Self-efficacy -.03 .99 -.45 .90 .70 .69 -.13 1.01 
Interest value -.21 1.02 -.32 .92 .57 .81 .04 1.00 
Utility value -.17 1.04 -.26 .96 .48 .81 .02 .99 
Personal value -.22 .99 -.28 .91 .48 .89 .07 1.02 
Cost value (absence of) .00 .99 .00 1.01 .16 .96 -.10 1.02 
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 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Orientation: mastery -.03 1.01 -.26 .98 .42 .78 -.08 1.07 
Orientation: performance -.10 1.00 -.24 1.00 .40 .85 -.02 1.03 
Perceived control -.09 .98 -.13 1.04 .41 .71 -.09 1.10 
Perceived control (exams) -.10 .98 -.26 .98 .53 .82 -.08 1.03 
Study strategy: self-regulation -.21 1.01 -.21 .92 .41 .90 .08 1.03 
Study strategy: control -.11 1.03 -.17 .94 .30 .88 .03 1.05 
Study strategy: memorisation -.11 .98 -.20 .97 .27 .92 .06 1.07 
Study strategy: elaboration -.26 .92 -.15 .99 .33 .87 .13 1.09 
Anxiety (absence of) -.19 .97 -.36 .98 .58 .77 .03 1.01 
Mastery norms (good grade) -.02 .98 -.07 .99 .19 .87 -.05 1.09 
Subject-comparisons -.16 .99 -.27 1.02 .47 .85 .02 .98 
Peer-comparisons -.21 1.04 -.22 .99 .48 .78 .02 .99 
Social persuasions (praise) -.20 .98 -.27 .98 .48 .81 .06 1.04 
Vicarious experiences -.12 1.01 -.18 .98 .28 .89 .06 1.05 
Norms/influence (friends) -.02 .91 -.06 .96 .15 .94 -.04 1.17 
Norms/influence (parents) -.11 1.01 -.21 .97 .43 .83 -.04 1.04 
Teacher perceptions -.15 .96 -.23 1.00 .38 .84 .06 1.07 
Teacher/school careers/events -.14 .92 -.22 .98 .22 .92 .14 1.10 
Group size (N, %) 441 29.4% 318 21.2% 321 21.4% 422 28.1% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table 22: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): difference-score accuracy/bias groups with accurately-low/accurately-high groups, group differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) U-L U-H U-O L-H L-O H-O 
Science intentions <.001 .076 .005 <.001 .385 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-score <.001 .545 <.001 .021 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 
Task-confidence <.001 .381 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) <.001 .761 <.001 <.001 <.001 .596 <.001 <.001 
Task sensitivity <.001 .275 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task specificity <.001 .273 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Task simple-matching <.001 .112 .037 <.001 1.000 <.001 .001 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .566 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .078 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .102 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .066 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Ethnicity (White) <.001 .026 .002 .007 1.000 <.001 .001 .026 
Ethnicity (Black) .400 .002 1.000 1.000 1.000 .993 1.000 .729 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .011 .007 1.000 .020 1.000 .033 1.000 .058 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) <.001 .019 .001 .521 1.000 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Ethnicity (mixed) .865 <.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (other) .596 .001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Books at home <.001 .061 <.001 .002 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .113 .004 .403 1.000 1.000 .111 .910 1.000 
Mothers’ education <.001 .051 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 .001 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .054 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Current grade <.001 .138 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .135 .046 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy <.001 .152 <.001 <.001 .610 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .105 .625 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .072 1.000 <.001 .020 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .081 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Cost value (absence of) .005 .008 1.000 .197 .690 .236 1.000 .002 
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 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) U-L U-H U-O L-H L-O H-O 
Orientation: mastery <.001 .054 .007 <.001 1.000 <.001 .068 <.001 
Orientation: performance <.001 .049 .363 <.001 1.000 <.001 .017 <.001 
Perceived control <.001 .045 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Perceived control (exams) <.001 .078 .155 <.001 1.000 <.001 .083 <.001 
Study strategy: self-regulation <.001 .060 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Study strategy: control <.001 .029 1.000 <.001 .229 <.001 .037 .002 
Study strategy: memorisation <.001 .028 1.000 <.001 .081 <.001 .003 .031 
Study strategy: elaboration <.001 .052 .916 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 .024 
Anxiety (absence of) <.001 .110 .093 <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Mastery norms (good grade) .002 .010 1.000 .022 1.000 .006 1.000 .007 
Subject-comparisons <.001 .069 .555 <.001 .054 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Peer-comparisons <.001 .071 1.000 <.001 .004 <.001 .006 <.001 
Social persuasions (praise) <.001 .078 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Vicarious experiences <.001 .029 1.000 <.001 .050 <.001 .007 .014 
Norms/influence (friends) .020 .007 1.000 .090 1.000 .039 1.000 .046 
Norms/influence (parents) <.001 .053 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .103 <.001 
Teacher perceptions <.001 .050 1.000 <.001 .008 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teacher/school careers/events <.001 .031 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Section 8.2.2: Accuracy/bias clusters 
 
In order to identify natural clusters within the data, latent-profile analysis 
was undertaken using the students’ task-confidence and task-scores, both 
standardised as within-year z-scores (Section 6.3). Any clusters would then 
exhibit distinct magnitudes of task-confidence and task-scores, and hence 
likely exhibit distinct magnitudes of accuracy/bias. 
Preliminary analysis produced broadly similar results (i.e. cluster 
profiles and proportions) for individual academic years considered 
separately, especially for lower numbers of modelled clusters (e.g. four 
clusters). However, manually combining/linking these various cluster 
assignments across the different years was not necessarily feasible, 
especially when modelling higher numbers of clusters (i.e. in situations 
where any clusters did not obviously match). Additionally, from the 
preliminary analysis, it was not necessarily clear whether differences in 
emerging cluster profiles and proportions across different academic years 
related to actual differences or followed from unreliability due to lower 
numbers of students being considered in Year 10 and Year 11 compared to 
Year 9. 
Accordingly, for operational efficiency, it was necessary to assume 
that cluster profiles and proportions were similar within each academic year 
(an assumption which was indeed broadly supported by the preliminary 
results). Latent-profile analysis was then undertaken across Years 9-11 
considered together, and used standardised indicators (i.e. within-year z-
scores) to account for potential differences in means per year. 
Essentially, the approach identified discrete clusters of students with 
particular magnitudes of task-score and task-confidence (in any combination 
that might emerge, and hence with any potential degree of accuracy/bias), 
maximising similarities within-clusters and differences across-clusters 
(Collins & Lanza, 2010; Vermunt & Magidson, 2013). For example, the 
approach might identify a discrete cluster of students all with above-average 
task-scores and below-average task-confidence (relative to other students 
within their academic year), if that was a discrete cluster of students that 
naturally-occurred within the data. 
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Identifying the number of clusters to consider 
 
Modelling one to ten clusters highlighted less relative improvements in the 
model information criteria from five clusters onwards (Table 23); lower 
information criteria reflected better fit to the data. However, given the 
varying cluster sizes, predictive modelling (necessary to address the 
subsequent research question in Section 9) was only feasible for each of the 
clusters from the four-cluster solution: the smallest cluster from the five-
cluster solution only included 69 students. 
Similarities in clusters could be observed across the different 
solutions, highlighting that some distinct clusters were identified regardless 
of the number of clusters being modelled. For example, three of the four 
clusters from the four-cluster solution remained as relatively discrete 
clusters in the five-cluster solution. Similarly, three clusters remained 
relatively discrete across the five-cluster and the six-cluster solutions. 
Fundamentally, considering four clusters (rather than five clusters) appeared 
to be a feasible compromise between the information criteria and potential 
comparability with PISA 2006 and the other grouping approaches, 
especially given the similar clusters across the four-cluster and five-cluster 
solutions (see Appendix 9 for the five-cluster details). Further research with 
larger samples may benefit from considering higher numbers of clusters. 
 
 
Accuracy/bias clusters from latent-profile analysis (four clusters) 
 
The cluster profiles are summarised in Table 24, and differences across the 
clusters are summarised in Table 25. Tabulating the clusters against the 
difference-score under-confident, accurately-low, accurately-high, and over-
confident groups highlighted that cluster A, the largest cluster, was mainly 
composed of ‘under-confident’ students (48.3%) then ‘accurately-high’ 
students (34.5%). Cluster B was mainly composed of ‘accurately-low’ 
students (44.7%) then ‘over-confident’ students (35.6%). Cluster C was 
mainly composed of ‘accurately-high’ students (76.2%), while cluster D 
was mainly composed of ‘over-confident’ students (83.2%). 
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Students in cluster A (42.3% of the modelled students) exhibited 
moderately above-average task-scores and task-confidence, although with a 
small bias towards under-confidence. Students in cluster B (41.5%) 
exhibited below-average task-scores and task-confidence, and were 
essentially accurate. Students in cluster C (8.7%) exhibited highly above-
average task-scores and task-confidence, and were again essentially 
accurate. Students in cluster D (7.5%) exhibited highly below-average task-
scores and moderately below-average task-confidence, and hence over-
confidence. 
Considered generally, the profiles were remarkably similar to the 
conceptual idea of four groups, broadly covering under-confident (cluster 
A), accurately-low (cluster B), accurately-high (cluster C), and over-
confident (cluster D) students. The clusters nevertheless exhibited distinct 
magnitudes of their task-scores and task-confidences; for example, students 
in cluster A exhibited moderately above-average task-scores and lower but 
still above-average task-confidence, rather than reflecting a conceptual idea 
of ‘above-average task-scores but below-average task-confidence’. 
Students in the different clusters had different magnitudes of 
(difference-score) accuracy/bias across all potential pairs, except for clusters 
B and C. For the other indicators of accuracy, the various pairs of clusters 
differed in task sensitivity and specificity, except for clusters B and D; 
similarly, the clusters differed in task simple-matching except for clusters A 
and D and for clusters B and D. Fundamentally, students in cluster C 
exhibited the highest sensitivity (knowing when they were right) and 
simple-matching (knowing when they were right and also when they were 
wrong), but the lowest specificity (knowing when they were wrong). 
Students in cluster C gained very high scores (on average, scoring 94% 
correct) and hence ‘ceiling effects’ may have been relevant (i.e. fewer 
extremely difficult tasks where they might have been wrong, hence they 
may have had fewer opportunities to recognise that they were wrong). 
Students in cluster C also exhibited the highest degree of relative over-
confidence via the regression-residual indicators, highlighting that relative 
accuracy/bias does not necessarily reflect absolute accuracy/bias (which 
potentially offers insight into the PISA 2006 results that were only able to 
consider a relative regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias). 
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Additionally, the results for cluster D may be potentially harder to infer 
from, given that these students gained extremely low scores (on average, 
scoring 2% correct); these students appeared to attempt some tasks in some 
manner, although this may have reflected disengagement, guessing, or other 
potential tendencies. 
The students’ reported science grades, self-concept beliefs, and self-
efficacy beliefs broadly followed the pattern of magnitudes seen for their 
task-scores and task-confidence. The students’ various attitudes followed a 
similar pattern, where students in cluster C exhibited the highest, above-
average attitudes and beliefs, while students in cluster A exhibited slightly 
above-average or average attitudes, while students in clusters B and D 
exhibited slightly or moderately below-average attitudes. For the majority of 
the attitudinal measures, students in clusters B and D did not significantly 
differ in their beliefs. Students in cluster C also reported the highest (above-
average) tendencies towards self-regulated studying strategies, and control, 
memorisation, and elaboration strategies; all of the various pairs of clusters 
significantly differed for these measures, except for clusters B and D. 
The students’ background and other reported characteristics also 
varied across the clusters, for example with above-average proportions of 
boys being present in cluster C (with the highest attitudes and beliefs), who 
also reported the highest levels of books at home, parental education, and 
parents working within science. 
The students’ science intentions differed across the clusters, on 
average, and across all potential pairs of clusters except that no difference 
was apparent between clusters B and D. Students in cluster C expressed the 
highest, above-average intentions (relative to students in their respective 
year). However, only a small amount of variance in the students’ science 
intentions (13.5%) could be attributed to the differences across the clusters. 
When considered on the unstandardized agreement-scale (from 1 to 6), the 
average response for cluster C was closer to agreement (M = 4.76, SD = 
1.19), while students in cluster A averaged between slight agreement and 
slight disagreement (M = 3.77, SD = 1.41, around but just above a neutral 
mid-point of 3.50), while students in clusters B and D averaged around 
slight disagreement (cluster B with M = 2.98, SD = 1.39; cluster D with M = 
3.16, SD = 1.31). 
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Table 23: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters, model information criteria 
 
Clusters BIC AIC SA-BIC 
1 8528.99 8507.73 8516.29 
2 8000.86 7953.03 7972.27 
3 7926.07 7851.67 7881.60 
4 7883.72 7782.75 7823.36 
5 7829.02 7701.47 7752.78 
6 7838.08 7683.96 7745.95 
7 7797.90 7617.21 7689.89 
8 7804.30 7597.03 7680.41 
9 7828.43 7594.59 7688.65 
10 7829.93 7569.52 7674.27 
Notes: The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SA-BIC) from the respective 
solutions for the numbers of clusters are reported. Lower information criteria reflected better fit to the data. 
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Table 24: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions .21 .95 -.35 .94 .86 .84 -.21 .87 
Task-score .70 .47 -.62 .45 1.36 .23 -1.90 .17 
Task-confidence .33 .72 -.55 .75 1.69 .30 -.69 1.05 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) -.47 .88 .18 .85 .04 .38 1.47 1.02 
Task sensitivity .32 .76 -.46 1.08 1.08 .15 -.42 .74 
Task specificity -.14 1.04 .29 .85 -.89 .73 .18 1.07 
Task simple-matching .07 .84 -.29 .88 1.22 .31 -.11 1.63 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.04 .92 -.27 .92 1.15 .39 .36 1.27 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) .04 .97 -.14 1.01 .63 .72 -.34 1.03 
Gender (1=boy) .13 .97 -.25 1.01 .63 .62 -.13 1.03 
Ethnicity (White) -.10 1.02 .27 .88 -.56 .92 -.23 1.11 
Ethnicity (Black) .00 1.02 -.04 .88 .12 1.31 .11 1.12 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) -.01 .95 -.08 .67 .52 2.08 -.07 .81 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .11 1.07 -.24 .76 .36 1.05 .21 1.24 
Ethnicity (mixed) .04 1.08 -.05 .89 -.03 .93 .09 1.18 
Ethnicity (other) -.03 .78 .00 1.05 .18 1.61 -.01 1.02 
Books at home .26 .90 -.27 .98 .62 .76 -.67 1.01 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .04 1.02 -.11 .91 .35 1.19 -.06 .97 
Mothers’ education .19 1.01 -.31 .88 .73 .92 -.14 1.02 
Fathers’ education .15 1.00 -.33 .88 .90 .85 -.07 .97 
Current grade .33 .87 -.46 .86 1.19 .59 -.64 .90 
Self-concept .20 .88 -.34 .92 1.13 .70 -.55 1.10 
Self-efficacy .34 .82 -.47 .92 1.13 .42 -.49 1.02 
Interest value .23 .86 -.34 .99 .98 .65 -.51 .97 
Utility value .19 .90 -.31 1.01 .81 .65 -.26 1.03 
Personal value .15 .93 -.31 .96 .97 .75 -.24 1.00 
Cost value (absence of) -.02 .96 .02 1.01 .31 1.05 -.24 1.02 
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 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Orientation: mastery .21 .85 -.27 1.05 .75 .66 -.46 1.12 
Orientation: performance .14 .94 -.25 1.02 .73 .76 -.22 .94 
Perceived control .24 .73 -.21 1.09 .54 .90 -.68 1.25 
Perceived control (exams) .18 .95 -.23 .98 .73 .78 -.51 .96 
Study strategy: self-regulation .15 .92 -.26 .97 .85 .90 -.37 1.05 
Study strategy: control .12 .91 -.19 1.02 .64 .84 -.31 1.11 
Study strategy: memorisation .15 .88 -.20 1.05 .48 .98 -.31 1.08 
Study strategy: elaboration .08 .90 -.18 1.02 .64 .89 -.22 1.16 
Anxiety (absence of) .20 .90 -.33 .99 .93 .63 -.36 1.04 
Mastery norms (good grade) .07 .92 -.14 1.04 .53 .78 -.11 1.14 
Subject-comparisons .13 .95 -.26 1.00 .89 .58 -.29 .96 
Peer-comparisons .12 .94 -.24 .99 .79 .71 -.27 1.09 
Social persuasions (praise) .17 .90 -.30 1.01 .88 .79 -.24 .92 
Vicarious experiences .09 .93 -.15 1.03 .55 .89 -.29 1.09 
Norms/influence (friends) .03 .91 -.07 1.04 .27 1.05 -.11 1.20 
Norms/influence (parents) .16 .95 -.25 1.01 .69 .67 -.24 1.06 
Teacher perceptions .15 .86 -.20 1.05 .62 .85 -.39 1.19 
Teacher/school careers/events .06 .95 -.18 1.02 .52 .88 .03 1.08 
Cluster size (N, %) 635 42.3% 624 41.5% 130 8.7% 113 7.5% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table 25: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters), cluster differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Science intentions <.001 .135 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .823 <.001 
Task-score <.001 .814 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-confidence <.001 .457 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .383 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) <.001 .273 <.001 <.001 <.001 .454 <.001 <.001 
Task sensitivity <.001 .242 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Task specificity <.001 .114 <.001 <.001 .006 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Task simple-matching <.001 .168 <.001 <.001 .325 <.001 .306 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .156 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .054 .012 <.001 .012 <.001 .666 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .068 <.001 <.001 .063 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Ethnicity (White) <.001 .066 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 .052 
Ethnicity (Black) .250 .003 1.000 1.000 1.000 .599 .935 1.000 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) <.001 .026 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) <.001 .046 <.001 .060 1.000 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Ethnicity (mixed) .372 .002 .885 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (other) .203 .003 1.000 .196 1.000 .375 1.000 .927 
Books at home <.001 .127 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .016 .064 .009 1.000 <.001 1.000 .012 
Mothers’ education <.001 .103 <.001 <.001 .004 <.001 .448 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .125 <.001 <.001 .124 <.001 .040 <.001 
Current grade <.001 .288 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .197 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .198 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .126 <.001 
Self-efficacy <.001 .269 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .173 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .454 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .118 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .134 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Cost value (absence of) <.001 .013 1.000 .003 .197 .013 .069 <.001 
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 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Orientation: mastery <.001 .114 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .280 <.001 
Orientation: performance <.001 .082 <.001 <.001 .002 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Perceived control <.001 .101 <.001 .007 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Perceived control (exams) <.001 .101 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .025 <.001 
Study strategy: self-regulation <.001 .109 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Study strategy: control <.001 .064 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Study strategy: memorisation <.001 .052 <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Study strategy: elaboration <.001 .054 <.001 <.001 .014 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Anxiety (absence of) <.001 .145 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Mastery norms (good grade) <.001 .036 .001 <.001 .525 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Subject-comparisons <.001 .111 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Peer-comparisons <.001 .090 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Social persuasions (praise) <.001 .122 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Vicarious experiences <.001 .045 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Norms/influence (friends) .003 .009 .583 .077 1.000 .003 1.000 .021 
Norms/influence (parents) <.001 .082 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Teacher perceptions <.001 .071 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .302 <.001 
Teacher/school careers/events <.001 .038 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 .208 .001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
Page 218 of 361 
Section 8.2.3: Intention/attitude clusters 
 
As with PISA 2006, latent-profile analysis was also applied to form clusters 
based on students’ science intentions and key predictors. Any differences in 
task-level accuracy/bias could then be considered across the clusters. This 
also offered the potential to quantify the proportion of students who might 
or might not be expected to progress further within science, given their 
expressed intentions and attitudes. Accordingly, latent-profile analysis was 
used to reveal clusters of students given their science intentions, self-
efficacy, interest, perceived utility, personal value, and norms/influences 
from parents (i.e. the key predictors and outcome from Section 7). These 
items/factors were standardised (as z-scores per academic year) and Years 9-
11 were considered together. 
Modelling one to ten clusters highlighted less relative improvements 
in the model information criteria from four or five clusters onwards (Table 
26). Less relative change to the cluster compositions was also observed 
from four-clusters to five-clusters and subsequently (compared to, for 
example, the change in cluster compositions from three-clusters to four-
clusters). It was again plausible to primarily consider the four-cluster 
solution (see Appendix 9 for the five-cluster solution). For these 
intention/attitude clusters, there appeared to be no clear correspondences 
with the difference-score accuracy/bias groups or with the accuracy/bias 
clusters. 
Considering four intention/attitude clusters, the cluster profiles and 
differences are respectively presented in Table 27 and Table 28. The four-
cluster solution essentially contained one small cluster of students (D, 
12.9% of considered students) who expressed highly below-average 
intentions and attitudes (relative to other students within their respective 
academic year), one cluster moderately below-average (A, 37.3%), one 
cluster moderately above-average (B, 33.6%), and another cluster highly 
above-average (C, 12.9%). The students’ reported science grades, task-
scores, task-confidence, and also other attitudes, similarly followed this 
pattern of magnitudes. 
Considered against the underlying agreement-scale (from 1 to 6), 
students in cluster D disagreed with intending to studying further in science 
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(M = 1.77, SD = .96), students in cluster A responded with slight 
disagreement (M = 2.64, SD = 1.08), students in cluster B responded with 
slight agreement (M = 4.06, SD = 1.02), and students in cluster C strongly 
agreed to study science further (M = 5.56, SD = .53). A large proportion of 
variance in science intentions (61.1%) could be attributed to the difference 
across the clusters, which was perhaps less informative given that the 
students were directly clustered according to their science intentions (and 
key predicting factors). 
The students’ (difference-score) accuracy/bias had less variation 
across the clusters, with differences only observable between clusters A and 
D and clusters C and D. Essentially, those in the cluster with the lowest 
intentions and attitudes (cluster D), exhibited a higher degree of under-
confidence than some other clusters. The indicators of task sensitivity and 
specificity differed across all pairs of clusters, while the simple-matching 
indicator of accuracy differed across the clusters on average, but only across 
some pairs of clusters (and not between A and D, and B and D). Essentially, 
those in the cluster with the highest intentions and attitudes (cluster C) 
exhibited the highest task-level accuracy considered as sensitivity 
(measuring whether they accurately knew when they had right answers) and 
simple-matching (measuring whether they accurately knew when they had 
right and wrong answers), but the lowest specificity (measuring whether 
they accurately knew when they had wrong answers). 
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Table 26: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): intention/attitude clusters, model information criteria 
 
Clusters BIC AIC SA-BIC 
1 19646.21 19585.54 19608.09 
2 17018.05 16891.66 16938.64 
3 16088.35 15896.24 15967.65 
4 15723.70 15465.88 15561.71 
5 15584.95 15261.41 15381.67 
6 15527.77 15138.51 15283.20 
7 15444.08 14989.10 15158.21 
8 15405.06 14884.37 15077.90 
9 15399.36 14812.94 15030.91 
10 15385.97 14733.83 14976.22 
Notes: The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SA-BIC) from the respective 
solutions for the numbers of clusters are reported. Lower information criteria reflected better fit to the data. 
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Table 27: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): intention/attitude clusters (four clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions -.58 .71 .38 .69 1.42 .37 -1.18 .65 
Task-score -.28 .84 .21 .86 .65 .79 -.42 .88 
Task-confidence -.31 .82 .17 .86 .93 .85 -.75 .84 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) .02 .90 -.07 .86 .11 .91 -.22 .97 
Task sensitivity -.21 1.00 .14 .91 .65 .67 -.56 .98 
Task specificity .21 .87 -.11 1.01 -.70 .96 .59 .76 
Task simple-matching -.14 .90 .02 .85 .34 .88 -.07 .85 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.20 .87 .08 .86 .68 .92 -.61 .93 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.26 .85 .22 .84 .69 .90 -.77 .99 
Gender (1=boy) -.19 1.01 .11 .98 .22 .95 -.39 1.01 
Ethnicity (White) .24 .86 -.08 .99 -.26 1.05 .35 .79 
Ethnicity (Black) -.08 .70 -.06 .84 -.18 .05 -.01 1.04 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) -.03 .87 -.02 .93 .14 1.43 -.05 .79 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) -.21 .79 .14 1.05 .30 1.13 -.33 .65 
Ethnicity (mixed) -.01 .99 -.03 .93 .02 1.05 -.02 .96 
Ethnicity (other) -.06 .62 .00 1.01 .04 1.10 -.10 .02 
Books at home -.11 .99 .13 .93 .41 .93 -.24 1.03 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.03 .97 .00 1.00 .21 1.14 -.23 .79 
Mothers’ education -.16 .96 .10 .99 .32 1.02 -.36 .87 
Fathers’ education -.21 .92 .07 .99 .43 1.02 -.46 .88 
Current grade -.23 .90 .26 .92 .75 .84 -.65 .97 
Self-concept -.32 .78 .34 .75 .99 .87 -.96 .87 
Self-efficacy -.25 .89 .30 .85 .86 .57 -.78 1.02 
Interest value -.36 .66 .48 .52 1.27 .37 -1.49 .85 
Utility value -.42 .56 .53 .44 1.32 .25 -1.65 .62 
Personal value -.45 .63 .41 .60 1.40 .42 -1.51 .39 
Cost value (absence of) .00 .90 -.09 1.00 -.09 1.27 .47 1.18 
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 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Orientation: mastery -.21 .93 .24 .78 .88 .60 -.85 1.29 
Orientation: performance -.21 .94 .23 .85 .75 .80 -.67 1.14 
Perceived control -.14 .91 .28 .78 .86 .59 -.85 1.36 
Perceived control (exams) -.12 .91 .22 .95 .73 1.05 -.48 1.11 
Study strategy: self-regulation -.24 .81 .23 .84 1.01 .87 -1.08 1.00 
Study strategy: control -.22 .93 .25 .74 .98 .76 -.87 1.25 
Study strategy: memorisation -.22 .94 .22 .83 .76 .93 -.99 1.11 
Study strategy: elaboration -.27 .86 .24 .90 .85 .91 -1.06 1.02 
Anxiety (absence of) -.26 .92 .21 .87 .67 .96 -.59 1.08 
Mastery norms (good grade) -.09 .99 .00 1.02 .22 .93 -.15 1.12 
Subject-comparisons -.27 .94 .30 .86 .62 .92 -.64 1.07 
Peer-comparisons -.21 .92 .21 .87 .55 .99 -.55 1.15 
Social persuasions (praise) -.33 .85 .34 .79 .93 .87 -.82 .98 
Vicarious experiences -.10 .95 .28 .81 .52 1.01 -.76 1.18 
Norms/influence (friends) -.14 .92 .19 .93 .45 1.04 -.38 1.19 
Norms/influence (parents) -.38 .80 .51 .57 .86 .80 -1.12 .96 
Teacher perceptions -.25 .91 .27 .81 .92 .74 -.92 1.15 
Teacher/school careers/events -.24 .91 .21 .95 .51 1.14 -.81 .95 
Cluster size (N, %) 432 37.3% 389 33.6% 188 16.2% 150 12.9% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey; the clusters were formed on these factors. 
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Table 28: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): intention/attitude clusters (four clusters), cluster differences 
 
 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Science intentions <.001 .616 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-score <.001 .160 <.001 <.001 .420 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-confidence <.001 .268 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) .004 .011 .869 1.000 .036 .118 .593 .005 
Task sensitivity <.001 .134 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task specificity <.001 .147 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task simple-matching <.001 .035 .045 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .153 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .205 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .042 <.001 <.001 .211 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Ethnicity (White) <.001 .051 <.001 <.001 1.000 .192 <.001 <.001 
Ethnicity (Black) .192 .004 1.000 .781 1.000 .417 1.000 .270 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .208 .004 1.000 .307 1.000 .469 1.000 .489 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) <.001 .057 <.001 <.001 1.000 .323 <.001 <.001 
Ethnicity (mixed) .943 <.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (other) .326 .003 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .752 
Books at home <.001 .044 .002 <.001 .937 .008 <.001 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .001 .015 1.000 .027 .274 .104 .115 <.001 
Mothers’ education <.001 .046 .001 <.001 .191 .080 <.001 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .075 <.001 <.001 .036 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Current grade <.001 .184 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .358 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy <.001 .256 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .645 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .769 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .699 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Cost value (absence of) <.001 .029 1.000 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
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 Overall group difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D 
Orientation: mastery <.001 .242 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Orientation: performance <.001 .178 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Perceived control <.001 .230 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Perceived control (exams) <.001 .122 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Study strategy: self-regulation <.001 .327 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Study strategy: control <.001 .267 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Study strategy: memorisation <.001 .229 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Study strategy: elaboration <.001 .274 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Anxiety (absence of) <.001 .154 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Mastery norms (good grade) .002 .012 1.000 .004 1.000 .086 .866 .007 
Subject-comparisons <.001 .166 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 
Peer-comparisons <.001 .116 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Social persuasions (praise) <.001 .295 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Vicarious experiences <.001 .141 <.001 <.001 <.001 .023 <.001 <.001 
Norms/influence (friends) <.001 .068 <.001 <.001 .072 .013 <.001 <.001 
Norms/influence (parents) <.001 .428 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teacher perceptions <.001 .272 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teacher/school careers/events <.001 .147 <.001 <.001 <.001 .002 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey; the clusters were formed on these factors. 
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Section 8.3: Discussion 
 
The analysis considered multiple complementary perspectives in order to 
address the second research question: whether students with different 
degrees of confidence accuracy/bias exhibited different science intentions, 
attitudes, and beliefs. 
Initially, differences in intentions and attitudes were considered 
across conceptual accuracy/bias groups, formed through traditional 
methods, which are discussed and contextualised in Section 8.3.1. 
Differences were then considered across accuracy/bias clusters from latent-
profile analysis, discussed in Section 8.3.2. As an alternate perspective, 
differences in accuracy/bias were considered across intention/attitude 
clusters from latent-profile analysis, discussed in Section 8.3.3. Conclusions 
for the second research question are then made in Section 8.3.4. 
Fundamentally, the process offered the potential for disconfirmation 
and enhanced rigour: considering the accuracy/bias clusters helped consider 
whether the conceptual accuracy/bias groups were meaningful; considering 
the intention/attitude clusters helped consider whether accuracy/bias 
actually differed within meaningful contexts; and considering self-reflective 
accuracy/bias in the 2014/2015 survey helped consider whether the PISA 
2006 results offered a meaningful insight into accuracy/bias. 
 
 
Section 8.3.1: Accuracy/bias groups 
 
Students were grouped into conceptual categories of confidence 
accuracy/bias, considering self-concept beliefs in the PISA 2006 survey and 
self-reflective task-confidence in the 2014/2015 survey. These conceptual 
groups considered under-confident, accurate, and over-confident students, 
where accurate students were separated into those with accurately-low or 
accurately-high confidence. This broadly extended earlier research, which 
had infrequently separated those with accurately-high or accurately-low 
confidence (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 
2011; Gresham, Lane, MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000). 
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Results from PISA 2006 for the above-average/below-average 
groups highlighted that students’ intentions and attitudes (specifically, the 
key predictors of students’ intentions) descended from the accurately-high 
group, then the over-confident group, then the under-confident group, and 
then the accurately-low group. Results from PISA 2006 for the regression-
residual groups alternately highlighted that intentions and attitudes 
descended from the over-confident group, then the accurately-high group, 
then the accurately-low group, and then the under-confident group. Results 
from the 2014/2015 survey for the difference-score accuracy/bias groups 
highlighted that intentions and self-efficacy descended from the accurately-
high group, then the over-confident and under-confident groups (which did 
not differ), and then the accurately-low group; for the other key predictors 
(interest value, utility value, personal value, and norms/influences from 
parents), attitudes descended from the accurately-high group, then the over-
confident group, and then the under-confident and the accurately-low 
groups (which did not differ). 
In general terms, these results somewhat supported the earlier 
hypothesis (Section 4.2) that over-confidence would associate with higher 
attitudes than under-confidence, but gave contrasting results regarding the 
potential benefits of over-confidence compared to accurately-high 
confidence. Prior research using regression-residual accuracy/bias groups 
has similarly highlighted that over-confident students reported higher 
interest than under-confident students, although also found that accurate 
students reported higher or similar interest to over-confident students, 
depending on the academic subject (Gonida & Leondari, 2011). The results 
from the 2014/2015 survey, directly considering task-level self-reflective 
accuracy/bias via a difference-score, highlighted that the under-confident 
and over-confident students reported similar orientations towards mastering 
learning and towards out-performing other students, while accurately-high 
students reported the highest orientations. This contrasted with the relevant 
hypothesis in Section 4.2 and hence with earlier studies that found over-
confident students to report higher out-performing orientations in some 
situations for secondary school students (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & 
Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011) and for university students (Bipp, 
Steinmayr, & Spinath, 2012; Willard & Gramzow, 2009). Future research 
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may then need to explore task-level accuracy/bias in more detail, and/or 
consider any potential methodological impacts. 
In the 2014/2015 survey, students with accurately-high task-level 
confidence reported higher current science grades, which cohered with 
earlier studies that have broadly associated higher accuracy with higher 
attainment (Chen, 2003; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). These students also 
reported higher self-regulated studying, which again broadly linked with 
established associations between attainment and self-regulated studying 
(Credé & Phillips, 2011; Sperling, Richmond, Ramsay, & Klapp, 2012). As 
a conceptual process, self-regulation may require accurate beliefs and/or 
generally entail that beliefs become accurate (Boekaerts, 1999; Butler & 
Winne, 1995; Pintrich, 1999); the idea of self-regulated studying, as 
involving cyclical phases of forethought, performance control, and self-
reflection, may similarly be facilitated by accurate beliefs (Butler & Winne, 
1995; Zimmerman, 2000; Zimmerman & Moylan, 2009). However, the idea 
of ‘self-regulated studying’ somewhat differs from the ideas of ‘self-
regulation’ and confidence accuracy/bias, and further research would be 
required to clearly establish the relationship between them. The results also 
could not, in themselves, clarify whether reported self-regulated studying 
followed from accurate confidence, high confidence, and/or from high 
attainment. 
Ultimately, the different approaches to forming groups entailed 
different conceptual definitions of accuracy/bias, but were each suited to 
their particular survey contexts. Specifically, PISA 2006 could only 
indirectly or implicitly consider accuracy/bias, hence regression-residual 
indicators were unavoidable; the simple cross-tabulation of above-
average/below-average self-concept and task-scores also provided a 
plausible baseline comparison, and broadly matched the difference-score 
groups in the 2014/2015 survey. The 2014/2015 survey directly considered 
task-level accuracy/bias so a difference-score was more meaningful than a 
regression-residual indicator. The results fundamentally highlighted the 
need for attention (and clarity) regarding how accuracy/bias groups are 
defined, since different approaches can entail different interpretations 
regarding the relative benefits or detriments of the various groups.  
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Section 8.3.2: Accuracy/bias clusters 
 
Considering clusters of students, revealed through latent-profile analysis, 
helped to determine the extents of under-confidence, accuracy, and over-
confidence across the students in PISA 2006 and the 2014/2015 survey. The 
clusters were emergent from the data rather than relying on conceptual 
classifications, and could conceivably emerge with any size and/or with any 
degree of accuracy/bias. 
There were some broad similarities between the clusters and the 
conceptual groups, for both surveys, suggesting that the clusters could be 
given the same descriptive labels as the groups (under-confident, accurately-
low, accurately-high, and over-confident). The conceptual groups may 
therefore reflect naturally-emerging tendencies, but the meaning of the 
broad labels could differ when assigned to the groups or to the clusters; for 
example, the particular profile of an ‘under-confident’ cluster (e.g. average 
task-scores but slightly below-average self-concept beliefs in PISA 2006) 
differed from the conceptual ‘under-confident’ groups (e.g. above-average 
task-scores but below-average self-concept beliefs, or average task-scores 
but moderately/highly below-average self-concept beliefs). However, 
‘accurately-high’ groups/clusters could also or conversely appear over-
confident, hence results could vary in interpretation depending on the 
considered indicators (and the four broad labels may not necessarily then be 
ideal terms). 
In the PISA 2006 survey, students’ science intentions and attitudes 
were highest in the cluster with ‘accurately-high’ self-concept beliefs 
(cluster D, 10.4% of the considered students, with highly above-average 
self-concept beliefs and task-scores, but with relatively higher self-concept 
beliefs and hence some degree of over-confidence), then ‘over-confident’ 
students (C, 15.9%, students with moderately above-average task-scores and 
self-concept beliefs but with relatively higher self-concept beliefs), then 
‘under-confident’ students (A, 55.9%, with average task-scores but slightly 
below-average self-concept beliefs), then ‘accurately-low’ students (B, 
17.8%, with below-average task-scores and self-concept beliefs). In the 
2014/2015 survey, students’ intentions and attitudes were highest in the 
cluster with ‘accurately-high’ task-confidence (cluster C, 8.7% of the 
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considered students), then ‘under-confident’ students (A, 42.3%, with 
moderately above-average task-scores and task-confidence but with 
relatively lower task-confidence), then ‘over-confident’ students (D, 7.5%, 
with below-average task-scores and task-confidence but with relatively 
higher task-confidence) and ‘accurately-low’ students (B, 41.5%) who 
generally reported similarly. 
The PISA 2006 survey and the 2014/2015 survey therefore provided 
contrasting results concerning differences between the under-confident and 
over-confident clusters: PISA 2006 showed the same pattern across the 
conceptual groups and the emergent clusters, where over-confidence 
entailed higher attitudes than under-confidence; the results from the 
2014/2015 survey suggested that under-confidence entailed higher attitudes 
than over-confidence when considering the clusters, but revealed little to no 
difference between the two biases when considering the conceptual groups. 
The groups and clusters, and the two surveys themselves, nevertheless 
involve different approaches (e.g. subject/task levels, relative/absolute 
differences), so some degree of difference is likely to be unavoidable. 
Additionally, interpretations depend on whether the groups/clusters with the 
highest attitudes are considered as accurate or over-confident; these 
groups/clusters could strengthen the apparent benefit of (some degree of 
relative) over-confidence. 
Relatively little research has been undertaken in the area, so it 
remains difficult to contextualise these results. One example of research 
with secondary school students in Spain had revealed clusters of relatively 
equal sizes that were equivalent in profile to under-confident, accurately-
low, accurately-high, and over-confident conceptual groups, essentially 
being akin to cross-tabulations of above-average/below-average 
mathematics performance and self-concept beliefs, for example where the 
cluster of under-confident students did indeed have above-average 
performance but below-average self-concept beliefs (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 
2016). The PISA 2006 and 2014/2015 cluster results were therefore similar 
in potentially highlighting the same four tendencies, but differed in their 
cluster sizes and particular profiles. On a wider level, the PISA 2006 and 
2014/2015 cluster results were also similar to prior findings where students 
with high confidence beliefs and high attitudes, identified through cluster 
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analysis, reported studying more science courses (Simpkins & Davis-Kean, 
2005), assuming that the students’ science intentions would reflect their 
actual choices. 
In both surveys, the cluster profiles suggested that students in 
higher-performing clusters had confidence (task-confidence or self-concept 
beliefs) in excess of their relative attainment (task-scores), although the 
pattern for the lower-performing clusters differed across the two surveys. 
PISA 2006 highlighted that the lowest-performing cluster was under-
confident (via a regression-residual indicator), while the 2014/2015 survey 
highlighted that the lowest-performing cluster was over-confident (via a 
difference-score considering task-level self-reflective accuracy/bias). 
Considered in general terms, this partially reflected patterns seen in prior 
research with comparable student ages. Specifically, for secondary school 
students in Switzerland and Germany (Grade 9, age 15), for physics, the 
cluster with the highest performance had self-concept beliefs slightly higher 
than their performance, and the cluster with the lowest performance had 
self-concept beliefs slightly lower than their performance, when considered 
on equalised scales (Seidel, 2006). The results from the 2014/2015 survey 
clusters partly reflected those seen in studies with undergraduate students, 
which have used various methods and generally found that students with 
lower attainment exhibited over-confidence; however, undergraduate 
students with higher attainment have often exhibited a small degree of 
under-confidence, which contrasted with the results from PISA 2006 and the 
2014/2015 survey (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
The presented results from PISA 2006 and the 2014/2015 survey are 
nevertheless beneficial in providing initial perspectives for England, from 
which further research can then extend on. 
Given the results from the accuracy/bias clusters, it may be 
somewhat difficult to conclusively determine whether under-confidence or 
over-confidence is detrimental or beneficial, since the clusters did not 
appear to exhibit extreme biases: some of the clusters could indeed be 
described as ‘under-confident’ and ‘over-confident’, but the magnitudes of 
these confidence biases appeared to be lower than those embodied by the 
(artificial) conceptual accuracy/bias groups. 
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Section 8.3.3: Intention/attitude clusters 
 
The first approach to latent-profile analysis formed clusters on students’ 
accuracy/bias via considering task-scores and self-concept beliefs or task-
confidence, and then considered differences in the cluster profiles and 
proportions. The second approach to latent-profile analysis formed clusters 
on students’ intentions and key predicting factors, and then considered 
differences in the cluster profiles, including their degrees of accuracy/bias.  
Considered broadly, the fundamental findings cohered across both 
approaches. When considering clusters of students with different 
magnitudes of science intentions and attitudes, smaller clusters of students 
with the highest intentions and attitudes were revealed in the PISA 2006 and 
the 2014/2015 surveys; these clusters also exhibited the highest indicators of 
attainment (task-scores and/or science grades) and the highest indicators of 
accuracy in their beliefs. The students’ confidence accuracy/bias indeed 
differed across the various intention/attitude clusters, highlighting that 
differences in accuracy/bias can be observed in meaningful contexts. 
In PISA 2006, the intention/attitude clusters with below-average 
attitudes and beliefs exhibited relative under-confidence (via the regression-
residual indicator) while clusters with above-average beliefs exhibited 
relative over-confidence. Relative ‘over-confidence’ perhaps depended on 
the particular regression-residual indicator, and may not necessarily entail 
biases in self-reflection. In the 2014/2015 survey, the cluster with the 
highest, above-average, intentions and attitudes also exhibited the highest 
self-reflective task-level accuracy and lowest degree of bias (i.e. under-
confidence or over-confidence), although the (difference-score) 
accuracy/bias indicator suggested a slight degree of over-confidence. As 
before, these results broadly cohered with earlier studies that have 
associated higher accuracy with higher attainment (Chen, 2003; Rinne & 
Mazzocco, 2014), but contrasted with studies with undergraduate students 
that associated higher attainment with slight under-confidence and lower 
attainment with larger degrees of over-confidence (Ackerman & Wolman, 
2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
The intention/attitude clusters (and the earlier accuracy/bias clusters) 
appeared to exhibit broadly proportionate attitudes and beliefs within each 
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cluster, which cohered with earlier studies (Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 
2012; Simpkins, Davis-Kean, & Eccles, 2006), although some within-
cluster differences could perhaps still be seen. For example, in PISA 2006, 
the intention/attitude cluster with the lowest, below-average attitudes 
(cluster C in the four-cluster model) exhibited even lower science intentions 
than their other attitudes (which were more similar in magnitude); the 
cluster with the highest, above-average attitudes (cluster D) exhibited 
relatively higher perceived utility of science (and to a lesser degree, science 
intentions) than their other attitudes (which appeared more similar in 
magnitude). These patterns, however, did not clearly follow those seen in 
some prior studies, which have found, for example, distinct clusters of 
students exhibiting highly above-average confidence but moderately above-
average utility and interest (Andersen & Chen, 2016), or exhibiting 
moderate self-concept beliefs and high interest (Aschbacher, Ing, & Tsai, 
2014), together with other clusters. It remains relatively unclear to what 
extent results may vary across different samples, time-periods, and the 
considered factors; PISA reflected the situation as of 2006, for example, and 
educational contexts, and their yearly cohorts of students, change over time. 
Within both surveys, relatively small proportions of students formed 
the clusters with the highest intentions and attitudes. Considering the four-
cluster solutions, these covered 11.7% of students in PISA 2006 and 16.2% 
of students in the 2014/2015 survey; in the 2014/2015 survey, for example, 
such students had strongly above-average attitudes equivalent to ‘agree’ to 
‘strongly agree’ on the underlying scale. Prior studies have similarly found 
that clusters of students with high confidence and attitudes (and/or 
intentions) have generally been small (Aschbacher, Ing, & Tsai, 2014; 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 2014). In broad terms, this supported 
the continuing assumptions and concerns around low numbers of students 
aspiring to study science subjects (Royal Society, 2008b). Additionally, the 
identification of distinct clusters highlighted that students’ attitudes and 
beliefs may be more closely associated than previously considered. It is 
possible that science identities, for example, may entail relatively high and 
cohering attitudes and beliefs. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that science education should only 
focus on those small numbers of students with universally high attitudes, 
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which might only sustain patterns of under-representation (Claussen & 
Osborne, 2013; Osborne & Dillon, 2008). Instead, educators and researchers 
may need to consider how particular patterns of attitudes may form, and 
how students’ attainment, confidence, and attitudes influence one another. 
Various interventions have indeed focused on students’ attitudes towards 
science (Rosenzweig & Wigfield, 2016), including various approaches that 
have helped to increase students’ interest in science (Bernacki, Nokes-
Malach, Richey, & Belenky, 2016; Hong & Lin-Siegler, 2012; Hulleman & 
Harackiewicz, 2009). Similarly, promoting the utility of science for students 
and parents has associated with higher science interest and attainment for 
students, and with students selecting courses in science (Harackiewicz, 
Rozek, Hulleman, & Hyde, 2012; Rozek, Hyde, Svoboda, Hulleman, & 
Harackiewicz, 2015). Greater understanding of how students’ attitudes 
associate may then inform whether interventions could feasibly continue to 
consider specific factors or intervention points, such as interest or utility 
alone, or whether interventions might need to consider many factors 
together or apply different approaches. 
 
 
Section 8.3.4: Conclusions 
 
Research question two: did students with different degrees of confidence 
accuracy/bias exhibit different science intentions, attitudes, and beliefs? 
 
Fundamentally, the various accuracy/bias groups and accuracy/bias clusters 
did indeed exhibit different science attitudes and intentions. On a wider 
level, there were some similarities between the emergent clusters and the 
conceptual groups, suggesting that conceptual groups may indeed reflect 
natural tendencies towards accuracy and/or confidence biases. Similarly, 
students clustered on their intentions and attitudes (i.e. their intentions and 
key predicting factors of their intentions) exhibited different degrees of 
confidence accuracy/bias, which again provides reassurance that confidence 
accuracy/bias is contextually meaningful within science education. 
Nevertheless, given that conceptual groups could entail different 
results depending on the particular grouping approach (i.e. the particular 
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conceptual definitions of under-confidence and over-confidence that were 
applied), considering accuracy/bias clusters may be beneficial within future 
research; clusters can also help clarify the magnitudes and extents of 
particular tendencies towards accuracy/bias. Otherwise, it may be necessary 
to clarify the impact of different methodological approaches, and/or apply 
multiple approaches within one study. 
In both surveys, students with accurately-high confidence generally 
reported the highest intentions and attitudes, across the conceptual groups 
and the emergent clusters, excepting that when considering the regression-
residual conceptual accuracy/bias groups in PISA 2006 over-confident 
students reported the highest. Groups/clusters with ‘accurately-high’ 
confidence could also or conversely appear somewhat over-confident, 
depending on the considered indicators. This may suggest the potential 
‘benefits’ of (relative) over-confidence, but perhaps highlight their 
contextual or conditional nature (perhaps requiring some level of underlying 
attainment and/or confidence). 
Across the groups and clusters in PISA 2006, under-confident 
students exhibited lower attitudes than over-confident students, suggesting 
that under-confidence may be problematic; the students’ attitudes and 
beliefs may closely associate, sufficient for their confidence to entail lower 
attitudes than might otherwise be expected, given their attainment. This was 
broadly supported by the accuracy/bias groups in the 2014/2015 survey: the 
under-confident and over-confident groups reported similar science 
intentions and self-efficacy, but under-confident students reported lower for 
other attitudes (including interest, utility, and personal value, found to be 
important predictors of science intentions) despite exhibiting higher 
attainment. However, the accuracy/bias clusters in the 2014/2015 survey 
conversely highlighted that those with over-confidence reported lower 
intentions and attitudes than those exhibiting under-confidence; the ‘over-
confident’ cluster exhibited lower attainment than the over-confident 
conceptual group, however. 
Despite such variation across approaches, given the limited prior 
research in England, the results provide a plausible and beneficial baseline 
for further exploration. 
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Section 9: Research question three 
 
The third research question considered whether students with different 
degrees of confidence accuracy/bias considered their science intentions in 
different ways. The results from the PISA 2006 survey (Section 9.1) and the 
2014/2015 survey (Section 9.2) are described in turn, and then discussed 
and contextualised in Section 9.3. 
 
 
Section 9.1: Results: PISA 2006 
 
Predictive modelling could not easily reveal the impact of accuracy/bias on 
students’ intentions (Section 7); students were then categorised according to 
their confidence accuracy/bias, and their expressed intentions, attitudes, and 
other beliefs differed across the various groups and clusters (Section 8). The 
students’ varying intentions may have followed from varying attitudes, 
and/or from students’ applying varying processes of decision-making. 
Predictive modelling was then applied for the separate accuracy/bias groups 
(Section 9.1.1) and accuracy/bias clusters (Section 9.1.2) to help explore 
why the students expressed different science intentions. Predictive 
modelling could not feasibly be applied for the intention/attitude clusters, 
however, given that these clusters were already formed on the students’ 
intentions and key predicting factors: within each cluster there would be less 
variance per factor, and less (if any) association between the factors, due to 
the nature of clustering the students. 
 
 
Section 9.1.1: Accuracy/bias groups 
 
Conceptual groups (above-average/below-average intersections) 
 
The students’ intentions and attitudes varied across the four (above-
average/below-average) conceptual accuracy/bias groups (Section 8.1.1): 
those with accurately-high beliefs (33.2% of the considered students) 
reported the highest intentions and attitudes, then over-confident students 
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(18.2%), then under-confident students (20.1%), and then those with 
accurately-low beliefs (28.5%). The groups were formed so that under-
confident students had below-average self-concept but above-average task-
scores, while over-confident students had above-average self-concept but 
below-average task-scores. 
Students’ science intentions were indeed predicted by different 
factors in different ways across these four conceptual groups (Table 29 
summarises the comprehensive set of predictors). For those with accurately-
high self-concept beliefs, science intentions were most strongly predicted by 
their utility value, personal value, interest value, and their interest in various 
science areas/topics. For those with over-confident beliefs, the strongest 
positive predictors were utility value, interest value, career information, and 
personal value, while applied teaching had a negative predictive association 
with intentions. For those with under-confident beliefs, the strongest 
predictors were utility value, interest value, and personal value. For those 
with accurately-low self-concept beliefs, the strongest positive predictors 
were utility value, personal value, careers information, self-concept beliefs, 
and interest value, while general value of science had a negative predictive 
association. 
Numerous differences in coefficient magnitude occurred across the 
groups. The clearest difference was that the students’ perceived utility of 
science was predictive of science intentions for all groups, but was 
relatively stronger for those students with accurately-high self-concept 
beliefs. Various other differences were apparent. For example, interest value 
had a lower predictive magnitude for accurately-low students compared to 
under-confident students. Careers information had a higher predictive 
magnitude for over-confident students than accurately-high and under-
confident students; careers information also had a higher predictive 
magnitude for accurately-low students than under-confident students. 
As examples of sensitivity checks, preliminary analysis also 
involved predicting science intentions using only the key predictors 
highlighted across the entire sample (Section 7.1), specifically using 
students’ perceived utility of science, interest/enjoyment of science, 
personal value of science, and their science self-concept beliefs, but also 
including task-scores and students’ background. When considering these 
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smaller sets of predictors, the majority of the same results were seen 
excepting that no coefficient differences were observed across the 
accurately-high and the under-confident groups (which were both formed 
with above-average task-scores but with either above-average or below-
average self-concept beliefs). In some cases, therefore, it may still be 
difficult to isolate effects following from the magnitude of task-scores 
and/or self-concept from effects following from the degree of accuracy/bias. 
As highlighted across the entire sample (Section 7.1), various factors may 
mediate the associations between other predictors and science intentions, 
which may introduce slightly varying results depending on which factors are 
considered, which may complicate any modelling. 
Fundamentally, when modelling the comprehensive array of 
predictors (Table 29), there were coefficient differences across all possible 
pairs of groups, although not necessarily for each predictor. There were still 
sufficient differences in predictive coefficients across these conceptual 
groups to infer that the students’ accuracy and/or bias appeared to be 
relevant moderators of the predictive associations between various factors 
and students’ science intentions, especially for utility value, interest value, 
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Table 29: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (above-average/below-average self-concept/task-score intersections), predicting science intentions 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept/constant 
UO
 NA .029 NA .023 
HO
 NA <.001 
UO HO
 NA .564 
Gender (1=boy) 
UL






 -.070 .011 
Books at home -.038 .157 -.017 .504 -.007 .695 -.013 .652 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) 
UH 
.036 .149 -.013 .588 
UH
 -.020 .207 .021 .444 
Mothers’ education -.037 .184 .021 .443 .004 .841 .012 .705 









 -.045 .149 




.036 .058 .040 .176 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.027 .337 -.072 .011 -.042 .020 -.044 .145 











.108 <.001 .154 <.001 .187 <.001 
Utility value 








Personal value .134 <.001 .154 <.001 .212 <.001 .149 <.001 
General value -.073 .009 -.115 <.001 -.092 <.001 -.035 .358 
Science activities .056 .042 .087 .001 .049 .013 .044 .202 
School career preparation .001 .960 -.030 .268 -.027 .148 -.073 .022 









Teaching: interaction -.016 .593 -.069 .028 -.036 .072 .008 .847 
Teaching: activities 
UH




 -.097 <.001 
HO
 -.020 .612 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .987 .058 .043 <.001 .988 .029 .444 
Teaching: applications -.027 .391 -.048 .141 -.039 .062 -.102 .018 
Explained variance 48.6%  36.4%  64.6%  42.9%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 50.9%  62.4%  34.6%  54.8%  
Unexplained variance (school) .5%  1.2%  .8%  2.3%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across groups are highlighted in superscript. 
 
Page 239 of 361 
Conceptual groups (regression-residual accuracy/bias groups) 
 
The students’ intentions and attitudes varied across the four (regression-
residual) conceptual accuracy/bias groups (Section 8.1.1): those with over-
confident beliefs (26.8% of the considered students) reported the highest 
intentions and attitudes, then those with accurately-high beliefs (23.6%), 
then those with accurately-low beliefs (20.6%), and then those with under-
confident beliefs (28.9%). The groups were formed via classifying the 
regression-residual indicator of accuracy/bias, which essentially ensured 
that under-confident students had below-average self-concept and average 
task-scores, while over-confident students had above-average self-concept 
and average task-scores. 
Students’ science intentions were predicted by different factors in 
different ways across these regression-residual groups (Table 30 
summarises the comprehensive set of predictors). For example, utility value 
had a relatively higher predictive association with science intentions for 
accurately-high students than for the other groups. Compared to accurately-
high students, interest in areas/topics within science had a relatively lower 
predictive association for under-confident students. The students’ personal 
value of science and reported careers information had lower predictive 
associations with science intentions for under-confident students than for 
over-confident students; for under-confident students, the reported careers 
information had a sufficiently low magnitude as to be insignificantly 
predictive (i.e. essentially not differing from zero). 
Students’ task-scores were predictive of their intentions only for 
under-confident students, while students’ self-concept beliefs were 
predictive only for accurately-low students, although the coefficient 
magnitudes were only significantly different when considering a smaller set 
of key predictors (from preliminary/sensitivity analysis and not tabulated for 
brevity) and not the comprehensive set of predictors (Table 30); 
accordingly, such results may not necessarily be conclusive. Nevertheless, 
the other patterns of coefficients (such as for utility and personal value) 
across the groups were not dependent on whether smaller or larger sets of 
predictors were used. 
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Fundamentally, the regression-residual groups (Table 30) and the 
earlier above-average/below-average groups (Table 29) showed some 
similarities, despite the different methods in forming the groups. For 
example, careers information had a significantly higher predictive 
association with science intentions for both of the over-confident groups, 
and for both of the accurately-low groups, when compared to their 
respective under-confident groups. Utility value was also more predictive of 
science intentions for accurately-high students than those in the other groups 
across both approaches. 
However, differences across the methods/approaches were also seen. 
Considering the above-average/below-average groups (Table 29), utility 
value had a higher predictive association for under-confident students than 
over-confident students, while no differences in predictive associations 
across the groups were observed for students’ personal value of science. 
Conversely, considering the regression-residual groups (Table 30), personal 
value had a lower predictive association with science intentions for under-
confident students than for over-confident students, while no difference 
across these two groups was observed for utility value. Accordingly, while 
similarities were observed, different methods of forming accuracy/bias 
groups could potentially entail some different conclusions/inferences, such 
as whether to focus on either utility value or personal value when further 
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Table 30: PISA (England) 2006: conceptual groups (regression-residual accuracy/bias groups, ±.5 SD boundaries), predicting science intentions 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept/constant NA .001 NA .295 NA .009 NA .004 
Gender (1=boy) .014 .532 .028 .307 .013 .530 -.017 .396 
Books at home -.037 .135 .002 .935 .014 .540 -.010 .663 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .017 .434 -.028 .316 -.009 .671 .026 .197 
Mothers’ education .003 .914 -.021 .532 -.020 .394 .028 .224 
Fathers’ education -.030 .233 .038 .265 .024 .321 <.001 .990 










 -.016 .563 
UL LH LO
 -.140 <.001 
LH
 -.046 .047 
LO
 -.030 .225 
Interest (various areas) 
UH




.121 <.001 .067 .009 












 .122 <.001 
LO 
.142 <.001 .172 <.001 
UO LO 
.251 <.001 
General value -.104 <.001 -.071 .049 -.088 <.001 -.101 <.001 
Science activities .078 .002 .066 .039 .049 .039 .046 .071 
School career preparation -.006 .823 -.071 .018 -.037 .097 -.029 .240 




.157 <.001 .075 .001 
UO 
.108 <.001 
Teaching: interaction -.021 .443 -.061 .091 -.055 .023 -.026 .336 
Teaching: activities 
UH




 -.094 <.001 
LO
 -.076 .004 
Teaching: investigations .001 .973 .059 .083 .010 .669 .017 .498 
Teaching: applications 
UL
 -.011 .698 
UL
 -.100 .008 -.034 .169 -.046 .111 
Explained variance 42.5%  33.9%  59.0%  57.0%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 55.8%  65.8%  41.0%  41.8%  
Unexplained variance (school) 1.7%  .3%  .0%  1.2%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across groups are highlighted in superscript. 
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Section 9.1.2: Accuracy/bias clusters 
 
The students’ reported science intentions and attitudes differed across the 
four accuracy/bias clusters from latent-profile analysis (Section 8.1.2). 
Essentially, intentions and attitudes were highest in the cluster with 
‘accurately-high’ self-concept beliefs (cluster D, 10.4% of the considered 
students, with highly above-average self-concept beliefs and task-scores, but 
with some degree of over-confidence), then ‘over-confident’ students 
(cluster C, 15.9%, students with moderately above-average task-scores and 
self-concept beliefs but with relatively higher self-concept beliefs), then 
‘under-confident’ students (cluster A, 55.9%, with average task-scores but 
slightly below-average self-concept beliefs), then ‘accurately-low’ students 
(cluster B, 17.8%, with below-average task-scores and self-concept beliefs). 
Students’ science intentions were predicted in different ways across 
these different clusters (Table 31). Some similarities were also observed in 
the patterns of coefficients across these accuracy/bias clusters and the earlier 
accuracy/bias groups (Section 9.1.1). While the students’ perceived utility 
of science and personal value of science were predictive of science 
intentions for all clusters, the predictive associations were lowest for those 
students in cluster B, especially compared to students in cluster D; this 
partially mirrored the differences between the ‘accurately-low’ and 
‘accurately-high’ groups (although recognising that the personal value 
coefficients did not statistically-significantly differ for the groups). The 
personal value of science had a relatively lower predictive coefficient for 
cluster A compared to cluster C, which mirrored the difference between the 
‘under-confident’ and ‘over-confident’ regression-residual groups. 
Reporting more student-led investigations within science lessons/teaching 
associated with higher science intentions only for students in cluster B (the 
factor was not significantly predictive for the other clusters), which was also 
seen for the ‘accurately-low’ above-average/below-average group. Students 
in clusters B and D reported, on average, experiencing similar levels of 
student-led investigations (Table 16 and Table 17), which perhaps 
emphasises the importance of considering whether different students might 
consider different factors in different ways during their decision-making. 
Various other differences were also apparent; for example, students’ task-
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scores were more predictive of science intentions for those students in 
cluster D than for those in other clusters. However, many differences across 
the clusters did not clearly correspond to those observed across the 
accuracy/bias groups, which perhaps unavoidably reflected the differences 
in profiles (and student numbers) across the groups and the clusters. 
 
 
Page 244 of 361 
Table 31: PISA (England) 2006: accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters), predicting science intentions 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 










Gender (1=boy) .009 .552 -.004 .894 .007 .795 -.020 .507 
Books at home 
AD
 -.001 .947 -.026 .345 
CD
 <.001 .995 
AD CD
 -.090 .005 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.013 .404 .043 .091 .037 .168 -.027 .371 
Mothers’ education AC -.017 .333 .010 .743 AC .057 .062 .004 .891 





 -.052 .090 
BC CD 
.065 .066 
AD BD CD 
.140 <.001 
Self-concept .053 .001 .201 <.001 -.048 .060 .015 .618 
Self-efficacy (areas) 
AB
 -.076 <.001 
AB 
.006 .858 -.045 .147 -.042 .177 






























General value -.087 <.001 -.080 .031 -.106 .002 -.085 .019 
Science activities .062 <.001 .082 .012 .048 .139 .062 .104 
School career preparation -.037 .030 -.006 .859 -.045 .138 .005 .892 
School career information .089 <.001 .129 <.001 .084 .005 .060 .060 
Teaching: interaction -.027 .143 -.051 .170 -.074 .040 -.030 .453 




AB BC BD 
.104 .004 
AC BC
 -.062 .074 
BD
 -.024 .494 
Teaching: applications -.035 .076 -.054 .168 .002 .955 -.086 .028 
Explained variance 45.2%  52.3%  53.9%  62.6%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 54.4%  47.0%  45.1%  34.2%  
Unexplained variance (school) .4%  .6%  1.0%  3.2%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across clusters are highlighted in superscript. 
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Section 9.2: Results: 2014/2015 survey 
 
Predictive modelling was applied for each of the various groups and clusters 
considered in the 2014/2015 survey, as with the PISA 2006 survey. This 
involved considering the accuracy/bias groups (Section 9.2.1) and the 
accuracy/bias clusters (Section 9.2.2) to help explore why the students 
expressed different science intentions. 
 
 
Section 9.2.1: Accuracy/bias groups 
 
Conceptual groups (difference-score groups with accurately-high and 
accurately-low groups) 
 
Examining the conceptual (difference-score) accuracy/bias groups in the 
2014/2015 survey, where the students’ task-level self-reflective 
accuracy/bias was measured, highlighted that (Section 8.2.1): the students’ 
intentions and self-efficacy descended from the accurately-high group, then 
the over-confident and under-confident groups (which did not differ), and 
then the accurately-low group; alternately, the other key predictors of 
intentions (interest value, utility value, personal value, and norms/influences 
from parents) descended from the accurately-high group, then the over-
confident group, and then the under-confident and the accurately-low 
groups (which did not differ). The groups were relatively similarly sized, 
with 29.4% of the considered students across Years 9, 10, and 11 classified 
as under-confident, 21.2% as accurately-low, 21.4% as accurately-high, and 
28.1% as over-confident. 
Fewer students were considered in the 2014/2015 survey compared 
to PISA 2006, so that undertaking predictive modelling using many 
predictors (estimating many parameters) for each group/cluster could 
potentially increase the uncertainty associated with the parameter estimates, 
given smaller groups/clusters. Accordingly, preliminary/sensitivity analysis 
considered smaller and larger set of predictors, covering theorised factors 
and those previously highlighted as key predictors (Section 7.2); the 
Page 246 of 361 
fundamental results were nevertheless broadly similar across the various 
models. 
When the students’ science intentions were predicted for each group, 
various predictive coefficients significantly differed across the groups 
(Table 32 shows the comprehensive set of predictors and Table 33 shows a 
smaller set of predictors for illustration). For example, science intentions 
were more strongly predicted by perceived utility of science, self-efficacy, 
and the students’ academic year itself, for accurately-high students 
compared to under-confident students. Conversely, science intentions were 
more strongly predicted by personal value of science for under-confident 
students than for accurately-high students; surprisingly, the students’ 
personal value of science was not significantly predictive for the accurately-
high students. 
Research and commentary within science education has often 
assumed that students’ aspirations and attitudes to science decline as they 
grow older (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 2003; Royal Society, 2008b). The 
students’ reported attitudes and beliefs, on average, appeared to support 
such an assumption, although this could not be conclusively determined due 
to the low numbers involved and since the students were not surveyed over 
time (the means per academic year are detailed in Appendix 7 for 
reference). Considered across all students in Years 9, 10, and 11, the 
indicator of academic year was not predictive of science intentions, once the 
students’ attitudes were included as predictors (Table 8). However, when 
considering the accuracy/bias groups separately, the indicator of the 
students’ academic year was positively predictive of science intentions for 
accurately-high students, when controlling for their various attitudes and 
backgrounds (Table 32). Further (unknown) factors would need to be 
considered in order to help explain such a result, and/or exploration 
undertaken into whether, for some specific groups of students at least, 
science intentions actually increase over time (which is perhaps plausible, 
given prior research as reviewed in Section 2.2.1). 
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Table 32: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): difference-score accuracy/bias groups with accurately-low/accurately-high groups, predicting science intentions (comprehensive set 
of predictors) 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept 
UH
 NA .513 
LH
 NA .216 
UH LH HO
 NA <.001 
HO
 NA .323 
Year 
UH
 -.017 .610 
LH
 -.073 .183 




Gender (1=boy) .005 .882 -.029 .509 -.022 .586 .024 .514 
Ethnicity (Black) 
UL
 -.017 .566 
UL 
.093 .052 .019 .605 -.009 .799 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .055 .076 .042 .330 -.021 .602 -.026 .452 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .012 .744 .104 .032 .044 .410 .075 .059 
Ethnicity (mixed) -.005 .862 .038 .393 .034 .362 .068 .051 
Ethnicity (other) .030 .300 .065 .132 -.009 .810 .035 .285 
Books at home -.020 .550 -.087 .065 -.022 .588 -.042 .299 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .010 .746 .054 .247 -.022 .558 .047 .185 
Mothers’ education -.044 .252 .004 .948 .042 .380 .041 .410 
Fathers’ education .033 .429 -.055 .372 -.085 .108 -.057 .258 
Task-score .037 .448 
LH
 -.129 .162 
LH 
.105 .187 .021 .689 
Task-confidence .014 .776 -.005 .957 .020 .806 .049 .377 
Current grade -.080 .073 -.034 .537 -.020 .737 -.056 .287 
Self-concept 
UH 
.107 .032 .096 .127 
UH
 -.058 .303 -.006 .917 
Self-efficacy 
UH 
.037 .421 .140 .011 
UH 
.176 .002 .102 .069 




UL LH LO 
.185 .019 






.249 <.001 .218 .001 
UH 
.045 .432 .205 .001 
Cost value (absence of) .070 .029 .056 .277 -.032 .419 .067 .125 
Orientation: mastery -.037 .315 .024 .650 -.065 .148 -.068 .188 
Orientation: performance -.026 .434 -.098 .048 -.079 .064 -.056 .242 
Perceived control 
UH
 -.124 .002 -.019 .744 
UH 
.074 .081 -.040 .465 




 -.106 .037 
UH
 -.090 .059 -.073 .091 
Study strategy: self-regulation .051 .353 -.072 .326 -.022 .711 -.040 .554 
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 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 




 -.051 .381 .068 .272 
Study strategy: memorisation 
UO
 -.040 .440 .126 .070 .041 .398 
UO 
.163 .007 




 -.077 .160 
Anxiety (absence of) .058 .218 .043 .537 .010 .844 .020 .705 
Mastery norms (good grade) .046 .145 -.007 .883 -.023 .609 -.025 .512 
Subject-comparisons .003 .937 .026 .677 .070 .142 .119 .017 
Peer-comparisons .020 .619 -.053 .382 -.011 .835 .016 .744 
Social persuasions (praise) -.105 .009 -.134 .018 .005 .920 -.019 .739 
Vicarious experiences 
UH
 -.009 .795 -.106 .035 
UH
 -.139 <.001 -.087 .048 
Norms/influence (friends) -.010 .754 
LH
 -.119 .016 
LH 
.026 .509 -.091 .032 
Norms/influence (parents) .064 .120 .154 .017 .123 .013 .187 <.001 







 -.034 .462 
LO
 -.012 .815 
Explained variance 68.4%  52.4%  65.7%  69.2%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 31.6%  47.0%  32.4%  30.8%  
Unexplained variance (school) .0%  .6%  1.8%  .0%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across groups are highlighted in superscript. 
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Table 33: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): difference-score accuracy/bias groups with accurately-low/accurately-high groups, predicting science intentions (smaller set of 
predictors) 
 
 Under-confident (U) Accurately-low (L) Accurately-high (H) Over-confident (O) 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept 
UH
 NA .695 
LH
 NA .249 
UH LH HO
 NA <.001 
HO
 NA .427 
Year 
UH
 -.025 .415 
LH
 -.072 .173 




Gender (1=boy) .012 .710 -.049 .247 -.015 .684 .001 .967 
Task-score 
UL




 -.143 .097 
LH 
.108 .150 .008 .883 
Task-confidence .001 .978 .031 .712 -.010 .891 .026 .625 
Current grade -.051 .184 .003 .949 -.047 .368 -.020 .677 
Self-concept .082 .064 .089 .134 -.024 .634 .065 .186 
Self-efficacy 
UH 
.049 .251 .128 .011 
UH 
.172 .001 .096 .059 
Interest value .061 .251 .064 .326 .028 .638 .104 .093 
Utility value 

















Cost value (absence of) 
UH 
.072 .019 .064 .204 
UH
 -.032 .395 .044 .277 




 -.091 .026 -.088 .070 
Orientation: performance -.030 .345 -.066 .164 -.085 .033 -.016 .711 
Perceived control 
UL UH
 -.135 <.001 
UL
 -.013 .801 
UH 
.055 .159 -.060 .198 
Perceived control (exams) 
UL UH UO 
.027 .449 
UL
 -.124 .008 
UH
 -.111 .009 
UO
 -.099 .013 
Study strategy: memorisation 
UL UO







Anxiety (absence) .066 .083 .016 .754 .042 .336 .091 .026 





 -.120 .011 
UH
 -.130 <.001 -.077 .066 
Norms/influence (friends) -.015 .609 -.108 .022 -.015 .668 -.086 .034 
Norms/influence (parents) 
UO 






UL LH LO 
.181 <.001 
UH LH
 -.048 .219 
LO 
.002 .956 
Explained variance 69.2%  51.4%  66.5%  59.4%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 30.8%  47.4%  32.1%  40.6%  
Unexplained variance (school) .0%  1.2%  1.5%  .0%  
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Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across groups are highlighted in superscript. 
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Section 9.2.2: Accuracy/bias clusters 
 
Using latent-profile analysis to reveal clusters of students in the 2014/2015 
survey, considering their task-confidence and task-scores and considering 
students across Years 9, 10, and 11, highlighted that (Section 8.2.2): 
students’ intentions and attitudes were highest in the cluster with 
‘accurately-high’ task-confidence (cluster C, 8.7% of the considered 
students), then ‘under-confident’ students (cluster A, 42.3%, with 
moderately above-average task-scores and task-confidence but with 
relatively lower task-confidence), then ‘over-confident’ students (cluster D, 
7.5%, with below-average task-scores and task-confidence but with 
relatively higher task-confidence) and ‘accurately-low’ students (cluster B, 
41.5%) who generally reported similarly. 
As with the accuracy/bias groups, when predicting the students’ 
science intentions for each cluster, the lower numbers of students in some 
clusters may have reduced the reliability and/or entailed that considering 
higher numbers of predictors would be less feasible. Accordingly, 
preliminary/sensitivity analysis considered comprehensive and reduced sets 
of predictors; the patterns of differences across the clusters were similar for 
many predictors, but not all. It remains unclear whether inconsistencies 
when modelling different sets of predictors were meaningful (perhaps 
highlighting potential mediation between factors that would need to be 
explored further) or reflected the inherent difficulty of modelling clusters 
with smaller numbers of students; further research with increased numbers 
of students would be necessary to clarify the area. 
Fundamentally, when the students’ science intentions were predicted 
for each cluster, various predictive coefficients significantly differed across 
the clusters (Table 34 shows the comprehensive set of predictors and Table 
35 shows a smaller set of predictors for illustration). For example, the 
predictive association between utility value and science intentions varied 
across some of the pairs of clusters, although the patterns varied depending 
on which predictors were included. 
Some patterns of coefficients and differences broadly followed those 
seen when considering the accuracy/bias groups (Section 9.2.1). For 
example, for cluster B (and as previously seen in the ‘accurate-low’ group), 
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students’ science intentions were predicted by their perceived utility of 
science at a lower magnitude, and were predicted by the reported provision 
of careers from teachers or the school at a higher magnitude, when 
compared to some of the other clusters. For cluster C (and as previously 
seen in the ‘accurately-high’ group), the students’ intentions were most 
strongly predicted by their perceived utility of science and by their self-
efficacy, although perhaps due to the greater uncertainty due to the smaller 
number of students in some clusters, only the predictive magnitude of 
perceived utility differed across the clusters in Table 35 when considering a 
reduced set of predictors. For those in cluster C, the indicator of the 
students’ academic year was more strongly (and positively) predictive of the 
students’ science intentions, and differed in predictive magnitude compared 
to other clusters, but only when considering the full set of predictors (Table 
34). However, the pattern of coefficients for cluster D had few similarities 
with those seen for the conceptual ‘over-confident’ group, and cluster A had 
few similarities with the conceptual ‘under-confident’ group, which may 
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Table 34: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters), predicting science intentions (comprehensive set of predictors) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept 





 NA <.001 
AD CD





-.053 .147 .141 .173 -.097 .277 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .995 .029 .364 -.054 .544 -.085 .241 
Ethnicity (Black) .007 .754 .040 .229 .002 .978 .076 .384 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .028 .266 -.005 .883 .023 .815 .002 .971 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .036 .276 .085 .017 .072 .568 -.012 .897 
Ethnicity (mixed) -.001 .971 .050 .107 .110 .157 .039 .635 
Ethnicity (other) .021 .382 .058 .052 .027 .724 -.002 .972 
Books at home -.031 .260 -.049 .139 .092 .235 -.049 .577 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.006 .808 .044 .167 -.007 .920 .009 .902 
Mothers’ education 
AD 






 -.266 .022 
Fathers’ education .005 .890 -.036 .388 -.107 .313 .173 .191 
Task-score .034 .210 -.013 .705 .064 .413 -.102 .242 
Task-confidence .015 .625 -.033 .353 .003 .968 -.004 .964 
Current grade -.022 .537 -.046 .244 .064 .552 .043 .718 
Self-concept .057 .146 .042 .348 .048 .675 -.077 .538 
Self-efficacy .085 .021 .089 .034 .189 .035 .223 .043 





.399 <.001 .500 <.001 
AD 
.292 .096 
Personal value .174 <.001 .161 .002 .179 .102 .041 .790 
Cost value (absence of) .016 .566 .097 .008 -.069 .347 -.153 .198 
Orientation: mastery 
AD
 -.030 .301 
BD
 -.019 .635 -.099 .337 
AD BD
 -.317 .005 
Orientation: performance -.056 .047 -.056 .128 -.090 .315 .073 .480 
Perceived control -.001 .972 
BC
 -.098 .021 
BC 
.201 .016 .076 .542 
Perceived control (exams) -.091 .005 -.048 .182 -.004 .971 -.031 .740 
Study strategy: self-regulation .015 .734 .044 .424 -.060 .623 -.121 .344 
Study strategy: control -.037 .366 .076 .150 -.148 .238 .098 .488 
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 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Study strategy: memorisation .073 .048 .053 .300 .049 .598 .189 .276 
Study strategy: elaboration -.052 .136 <.001 .999 .151 .090 -.022 .878 
Anxiety (absence of) .017 .660 .033 .484 -.084 .355 .092 .471 
Mastery norms (good grade) 
AC




 -.078 .416 
Subject-comparisons .046 .158 .060 .168 -.017 .827 .114 .255 
Peer-comparisons -.007 .826 -.036 .383 .132 .188 -.046 .742 
Social persuasions (praise) -.048 .146 -.081 .057 -.052 .586 -.015 .907 
Vicarious experiences 
AC
 -.018 .510 -.106 .004 
AC
 -.237 .004 -.012 .911 
Norms/influence (friends) -.041 .115 -.069 .049 .122 .153 -.023 .849 
Norms/influence (parents) .095 .005 .126 .004 .179 .052 .053 .700 







 -.268 .004 .003 .980 
Explained variance 68.1%  49.8%  48.8%  62.2%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 31.5%  49.7%  36.9%  37.8%  
Unexplained variance (school) .3%  .5%  14.2%  .0%  
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across clusters are highlighted in superscript. 
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Table 35: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters (four clusters), predicting science intentions (smaller set of predictors) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D 
Item/factor Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) Std. Effect Sig. (p) 
Intercept 
AB AC AD
 NA .005 
AB BC
 NA .448 
AC BC CD
 NA .002 
AD CD
 NA .016 
Year 
AB AD
 035 .201 
AB






 -.112 .128 









 -.102 .162 
Task-confidence .012 .687 -.041 .213 .027 .691 -.017 .821 
Current grade -.021 .521 -.043 .246 -.064 .426 .074 .428 
Self-concept .063 .069 .071 .091 .056 .564 -.021 .825 
Self-efficacy .078 .022 .103 .009 .190 .020 .123 .130 










Personal value .172 <.001 .173 <.001 .104 .274 .159 .238 








 -.205 .036 
Orientation: mastery 
AD
 -.038 .168 
BD
 -.004 .923 -.123 .126 
AD BD
 -.263 .008 
Orientation: performance -.061 .020 -.045 .204 -.101 .151 .091 .301 
Perceived control -.022 .458 
BC
 -.103 .007 
BC 
.123 .089 .055 .559 
Perceived control (exams) -.096 .001 -.070 .041 -.142 .104 -.092 .239 
Study strategy: memorisation .031 .269 .102 .005 .139 .054 .169 .095 
Anxiety (absence) .032 .308 .051 .152 .036 .630 .127 .096 
Social persuasions (praise) -.058 .057 -.101 .012 .048 .573 -.052 .627 
Vicarious experiences -.019 .459 -.104 .003 -.157 .026 -.006 .943 
Norms/influence (friends) -.054 .028 -.067 .047 .012 .853 -.035 .721 
Norms/influence (parents) .116 <.001 .120 .004 .101 .231 .088 .426 
Career/events 
AB AC
 -.017 .517 





 -.255 .001 
BD
 -.119 .214 
Explained variance 69.1%  49.4%  55.9%  59.4%  
Unexplained variance (residual) 30.6%  49.9%  39.9%  40.6%  
Unexplained variance (school) .3%  .7%  4.1%  .0%  
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Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Standardised coefficients (‘Std. Effect’) and significance (p-values; ‘Sig. (p)’) are reported. Significant 
coefficients (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Significant differences in coefficient magnitude (p < .05) across clusters are highlighted in superscript. 
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Section 9.3: Discussion 
 
In PISA 2006 and in the 2014/2015 survey, the students’ science intentions 
were predicted by different factors in different ways across the various 
conceptual accuracy/bias groups and across the accuracy/bias clusters from 
latent-profile analysis, although differences were not apparent for every 
predictor. Accuracy/bias could then be inferred to be a ‘moderator’ of some 
of the associations between the predictors and students’ science intentions 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Some notable differences in coefficient magnitude across the groups 
and/or clusters appeared to involve the expectancy-value factors. 
Specifically, considering the conceptual groups for both surveys, those with 
accurately-high confidence beliefs had the highest predictive association 
between their perceived utility of science and their science intentions, while 
students with accurately-low beliefs had the lowest predictive association. 
Considering the clusters from latent-profile analysis, in PISA 2006, science 
intentions for the cluster of ‘accurately-high’ students (cluster D) were more 
strongly predicted by their perceived utility of science and personal value of 
science when compared to the cluster of ‘accurately-low’ students (cluster 
B), similar to the results from the conceptual groups. A somewhat similar 
pattern was seen also across the clusters for the 2014/2015 survey when 
considering the students’ utility value. Additionally, utility value had a 
higher predictive association with intentions for under-confident students 
than for over-confident students when considering the above-
average/below-average conceptual groups in PISA 2006, and when 
considering the difference-score conceptual groups in the 2014/2015 survey 
(but only in models with smaller sets of predictors for the 2014/2015 survey, 
and this pattern was not observed for the regression-residual conceptual 
groups in PISA 2006). 
The students’ personal value of science to their identity was 
predictive for all of the conceptual groups in PISA 2006, but no differences 
in coefficient magnitude were observed across the above-average/below-
average groups. For the regression-residual groups, and also for the clusters, 
personal value of science had a higher predictive association with intentions 
for over-confident students compared to under-confident students (cluster C 
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and cluster A). There was little correspondence across the two surveys, 
however. No statistically-significant differences were apparent for personal 
value across the clusters in the 2014/2015 survey; for the conceptual groups, 
however, personal value was not predictive for those with accurately-high 
confidence, but had a higher predictive magnitude for under-confident 
students. 
The students’ interest/enjoyment value of science was predictive for 
all conceptual groups in PISA 2006, but least strongly predictive for those 
with accurately-low beliefs (recognising that the coefficients followed this 
pattern for the regression-residual groups, although were not statistically-
significantly different). A similar pattern could be inferred from the clusters, 
but with fewer statistically-significant differences. Conversely, in the 
2014/2015 survey, there were no significant differences of coefficient 
magnitude for interest across the groups or the clusters. In the 2014/2015 
survey, interest value appeared less predictive than other factors even when 
considering all students (Section 7.2), which may explain the absence of 
differences across the groups or clusters. 
The perceived costs associated with studying science were not 
measured in PISA 2006. The 2014/2015 survey highlighted that the absence 
of perceived costs associated with higher intentions, but only for the under-
confident conceptual group at a small magnitude and with no statistically-
significant differences in coefficient magnitude across the groups. The 
separate factor of science anxiety was generally not predictive for any group 
or cluster. 
Cohering in some respects with earlier research (Dupeyrat, Escribe, 
Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & Leondari, 2011; Gresham, Lane, 
MacMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000), the over-confident students generally 
expressed higher attitudes than under-confident students (Section 8). 
Contrary to the relevant hypothesis (Section 4.2), however, interest did not 
appear to be more predictive of intentions for over-confident students 
compared to under-confident students; for other factors, differences across 
the methods and the two surveys ensured that the results were less clear. 
It remains difficult to contextualise and compare the results against 
prior studies; relatively little research has explicitly focused on potential 
differences in decision-making for different students, although some 
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research has plausibly established that different students may find different 
factors to be more or less relevant to their subject choices (Bøe, 2012). The 
various results from the two surveys highlight the benefit of considering 
differences across groups or clusters, rather than considering entire samples, 
although it perhaps remains unclear what groups or analytical perspectives 
may be most relevant. Given the focus on students’ accuracy/bias, other 
potential groups were not considered, such as grouping by interest, utility, 
gender, background, and/or any other factors. For example, students’ 
attainment considered alone has appeared to entail differences in students’ 
decision-making, suggesting that students could simply be analytically 
grouped by attainment (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 2008). Similarly, further 
research has highlighted that girls and boys may consider different factors 
and/or the same factors in different ways when making their studying 
choices, although potentially contrasting results can be seen across different 
studies (Bøe, 2012; Bosker & Dekkers, 1994; Crombie, et al., 2005; 
Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009). 
The varying predictive magnitudes of the expectancy-value factors 
across the groups and clusters may potentially provide insight to further link 
motivational theories and analytical perspectives with students’ choices. In 
contemporary research, the expectancy-value model of students’ choices 
proposes a general structure and key factors, including specific aspects of 
‘value’ that are theorised to reciprocally associate with each other and with 
students’ confidence considered as expectations of success (akin to self-
efficacy beliefs) (Eccles, 2009; Eccles, et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 
2000). Sometimes the measures of value have been aggregated together 
rather than being considered separately (Chow, Eccles, & Salmela-Aro, 
2012; Wang, 2012). Essentially, the contemporary expectancy-value model 
assumes that high interest, and/or utility, and/or other factors, may entail 
higher intentions. High beliefs in any one factor may be sufficient for high 
intentions, for example where higher perceived utility may cover for lower 
interest. Most predictive modelling implicitly follows a similar assumption 
of independence; any one factor considered alone is sufficient to predict 
high intentions. Alternately, historical models of students’ choices often 
assumed that motivations towards choices or actions followed from some 
form of complex aggregation or interactions between the various modelled 
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factors, such as choices following from motives multiplied by expectancies 
multiplied by incentives (Atkinson, 1957, 1964; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). 
Adapting the idea of ‘interactions’ from historical models of motivation or 
choices may suggest that high beliefs across all (or some) attitudes are 
necessary for high intentions, and/or that the interaction between someone 
holding both high interest and high utility (for example) might entail that 
they hold greatly higher intentions. 
Some prior research has explored interactions between various 
factors. For example, across all countries in PISA 2006, science intentions 
were predicted by the students’ self-concept beliefs, their interest, and (at a 
small magnitude) the interaction between self-concept and interest 
(Nagengast, et al., 2011). Similarly, for secondary school students in 
Germany, self-concept beliefs, aspects of value, and their interaction, all 
predicted higher attainment (Guo, et al., 2016; Trautwein, et al., 2012). 
However, it remains unclear which particular attitudes would interact with 
which particular factors when predicting different outcomes. For example, 
prior research either omitted students’ perceived utility value (Nagengast, et 
al., 2011) or found that it had little predictive association with attainment 
and hence was less relevant within interactions with other factors (Guo, et 
al., 2016). Such studies perhaps establish the plausibility of a general idea, 
rather than entail definitive models to be applied in other contexts. 
The results from PISA 2006 and the 2014/2015 survey suggest that 
students’ perceived utility of science may have an increased influence on 
their intentions for those with accurately-high beliefs (high confidence and 
high attainment), which perhaps suggests that interactions between factors 
are plausible. Future research may need to explore whether and how utility 
value and perhaps personal value (and/or other factors) interact with 
students’ other attitudes, attainment, and/or confidence when predicting 
their intentions. However, researchers may need to remain mindful of what 
factors intend to measure and represent (such as whether utility value, 
representing ‘indirect value’, may also have elements of ‘direct value’ for 
some students), and how interactions between factors would be interpreted 
to help understand students’ intentions and choices. As predictive models 
become increasingly abstracted, elements such as interactions may become 
harder to link to students’ potential processes of decision-making, but the 
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area could perhaps be alternately explained or explored via considering 
clusters of students. Cluster membership can be considered as another 
perspective that helps explain the overall patterns of association seen across 
an entire sample (Collins & Lanza, 2010). In PISA 2006 for example 
(Section 8.1.3), the intention/attitude cluster with the highest, above-
average, attitudes exhibited even higher perceived utility of science (and to 
a lesser degree, science intentions) than their other attitudes; modelling 
interactions between utility and other attitudes when predicting intentions 
across an entire sample might essentially help account for such (smaller 
numbers of) students. The area could alternately/additionally then be 
explored by attempting to consider what predicts cluster membership, 
and/or students’ attitudes themselves. 
The results highlighted various other points of note, when 
considering further factors. Prior studies have highlighted that students’ 
intentions may be influenced by parental or other encouragement in various 
ways (Buschor, Berweger, Frei, & Kappler, 2014; Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; 
Sjaastad, 2012). The 2014/2015 survey results extended on such earlier 
studies and highlighted that for the conceptual group of over-confident 
students, in comparison to other groups, science intentions were predicted 
relatively more by perceived norms/influences from the students’ parents. 
Further research may be necessary to explore whether any influences from 
other people are perceived by students as support or as expectations to be 
met. If over-confident students are especially encouraged to study science, 
then they may need further academic support in order to ensure that they can 
gain any pre-requisite attainment for studying science further. It also 
remains unclear whether encouragement might, in some cases, lead to over-
confidence (and/or whether over-confidence is partially rationalised via 
perceived expectations). 
In the 2014/2015 survey, across all students, the students’ age 
(academic year) had no predictive association with their intentions, once the 
students’ attitudes were modelled. However, when considered for the 
conceptual accuracy/bias groups, older students were predicted to have 
higher science intentions, accounting for their attitudes and background, but 
only for those with accurately-high beliefs. It is perhaps plausible to infer 
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that some students may refine their intentions over time and become 
increasingly sure of particular aspirations (Cleaves, 2005). 
In England, declining attitudes to science as students grow older has 
often been considered as a cause for concern (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 
2003). In other countries, changes in students’ attitudes over time have often 
involved largely-positive views declining to slightly-positive or neutral 
views when considered across various academic subjects (Archambault, 
Eccles, & Vida, 2010; Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, & Wigfield, 2002; 
Nagy, et al., 2010). Similarly, different patterns of change have been 
observed for different groups of students, for example with some attitudes 
remaining relatively stable over time for some students or some attitudes 
declining but remaining high or moderate for other students (Archambault, 
Eccles, & Vida, 2010; Köller, Baumert, & Schnabel, 2001; Musu-Gillette, 
Wigfield, Harring, & Eccles, 2015). Further research may then need to 
identify groups of students in England and explore in more detail how 
attitudes decrease or increase over time. 
Both surveys highlighted that the reported provision of careers 
information or guidance was generally not predictive or was less predictive 
for the conceptual groups with accurately-high beliefs, although the 
magnitudes varied across the two surveys for the other groups. Considering 
the clusters, careers information was more predictive of science intentions 
for the ‘accurately-low’ cluster than for the ‘under-confident’ and 
‘accurately-high’ clusters in the 2014/2015 survey. A similar pattern of 
coefficient magnitudes was seen for the groups and clusters in the PISA 
2006 survey, although differences were only statistically-significant across 
the regression-residual groups. 
Promoting science through careers information and guidance has 
often been emphasised within science education, especially as the National 
Curriculum has not explicitly conveyed a requirement for teachers to 
explain the careers available within science and the careers that may be 
facilitated by science skills or qualifications (Archer & DeWitt, 2015; 
Department for Education, 2013, 2014; Osborne & Dillon, 2008; Royal 
Society, 2014). The National Curriculum does not appear to cover a need to 
explain careers information for any subject, however, perhaps due to the 
need for careers information being addressed through other statutory 
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guidance, which does highlight a need to convey that many careers require 
high mathematics and science knowledge (Department for Education, 
2015). It is possible that teachers may discuss careers within science or 
other lessons regardless, in addition to any provision from specialised 
careers staff and external sources. While the nature and provision of careers 
advice at school has indeed been associated with students studying physical 
science subjects, the extent or mechanism perhaps remains unclear (Bennett, 
Lubben, & Hampden-Thompson, 2013; Blenkinsop, McCrone, Wade, & 
Morris, 2006). For example, interviews with university students in Denmark 
highlighted that they had considered their choices as a personal 
responsibility and that advice from school careers staff had not been 
frequently sought (Holmegaard, Ulriksen, & Madsen, 2014). In many 
research studies that highlight the influence of teachers, it also remains 
unclear whether this involved formal or informal careers guidance and/or 
other forms of support (Aschbacher, Li, & Roth, 2010; Maltese, Melki, & 
Wiebke, 2014; Sjaastad, 2012). Given the results from PISA 2006 and the 
2014/2015 survey, it perhaps remains important to consider and explore 
whether different students find careers advice more or less helpful, and how 
careers advice might influence students’ intentions (potentially directly) 
and/or influence students’ attitudes (such as someone’s perceived utility of 
science, and hence indirectly influence their intentions). 
 
 
Section 9.3.1: Conclusions 
 
Research question three: did students with different degrees of confidence 
accuracy/bias consider their science intentions in different ways? 
 
Fundamentally, the results from the PISA 2006 survey and the 2014/2015 
survey highlighted that science intentions were indeed predicted by different 
factors and/or in different ways, especially for factors such as the students’ 
utility value and personal value of science, although with some variation 
across the methods and surveys. These highlighted that attitudes such as 
utility value could be more predictive of intentions for students with 
accurately-high confidence beliefs; depending on the methods, utility value 
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could be more predictive of intentions for under-confident students than 
over-confident students, and personal value could be more predictive for 
over-confident students than under-confident students, or that no differences 
could be observed for these factors. These inconsistencies highlighted that 
further research would be needed to clarify the area. Nevertheless, the 
results broadly highlighted that the impact of under-confidence and over-
confidence may be more complex than previously assumed within prior 
studies (Bouffard & Narciss, 2011): confidence biases may associate with 
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Section 10: General discussion 
 
The preceding results are now summarised, broadly focusing on 
highlighting the new knowledge and insights gained (Section 10.1). As in 
any research, various limitations may determine how meaningful the results 
are, and may raise implications for future research (Section 10.2). Finally, 
implications for practice and policy are suggested (Section 10.3) and 
conclusions are drawn (Section 10.4). 
 
 
Section 10.1: New knowledge and insights gained 
 
An increased understanding of students’ intentions to study science at 
upper-secondary school may help wider consideration of varying or 
imbalanced progression (Section 1). Prior research into science education in 
England has not extensively considered the potential impact of students’ 
confidence accuracy/bias (Section 2), although such bias may associate with 
students’ attitudes and motivational beliefs (Section 3). The research 
presented in this thesis broadly aimed to enhance understanding of the area 
by applying confidence accuracy/bias as an analytical perspective (Section 
4). The research considered two surveys (Section 5), PISA 2006 and a new 
survey undertaken in 2014/2015, to address methodological limitations in 
one set of data with strengths in the other, and so that any consistent results 
across varying approaches would enhance their plausibility. Emerging 
methods such as identifying clusters of students with different degrees of 
confidence accuracy/bias via latent-profile analysis were also applied 
(Section 6), which appeared not to have been previously used to consider 
confidence accuracy/bias in England. 
The first research question examined which attitudes and 
motivational beliefs (including expressions of confidence) were the most 
relevant influences on students’ science intentions (Section 7). Across both 
surveys, students’ perceived utility of science and personal value of science 
were most strongly predictive of science intentions, together with other 
factors. This provided a new insight in itself, since the personal value of 
science to someone’s identity has generally been explored through 
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qualitative perspectives where the relative impact compared to other factors 
could not easily be determined (Archer, et al., 2010; Aschbacher, Li, & 
Roth, 2010; Carlone & Johnson, 2007). On a wider level, the subsequent 
formation of clusters of students, based on their intentions and attitudes 
(specifically, including the key predictors of intentions such as personal 
value), highlighted some coherence across these factors for students within 
each cluster. Accordingly, science education may benefit from exploring 
how ideas of science identity can be considered and developed further 
within quantitative approaches, such as extending ‘personal value’ factors to 
consider more dimensions of identity and/or considering the structure, 
coherence, or associations between multiple factors. 
Across both surveys, the indicators of attainment appeared to 
mediate the predictive association between the number of books at home 
and students’ intentions, while the indicators of confidence appeared to 
mediate the association between gender and intentions. The predictive 
association between intentions and parents working within science appeared 
to be mediated by attainment in PISA 2006 and by utility value in the 
2014/2015 survey. Additionally, in the 2014/2015 survey, utility value and 
norms/influences from parents formed separate factors and were both 
independent predictors of students’ science intentions. These results provide 
another wider insight, suggesting that aggregating indicators of parents 
working within science, utility value, norms/influences from parents, and 
other aspects as ‘science capital’ should perhaps be considered cautiously 
(Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015). Ideas such as science 
identity and science capital could perhaps be developed further within 
social-cognitive models (Eccles, 2009; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), separating 
potential antecedents, such as parental attitudes or parents working within 
science, from students’ attitudes and beliefs, while further considering and 
clarifying what ‘identity’ and ‘capital’ may entail. 
Across both surveys, the students’ intentions were predicted more by 
utility value than interest value; prior research in England has similarly 
highlighted the importance of utility value (Mujtaba & Reiss, 2014; Vidal 
Rodeiro, 2007) or highlighted the importance of interest (Bates, Pollard, 
Usher, & Oakley, 2009; Mellors-Bourne, Connor, & Jackson, 2011). Utility 
value aims to measure students’ perceptions of the indirect value of studying 
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science (Eccles, 2009), such as to gain skills that could be employed in 
many areas, but this may be inseparable from some aspects of direct value: 
for those who intend a career in science, utility value may potentially reflect 
the recognition that studying science at various stages of education is 
unavoidably necessary for a science career. On a wider level, it may be 
useful to consider how studying science may be directly and/or indirectly 
valued, and how factors are conceptualised and interpreted (Archer, 
Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015; Claussen & Osborne, 2013; 
Williams & Choudry, 2016). Concurrently, it may be beneficial to identify 
antecedents of attitudes such as utility value. 
Students’ confidence expressed as self-concept beliefs was a strong 
predictor of their science intentions in the PISA 2006 survey, while 
confidence expressed as self-efficacy beliefs (contextualised as confidence 
in their expected grades at GCSE/A-Level) was a strong predictor in the 
2014/2015 survey. Indicators of accuracy/bias appeared to be directly 
predictive of science intentions if the underlying expression of confidence 
was also predictive, as in PISA 2006. Measures of task-level accuracy/bias 
were ultimately not predictive of science intentions in the 2014/2015 survey, 
however, when also accounting for the students’ various attitudes and 
beliefs. 
Indicators of confidence, attainment, and accuracy/bias could not be 
included together within predictive modelling, since any one of these could 
be perfectly predicted by any two of the others, given the calculation 
approaches; the impact of accuracy/bias was then unavoidably less clear 
when considering all students together (Section 7). The impact of 
accuracy/bias was then considered via grouping or clustering students, to 
determine whether students with different degrees of accuracy/bias 
nevertheless expressed different science intentions and attitudes (the second 
research question, Section 8), and whether such students might consider 
their choices in different ways (the third research question, Section 9). Both 
of these research questions were positively answered by the results from the 
two surveys: students with different degrees of accuracy/bias did express 
different science intentions and attitudes, and could be inferred to consider 
their choices in different ways, which was another new finding. 
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The application of multiple approaches to classify students also 
highlighted another insight: emergent clusters of students could be broadly 
described as showing tendencies towards under-confidence, accurately-low 
confidence, accurately-high confidence, or over-confidence. This validated 
the use of conceptual accuracy/bias groups (formed from particular 
conceptual definitions of ‘under-confidence’ and ‘over-confidence’, 
partially depending on a methodological approach or technique), especially 
since similar results from emergent clusters have been observed outside of 
England for mathematics (Sáinz & Upadyaya, 2016). While the conceptual 
groups and the emergent clusters embodied different proportions of students 
with different profiles (so that descriptive labels such as ‘under-confident’ 
would entail different magnitudes of confidence and attainment in a group 
or in a cluster), some similarities in results were still observed across the 
approaches. 
Students with accurately-high confidence generally reported the 
highest intentions and attitudes, across both surveys and for the conceptual 
accuracy/bias groups and the accuracy/bias clusters (Section 8). The results 
from PISA 2006 showed that under-confident students exhibited lower 
intentions and attitudes than over-confident students across the conceptual 
groups and emergent clusters. The results from the 2014/2015 survey 
provided partial support: the under-confident and over-confident conceptual 
accuracy/bias groups reported similar science intentions and self-efficacy, 
but under-confident students reported lower attitudes including interest, 
utility, and personal value, which were important predictors of science 
intentions (Section 7). Conversely, however, the accuracy/bias clusters in 
the 2014/2015 survey showed that those exhibiting over-confidence 
reported lower intentions and attitudes than those exhibiting under-
confidence. Groups/clusters with ‘accurately-high’ confidence could also or 
conversely appear over-confident (to varying extents), depending on the 
considered indicators, perhaps suggesting the contextual or conditional 
nature of any benefits or detriments of confidence biases, such as requiring 
some level of underlying attainment and/or confidence. 
On a wider level, the results then highlighted that results could 
partially depend on particular analytical approaches, which may be 
problematic if a study only considers one approach; while conceptual 
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groups reflected tendencies towards accuracy/bias that were indeed 
observed in emergent clusters (to varying extents), the specific profiles of 
conceptual groups and clusters unavoidably differed. Across the two 
surveys, the results broadly cohered with earlier research that associated 
higher interest with over-confidence rather than under-confidence (Gonida 
& Leondari, 2011), but contrasted when considering some other 
motivational beliefs. Earlier studies have highlighted that over-confident 
students have reported higher out-performing orientations than under-
confident students (Dupeyrat, Escribe, Huet, & Régner, 2011; Gonida & 
Leondari, 2011), for example. However, no difference was observed across 
the under-confident and over-confident accuracy/bias groups in the 
2014/2015 survey, while the under-confident accuracy/bias cluster exhibited 
higher beliefs than the over-confident cluster regarding their orientations to 
master learning and to out-perform others in science. Given the differences 
in profiles (magnitudes of attainment and confidence) across the groups and 
clusters, further research may need to consider whether such motivational 
beliefs follow more from confidence, attainment, and/or accuracy/bias. 
Concurrently (Section 9), across both surveys, despite some 
variability across the groups and clusters, it can be plausibly inferred that 
the students’ perceived utility value was more predictive of intentions for 
those with accurately-high confidence compared to other groups and 
clusters. Careers information appeared to predictively associate with 
intentions to a relatively greater extent for those with accurately-low 
confidence. Depending on the method/approach, utility value could be more 
predictive of intentions for under-confident students than over-confident 
students, and personal value could be more predictive for over-confident 
students than under-confident students, or that no differences could be 
observed (although the magnitudes of coefficients still broadly followed 
these patterns when statistically-significant differences were not confirmed). 
Now that differences across methods and surveys have been revealed, 
further research would be beneficial to clarify the area. 
On a theoretical level, higher confidence, contextualised as self-
efficacy beliefs or someone’s expected capability in future tasks and 
activities, has been theorised to be motivational and facilitate people to 
surpass their normal performance, while low confidence beliefs may be 
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limiting and ensure that some actions are not even attempted (Bandura, 
1997). This implies that under-confidence may be detrimental while over-
confidence may be beneficial. Alternately, the idea of self-regulation 
assumes that accurate beliefs are integral to personal well-being and 
functioning (Butler & Winne, 1995). This implies that under-confidence and 
over-confidence may be equally detrimental. 
Much research has focused on this potential duality between the 
underlying social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997) and ideas of self-
regulation (Butler & Winne, 1995), for example considering whether over-
confidence may be beneficial or detrimental (Bouffard & Narciss, 2011). 
These areas may not necessarily be mutually exclusive, as social-cognitive 
theory has been contextualised within cyclical model of self-regulation 
(Bandura, 1989, 2001), and self-regulation is often conceptualised within a 
social-cognitive framework (Zimmerman, 2000). It remains possible that 
self-regulation may ensure general tendencies towards accuracy, while 
higher confidence may be motivational. The various results broadly support 
this conclusion: essentially, magnitudes of confidence bias were less 
extreme in the emergent clusters of students than assumed by the various 
conceptual groups; the students’ attitudes were broadly proportional to their 
confidence and those with the highest confidence and attainment also 
exhibited the highest accuracy. 
 
 
Section 10.2: Limitations and implications to further research 
 
Through considering the PISA 2006 survey (considering implicit subject-
level self-concept accuracy/bias) and through applying a new survey in 
2014/2015 (considering explicit task-level confidence accuracy/bias), the 
overall approach aimed to address methodological limitations in one survey 
with strengths in the other. Some similar results were observed across both 
surveys, regardless of the inherent differences in students, measurement, 
and approaches to consider accuracy/bias, which enhanced the overall 
plausibility of these findings. Different results were also observed, however. 
As in any research, various issues may determine how meaningful the 
results are and may suggest areas for further exploration. 
Page 271 of 361 
The two surveys applied some comparability in measurement but 
also some differences (Section 5 and Appendix 1). The 2014/2015 survey 
was intended to be comparable across both PISA and TIMSS in order to 
facilitate emergent analysis or wider explorations; the questionnaire 
development also considered subsequent surveys such as PISA 2012 in 
addition to PISA 2006 in case of potential refinements or developments in 
measurement having occurred over time (OECD, 2009a, 2013). The 
development process theoretically increased construct/factor validity, where 
the measured items then reflected established operationalisations; similarly, 
content validity, considered as the scope of the measurement items, was also 
theoretically increased through including items covering multiple themes or 
dimensions from across different prior surveys. The similar results, for 
example where utility value and personal value were the strongest predictors 
of intentions in both surveys (Section 7), highlighted the predictive/criterion 
validity of these factors (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007; Messick, 
1995). Essentially, the 2014/2015 survey highlighted that different 
operationalisations of factors (e.g. personal value) could be strongly 
grounded in particular theoretical perspectives (e.g. Carlone & Johnson, 
2007), relatively briefly measured, show acceptable internal consistency and 
reliability, and broadly reveal similar findings to those observed in PISA. 
The research design was not necessarily ideal, however. 
Construct/factor validity could be maximised by using items from only one 
source, although this would assume that the selected source covers all 
necessary dimensions of the underlying idea. Given that attitudes and beliefs 
can be potentially defined in different ways, it remains difficult to determine 
what items/dimensions are necessary and/or sufficient in measurement, and 
hence it remains difficult to definitively ensure content validity (Murphy & 
Alexander, 2000; Wigfield & Cambria, 2010). Construct/factor validity also 
depends on historical and/or contemporary interpretations of any underlying 
ideas, yet personal value or ‘science identity’ can still be considered in 
various ways (e.g. Archer, et al., 2010; Aschbacher, Li, & Roth, 2010; 
Carlone & Johnson, 2007). Further research may need to apply qualitative 
approaches or facilitate free-text responses from students in order to explore 
how they consider or define discrete dimensions within their interest in 
science, perceived utility of science, personal value of science, and other 
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areas. This would help ensure ecological validity, given that students may 
find various experiences or aspects of life to be relevant to their interest or 
identity (and their other attitudes and beliefs) regardless of what 
contemporary theories may propose, and also help ensure face validity, 
given that students may have different ‘intuitive’ interpretations of items 
(and/or wider ideas) compared to any intended meanings. 
Differences across the surveys were observed for factors such as 
interest value, highlighting that predictive/criterion validity could vary. It 
remains unclear whether item-level measurement similarity/difference 
influenced any differences in results (e.g. personal value was measured with 
greater difference across the surveys yet showed similar results; Section 7). 
Aggregating across Years 9, 10, and 11 in the 2014/2015 survey may have 
ensured that some effects were potentially harder to observe if they varied 
by age. For example, the similar predictive associations between personal 
value and intentions across both surveys may suggest that the underlying 
‘effect’ was independent of age; the different predictive associations 
between interest value and intentions across the surveys may suggest that 
the effect was potentially obscured in the 2014/2015 survey by differences 
across ages (where different predictive associations depending on students’ 
ages may have potentially reduced the overall observed association). With 
relatively few students and different numbers in each year group, the 
2014/2015 survey could not feasibly explore differences by age, and further 
research would be necessary to explore this area. Alternately, differences 
across surveys may unavoidably occur, given different cohorts of students 
surveyed at different times, and/or some results may have been specific to 
the particular sample of students surveyed in 2014/2015 who were not 
necessarily generalizable to the wider population of students across 
England. 
Aspects of measurement were also relevant to considering 
confidence accuracy/bias. Fundamentally, indicators of accuracy/bias 
formed through comparisons of confidence and attainment may inherently 
involve uncertainty (Section 3.4), which was especially relevant for the 
PISA 2006 data. Comparing students’ self-concept beliefs against different 
indicators of attainment may produce different results; any comparisons 
may be artificial, and cannot confirm or entail that students self-evaluate in 
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the same way. Considering paired tasks and confidence-ratings in the 
2014/2015 survey theoretically measured self-reflective accuracy/bias with 
stronger validity, but task-level indicators may have lower generalisation to 
students’ subject-level attitudes and beliefs (Bandura, 1997; Bong, 1997; 
Pajares & Miller, 1995), which appeared to be highlighted in the analysis 
(Section 7). Nevertheless, the similarities across both surveys (broadly seen 
in Section 8 and Section 9) supported the plausibility of exploring 
accuracy/bias even when approximated via PISA data. 
When grouping or clustering the students in the 2014/2015 survey 
on their task-confidence and task-scores, their self-concept beliefs and 
current grades followed broadly proportional patterns, suggesting that, in 
general terms, the same tendency towards accuracy/bias might be observed 
on the task and subject levels. The calculated indicators of accuracy/bias 
showed low to moderate correlations across the task and subject levels, 
however, although such results may be less clear due to accuracy/bias being 
considered explicitly on the task level (via paired tasks and confidence-
ratings) and implicitly on the subject level (via self-concept beliefs and 
subject grades, where various other measures of attainment may be 
relevant). Even considering prior research, it still remains relatively unclear 
whether students’ confidence accuracy/bias generalises from the task-level 
to the subject-level, and/or whether either or both can reveal tendencies that 
are specific to subjects or tendencies that are more generalised. For 
example, for secondary school students in Greece, there appeared to be no 
clear pattern of tendencies towards similar biases across mathematics and 
languages (Gonida & Leondari, 2011). Studies with undergraduate students 
in the United States have highlighted some similarities of accuracy/bias 
across domains or areas, although these have not reflected academic 
subjects and may have less contextual relevance to secondary school 
students (Gutierrez, Schraw, Kuch, & Richmond, 2016; Schraw, Dunkle, 
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; West & Stanovich, 1997). However, studies 
with primary and secondary school students, and university students, have 
suggested some stability of accuracy/biases over time (Bouffard, Vezeau, 
Roy, & Lengelé, 2011; Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Rytkönen, 
Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007). Further research may be useful to explore such 
areas. 
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Exploring confidence accuracy/bias in general may be informed by 
further research into how students form their confidence beliefs, which may 
benefit from more exploratory or qualitative approaches (Butz & Usher, 
2015; Zeldin & Pajares, 2000; Zeldin, Britner, & Pajares, 2008). The 
2014/2015 survey started to explore and extend such areas through asking 
students, for example, what grade entailed ‘being good’ at science, which 
showed less variation across the accuracy/bias groups and clusters. 
Accordingly, it may be plausible that students have relatively similar ideas 
about what entails good attainment, which can be explicitly measured so 
that self-concept beliefs (measured through agreement or disagreement with, 
for example, ‘I usually do well in science’, ‘I have always been good at 
science’, and ‘I get good grades in science’) and other indicators of 
confidence can then be compared against these ideas (with increased 
validity). However, given the focus on various other groups and clusters, 
and for brevity, this area was left for future research. Further longitudinal 
research would also be necessary to explore the accuracy/bias of students’ 
self-efficacy expressed through expected grades. 
Similarly, and on a wider level, further research may need to 
continue to apply more qualitative studies where students can express their 
own reasons for their subject choices, and also define areas such as utility 
value and personal value in their own way. Ideally, such findings could then 
also aid the refinement of measurement items (Clark & Watson, 1995; 
Messick, 1995; Simms, 2008); for example, the conception and 
measurement of areas such as utility value may need to be calibrated against 
students’ conceptions of the area. Qualitative studies have often highlighted 
that students considered interest and enjoyment more relevant to their 
choices than utility, which may highlight potential differences between 
qualitative and quantitative results, highlighting the benefit to consider and 
integrate findings from across both approaches (Holmegaard, Ulriksen, & 
Madsen, 2014; Jensen & Henriksen, 2015). 
Quantitative approaches allow independent associations between 
factors and expressed intentions to be revealed, but results from predictive 
models do not necessarily mean that students form their intentions or make 
their choices in the same way as suggested by the various significant 
predictors. Students may consider their choices and intentions in different 
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ways, perhaps depending on their gender (Bosker & Dekkers, 1994; 
Crombie, et al., 2005), and/or their background (Archer, et al., 2012, 2013; 
Archer, DeWitt, & Wong, 2014), and/or their focus on particular subjects 
(Bøe, 2012). A potential difference in decision-making due to confidence 
accuracy/bias was plausible, but further research may need to determine 
which analytical perspectives are most relevant or explanatory. 
Analytical models are simplified representations of reality, designed 
to accomplish particular purposes. The particular purpose may explicitly 
influence results by determining what research questions are asked and 
hence what results are considered to be meaningful or not. The various 
simplifications within analysis may implicitly influence results, such as 
through factors being included or omitted, or through particular 
methodological approaches being applied. Specifically, the research covered 
in this thesis applied confidence accuracy/bias as a broad analytical 
perspective, in order to increase understanding of students’ intentions to 
study science. Various other perspectives are possible, including those based 
on more observable characteristics such as gender and background/ethnicity 
(Carlone & Johnson, 2007; Murphy & Whitelegg, 2006), or less observable 
areas including social and cultural aspects such as expectations and 
stereotypes (Cundiff, Vescio, Loken, & Lo, 2013; Forgasz, Leder, & 
Kloosterman, 2004), and ideas of general advantage and disadvantage 
transferred in part through resources or ‘capital’ (Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, 
Seakins, & Wong, 2015; Claussen & Osborne, 2013). Ultimately, the impact 
of students’ confidence accuracy/bias may be relatively small, for example 
when considering the magnitude of differences in attitudes across the 
various groups and clusters from PISA 2006 and the 2014/2015 survey; it is 
possible that other perspectives might reveal larger differences or effects. 
Predictive modelling, regardless of the level of statistical 
sophistication, relies on underlying assumptions such as linear associations. 
Practical contexts may involve complex combinations of linearity but also 
thresholds: at some particular magnitude of interest, perceived utility, and/or 
any other factors, someone might chose to study science rather than not 
study science. Any thresholds may also potentially vary for different 
students. Prior research broadly suggests that various thresholds may be 
relevant, most obviously the expected or actual grades that may be required 
Page 276 of 361 
by schools as pre-requisites for A-Level study (Brown, Brown, & Bibby, 
2008; Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2009). The analytical 
approach indirectly addressed this area through applying latent-profile 
analysis to identify clusters of students based on their science intentions and 
key predicting factors; essentially, various magnitudes of these factors 
(perhaps in combination) might entail thresholds for membership of one 
cluster compared to another. Across both surveys, only the smallest clusters 
with consistently highly above-average attitudes exhibited agreement to 
study science further, while the other clusters generally exhibited some 
degree of disagreement or ambivalence. Further research could beneficially 
explore this area through predictive modelling, perhaps through considering 
intentions as ordered categories, and/or through more complex approaches. 
It may also be beneficial to consider what predicts cluster membership, 
and/or what might entail movement from one cluster to another. 
The two surveys both considered science as a holistic area. While 
this reflected the National Curriculum and simplified the measurement of 
students’ attitudes and beliefs, students may have varying views across 
biology, chemistry, physics, and other relevant areas (Hardy, 2014; Jansen, 
Schroeders, & Lüdtke, 2014). Ultimately, students would also need to select 
biology, chemistry, physics, and/or other specific subjects for A-Level 
and/or university study. The results may then provide a plausible overview, 
but may be less meaningful to help understand students’ actual decisions. 
Studying one subject at upper-secondary school or university in 
England may entail not studying another subject or subjects. Considered in 
general terms, it may be difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
students’ intentions and choices to study science without also considering 
what other subjects might be favoured instead of science and why. For 
example, it may be difficult to understand why someone with high interest 
and perceived utility for science might not study science, without 
considering whether they had even higher interest in another subject; 
relative differences in attitudes across subjects may then be equally or more 
relevant than considering attitudes in one subject alone. Research has indeed 
suggested that some students may study other subjects (and not science) due 
to favouring other subjects rather than necessarily disfavouring science 
(Cleaves, 2005). Prior research has also suggested that clusters of students 
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may prefer sciences, humanities, or other areas, although the particular 
patterns and profiles of students remains somewhat unclear (Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, 2014). This area could be addressed through future 
research considering limited arrays of items/factors but covering students’ 
attitudes and beliefs across multiple academic areas. 
Various other analytical aspects may be relevant limitations to the 
thesis. For example, the analysis only considered cluster solutions with 
relatively small numbers of clusters. Higher number of clusters essentially 
entailed fewer numbers of students within each cluster, ensuring that 
predictive modelling per cluster and multiple comparisons were less 
feasible. An alternate approach might involve considering higher numbers 
of clusters, perhaps ignoring those with very few numbers of students (i.e. 
potentially ‘outliers’ due to uncertainty or unreliability); such decisions 
might become arbitrary, however, and there may be no easy resolution. 
Additionally, latent-profile analysis identifies discrete clusters of 
students, given the various indicators (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Everitt, 
Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). The meaning of the cluster profiles then 
needs to be interpreted, and the clusters may not necessarily reflect what 
they were intended to reflect. For example, the analysis identified clusters of 
students in England in PISA 2006 given their self-concept beliefs and task-
scores, to implicitly form clusters with different degrees of self-concept 
accuracy/bias; one cluster of students was identified with an essentially 
unvarying magnitude of self-concept and with lower but more variable task-
scores (while other clusters showed within-cluster variation for both 
indicators). The analysis simply revealed emergent clusters within the data, 
and the students may have expressed those particular self-concept beliefs for 
many reasons. For example, the students may have essentially agreed to 
every self-concept item with less reflection on the content (perhaps given 
that the items were on the last page of the questionnaire); the result may 
have then reflected some form of response style or tendency rather than 
reflecting self-concept accuracy/bias. Conversely, it cannot necessarily be 
determined that particular response styles were present since the students 
expressed variability in their other attitudes. The results nevertheless 
highlight that the appearances of accuracy/bias may perhaps follow from 
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low self-reflection or from other aspects that may not necessarily be easily 
determined or isolated. 
It remains uncertain whether students’ reported attitudes and beliefs 
in surveys reflect their actual attitudes and beliefs, although this is an issue 
for any research study. While anything that reduces the correspondence 
between indicators of confidence and attainment may give the appearance of 
under-confidence or over-confidence, it remains unclear whether and to 
what extent random variation or other measurement aspects may influence 
appearances of accuracy/bias. Studies have variously proposed that 
confidence biases are explained or are not explained by random variation 
(Brenner, 2000; Budescu, Wallsten, & Au, 1997; Erev, Wallsten, & 
Budescu, 1994; Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000; Merkle, Sieck, & van 
Zandt, 2008). It perhaps remains pragmatic to assume that indicators of 
accuracy/bias will unavoidably involve some degree of imprecision and 
uncertainty, but still measure a meaningful idea. 
Assuming that some students may potentially agree to items 
regardless of their content and/or may respond differently to positively-
phrased or negatively-phrased items (Cronbach, 1950; Paulhus, 1991; 
Weems, Onwuegbuzie, & Collins, 2006; Weems, Onwuegbuzie, Schreiber, 
& Eggers, 2003), it may be beneficial for further research to explore any 
associations between response styles and confidence accuracy/bias. For 
example, studies have begun to explore over-confidence defined as students 
expressing familiarity with or knowledge of non-existent concepts, which 
combines ideas of an acquiescence response style with a confidence bias, 
and which has associated with other indicators of over-confidence biases 
(Paulhus & Dubois, 2014; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether response styles such as 
acquiescence are prevalent or uncommon. Prior research on PISA 2006 has 
suggested, for example, that the majority of students in Germany did not 
appear to respond with a particular style such as only selecting the extreme 
response categories (Wetzel, Carstensen, & Böhnke, 2013). It remains 
difficult to conclusively consider the area without carefully designed 
questionnaires, for example containing similar numbers of positively-
phrased and negatively-phrased items for all factors, which may be difficult 
to practically implement. 
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On a wider level, confidence biases may potentially follow from 
particular motivations, such as to self-enhance through maximising positive 
beliefs or to self-protect through minimising negative beliefs (Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). Alternately, confidence biases 
may potentially follow from low self-reflection, or from students forming 
their beliefs against subjective criteria or being influenced by other factors, 
without any particular underlying enhancement or protection motivation. 
Confidence biases may also associate with traditional characterisations or 
measures of personality, although results have varied within psychological 
studies of university students (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; 
Schaefer, Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, 2004). These areas may 
nevertheless suggest further factors to be considered in future research, 
especially to help understand why particular confidence accuracy/bias 
tendencies might form, and hence how they might plausibly be amended. 
 
 
Section 10.3: Practical and policy implications 
 
Wider policy recommendations within science education have recently 
included focusing on a need for inspirational curricula, which emphasise 
practical work and problem-solving, and have highlighted that increased 
science careers guidance should be given, that students should study science 
throughout upper-secondary education to help broadly increase students’ 
skills, and that further specialised teachers are needed (Osborne & Dillon, 
2008; Royal Society, 2014). The various insights from this thesis do not 
easily lead to policy implications on such a wide scale, and perhaps 
fundamentally suggest a more cautious approach: without understanding 
how different students make their choices in different ways, broad changes 
to practices may not necessarily achieve any intended increases in the 
numbers of students studying science. Differences in students’ decision 
making may include varying influences (e.g. while the perceived utility of 
science was predictive of intentions for all students, it was most strongly 
predictive for those with accurately-high confidence), and varying scope 
(e.g. the reported provision of careers information was predictive of 
intentions for some groups and clusters but not for others). In order to 
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increase numbers of students studying science, researchers and teachers may 
need to consider target groups (e.g. under-confident students who might 
already have sufficient attainment) and consider how they make their 
choices in more detail. 
With reference to existing policy recommendations such as forming 
and applying inspirational curricula (Royal Society, 2014), the various 
results and insights from the thesis confirm that attitudes such as students’ 
interest associate with students’ intentions, but that students’ perceptions of 
their teachers and reported frequency of experiencing different teaching 
approaches had limited associations with intentions. Teaching approaches 
and classroom experiences may influence students’ interest and other 
attitudes, but research may need to determine to what extent and whether 
other influences might be more relevant (Abrahams, 2009; Hampden-
Thompson & Bennett, 2013; Wang, 2012). Similarly, the various results 
suggest that careers guidance may not necessarily have large or direct 
impacts on students’ intentions to study science, on average, but may be 
more relevant to students’ with accurately-low confidence (who generally 
expressed below-average levels of background resources and parental 
education) and so may potentially help equality. While international 
comparisons were not a feature of the thesis, without extensive changes to 
upper-secondary education in England, compulsory study of science would 
simply entail that students cannot study one other subject; alternately, 
changing the educational structure to the one used in Sweden (with broad 
but relatively few programmes of specialism that still include compulsory 
areas such as general science across all programmes) or Finland (with 
multiple compulsory basic areas including sciences and multiple optional 
areas of further specialisation) may not be easily or swiftly undertaken 
(EACEA, 2011; Eurydice, 2016). Essentially, some existing policy 
recommendations can be broadly supported through the results, while others 
may need to be clarified and considered further. 
Intuitively, science skills may be less relevant without the 
confidence to apply them; similarly, over-confidence may be problematic if 
someone ultimately lacks the attainment necessary to progress within 
science. The results from the PISA 2006 survey and the 2014/2015 survey 
broadly supported such assumptions through highlighting the relevance of 
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students’ confidence to their science intentions; the final impact may also be 
complex due to science intentions being predicted differently for students 
with different degrees of accuracy/bias. Practically, it may be beneficial to 
further consider how different students make different choices, which may 
also entail considering multiple perspectives such as students’ background, 
resources, and attitudes (Archer, Dawson, DeWitt, Seakins, & Wong, 2015; 
Bøe, 2012; Carlone & Johnson, 2007; Murphy & Whitelegg, 2006). 
Additionally, students may differ even within particular classifications (e.g. 
girls may have various orientations towards science and distinct clusters 
may be apparent), which may entail some unavoidable degree of complexity 
when considering which perspective might be most informative. 
The association between students’ science intentions and their self-
efficacy expressed as expected grades in the 2014/2015 survey may suggest 
that teachers could help provide feedback to ensure that students have 
realistic expectations. Similarly, the association between students’ intentions 
and their self-concept beliefs in the PISA 2006 survey may suggest that 
teachers need to be aware of potential under-confidence or over-confidence. 
However, various studies have highlighted that teachers’ beliefs of their 
students’ attainment may not necessarily correspond to the students’ 
attainment (Harlen, 2005; Südkamp, Kaiser, & Möller, 2012), and that 
teachers may not easily or accurately estimate students’ attitudes and 
motivational beliefs (Dicke, Lüdtke, Trautwein, Nagy, & Nagy, 2012; 
Freiberger, Steinmayr, & Spinath, 2012; Machts, Kaiser, Schmidt, & 
Möller, 2016; Mullola, et al., 2014; Praetorius, Berner, Zeinz, Scheunpflug, 
& Dresel, 2013; Urhahne, Chao, Florineth, Luttenberger, & Paechter, 2011). 
For example, some teachers may have lower expectations or perceive lower 
abilities in students with different backgrounds, regardless of their 
attainment (Campbell, 2015; Strand, 2007); educators’ and scientists’ 
perceived images of ideal students or peers may perhaps limit their 
recognition of those with different genders or ethnicities (Carlone & 
Johnson, 2007). It may be broadly beneficial for teachers to self-reflect on 
their perceptions regarding their students, so that they can avoid biases and 
provide appropriate advice and guidance. 
Similarly, it may be beneficial to help students’ self-reflect and 
consider their own confidence and attainment. In broad terms, the results 
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from the various accuracy/bias and intention/attitude clusters highlighted 
that few students exhibited high attainment and high accuracy; for the other 
students, however, accuracy/bias varied, suggesting that greater self-
reflection may be beneficial. However, it remains somewhat unclear how 
this could be practically accomplished. This may be already undertaken to 
some extent in schools or other contexts, for example through students 
undertaking practice examination questions. Various studies have 
highlighted that interventions to promote confidence accuracy and/or self-
regulated learning (involving some self-reflection) are broadly possible and 
have sometimes improved students’ confidence accuracy, although results 
have varied (Bol & Hacker, 2001; Bol, Hacker, Walck, & Nunnery, 2012; 
Dignath & Büttner, 2008; Huff & Nietfeld, 2009; Labuhn, Zimmerman, & 
Hasselhorn, 2010). For example, such interventions have entailed benefits 
such as increased attainment (Bol, Hacker, Walck, & Nunnery, 2012; 
Kramarski, Mevarech, & Arami, 2002), although others have highlighted no 
effects (Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & Allen, 2005; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991). In broad terms, suggesting reflection on confidence and 
attainment does not necessarily entail that students must follow self-
regulated learning or other formalised approaches, since the actual 
associations between accurate beliefs and self-regulated learning still remain 
somewhat unclear (Boekaerts, 1999; Pintrich, 1999; Stone, 2000). 
Within science education, it perhaps remains somewhat unclear 
which attitudes, teaching practices, enrichment activities, and/or other 
related aspects should be promoted and how and why. Research studies 
have broadly associated students’ science intentions with their attitudes such 
as their interest in science and perceived utility of science, together with 
their confidence and attainment (Bøe & Henriksen, 2015; Regan & DeWitt, 
2015), as broadly seen in the results across this thesis. While students’ 
intentions and aspirations have been found to be somewhat difficult to 
change directly, various interventions have instead shown the feasibility of 
increasing students’ interest in science and perceived utility of science 
(Archer, DeWitt, & Dillon, 2014; Bernacki, Nokes-Malach, Richey, & 
Belenky, 2016; Harackiewicz, Rozek, Hulleman, & Hyde, 2012; Hong & 
Lin-Siegler, 2012; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009; Rosenzweig & 
Wigfield, 2016; Rozek, Hyde, Svoboda, Hulleman, & Harackiewicz, 2015). 
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However, the identification of distinct clusters of students, each holding 
relatively similar within-cluster magnitudes of intentions and attitudes, 
suggested that students’ attitudes may be more closely associated than 
previously considered. Accordingly, greater understanding of how students’ 
attitudes associate and are influenced could then direct future interventions, 
and it is possible that interventions may need to address multiple factors 
concurrently. Additionally, and to reiterate, researchers and policy-makers 
may need to consider further how different students may make their choices 
in different ways; otherwise, any interventions to promote higher aspirations 
towards science may not necessarily achieve the desired effects. 
 
 
Section 10.4: Conclusions 
 
For Year 11 students in England surveyed in PISA 2006, science intentions 
were most strongly predicted by the students’ perceived utility of science, 
interest/enjoyment of science, personal value of science, and their science 
self-concept beliefs (their subjective confidence in their abilities, measured 
through agreement or disagreement with items such as ‘Science topics are 
easy for me’ and ‘I learn science topics quickly’). For students in Years 9, 
10, and 11 surveyed in England in 2014/2015, science intentions were most 
strongly predicted by the students’ perceived utility of science, personal 
value of science, self-efficacy (measured through confidence in their 
expected grades at GCSE/A-Level), subjective-norms/influences from 
parents, and the students’ interest in science. These results reaffirmed the 
relevance of the perceived utility of science and students’ confidence, but 
highlighted the importance of contextualisation in expressions of 
confidence, and also showed the relevance of considering the personal value 
of science to someone’s identity through quantitative perspectives. 
Students with different degrees of accuracy/bias expressed different 
science intentions and attitudes, and could be inferred to consider their 
choices in different ways. Emergent clusters of students could also be 
broadly described as showing tendencies towards under-confidence, 
accurately-low confidence, accurately-high confidence, or over-confidence. 
This affirmed the practice of classifying students into such conceptual 
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groups, but the results highlighted the benefit of applying multiple 
approaches: the profiles and sizes of the conceptual groups and emergent 
clusters varied, and could entail wider differences in results. 
Students with accurately-high confidence generally reported the 
highest intentions and attitudes, across both surveys and when considering 
conceptual groups or emergent clusters of students. In PISA 2006, under-
confident students exhibited lower intentions and attitudes than over-
confident students across the groups and clusters. In the 2014/2015 survey, 
considering task-level confidence accuracy/bias, results varied: the under-
confident and over-confident conceptual groups exhibited similar science 
intentions and self-efficacy, but under-confident students exhibited lower 
attitudes including interest, utility, and personal value; conversely, the 
clusters showed that those exhibiting over-confidence reported lower 
intentions and attitudes than those exhibiting under-confidence. 
Groups/clusters with ‘accurately-high’ confidence could also or conversely 
appear over-confident, however, perhaps suggesting the contextual or 
conditional nature of any benefits or detriments of confidence biases, such 
as requiring some level of underlying attainment and/or confidence. 
Concurrently, across both surveys, it can be inferred that the 
students’ perceived utility value of science was more predictive of 
intentions for students with accurately-high confidence compared to other 
groups and clusters. Depending on whether or which groups and/or clusters 
were considered, utility value could be more predictive of intentions for 
under-confident students than over-confident students, and personal value 
could be more predictive for over-confident students than under-confident 
students, or that no differences could be observed. 
While the differences across methods and surveys highlighted that 
further research would be needed to clarify such areas, these results 
provided a beneficial foundation, given little prior research into confidence 
accuracy/bias in England. Fundamentally, the results highlighted that the 
impact of under-confidence and over-confidence may be more complex than 
previously assumed, not simply through associating with lower or higher 
attitudes, but also through students considering their choices in different 
ways. 
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Appendix 1: Item/factor comparability across surveys 
 
Table A1.1: Item-level survey comparability for measuring self-concept beliefs 
 
 Example source/reference items 
2014/2015 survey items PISA 2006 TIMSS 2011 PISA 2012 
‘I usually do well in science’ ‘I can usually give good answers to test 
questions on science topics’ 
‘I usually do well in science’ - 
‘I have always been good at science’ - - - 
‘I get good grades in science’ - - ‘I get good grades in science’ 
‘I understand even the most difficult 
science work’ 
‘Learning advanced science topics would 
be easy for me’ 
‘I am good at working out difficult science 
problems’ 
‘In my science class, I understand even the 
most difficult work’ 
‘I learn things quickly in science’ ‘I learn science topics quickly’ ‘I learn things quickly in science’ ‘I learn science quickly’ 
- - ‘Science is not one of my strengths’ ‘I am just not good at science’ 
- ‘Science topics are easy for me’ - - 
- ‘When I am being taught science, I can 
understand the concepts very well’ 
- - 
- ‘I can easily understand new ideas in 
science’ 
- - 
Notes: PISA 2012 measured students’ attitudes and beliefs related to mathematics; the listed items have been re-phrased to science for illustration. 
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Table A1.2: Item-level survey comparability for measuring interest value 
 
 Example source/reference items 
2014/2015 survey items PISA 2006 TIMSS 2011 PISA 2012 
‘I look forward to my science lessons’ - - ‘I look forward to my science lessons’ 
‘I am interested in the things I learn in 
science’ 
‘I am interested in learning about science’ ‘I learn many interesting things in science’ ‘I am interested in the things I learn in 
science’ 
‘I enjoy learning science’ ‘I enjoy acquiring new knowledge in 
science’ 
‘I enjoy learning science’ ‘I enjoy reading about science’ 
‘I like science’ ‘I like reading about science’ ‘I like science’ - 
‘I like biology’ - - - 
‘I like chemistry’ - - - 
‘I like physics’ - - - 
- ‘I generally have fun when I am learning 
science topics’ 
- - 
- ‘I am happy doing science problems’ - ‘I do science because I enjoy it’ 
- - ‘I wish I did not have to study science’ - 
- - ‘Science is boring’ - 
Notes: PISA 2012 measured students’ attitudes and beliefs related to mathematics; the listed items have been re-phrased to science for illustration. 
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Table A1.3: Item-level survey comparability for measuring utility value 
 
 Example source/reference items 
2014/2015 survey items PISA 2006 TIMSS 2011 PISA 2012 
‘Making an effort in science is worth it 
because it will help me in the work that I 
want to do later on’ 
‘Making an effort in science is worth it 
because this will help me in the work I 
want to do later on’ 
- ‘Making an effort in science is worth it 
because it will help me in the work that I 
want to do later on’ 
‘Learning science is worthwhile for me 
because it will improve my career 
prospects’ 
‘Studying science is worthwhile for me 
because what I learn will improve my 
career prospects’ 
- ‘Learning science is worthwhile for me 
because it will improve my career 
prospects’ 
‘Science is an important subject for me 
because I need it for what I want to study 
later on’ 
‘What I learn in science is important for 
me because I need this for what I want to 
study later on’ 
- ‘Science is an important subject for me 
because I need it for what I want to study 
later on’ 
‘I will learn many things in science that 
will help me get a job’ 
‘I will learn many things in science that 
will help me get a job’ 
- ‘I will learn many things in science that 
will help me get a job’ 
‘I need to do well in science to get the job I 
want’ 
- ‘I need to do well in science to get the job I 
want’ 
- 
‘I need to do well in science to get into the 
university of my choice’ 
- ‘I need to do well in science to get into the 
university of my choice’ 
- 
‘I think learning science will help me in 
my daily life’ 
- ‘I think learning science will help me in 
my daily life’ 
- 
‘I need science to learn other school 
subjects’ 
- ‘I need science to learn other school 
subjects’ 
- 
‘I would like a job that involves using 
science’ 
- ‘I would like a job that involves using 
science’ 
- 
‘Science is important to me’ - - - 
‘It is important to do well in science’ - ‘It is important to do well in science’ - 
- ‘I study science because I know it is useful 
for me’ 
- - 
Notes: PISA 2012 measured students’ attitudes and beliefs related to mathematics; the listed items have been re-phrased to science for illustration. As highlighted in the methods 
(Section 5.3), some items (e.g. ‘It is important to do well in science’) appeared potentially similar to those covering personal value, but empirically loaded onto the utility value 
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factor. Additionally, utility value aimed to measure the indirect or extrinsic benefits, importance, or value associated with science or studying science: items sourced from TIMSS 
(e.g. ‘I would like a job that involves using science’; Martin & Mullis, 2013) aimed to measure preferences towards using scientific but transferable skills in a job not necessarily 
within science; the item potentially appeared similar to science intentions, but still loaded onto the utility value factor. Preliminary analysis highlighted that similar predictive 
coefficients were given regardless of whether the item was included or omitted from the factor. 
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Table A1.4: Item-level survey comparability for measuring personal value 
 
 Example source/reference items 
2014/2015 survey items PISA 2006 TIMSS 2011 PISA 2012 
‘Science is important to me personally’ ‘Science is very relevant to me’ - - 
‘Thinking scientifically is an important 
part of who I am’ 
- - - 
‘Being able to do science helps me show 
other people who I am’ 
- - - 
- ‘Some concepts in science help me see 
how I relate to other people’ 
- - 
- ‘I will use science in many ways when I 
am an adult’ 
- - 
- ‘I find that science helps me to understand 
the things around me’ 
- - 
- ‘When I leave school there will be many 
opportunities for me to use science’ 
- - 
Notes: Personal value was referenced less from PISA/TIMSS and more from discrete studies (e.g. Conley, 2012; Trautwein, et al., 2012; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) and broadly 
following theoretical aspects/dimensions of personal value or ‘science identity’ (e.g. the personal importance of science, science as an inherent aspect of personal identity, and 
science as a means to convey personal identity to other people; Carlone & Johnson, 2007). 
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Appendix 1.1: Item-level measurement in PISA 2006 
 
The PISA 2006 items were mainly measured through agreement scales (‘strongly disagree’, 
‘disagree’, ‘agree’, and ‘strongly agree’) (OECD, 2009a). As highlighted in Section 5.2, the 
OECD’s intended/theorised factor composition, as below, was empirically confirmed for 
the students in England in PISA 2006. 
 
Science intentions: ‘I would like to work in a career involving science’; ‘I would like to 
study science after secondary school; ‘I would like to spend my life doing 
advanced science; ‘I would like to work on science projects as an adult’. 
Background factors (used as separate indicators/items): Gender (1=boy); Books at home 
(‘How many books are there in your home’); Parent(s) working in science (1=yes); 
Mothers’ education; Fathers’ education. 
Task-score (PV1): covered in detail within the OECD documentation (OECD, 2009a). 
Self-concept: ‘Learning advanced science topics would be easy for me’; ‘I can usually give 
good answers to test questions on science topics’; ‘I learn science topics quickly; 
‘Science topics are easy for me’; ‘When I am being taught science I can 
understand the concepts very well’; ‘I can easily understand new ideas in science’. 
Self-efficacy (areas) (‘How easy do you think it would be for you to perform the following 
tasks on your own?’): ‘Recognise the science question that underlies a newspaper 
report on a health issue’; ‘Explain why earthquakes occur more frequently in some 
areas than in others’; ‘Describe the role of antibiotics in the treatment of disease’; 
‘Identify the science question associated with the disposal of garbage’; ‘Predict 
how changes to an environment will affect the survival of certain species’; 
‘Interpret the scientific information provided on the labelling of food items’; 
‘Discuss how new evidence can lead you to change your understanding about the 
possibility of life on Mars’; ‘Identify the better of two explanations for the 
formation of acid rain’. 
Interest (various areas) (‘How much interest do you have in learning about the following 
science topics?’): ‘Topics in physics’; ‘Topics in chemistry’; ‘The biology of 
plants’; ‘Human biology’; ‘Topics in astronomy’; ‘Topics in geology’; ‘Ways 
scientists design experiments’; ‘What is required for scientific explanations’. 
Interest value: ‘I generally have fun when I am learning science topics’; ‘I like reading 
about broad science’; ‘I am happy doing science problems’; ‘I enjoy acquiring 
new knowledge in science’; ‘I am interested in learning about broad science’. 
Utility value: ‘Making an effort in my science subjects is worth it because this will help me 
in the work I want to do later on’; ‘What I learn in my science subjects is 
important for me because I need this for what I want to study later on’; ‘I study 
science because I know it is useful for me’; ‘Studying my science subjects is 
worthwhile for me because what I learn will improve my career prospects’; ‘I will 
learn many things in my science subjects that will help me get a job’. 
Personal value: ‘Some concepts in science help me see how I relate to other people’; ‘I 
will use science in many ways when I am an adult’; ‘Science is very relevant to 
me’; ‘I find that science helps me to understand the things around me’; ‘When I 
leave school there will be many opportunities for me to use science’. 
General value: ‘Advances in science and technology usually improve people’s living 
conditions’; ‘Science is important for helping us to understand the natural world’; 
‘Advances in science and technology usually help improve the economy’; 
‘Science is valuable to society’; ‘Advances in science and technology usually 
bring social benefits’. 
Science activities (‘How often do you do these things?’): ‘Watch TV programmes about 
science’; ‘Borrow or buy books on science topics’; ‘Visit web sites about science 
topics’; ‘Listen to radio programmes about advances in science’; ‘Read science 
magazines or science articles in newspapers’; ‘Attend a science club’. 
School career preparation: ‘The subjects available at my school provide students with the 
basic skills and knowledge for a science-related career’; ‘The science subjects at 
my school provide students with the basic skills and knowledge for many different 
careers’; ‘The subjects I study provide me with the basic skills and knowledge for 
a science-related career’; ‘My teachers equip me with the basic skills and 
knowledge I need for a science-related career’. 
School career information (‘How informed are you about these topics?’): ‘Science-related 
careers that are available in the job market’; ‘Where to find information about 
science-related careers’; ‘The steps a student needs to take if they want a science-
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related career’; ‘Employers or companies that hire people to work in science-
related careers’. 
Teaching, interaction (‘When learning science topics at school, how often do the 
following activities occur?’): ‘Students are given opportunities to explain their 
ideas’; ‘The lessons involve students’ opinions about the topics’; ‘There is a class 
debate or discussion’; ‘The students have discussions about the topics’. 
Teaching, activities (‘When learning science topics at school, how often do the following 
activities occur?’): ‘Students spend time in the laboratory doing practical 
experiments’; ‘Students are required to design how a science question could be 
investigated in the laboratory’; ‘Students are asked to draw conclusions from an 
experiment they have conducted’; ‘Students do experiments by following the 
instructions of the teacher’. 
Teaching, investigations (‘When learning science topics at school, how often do the 
following activities occur?’): ‘Students are allowed to design their own 
experiments’; ‘Students are given the chance to choose their own investigations’; 
‘Students are asked to do an investigation to test out their own ideas’. 
Teaching, applications (‘When learning science topics at school, how often do the 
following activities occur?’): ‘The teacher explains how a science idea can be 
applied to a number of different phenomena (e.g. the movement of objects, 
substances with similar properties)’; ‘The teacher uses science to help students 
understand the world outside school’; ‘The teacher clearly explains the relevance 
of science concepts to our lives’; ‘The teacher uses examples of technological 
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Appendix 1.2: Item-level measurement in the 2014/2015 survey 
 
Following the questionnaire development (Section 5.3), which balanced covering multiple 
items/dimensions sourced or adapted from various prior studies (e.g. PISA 2006, TIMSS 
2011, etc.) with empirical indicators of internal consistency and reliability, given the 
particular sample of students, the various factors were defined as summarised in Section 
5.3 and detailed below. For example, the factors covering the expectancy-value ‘subjective 
task values’ (interest value, utility value, personal value, and cost value) were broadly 
measured through items from both PISA and TIMSS surveys, together with other sources, 
with duplicate items removed and phrasing adapted (when necessary) to be clear and 
contextually relevant (e.g. Conley, 2012; Martin & Mullis, 2013; OECD, 2013; Trautwein, 
et al., 2012; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). 
As highlighted in Section 5.3, preliminary analysis confirmed that the results were 
insensitive to small changes in factor composition (i.e. the same conclusions would be 
drawn regarding relative coefficient magnitudes), such as measuring personal value or cost 
value with two or three items. 
The questionnaire items mainly used agreement scales (‘strongly disagree’, 
‘disagree’, ‘slightly disagree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘agree’, and ‘strongly agree’); depending on 
the item phrasing, categories were reverse-scored when necessary so that high item/factor 
values consistently indicated a positive experience or belief (e.g. doing well, being 
interested, the absence of anxiety, etc.). 
 
Science intentions: ‘I intend to study science at A-Level’; ‘I intend to study science at 
university’; ‘I am planning on pursuing a career that involves a lot of science’. 
Background factors (used as separate indicators/items): Year; Gender (1=boy); Ethnicity; 
Books at home; Parent(s) working in science (1=yes); Mothers’ education; 
Fathers’ education. 
Task-score: see the reproduced questionnaire for the particular items (Appendix 3). 
Task-confidence: see the reproduced questionnaire for the particular items (Appendix 3). 
Current grade: ‘What overall grade/level have you got so far this year in science?’. 
Self-concept: ‘I usually do well in science’; ‘I have always been good at science’; ‘I get 
good grades in science’; ‘I understand even the most difficult science work.’; ‘I 
learn things quickly in science’. 
Self-efficacy: ‘What grade do you think you will be able to get at GCSE (or equivalent) 
science?’; ‘What grade do you think you would be able to get if you studied your 
best science subject at A-Level?’. 
Interest value: ‘I look forward to my science lessons’; ‘I am interested in the things I learn 
in science’; ‘I enjoy learning science’; ‘I like science’; ‘I like biology’; ‘I like 
chemistry’; ‘I like physics’. 
Utility value: ‘Making an effort in science is worth it because it will help me in the work 
that I want to do later on’; ‘Learning science is worthwhile for me because it will 
improve my career prospects’; ‘Science is an important subject for me because I 
need it for what I want to study later on’; ‘I will learn many things in science that 
will help me get a job’; ‘I need to do well in science to get the job I want’; ‘I need 
to do well in science to get into the university of my choice’; ‘I think learning 
science will help me in my daily life’; ‘I need science to learn other school 
subjects’; ‘I would like a job that involves using science’; ‘Science is important to 
me’; ‘It is important to do well in science’. 
Personal value: ‘Science is important to me personally’; ‘Thinking scientifically is an 
important part of who I am’; ‘Being able to do science helps me show other people 
who I am’. 
Cost value (absence of): ‘I have to give up a lot to do well in science’; ‘Success in science 
means that I need to give up other activities I enjoy’; ‘I have to sacrifice a lot of 
free time to be good at science’; ‘I have to invest a lot of time to get good grades 
in science’. 
Orientation, mastery: ‘I aim to understand and learn the material in science’. 
Orientation, performance: ‘I aim to perform better than other students in science’. 
Perceived control: ‘People can generally improve their ability in science’; ‘I can improve 
my ability in science’; ‘If I put in enough effort I can succeed in science’; 
‘Whether or not I do well in science is completely up to me’; ‘If I wanted to, I 
could do well in science’. 
Perceived control (exams): ‘I do badly in science whether or not I study for my exams’; 
‘No matter whether or not I do my best in science, it will not improve my grades’; 
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‘It is not worth practicing science for a test because I will come off badly again 
anyway’; ‘I accomplish almost nothing in science of what I intend to do’. 
Study strategy, self-regulation: ‘During science class time I often miss important points 
because I'm thinking of other things’; ‘When studying for science, I make up 
questions to help focus my studying’; ‘When I become confused about something 
I'm studying for science class, I go back and try to figure it out’; ‘If science course 
materials are difficult to understand, I change the way I approach the material’; 
‘Before I study new science course material thoroughly, I often skim it to see how 
it is organized’; ‘I ask myself questions to make sure I understand the material I 
have been studying earlier in science class’; ‘I try to change the way I study in 
order to fit the science course requirements and the teacher's teaching style’; ‘I 
often find that I have been studying for science class but don't know what it was 
all about’; ‘I try to think through a science topic and decide what I am supposed to 
learn from it rather than just reading it over when studying for science’; ‘When 
studying for this science course I try to determine which concepts I don't 
understand well’; ‘When I study for my science class, I set goals for myself in 
order to direct my activities in each study period’; ‘If I get confused taking notes 
in science class, I make sure I sort it out afterwards’. 
Study strategy, control: ‘When I study for a science test, I try to work out what the most 
important parts to learn are’; ‘When I study science, I try to figure out which 
concepts I still have not understood properly’; ‘When I study science, I start by 
working out exactly what I need to learn’; ‘When I cannot understand something 
in science, I always search for more information to clarify the problem’. 
Study strategy, memorisation: ‘When I study for a science test, I learn as much as I can 
off by heart’; ‘When I study science, I go over some problems so often that I feel 
as if I could solve them in my sleep’; ‘In order to remember the method for 
solving a science problem, I go through examples again and again’; ‘When I study 
science, I make myself check to see if I remember the work I have already done’. 
Study strategy, elaboration: ‘When I study for a science test, I try to understand new 
concepts by relating them to things I already know’; ‘When I study science, I think 
of new ways to get the answer’; ‘When I study science, I try to relate the work to 
things I have learnt in other subjects’; ‘I think about how the science I have learnt 
can be used in everyday life’. 
Anxiety (absence of): ‘Science makes me confused and nervous’; ‘I often worry that it will 
be difficult for me in science classes’; ‘I get very tense when I have to do science 
work’; ‘I feel helpless when doing a science problem’; ‘I worry that I will get poor 
grades in science’. 
Mastery norms (good grade): ‘What grade do you think people need to get in order to be 
‘good’ at science?’. 
Subject-comparisons: ‘Science is harder for me than any other subject’. 
Peer-comparisons: ‘Science is harder for me than for many of my classmates’. 
Social persuasions (praise): ‘I have been praised for my ability in science’; ‘My science 
teacher tells me I am good at science’; ‘My science teacher thinks I can do well in 
science work with difficult materials’. 
Vicarious experiences: ‘When I see how another student solves a science problem, I can 
see myself solving the problem in the same way’. 
Norms/influence (friends): ‘Most of my friends do well in science’; ‘Most of my friends 
work hard at science’; ‘My friends enjoy taking science tests’. 
Norms/influence (parents): ‘My parents believe it's important for me to study science’; 
‘My parents believe that science is important for my career’; ‘My parents like 
science’. 
Teacher perceptions: ‘I know what my science teacher expects me to do’; ‘My science 
teacher is easy to understand’; ‘I am interested in what my science teacher says’; 
‘My science teacher gives me interesting things to do’; ‘My science teacher gives 
me feedback on my strengths and weaknesses in science’; ‘My science teacher 
tells us what is expected of us when we get a test, quiz or assignment’; ‘My 
science teacher tells us what we have to learn’; ‘My science teacher tells me what I 
need to do to become better in science’. 
Teacher/school careers/events: ‘My science teacher tells me about careers and jobs in 
science’; ‘Other people at my school tell me about careers and jobs in science’; 
‘My school does special activities, talks, events, or visits related to science (inside 
or outside of lessons)’. 
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Appendix 2: England 2014/2015 survey: sampled schools 
 
Table A2.1a: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2012/2013 data), school admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy N % N % N % N % 
Comprehensive 2902 55.4% 2902 70.4% 269 85.7% 9 75.0% 
Modern 134 2.6% 134 3.2% 13 4.1% 0 .0% 
Selective 164 3.1 164 4.0% 17 5.4% 2 16.7% 
Not applicable / other 783 14.9% 42 1.0% 1 .3% 0 .0% 
Missing 1255 24.0% 883 21.4% 14 4.5% 1 8.3% 
Total 5238 100.0% 4125 100.0% 314 100.0% 12 100.0% 
Notes: Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, 
from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
 
 
Table A2.1b: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2014/2015 data), school admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy N % N % N % N % 
Comprehensive 3008 57.8% 2787 71.8% 265 86.0% 9 75.0% 
Modern 121 2.3% 121 3.1% 13 4.2% 0 .0% 
Selective 163 3.1% 163 4.2% 17 5.5% 2 16.7% 
Not applicable / other 771 14.8% 1 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
Missing 1141 21.9% 808 20.8% 13 4.2% 1 8.3% 
Total 5204 100.0% 3880 100.0% 308 100.0% 12 100.0% 
Notes: Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, 
from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
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Table A2.2a: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2012/2013 data), school gender admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy N % N % N % N % 
Boys 326 6.2% 241 5.8% 22 7.0% 3 25.0% 
Girls 431 8.2% 421 10.2% 28 8.9% 1 8.3% 
Mixed 4475 85.4% 3457 83.8% 264 84.1% 8 66.7% 
Missing 6 .1% 6 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
Total 326 6.2% 4125 100.0% 314 100.0% 12 100.0% 
Notes: Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, 
from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
 
 
Table A2.2b: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2014/2015 data), school gender admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy N % N % N % N % 
Boys 305 5.9% 224 5.8% 22 7.1% 3 25.0% 
Girls 406 7.8% 390 10.1% 27 8.8% 1 8.3% 
Mixed 4492 86.3% 3266 84.2% 259 84.1% 8 66.7% 
Missing 1 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 
Total 5204 100.0% 3880 100.0% 308 100.0% 12 100.0% 
Notes: Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, 
from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
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Table A2.3a: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2012/2013 data), school admissions policies by gender admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed 
Comprehensive 97 144 2661 97 144 2661 14 17 238 1 1 7 
 2.4% 3.6% 66.9% 3.0% 4.4% 82.2% 4.7% 5.7% 79.3% 9.1% 9.1% 63.6% 
Modern 12 16 106 12 16 106 3 1 9 0 0 0 
 .3% .4% 2.7% .4% .5% 3.3% 1.0% .3% 3.0% .0% .0% .0% 
Selective 59 62 43 59 62 43 5 9 3 2 0 0 
 1.5% 1.6% 1.1% 1.8% 1.9% 1.3% 1.7% 3.0% 1.0% 18.2% .0% .0% 
Not applicable / other 44 2 731 0 0 36 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1.1% .1% 18.4% .0% .0% 1.1% .0% .0% .3% .0% .0% .0% 
Notes: Percentages sum to 100% for each of the main categories (e.g. England, the sampling frame, etc.). Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the 
original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
 
 
Table A2.3b: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): contextualisation (2014/2015 data), school admissions policies by gender admissions policies 
 
 England Sampling frame Invited Participated 
Admissions policy Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed Boys Girls Mixed 
Comprehensive 91 139 2777 85 136 2566 14 16 235 1 1 7 
 2.2% 3.4% 68.4% 2.8% 4.4% 83.5% 4.7% 5.4% 79.7% 9.1% 9.1% 63.6% 
Modern 11 14 96 11 14 96 3 1 9 0 0 0 
 .3% .3% 2.4% .4% .5% 3.1% 1.0% .3% 3.1% .0% .0% .0% 
Selective 59 61 43 59 61 43 5 9 3 2 0 0 
 1.5% 1.5% 1.1% 1.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.7% 3.1% 1.0% 18.2% .0% .0% 
Not applicable / other 41 2 728 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1.0% .0% 17.9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 
Notes: Percentages sum to 100% for each of the main categories (e.g. England, the sampling frame, etc.). Due to continual changes in school status, not all of the schools in the 
original sampling frame (4125 schools, from 2012/2013 data) and the invited schools (314 schools, from 2012/2013 data) could be matched against subsequent data. 
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Appendix 3: England 2014/2015 survey: questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire has been reproduced within the format of this thesis; the typeface and 
size, page size (margins) and pagination, and the overall layout (including the size of 
response fields) differs from the original.  
 
 
England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): 10-task questionnaire 
 
What do you think about science? 
 
About this research 
 
I am Richard Sheldrake from the Institute of Education at the University of London. I am 
exploring what students across the country think about science, and I would like you to take 
part in my research! 
 
This questionnaire is anonymous (it does not ask for your name or for any identifying 
information) and confidential (your individual answers will only be seen by me). When I 
report on the results, I will analyse everyone’s responses together and will not identify 
anyone. 
 
If you have any questions about the research or want to find out more (including the 
results), you can contact me by email at rsheldrake@ioe.ac.uk 
 
About this questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire asks what you think about science, what you like or dislike, what you 
think about science lessons and other areas, and also about your general approaches to 
learning. I also have a few science puzzles, and I’m keen to know what you think and 
whether you can do them. 
 
You may be studying science subjects separately, such as in classes for biology, chemistry, 
and physics, or you might study the areas together. For this questionnaire, please try to 
think about science generally. There are also questions where you can tell me about the 
separate areas of science. 
 
Throughout the questionnaire, please tick the items that best represent you or what you 
think. Please only tick one item per question. You can leave any question blank if you don’t 
want to answer it. 
 
Thank you for your help!  
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About you 
 




 I am a boy.  I am a girl. 
 
What year are you in? 









How would you describe your background or ethnicity? 
 White British  Indian 
 White Irish  Pakistani 
 White European  Bangladeshi 
 Any other white background  Any other Asian background 
 Black African  White and Asian 
 Black Caribbean  White and Black African 
 Any other black background  White and Black Caribbean 
 Chinese  Any other mixed background 
 Any other East Asian background  Any other ethnic group 
 
How many books are there in your home? (Please include electronic books, but do not 
count magazines, newspapers, or your schoolbooks.) 
 None or very few (0–10 books)  
 Around one shelf (11–25 books)  
 Around one bookcase (26–100 books)  
 Around two bookcases (101–200 books)  
 Around five bookcases (201–500 books)  
 More than five bookcases (more than 500 books)  
 
What is the highest level of schooling completed by your mother and father? (Or your 
step-parents or other guardians.) Don’t worry if you’re not sure, or if you don’t know; just 
answer as closely as you can, or leave the questions blank. 
Mother Father  
  GCSE or equivalent qualifications at secondary school 
  A-Level or equivalent qualifications at secondary school or college 
  Vocational qualifications at secondary school or college 
  Vocational qualifications after secondary school or college 
  A first degree at university (Bachelors) 
  A further degree at university (Masters or a Doctorate) 
 
Do either of your parents (or other guardians) work in any job or area related to 
science? 





Which of the following defines a compound? 
 Different substances mixed together 
 Atoms and molecules mixed together 
 Atoms of different elements combined together 
 Atoms of the same element combined together 
 
 






How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
  
Page 326 of 361 
How are you are doing in science? 






















































I usually do well in science.       
I have always been good at science.       
I get good grades in science.       
I understand even the most difficult science work.       
I learn things quickly in science.       
I need to use much effort to do well in science.       
Science is harder for me than any other subject.       
Science is harder for me than for many of my classmates.       
Science makes me confused and nervous.       
I often worry that it will be difficult for me in science 
classes. 
      
I get very tense when I have to do science work.       
I feel helpless when doing a science problem.       
I worry that I will get poor grades in science.       
 
Do you have separate classes for different science subjects (biology, chemistry, and 
physics)? 
 Yes  No   
 
Are you in a set or group for science or any science subject based on your 
performance? 




Please write in answers to the following questions, using your grades, national 
curriculum levels, or other results. 
What overall grade/level did you get last year for 
science? 
 
What overall grade/level have you got so far this 
year in science? 
 
On average, what grade/level do you usually get 
across all subjects? 
 
What is the lowest grade/level on your next science 
exam that you would be satisfied with getting? 
 
What grade/level do you think your class or set is 
generally getting in science? 
 
What grade/level do you think your friends are 
generally getting in science? 
 
What grade/level do you think you will be able to 





Please tick a grade for each of the following 
questions. A* A B C D E Lower 
What grade do you think you will be able to get 
at GCSE (or equivalent) science? 
       
What grade do you think you would be able to 
get if you studied your best science subject at A-
Level? 
       
What grade do you think people need to get in 
order to be ‘good’ at science? 
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When you think about how good you are at science, 
how important or influential are the following areas 
to you? (Put another way: could the following areas 
change your own view about how good you are at 
science? Would the area be unimportant and irrelevant to 
you, and would not cause you to change your view of 
how good you are? Or would the area be important and 































































My ability to successfully complete tasks, exercises, or 
assignments. 
      
The amount of effort I need to successfully complete 
tasks, exercises, or assignments. 
      
My earlier grades, marks, and other results.       
Comparing my abilities or grades in science against my 
abilities or grades in another subject. 
      
Comparing my abilities or grades in science against other 
students. 
      
Seeing other students being able to successfully complete 
tasks, exercises, or assignments. 
      
Being told that I am good at science.       
Being told that I am bad at science.       
Being told that I can successfully complete tasks, 
exercises, or assignments in science. 
      
Feeling that doing science work is interesting.       
Enjoying doing science work.       





Which of the following best describes the purpose of cellular respiration? 
 To provide energy for cell activities. 
 To produce sugar for storage in cells. 
 To release oxygen for breathing. 
 To supply carbon dioxide for photosynthesis. 
 
 






How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
How are you doing in other subjects? 






















































I usually do well in English.       
I usually do well in maths.       
I usually do well in biology.       
I usually do well in chemistry.       
I usually do well in physics.       
I usually do well in history.       
I usually do well in geography.       
I usually do well in modern foreign languages.       
I usually do well in design and technology.       
I usually do well in art and design.       
I usually do well in music.       
I usually do well in physical education.       
I usually do well in citizenship.       
I usually do well in information technology.       
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Puzzle 3 
 
A parachute jumper is in different positions at different times during their jump. 
 Position 1: In the aircraft before the jump. 
 Position 2: In freefall immediately after jumping and before the parachute opens. 
 Position 3: Falling to the ground after the parachute opens. 
 Position 4: On the ground just after landing. 
 
In which of the positions does the force of gravity act on the jumper? 
 Position 2 only 
 Positions 2 and 3 only 
 Positions 1, 2, and 3 only 
 Positions 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 
 






How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
Science and other people 






















































Most of my friends do well in science.       
Most of my friends work hard at science.       
My friends enjoy taking science tests.       
My parents believe it’s important for me to study 
science. 
      
My parents believe that science is important for my 
career. 
      
My parents like science.       
I have been praised for my ability in science.       
I have been told that I am bad at science.       
My science teacher tells me I am good at science.       
My science teacher thinks I can do well in science work 
with difficult materials. 
      
My science teacher tells me that I am bad at science.       
When I see how another student solves a science 
problem, I can see myself solving the problem in the 
same way. 
      
I get discouraged when I see other students do well in 
science. 
      
I aim to understand and learn the material in science.       
I aim to avoid looking like I don’t understand the 
material in science. 
      
I aim to perform better than other students in science.       
I aim to avoid looking like I’m performing worse than 
other students in science. 
      
My teacher aims to make us understand and learn the 
material in science. 
      
My teacher aims to make us compete and perform 
against one another in science. 
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Puzzle 4 
 
Please complete the table below to show the number of atoms of each element in a 
molecule of sulphuric acid (H2SO4). 
 
Element Hydrogen Sulphur Oxygen 












How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
More about other people 
How often do you compare your abilities and 




































Against your abilities and grades in other subjects?      
Against people in your class?      
Against people in your school (outside of your 
class)? 
     
Against people in other schools?      
 
Thinking about science, to what extent do you agree 





















































I compare myself against people doing better than me.       
I compare myself against people doing about the same as 
me. 
      
I compare myself against people doing worse than me.       
I don’t tend to compare myself against other people.       
When someone is good in science, it means that they 
must be worse in some other subjects like English. 
      
I know how well everyone in my class performs.       
I know how well everyone in my school year performs.       
I know how well my school performs on average 
compared to other schools. 





Some birds eat snails. A species of snail that lives in the forest has a dark shell. The same 
species of snail that lives in a field has a light-coloured shell. Please explain how this 












How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
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About science 






















































I look forward to my science lessons.       
I am interested in the things I learn in science.       
Science is important to me.       
I enjoy learning science.       
I wish I did not have to study science.       
Science is boring.       
I like science.       
I like biology.       
I like chemistry.       
I like physics.       
Making an effort in science is worth it because it will help 
me in the work that I want to do later on. 
      
Learning science is worthwhile for me because it will 
improve my career prospects. 
      
Science is an important subject for me because I need it for 
what I want to study later on. 
      
I will learn many things in science that will help me get a 
job. 
      
I need to do well in science to get the job I want.       
I need to do well in science to get into the university of my 
choice. 
      
I think learning science will help me in my daily life.       
I need science to learn other school subjects.       
I would like a job that involves using science.       
It is important to do well in science.       
Science is important to me personally.       
Thinking scientifically is an important part of who I am.       
Being able to do science helps me show other people who I 
am. 
      
I have to give up a lot to do well in science.       
Success in science means that I need to give up other 
activities I enjoy. 
      
I have to sacrifice a lot of free time to be good at science.       
I have to invest a lot of time to get good grades in science.       
 
 

































































Thinking about what I know or don’t know, how I learn, 
and changing my own studying approaches to fit the 
course. 
      
Keeping trying and putting in effort, even if I get low or 
high grades. 
      
Organising and planning how and what to study.       
Memorising facts and how to do things.       
Linking ideas together, finding new insights or ways to do 
things. 
      
 
 
If you want, you can say more about what you think about science or what you like or 
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Puzzle 6 
 
Which of these diagrams best represents the structure of matter, starting with the 
more complex particles at the top and ending with the more fundamental particles at 
the bottom? 





















How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 





Electrons Neutrons Protons 
Molecules 
Atoms 
Electrons Neutrons Protons 
Protons 
Electrons 
Neutrons Molecules Atoms 
Electrons 
Neutrons 
Protons Atoms Molecules 
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About ability in science 






















































People can generally improve their ability in science.       
I can improve my ability in science.       
If I put in enough effort I can succeed in science.       
Whether or not I do well in science is completely up to 
me. 
      
If I wanted to, I could do well in science.       
I do badly in science whether or not I study for my 
exams. 
      
No matter whether or not I do my best in science, it will 
not improve my grades. 
      
It is not worth practicing science for a test because I will 
come off badly again anyway. 
      
I accomplish almost nothing in science of what I intend 
to do. 





The amount of carbon dioxide in the air is increasing in a large city due to the growing 
number of vehicles. The mayor wants to plant more trees. 
 
Do you agree with the mayor’s suggestion? 
 Yes   No  
 












How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
About science classes 






















































I know what my science teacher expects me to do.       
I think of things not related to the science lesson.       
My science teacher is easy to understand.       
I am interested in what my science teacher says.       
My science teacher gives me interesting things to do.       
My science teacher gives me feedback on my strengths 
and weaknesses in science. 
      
My science teacher tells us what is expected of us when 
we get a test, quiz or assignment. 
      
My science teacher tells us what we have to learn.       
My science teacher tells me what I need to do to become 
better in science. 
      
My science teacher tells me about careers and jobs in 
science. 
      
Other people at my school tell me about careers and jobs 
in science. 
      
My school does special activities, talks, events, or visits       
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related to science (inside or outside of lessons). 
 








As a liquid changes into a gas, which characteristics or properties change and which 
stay the same? In each row of the table below, please put a tick in the appropriate column. 
 
 Changes Stays the same 
Density   
Mass   
Volume   
Size of molecules   
Speed of molecules   
 
 






How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
About the future 
 
How far in your education do you expect to go? (Please tick as many items as you need.) 
 I intend to study at A-Level or equivalent qualifications at secondary school or college 
 I intend to study vocational qualifications at secondary school or college 
 I intend to study vocational qualifications after secondary school or college 
 I intend to study a first degree at university (Bachelors) 
 I intend to study a further degree at university (Masters or a Doctorate) 
 






















































I have thought about what I will study at GCSE (or 
equivalent). 
      
I have thought about what I will study at A-Level (or 
equivalent). 
      
I intend to study science at A-Level (or equivalent).       
I have thought about what I will study at university.       
I intend to study science at university.       
I am planning on pursuing a career that involves a lot of 
science. 
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Puzzle 9 
 
Three identical light bulbs are connected to a battery as shown in the diagram. The arrow 




Which statement is true? 
 The current in Bulb 1 is greater than the current in Bulb 2. 
 The current in Bulb 1 is greater than the current in Bulb 3. 
 The current in Bulb 2 is the same as the current in Bulb 3. 
 The current in Bulb 2 is the same as the current in Bulb 1. 
 
 






How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 
    
 
 
About your studying 






















































During science class time I often miss important points 
because I’m thinking of other things. 
      
When studying for science, I make up questions to help 
focus my studying. 
      
When I become confused about something I’m studying 
for science class, I go back and try to figure it out. 
      
If science course materials are difficult to understand, I 
change the way I approach the material. 
      
Before I study new science course material thoroughly, I 
often skim it to see how it is organized. 
      
I ask myself questions to make sure I understand the 
material I have been studying earlier in science class. 
      
I try to change the way I study in order to fit the science 
course requirements and the teacher’s teaching style. 
      
I often find that I have been studying for science class 
but don’t know what it was all about. 
      
I try to think through a science topic and decide what I 
am supposed to learn from it rather than just reading it 
over when studying for science. 
      
When studying for this science course I try to determine 
which concepts I don’t understand well. 
      
When I study for my science class, I set goals for myself 
in order to direct my activities in each study period. 
      
If I get confused taking notes in science class, I make 
sure I sort it out afterwards. 
      
When I study for a science test, I try to work out what the       
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most important parts to learn are. 
When I study science, I try to figure out which concepts I 
still have not understood properly. 
      
When I study science, I start by working out exactly what 
I need to learn. 
      
When I cannot understand something in science, I always 
search for more information to clarify the problem. 
      
When I study for a science test, I learn as much as I can 
off by heart. 
      
When I study science, I go over some problems so often 
that I feel as if I could solve them in my sleep. 
      
In order to remember the method for solving a science 
problem, I go through examples again and again. 
      
When I study science, I make myself check to see if I 
remember the work I have already done. 
      
When I study for a science test, I try to understand new 
concepts by relating them to things I already know. 
      
When I study science, I think of new ways to get the 
answer. 
      
When I study science, I try to relate the work to things I 
have learnt in other subjects. 
      
I think about how the science I have learnt can be used in 
everyday life. 





An ice block is put in a bowl. Another ice block is wrapped in newspaper, and then put in 
another bowl.  
 
Which ice block will melt first? 
 The ice block not wrapped in newspaper 
 The ice block wrapped in newspaper 
 












How confident are you that you solved 
this correctly? 










Thank you for your help! 
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Appendix 4: England 2014/2015 survey: coding current grades/levels 
 
Table A4.1: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): coding current grades/levels 
 
National Curriculum Level Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
8a and above 6 6 6 
8b 6 6 6 
8c 6 6 6 
7a 6 6 5 
7b 6 6 5 
7c 6 5 5 
6a 6 5 4 
6b 5 5 4 
6c 5 4 4 
5a 5 4 3 
5b 4 4 3 
5c 4 3 3 
4a 4 3 2 
4b 3 3 2 
4c 3 2 2 
3a 3 2 1 
3b 2 2 1 
3c 2 1 1 
2a 2 1 1 
2b 1 1 1 
2c and below 1 1 1 
Note: Alphabetical grades were coded as: (6) A*, (5) A, (4) B, (3) C, (2), D, (1) E and lower. The relative per year National Curriculum codes scaled as: (6) above an expected level 
[A*], (5) above an expected level [A], (4) at an expected level [B], (3) just below an expected level [C], (2), below an expected level [D], (1) below the expected level [E and lower]. 
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Appendix 5: England 2014/2015 survey: task-score details 
 
Table A5.1: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-score reliability 
 
  Reliability 
Factor/scale Items Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Years 9-11 
Task-score (10 items) 10 .661 .611 .631 .645 
Task-confidence (10 items) 10 .904 .883 .897 .897 
Task-score (8 items) 8 .617 .577 .595 .598 
Task-confidence (8 items) 8 .882 .863 .875 .874 
Notes: Reliability was measured through Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients for the available students, depending on the questionnaire version. 
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Table A5.2: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-scores and task-confidence, item-level proportion correct 
 
Science task 
TIMSS 2011 (Year 9) 
England results 
2014/2015 survey (Year 9) 
results 
2014/2015 survey (Year 10) 
results 





number Domain M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 S042306 Chemistry .49 .50 .53 .50 .80 .40 .64 .48 
2 S032611  Biology .36 .48 .55 .50 .59 .49 .61 .49 
3* S032141 Physics .44 .50 .54 .50 .74 .44 .55 .50 
4 S042076 Chemistry .46 .50 .58 .49 .75 .43 .71 .45 
5* S032451 Biology .82 .37 .83 .34 .89 .28 .90 .26 
6 S032579 Chemistry .34 .47 .45 .50 .59 .49 .50 .50 
7 S052091 Biology .52 .50 .56 .50 .68 .47 .70 .46 
8 S042173Z Physics .65 .30 .71 .31 .81 .28 .79 .27 
9 S032184 Physics .46 .50 .48 .50 .48 .50 .48 .50 
10 S042407 Physics .38 .49 .21 .41 .16 .37 .11 .32 
Notes: Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Missing responses were not estimated. Partial-credit tasks were coded as 0-1 proportions (0 for incorrect, .5 for 
partially correct, and 1.0 for fully correct). The means reflect proportions correct for those who were administered the item and who attempted the item. In the 2014/2015 survey, 
items 3 and 5 were not included in the last questionnaire version (i.e. the proportions are only reported for those who were administered the items). 
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Appendix 6: England 2014/2015 survey: calculating sensitivity, specificity, and simple-matching 
 
Table A6.1: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-score and task-confidence intersections 
 
 Task-score 
Task-confidence Correct answer Incorrect answer 
Confident True positive (A) False positive (B) 
Not confident False negative (C) True negative (D) 
 
 
Indicators of sensitivity, specificity, and simple-matching were calculated from the intersection of task-score and task-confidence. The various categories were summed for each 
student across their respective responses; the following formulae were then used (Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2013; Schraw, Kuch, Gutierrez, & Richmond, 2014; Yule, 1912). 
 
 
Task sensitivity = A / (A + C) 
Task specificity = D / (B + D) 
Task simple-matching = (A + D) / (A + B + C + D) 
 
 
Task sensitivity reflected the number of ‘true positive’ ratings across all the items, as a proportion of the total number of ‘true positive’ and ‘false negative’ ratings.  Sensitivity 
provided an indicator of when someone knows that they have answered correctly (i.e. being ‘confident’ when they have the right answer). 
Task specificity reflected the number of ‘true negative’ ratings across all the items, as a proportion of the total number of ‘true negative’ and ‘false positive’ ratings. 
Specificity provided an indicator of when someone knows that they have the wrong answer (i.e. being ‘not confident’ when they have the wrong answer). 
Task simple-matching reflected the number of ‘true positive’ and ‘true negative’ ratings across all the items, as a proportion of all ratings. Simple-matching provided an 
indicator of the combined proportions of both knowing when answers are right and knowing when answers are wrong. 
Within statistics and research methods, cell B reflects a Type I error (a false positive) and cell C reflects a Type II error (a false negative). Specificity subtracted from one 
represents a Type I (false positive) error rate (which can also be calculated directly as B / (B+D)), and sensitivity subtracted from one represents a Type II (false negative) error rate 
(which can also be calculated directly as C / (A + C)). 
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Appendix 7: England 2014/2015 survey: responses per academic year 
 
Table A7.1: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): descriptive statistics per year 
 
 Year 9 (A) Year 10 (B) Year 11 (C) 
Item/factor (1-6 scales unless highlighted otherwise) M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions 
AC
 3.62 1.42 
BC
 3.57 1.43 
AC BC
 3.08 1.57 
Task-score (0-1) 
AB AC
















 -.05 .26 
AC
 -.06 .26 







Task specificity (0-1) .57 .36 .56 .37 .62 .36 























.06 .23 .04 .19 








Ethnicity (1=mixed) .05 .21 .05 .21 .04 .20 
Ethnicity (1=other) .01 .09 .02 .14 .01 .08 
Books at home (1-5) 3.12 1.30 3.27 1.33 3.13 1.32 





Mothers’ education AC 3.05 1.55 BC 3.19 1.66 AC BC 2.54 1.60 





 3.93 1.42 
BC
 3.30 1.50 
Self-concept 
AC
 3.93 1.04 
BC
 3.81 1.12 
AC BC
 3.62 1.10 
Self-efficacy 
AC
 4.57 1.09 
BC
 4.68 1.09 
AC BC
 3.81 1.18 
Interest value 
AC
 4.10 1.25 
BC
 4.09 1.14 
AC BC










 3.66 1.40 
BC
 3.57 1.37 
AC BC
 3.25 1.33 
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 Year 9 (A) Year 10 (B) Year 11 (C) 
Item/factor (1-6 scales unless highlighted otherwise) M SD M SD M SD 
Cost value (absence of) 
AB
 3.84 1.34 
AB
 3.57 1.22 3.70 1.15 
Orientation: mastery 
AC
 4.71 1.11 
BC
 4.73 1.15 
AC BC
 4.47 1.12 
Orientation: performance 
AC
 4.45 1.31 
BC
 4.40 1.26 
AC BC
 4.01 1.29 
Perceived control 
AB AC
 4.77 .89 
AB
 4.58 1.02 
AC
 4.48 .94 
Perceived control (exams) 
AB AC
 4.32 1.26 
AB
 4.15 1.23 
AC
 4.08 1.17 
Study strategy: self-regulation 
AC
 3.76 .80 
BC
 3.75 .68 
AC BC
 3.62 .75 
Study strategy: control 
AC
 4.21 1.05 4.13 .92 
AC
 4.00 1.01 
Study strategy: memorisation 3.98 1.03 3.98 .97 3.83 .99 
Study strategy: elaboration 
AC
 3.96 1.08 3.82 1.01 
AC
 3.70 .99 
Anxiety (absence of) 4.19 1.25 4.22 1.23 4.09 1.19 









 4.07 1.50 
BC
 4.01 1.57 
AC BC
 3.73 1.51 
Peer-comparisons 
AC
 4.20 1.32 4.14 1.38 
AC
 3.96 1.33 
Social persuasions (praise) 3.83 1.20 3.88 1.14 3.78 1.10 
Vicarious experiences 
AC
 4.09 1.29 
BC
 4.02 1.22 
AC BC
 3.71 1.16 
Norms/influence (friends) 
AB
 3.81 .86 
AB








Teacher perceptions 4.34 1.01 4.32 .96 4.26 .91 
Teacher/school careers/events 3.55 1.19 3.63 1.10 3.50 1.07 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Differences in means across academic years (p < .05) 
are highlighted in superscript; for brevity, ‘ALL’ indicates where all years differed. Books at home were coded as in international surveys: (1) 0-10 books; (2) 11-25 books; (3) 26-
100 books; (4) 101-200 books; and (5) more than 200 books. Parental education was coded as: (1) GCSE or equivalent qualifications at secondary school; (2) A-Level or equivalent 
qualifications at secondary school or college; (3) vocational qualifications at secondary school or college; (4) vocational qualifications after secondary school or college; (5) a first 
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Appendix 8: England 2014/2015 survey: correlation tables 
 
Table A8.1: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations (set 1) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Science intentions 1.000             
2. Current grade .351 1.000            
3. Self-concept .475 .491 1.000           
4. Self-efficacy .444 .638 .553 1.000          
5. Interest value .622 .424 .642 .484 1.000         
6. Utility value .732 .329 .505 .422 .724 1.000        
7. Personal value .684 .359 .525 .416 .723 .777 1.000       
8. Cost value (absence of) -.135 -.053 (.044) (.016) -.080 -.216 -.250 1.000      
9. Anxiety (absence of) .309 .362 .549 .416 .461 .255 .307 .246 1.000     
10. Norms (parents) .554 .297 .393 .420 .527 .668 .543 -.149 .221 1.000    
11. Teacher perceptions .399 .249 .435 .252 .628 .507 .484 -.066 .318 .353 1.000   
12. Careers/events .374 .263 .284 .194 .411 .376 .449 -.234 .138 .309 .548 1.000  
13. Gender .152 .241 .191 .279 .190 .107 .195 (.016) .255 .120 .083 .080 1.000 
14. Year -.132 (.049) -.111 -.221 -.090 -.169 -.111 -.058 (-.029) -.197 (-.029) (-.010) (-.013) 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Table A8.2: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations (set 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Science intentions 1.000             
2. Current grade .351 1.000            
3. Self-concept .475 .491 1.000           
4. Self-efficacy .444 .638 .553 1.000          
5. Task-score .256 .517 .328 .422 1.000         
6. Task-confidence .403 .514 .560 .531 .520 1.000        
7. Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-s.) .080 -.108 .141 (.012) -.638 .326 1.000       
8. Task sensitivity .259 .389 .424 .401 .374 .744 .256 1.000      
9. Task specificity -.317 -.238 -.410 -.332 -.171 -.679 -.423 -.403 1.000     
10. Task simple-matching .115 .273 .144 .214 .281 .233 -.101 .561 .255 1.000    
11. Task-conf. accuracy/bias (resid.) .298 .285 .448 .346 (.000) .849 .769 .643 -.687 .109 1.000   
12. Self-concept accuracy/bias (resid.) .337 (.000) .845 .267 .132 .363 .203 .301 -.325 .069 .358 1.000  
13. Gender .152 .241 .191 .279 .187 .348 .107 .296 -.248 .160 .286 .130 1.000 
14. Year -.132 (.049) -.111 -.221 .134 (.019) -.131 (.028) (.044) .071 (.000) (.000) -.013 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Table A8.3: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations (set 3) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Science intentions 1.000             
2. Current grade .351 1.000            
3. Self-concept .475 .491 1.000           
4. Self-efficacy .444 .638 .553 1.000          
5. Norms/influence (friends) .162 .119 .189 .110 1.000         
6. Norms/influence (parents) .554 .297 .393 .420 .316 1.000        
7. Teacher perceptions .399 .249 .435 .252 .299 .353 1.000       
8. Teacher/school careers/events .374 .263 .284 .194 .216 .309 .548 1.000      
9. Orientation: mastery .357 .316 .366 .365 .269 .468 .372 .187 1.000     
10. Orientation: performance .317 .249 .359 .368 .150 .429 .276 .145 .462 1.000    
11. Perceived control .361 .263 .450 .374 .290 .413 .547 .208 .438 .370 1.000   
12. Perceived control (exams) .190 .270 .446 .358 (.035) .221 .269 (-.018) .251 .204 .302 1.000  
13. Gender .152 .241 .191 .279 (-.041) .120 .083 .080 (.036) .154 .060 .132 1.000 
14. Year -.132 (.049) -.111 -.221 -.065 -.197 (-.029) (-.010) -.072 -.125 -.123 -.083 (-.013) 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Table A8.4: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations (set 4) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Science intentions 1.000         
2. Current grade .351 1.000        
3. Self-concept .475 .491 1.000       
4. Self-efficacy .444 .638 .553 1.000      
5. Study strategy: self-regulation .492 .365 .519 .369 1.000     
6. Study strategy: control .444 .353 .441 .340 .745 1.000    
7. Study strategy: memorisation .435 .305 .365 .309 .711 .700 1.000   
8. Study strategy: elaboration .448 .266 .420 .298 .671 .610 .664 1.000  
9. Gender .152 .241 .191 .279 .130 (.016) .057 .115 1.000 
10. Year -.132 (.049) -.111 -.221 -.066 -.081 -.051 -.102 (-.013) 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Table A8.5: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations (set 5) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Science intentions 1.000           
2. Current grade .351 1.000          
3. Self-concept .475 .491 1.000         
4. Self-efficacy .444 .638 .553 1.000        
5. Anxiety (absence of) .309 .362 .549 .416 1.000       
6. Mastery norms (grade) .122 .288 .066 .312 (.037) 1.000      
7. Subject-comparisons .331 .316 .498 .395 .672 (.028) 1.000     
8. Peer-comparisons .261 .306 .497 .380 .672 (.043) .632 1.000    
9. Social persuasions (praise) .389 .378 .600 .414 .395 .052 .348 .358 1.000   
10. Vicarious experiences .240 .229 .363 .314 .238 .063 .206 .220 .429 1.000  
11. Gender .152 .241 .191 .279 .255 .144 .215 .162 .146 .115 1.000 
12. Year -.132 (.049) -.111 -.221 (-.029) -.068 -.084 -.068 (-.011) -.112 (-.013) 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Table A8.6: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): correlations with science intentions, summary 
 
 Correlation with science intentions 
Item/factor Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Years 9-11 
Year NA NA NA -.132 
Gender (1=boy) .077 .204 .194 .152 
Task-score .208 .329 .313 .256 
Task-confidence .333 .470 .444 .403 
Task-confidence accuracy/bias (difference-score) (.064) .094 (.037) .080 
Task sensitivity .182 .296 .360 .259 
Task specificity -.277 -.325 -.362 -.317 
Task simple-matching (.061) .163 .167 .115 
Task-confidence accuracy/bias (regression-residual) .263 .338 .327 .298 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-residual) .346 .243 .458 .337 
Ethnicity (White) -.329 -.200 (-.067) -.251 
Ethnicity (Black) (.025) (.004) (.004) (.007) 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) (-.015) (.041) (.067) (.026) 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .327 .160 (.067) .243 
Ethnicity (mixed) (.042) (.019) (-.008) (.025) 
Ethnicity (other) (.023) .109 (.014) .058 
Books at home .093 .188 .121 .130 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) (.044) .122 .208 .115 
Mothers’ education .142 .122 .219 .172 
Fathers’ education .204 .185 .274 .227 
Current grade .326 .359 .416 .351 
Self-concept .452 .377 .613 .475 
Self-efficacy .369 .433 .509 .444 
Interest value .571 .666 .643 .622 
Utility value .712 .730 .751 .732 
Personal value .616 .740 .723 .684 
Cost value (absence of) -.174 -.143 (-.066) -.135 
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 Correlation with science intentions 
Item/factor Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Years 9-11 
Orientation: mastery .347 .340 .366 .357 
Orientation: performance .275 .320 .334 .317 
Perceived control .354 .400 .291 .361 
Perceived control (exams) .142 .150 .309 .190 
Study strategy: self-regulation .450 .536 .509 .492 
Study strategy: control .448 .444 .419 .444 
Study strategy: memorisation .427 .437 .439 .435 
Study strategy: elaboration .422 .453 .472 .448 
Anxiety (absence of) .251 .325 .386 .309 
Mastery norms (good grade) .148 .132 (-.004) .122 
Subject-comparisons .292 .346 .346 .331 
Peer-comparisons .210 .257 .327 .261 
Social persuasions (praise) .354 .410 .441 .389 
Vicarious experiences .181 .264 .270 .240 
Norms/influence (friends) .153 .198 .116 .162 
Norms/influence (parents) .534 .520 .592 .554 
Teacher perceptions .383 .461 .352 .399 
Teacher/school careers/events .360 .366 .418 .374 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Pearson’s correlation coefficients (R) are reported. Coefficients in brackets highlight non-significant 
associations (i.e. not meeting the p < .05 criterion for significance). 
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Appendix 9: Further cluster solutions 
 
Table A9.1: PISA (England) 2006: accuracy/bias clusters (five clusters)  
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias -.35 .46 .65 .36 1.56 .63 -1.79 .67 .30 .31 
Intentions -.22 .85 .43 .89 .91 1.04 -1.02 .57 .12 .89 
Gender (1=boy) -.13 .99 .14 .99 .35 .94 -.28 .96 .14 .99 
Books at home -.05 .99 .13 1.00 .23 .98 -.21 1.01 .03 .95 
Parent(s) in sci. (1=yes) -.02 .98 .04 1.03 .15 1.10 -.17 .84 -.02 .99 
Mothers’ education -.03 .99 .04 1.00 .18 1.06 -.13 1.04 -.02 .94 
Fathers’ education -.06 .98 .10 .98 .28 1.09 -.22 1.07 -.01 .94 
Task-score (PV1) -.14 .88 .30 1.01 .60 1.08 -.53 .94 .14 .87 
Self-concept -.39 .36 .71 .00 1.69 .53 -1.90 .58 .32 .00 
Self-efficacy (areas) -.24 .80 .48 .95 .90 1.02 -.90 .96 .11 .73 
Interest (various areas) -.15 .87 .34 .87 .72 .91 -1.01 1.16 .18 .81 
Interest value -.24 .79 .43 .80 1.03 .98 -1.17 .86 .21 .78 
Utility value -.22 .84 .38 .90 .87 .94 -1.01 .95 .20 .87 
Personal value -.24 .82 .37 .84 .98 .99 -1.01 .90 .17 .84 
General value -.19 .87 .26 .94 .82 1.08 -.67 .94 .08 .88 
Science activities -.18 .92 .31 .94 .76 .98 -.71 .79 .07 .95 
School career preparation -.17 .89 .27 .94 .78 1.01 -.72 1.03 .09 .89 
School career information -.13 .93 .26 .94 .56 1.03 -.62 1.11 .06 .91 
Teaching: interaction -.09 .92 .13 .95 .42 1.12 -.55 1.16 .10 .93 
Teaching: activities -.09 .93 .13 .98 .36 1.07 -.45 1.15 .11 .98 
Teaching: investigations -.09 .96 .22 1.01 .28 1.12 -.43 .89 .00 .97 
Teaching: applications -.11 .92 .17 1.00 .52 1.11 -.59 1.05 .06 .90 
Cluster size (N, %) 2390 50.5% 754 15.9% 646 13.6% 441 9.3% 502 10.6% 
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Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .767 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .261 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .038 <.001 <.001 .036 <.001 .001 <.001 1.000 <.001 .003 <.001 
Books at home <.001 .015 <.001 <.001 .022 .901 .497 <.001 1.000 <.001 .008 .002 
Parent(s) in sci. (1=yes) <.001 .006 1.000 .001 .042 1.000 .489 .004 1.000 <.001 .055 .170 
Mothers’ education <.001 .007 1.000 <.001 .423 1.000 .085 .048 1.000 <.001 .010 .771 
Fathers’ education <.001 .018 .001 <.001 .020 1.000 .009 <.001 .655 <.001 <.001 .010 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .103 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .021 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .869 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .251 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .196 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .018 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .330 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .245 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .004 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .275 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .163 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .012 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .158 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .157 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .012 <.001 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .096 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .059 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: activities <.001 .045 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .039 <.001 <.001 <.001 .692 1.000 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: applications <.001 .079 <.001 <.001 <.001 .002 <.001 <.001 .549 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table A9.3: PISA (England) 2006: intention/attitude clusters (five clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Self-concept accuracy/bias .39 .81 -.66 1.03 -.03 .74 -.33 .84 .86 .94 
Intentions .78 .56 -1.33 .00 .08 .00 -.60 .24 1.39 .77 
Gender (1=boy) .13 .99 -.17 .98 -.03 1.00 -.06 1.00 .03 1.00 
Books at home .13 .98 -.16 1.04 -.11 .97 .07 .97 .19 .98 
Parent(s) in sci. (1=yes) .04 1.03 -.06 .95 -.08 .93 -.03 .98 .19 1.12 
Mothers’ education .08 1.02 -.05 1.02 -.09 .97 .02 .99 .09 1.05 
Fathers’ education .14 .98 -.16 1.01 -.08 .99 -.03 .98 .20 1.06 
Task-score (PV1) .21 1.03 -.29 .89 -.14 .92 .04 .89 .56 .96 
Self-concept .43 .81 -.74 1.00 -.09 .70 -.31 .82 1.00 .93 
Self-efficacy (areas) .26 .94 -.43 1.01 -.09 .86 -.14 .86 .72 .96 
Interest (various areas) .38 .73 -.79 1.17 .04 .73 -.20 .69 .85 .84 
Interest value .48 .82 -.84 .87 -.06 .68 -.33 .73 1.10 .88 
Utility value .37 .61 -.91 .84 -.18 .62 -.40 .63 1.77 .00 
Personal value .46 .84 -.80 .86 -.14 .64 -.38 .63 1.27 .85 
General value .26 .99 -.44 .94 -.17 .82 -.21 .82 .88 1.00 
Science activities .41 .93 -.61 .84 -.11 .90 -.26 .86 .78 .94 
School career preparation .22 .91 -.48 1.02 -.11 .81 -.16 .89 .89 1.00 
School career information .25 .88 -.50 1.07 .02 .85 -.23 .94 .64 1.00 
Teaching: interaction .11 .96 -.30 1.06 .04 .89 -.06 1.00 .29 1.07 
Teaching: activities .13 .96 -.25 1.09 -.03 .97 -.06 .94 .29 .98 
Teaching: investigations .11 1.03 -.25 .95 .06 .98 -.13 .97 .16 1.05 
Teaching: applications .15 .96 -.35 1.06 -.04 .90 -.10 .94 .47 1.04 
Cluster size (N, %) 1321 28.2% 1048 22.4% 989 21.1% 782 16.7% 537 11.5% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Self-concept accuracy/bias <.001 .243 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Intentions <.001 .837 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .012 <.001 .001 <.001 .409 .015 .180 .002 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Books at home <.001 .018 <.001 <.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 .266 
Parent(s) in sci. (1=yes) <.001 .007 .101 .033 1.000 .044 1.000 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .001 
Mothers’ education <.001 .005 .034 .001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .103 .204 .006 1.000 
Fathers’ education <.001 .017 <.001 <.001 .002 1.000 .765 .088 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Task-score (PV1) <.001 .072 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 .005 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .299 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy (areas) <.001 .126 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Interest (various areas) <.001 .270 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .374 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .601 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .408 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
General value <.001 .161 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Science activities <.001 .211 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 
School career preparation <.001 .161 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
School career information <.001 .127 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: interaction <.001 .033 <.001 .855 .001 .005 <.001 <.001 <.001 .363 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: activities <.001 .028 <.001 .001 <.001 .018 <.001 .001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Teaching: investigations <.001 .024 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .089 <.001 <.001 .708 <.001 
Teaching: applications <.001 .059 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table A9.5: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): task-level accuracy/bias clusters (five clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions .09 .96 -.33 .95 -.19 .87 .62 .85 1.00 .85 
Task-score .55 .46 -.71 .40 -1.90 .17 1.40 .05 1.18 .39 
Task-confidence .20 .73 -.59 .75 -.67 1.06 1.16 .61 1.80 .26 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) -.43 .88 .25 .83 1.48 1.02 -.48 .57 .32 .52 
Task sensitivity .19 .81 -.48 1.10 -.41 .75 .86 .42 1.10 .14 
Task specificity -.06 1.04 .30 .84 .17 1.08 -.45 .85 -1.25 .54 
Task simple-matching -.06 .85 -.26 .88 -.12 1.63 1.00 .61 1.01 .42 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.11 .93 -.26 .92 .38 1.28 .50 .72 1.39 .40 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) .03 .95 -.16 1.03 -.32 1.03 .22 .90 .84 .58 
Gender (1=boy) .04 .99 -.22 1.02 -.12 1.03 .39 .83 .78 .41 
Ethnicity (White) .01 .99 .24 .90 -.22 1.11 -.48 .97 -.60 .98 
Ethnicity (Black) -.02 .98 -.02 .94 .11 1.11 .07 1.17 .01 1.09 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) -.03 .89 -.08 .67 -.07 .80 .29 1.65 .51 2.10 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) .02 1.03 -.22 .78 .20 1.23 .29 1.05 .50 1.07 
Ethnicity (mixed) .01 1.02 -.04 .91 .09 1.17 .04 1.08 .00 1.04 
Ethnicity (other) -.06 .58 .01 1.12 -.01 1.01 .30 1.91 -.10 .02 
Books at home .23 .93 -.31 .97 -.67 1.01 .44 .81 .58 .81 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .02 1.01 -.13 .89 -.04 .98 .32 1.18 .21 1.13 
Mothers’ education .11 1.00 -.33 .88 -.14 1.01 .57 .96 .76 .90 
Fathers’ education .04 .99 -.32 .89 -.07 .97 .73 .89 .84 .85 
Current grade .23 .88 -.50 .85 -.63 .90 .93 .69 1.18 .64 
Self-concept .14 .87 -.38 .92 -.54 1.11 .64 .85 1.31 .60 
Self-efficacy .24 .85 -.51 .92 -.49 1.01 .86 .62 1.14 .38 
Interest value .17 .89 -.38 .99 -.49 .98 .62 .73 1.12 .63 
Utility value .11 .94 -.32 1.01 -.24 1.04 .56 .70 .88 .70 
Personal value .06 .94 -.30 .96 -.23 1.01 .55 .81 1.16 .75 
Cost value (absence of) .01 .99 -.02 1.00 -.23 1.03 .14 .90 .22 1.17 
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 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Orientation: mastery .17 .87 -.32 1.06 -.45 1.13 .54 .67 .82 .63 
Orientation: performance .12 .95 -.30 1.03 -.20 .95 .49 .81 .69 .84 
Perceived control .22 .74 -.26 1.12 -.67 1.25 .36 .80 .67 .85 
Perceived control (exams) .15 .96 -.26 .99 -.53 .98 .40 .79 .87 .84 
Study strategy: self-regulation .06 .93 -.27 .97 -.35 1.06 .59 .77 .97 1.00 
Study strategy: control .08 .92 -.24 1.04 -.30 1.12 .46 .73 .84 .87 
Study strategy: memorisation .10 .89 -.24 1.07 -.31 1.07 .42 .89 .65 .85 
Study strategy: elaboration .04 .91 -.20 1.04 -.21 1.17 .38 .84 .78 .88 
Anxiety (absence of) .12 .91 -.35 .99 -.35 1.04 .58 .76 1.13 .44 
Mastery norms (good grade) -.01 .94 -.11 1.05 -.11 1.14 .38 .77 .56 .88 
Subject-comparisons .09 .96 -.31 1.00 -.28 .97 .56 .78 .98 .58 
Peer-comparisons .07 .96 -.27 .98 -.26 1.09 .50 .83 .89 .68 
Social persuasions (praise) .09 .92 -.32 1.02 -.23 .94 .54 .75 1.05 .81 
Vicarious experiences .04 .95 -.17 1.03 -.28 1.09 .42 .81 .65 .91 
Norms/influence (friends) .03 .92 -.09 1.06 -.09 1.20 .23 .82 .14 1.17 
Norms/influence (parents) .10 .96 -.27 1.01 -.22 1.06 .52 .80 .65 .70 
Teacher perceptions .13 .86 -.24 1.06 -.38 1.20 .31 .87 .81 .77 
Teacher/school careers/events -.01 .96 -.18 1.03 .05 1.10 .42 .83 .50 .98 
Cluster size (N, %) 640 42.6% 544 36.2% 114 7.6% 135 9.0% 69 4.6% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Science intentions <.001 .126 <.001 .035 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .063 
Task-score <.001 .841 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 
Task-confidence <.001 .446 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) <.001 .298 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task sensitivity <.001 .233 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .624 
Task specificity <.001 .126 <.001 .178 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task simple-matching <.001 .166 .001 1.000 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .152 .055 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .056 .035 .045 .539 <.001 1.000 .003 <.001 .002 <.001 .001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .062 <.001 1.000 .002 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 .059 
Ethnicity (White) <.001 .062 .001 .180 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .362 .115 1.000 
Ethnicity (Black) .665 .002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) <.001 .022 1.000 1.000 .006 <.001 1.000 .001 <.001 .051 .002 1.000 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) <.001 .041 <.001 .807 .044 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 .465 1.000 
Ethnicity (mixed) .759 .001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (other) .005 .010 1.000 1.000 .002 1.000 1.000 .032 1.000 .177 1.000 .077 
Books at home <.001 .124 <.001 <.001 .221 .035 .002 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) <.001 .018 .090 1.000 .022 1.000 1.000 <.001 .087 .061 1.000 1.000 
Mothers’ education <.001 .102 <.001 .091 <.001 <.001 .501 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Fathers’ education <.001 .118 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 .097 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Current grade <.001 .285 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .502 
Self-concept <.001 .196 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .839 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-efficacy <.001 .264 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .253 
Interest value <.001 .174 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .002 
Utility value <.001 .110 <.001 .003 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .221 
Personal value <.001 .128 <.001 .028 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Overall group 
difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Cost value (absence of) .019 .008 1.000 .180 1.000 1.000 .437 1.000 .653 .044 .037 1.000 
Orientation: mastery <.001 .121 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .463 
Orientation: performance <.001 .085 <.001 .009 .001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Perceived control <.001 .111 <.001 <.001 1.000 .002 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .264 
Perceived control (exams) <.001 .105 <.001 <.001 .054 <.001 .066 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .009 
Study strategy: self-regulation <.001 .111 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .070 
Study strategy: control <.001 .080 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .083 
Study strategy: memorisation <.001 .066 <.001 <.001 .004 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Study strategy: elaboration <.001 .058 <.001 .148 .002 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .052 
Anxiety (absence of) <.001 .149 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 
Mastery norms (good grade) <.001 .033 .860 1.000 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 1.000 
Subject-comparisons <.001 .115 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .025 
Peer-comparisons <.001 .092 <.001 .007 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .064 
Social persuasions (praise) <.001 .120 <.001 .008 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .002 
Vicarious experiences <.001 .051 .003 .014 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Norms/influence (friends) .006 .010 .369 1.000 .357 1.000 1.000 .009 .645 .120 1.000 1.000 
Norms/influence (parents) <.001 .078 <.001 .010 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 
Teacher perceptions <.001 .077 <.001 <.001 .461 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .005 
Teacher/school careers/events <.001 .039 .029 1.000 <.001 .001 .252 <.001 <.001 .032 .030 1.000 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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Table A9.7: England 2014/2015 (Years 9, 10, 11): intention/attitude clusters (five clusters) 
 
 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Science intentions -.65 .67 .24 .72 1.20 .46 -1.19 .71 1.63 .18 
Task-score -.27 .84 .13 .89 .48 .86 -.39 .85 .72 .79 
Task-confidence -.32 .81 .11 .86 .61 .90 -.79 .87 1.20 .87 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) .00 .89 -.05 .88 .01 .85 -.29 .93 .29 1.04 
Task sensitivity -.20 .98 .07 .93 .46 .84 -.58 .99 .77 .59 
Task specificity .23 .87 -.10 1.00 -.42 1.02 .60 .75 -.85 .92 
Task simple-matching -.12 .89 -.02 .87 .22 .90 -.08 .81 .46 .89 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.21 .85 .05 .86 .40 .87 -.68 .93 .97 1.03 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) -.30 .85 .17 .83 .57 .80 -.76 1.00 .73 1.17 
Gender (1=boy) -.20 1.01 .08 .98 .07 .99 -.38 1.01 .47 .82 
Ethnicity (White) .25 .85 -.03 .98 -.15 1.03 .34 .81 -.46 1.00 
Ethnicity (Black) -.09 .67 -.04 .89 -.15 .33 -.03 1.05 -.20 .05 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) -.04 .83 -.02 .92 .03 1.14 -.04 .84 .31 1.80 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) -.22 .76 .09 1.04 .22 1.10 -.32 .67 .45 1.10 
Ethnicity (mixed) .00 1.00 -.04 .90 .01 1.03 .01 1.02 .01 1.02 
Ethnicity (other) -.06 .65 .00 1.01 -.06 .57 -.11 .02 .17 1.59 
Books at home -.17 .99 .14 .94 .27 .98 -.20 1.03 .47 .87 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) -.07 .94 .02 1.01 .13 1.09 -.25 .78 .31 1.18 
Mothers’ education -.20 .94 .09 .99 .22 1.05 -.35 .90 .43 .99 
Fathers’ education -.24 .90 .02 .98 .31 1.03 -.46 .90 .60 .98 
Current grade -.24 .91 .19 .93 .52 .88 -.65 .99 1.01 .73 
Self-concept -.36 .79 .25 .76 .79 .76 -.95 .88 1.11 1.14 
Self-efficacy -.30 .91 .25 .85 .61 .71 -.77 1.05 1.09 .40 
Interest value -.43 .64 .39 .58 1.01 .38 -1.59 .83 1.54 .16 
Utility value -.52 .53 .41 .43 1.17 .24 -1.73 .61 1.46 .22 
Personal value -.53 .62 .31 .64 1.07 .47 -1.55 .38 1.73 .18 
Cost value (absence of) .02 .89 -.06 .98 -.13 1.14 .51 1.21 -.19 1.43 
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 Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C Cluster D Cluster E 
Item/factor (per year z-scores) M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Orientation: mastery -.21 .90 .13 .87 .78 .54 -.92 1.30 .89 .76 
Orientation: performance -.22 .93 .16 .88 .57 .85 -.70 1.15 .90 .80 
Perceived control -.18 .92 .21 .84 .70 .64 -.86 1.37 1.01 .43 
Perceived control (exams) -.15 .90 .19 .92 .63 .96 -.46 1.14 .60 1.39 
Study strategy: self-regulation -.28 .79 .15 .82 .81 .87 -1.18 1.01 1.18 .93 
Study strategy: control -.26 .91 .16 .78 .80 .72 -.88 1.30 1.10 .93 
Study strategy: memorisation -.26 .92 .15 .87 .68 .83 -1.05 1.13 .77 1.10 
Study strategy: elaboration -.31 .84 .16 .91 .64 .88 -1.11 1.04 1.10 .99 
Anxiety (absence of) -.28 .92 .18 .86 .44 .97 -.61 1.09 .82 1.05 
Mastery norms (good grade) -.09 .97 -.02 1.04 .08 .92 -.13 1.14 .43 .95 
Subject-comparisons -.29 .93 .24 .88 .51 .88 -.68 1.09 .70 1.03 
Peer-comparisons -.23 .91 .14 .89 .41 .94 -.52 1.17 .68 1.11 
Social persuasions (praise) -.37 .85 .25 .79 .71 .83 -.85 .99 1.23 .91 
Vicarious experiences -.11 .93 .18 .88 .50 .82 -.80 1.21 .62 1.17 
Norms/influence (friends) -.16 .91 .12 .96 .40 .91 -.35 1.20 .51 1.23 
Norms/influence (parents) -.46 .77 .36 .69 .94 .49 -1.16 .99 .90 .82 
Teacher perceptions -.29 .89 .20 .83 .65 .76 -.99 1.19 1.32 .47 
Teacher/school careers/events -.28 .89 .14 .96 .38 1.03 -.85 .96 .90 1.16 
Cluster size (N, %) 399 34.4% 390 33.6% 171 14.8% 132 11.4% 67 5.8% 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are reported. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
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difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Science intentions <.001 .623 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-score <.001 .131 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .477 <.001 
Task-confidence <.001 .256 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (diff.-score) <.001 .018 1.000 1.000 .012 .152 1.000 .072 .047 .036 .330 <.001 
Task sensitivity <.001 .124 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .179 <.001 
Task specificity <.001 .132 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 .002 <.001 <.001 <.001 .016 <.001 
Task simple-matching <.001 .033 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .028 1.000 <.001 .035 .510 <.001 
Task-conf. accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .161 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Self-concept accuracy/bias (regression-r.) <.001 .196 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Gender (1=boy) <.001 .044 <.001 .026 .743 <.001 1.000 <.001 .033 .001 .051 <.001 
Ethnicity (White) <.001 .050 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 .001 .006 <.001 .195 <.001 
Ethnicity (Black) .279 .004 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (East-Asian) .114 .007 1.000 1.000 1.000 .088 1.000 1.000 .145 1.000 .604 .210 
Ethnicity (South-Asian/Indian) <.001 .053 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .036 <.001 .882 <.001 
Ethnicity (mixed) .957 .001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnicity (other) .199 .005 1.000 1.000 1.000 .393 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .590 .280 
Books at home <.001 .045 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 .003 .104 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Parent(s) in science (1=yes) .001 .017 1.000 .342 .735 .037 1.000 .076 .274 .013 1.000 .002 
Mothers’ education <.001 .048 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 .078 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Fathers’ education <.001 .078 .001 <.001 .219 <.001 .010 <.001 <.001 <.001 .378 <.001 
Current grade <.001 .176 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .002 <.001 
Self-concept <.001 .335 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .065 <.001 
Self-efficacy <.001 .247 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 
Interest value <.001 .661 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Utility value <.001 .792 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Personal value <.001 .701 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
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Overall group 
difference Paired group differences, sig. (p) 
Item/factor Sig. (p) Size (η2) A-B A-C A-D A-E B-C B-D B-E C-D C-E D-E 
Cost value (absence of) <.001 .032 1.000 1.000 <.001 1.000 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Orientation: mastery <.001 .241 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Orientation: performance <.001 .171 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .127 <.001 
Perceived control <.001 .227 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .179 <.001 
Perceived control (exams) <.001 .109 <.001 <.001 .017 <.001 <.001 <.001 .015 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Study strategy: self-regulation <.001 .340 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .030 <.001 
Study strategy: control <.001 .260 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .219 <.001 
Study strategy: memorisation <.001 .231 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Study strategy: elaboration <.001 .279 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .005 <.001 
Anxiety (absence of) <.001 .143 <.001 <.001 .003 <.001 .021 <.001 <.001 <.001 .052 <.001 
Mastery norms (good grade) .001 .016 1.000 .521 1.000 .001 1.000 1.000 .008 .688 .177 .002 
Subject-comparisons <.001 .163 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .017 <.001 .002 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Peer-comparisons <.001 .107 <.001 <.001 .023 <.001 .024 <.001 <.001 <.001 .476 <.001 
Social persuasions (praise) <.001 .301 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Vicarious experiences <.001 .139 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .003 <.001 .006 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Norms/influence (friends) <.001 .062 .001 <.001 .489 <.001 .022 <.001 .030 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Norms/influence (parents) <.001 .448 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 1.000 <.001 
Teacher perceptions <.001 .292 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Teacher/school careers/events <.001 .167 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .062 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 
Notes: Missing responses were estimated by expectation-maximisation. Significant p-values (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. Science intentions and their key predictors (identified 
in Section 7) are shaded in grey. 
 
 
